

The Cooperation Triangle and Civilian Capacity^{*}

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Introduction

When the “New Horizon” process was launched in 2008 (culminating in the publication in 2009 of “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping”), peacekeeping was in an era of overstretch. The number of uniformed and civilian personnel in the field had reached a peak and the range of tasks they were asked to perform had grown substantially. Finding resources and capabilities to meet that demand was an enormous challenge. Today’s context is different. The steady expansion in large-scale peacekeeping that occurred since the year 2000 seems to have leveled off and is likely to decline in the years ahead, due in part to the desire to find cost savings in contemporary operations. Alternatives to large multidimensional operations like the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the recently-approved UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), have become more popular. This may be an opportune moment for consolidating the various mechanisms that have been put in motion in recent years, but care must be taken not to allow money concerns to drive the process at the expense of realistic assessments of what effective peace operations require.

This paper begins with an overview of the context for the capacity debate, asking the question “capabilities for what?”. The following section considers military and police capacity through the lens of triangular cooperation among the Security Council, Secretariat and troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs). The fourth section concerns the civilian capacity review and implementation process. While the focus is on civilian aspects of multidimensional peace operations, the civilian capacity review has implications for a range of UN prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and good governance-related activities that implicate the entire system. The paper concludes with some issues and recommendations for consideration at the Challenges Forum.

Context

As noted, concerns about peace operations capacity have their origins in the expanding scale and scope of contemporary peacekeeping. The numbers grew to 130,000 in 2010, operations became more “robust” and they took on ever-more complex civilian functions. The more robust approach was manifest most significantly in the protection of civilian mandates UN operations have been given since 1999. Questions about how to fulfill this mandate led to doctrinal development, signaled first in the “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:

^{*} This paper is a commissioned background paper for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Challenges Partnership or the Host.

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Principles and Guidelines” (“Capstone Doctrine”)¹ and then elaborated in a Lessons Learned Note and Operational Concept presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) in 2009.² The Committee ultimately embraced protection of civilians as a core function of peacekeeping though with sharp differences of opinion as to what this meant in practice. Meanwhile, the Security Council in resolution 1894 decided that the protection of civilians should be given priority in decisions about capacity and resources. Given the comprehensive concept of protection of civilians embraced by the UN – protection through political processes, protection from physical violence, and establishing a protective environment – identifying the required capacity and resources is no easy task.

Meanwhile, mission mandates and policy documents have converged on a list of five recurring peacebuilding priorities:

- Support to basic safety and security;
- Support to political processes;
- Support to the provision of basic services and the return of displaced persons;
- Support to restoring core government functions;
- Support to economic revitalization.³

To some this looked like a holistic vision of how external actors could contribute to the consolidation of peace. To others, it was a laundry list of desirable objectives that were impossible to fulfill. In any case, the list provoked reflection on which aspects are the core business of *peacekeeping*. The Capstone Doctrine highlights security, rule of law, support to political processes and coordination of other actors. The New Horizon Progress Report of October 2010 specifies three primary roles for peacekeepers as “early peacebuilders”: articulating priorities and guiding strategies; providing a security umbrella and political space for other national and international actors to implement peacebuilding tasks; and implementing some peacebuilding tasks directly, such as police, justice, corrections and security sector reform. In a strategy paper on early peacebuilding, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) stress security, political processes and the extension of state authority, including by laying the foundations for long-term institution-building.⁴ In a nutshell, *peacekeepers* focus on politics and security, but with the understanding that these cannot be disconnected from the other peacebuilding priorities, typically undertaken by other actors like the World Bank and UNDP as part of an integrated approach.

These policy documents tie into another important debate in recent years, about transitions and exit strategies. This was driven in part by financial considerations, but also by the fact that some relatively successful missions were ready to start winding up, in Liberia and Timor for example. The discussion was further complicated by deteriorating or outright withdrawal of consent by host governments, in Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and

¹ “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines”, DPKO/DFS, United Nations, New York, March 2008.

² This doctrinal thinking was informed by the DPKO/OCHA commissioned study “Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Contexts”; see Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations. Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, Independent Study, DPKO/OCHA, New York, 2009.

³ Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, United Nations, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009.

⁴ United Nations “The Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: A DPKO/DFS Strategy Paper”. DPKO/DFS non-paper adopted in June 2011. On the extension of state authority, see also, Jake Sherman in *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012*, CIC, New York, 2012.

Sudan. The Security Council held a thematic debate and adopted a presidential statement on transitions in 2010,⁵ which included an appeal for benchmarks as a way of measuring progress in mandated tasks and facilitating handover to national authorities. Thus the building of national capacity is critical to smooth transitions, a job that peacekeepers share with many other external actors and is often taken up by successor arrangements.

A final complication is the major disconnect that may exist on timeframes. The *World Development Report* of 2011 argues that building legitimate institutions and governance to end repeated cycles of violence takes a generation. Yet peacekeeping, peacebuilding and even development interventions are of much shorter duration. For the purposes of the Challenges Forum, this raises unresolved questions about what a peacekeeping operation can expect to do during the relatively limited period in which it is typically deployed. Is it possible to lay the foundations for institution building during that period? What can be done to ensure seamless transitions to long-term peace building that may take as much as a generation?

As it turns out, the expected decline in the number of peacekeepers did not occur in 2010 and 2011. Indeed UN missions survived the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, a fraught referendum in South Sudan, and volatile elections in the DRC, while a new mission was established in South Sudan, UN support for AMISOM expanded and a small political mission was deployed to Libya. Moreover, the likely decline in military personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions is not likely to be matched by a proportionate decline in civilians and police. Indeed, we may see an increase in the latter categories.

Yet the tone of the debate on capacities is different from 2008-09. The pressure for greater efficiency and oversight still exists, but financial issues have moved to the fore, exemplified by a pitched battle in the 2012 meeting of the C-34 on troop reimbursement rates. An unspoken question that lurks beneath the discussion on capabilities therefore is not simply whether peacekeepers can do more with less, but whether they should try to do less – to scale back from the ambitious agenda that has characterized operations since 1999.

Triangular Cooperation

The “New Horizon” process, launched in 2008, identified four priority areas for a new partnership between the Secretariat and Member States: policy development; capability development; the global field support strategy; and planning and oversight. Triangular cooperation falls mainly within “planning and oversight”, although it cuts across all four areas.

The ostensible purpose of triangular cooperation is to improve oversight of peacekeeping while enhancing awareness among key stakeholders of the challenges and concerns associated with complex operations. The history is well documented in a background paper prepared for the Challenges Forum 2010.⁶ In June 2001, the Security Council adopted a resolution that laid out a set of procedures for more systematic consultation among the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat.⁷ The Security Council Working Group on peacekeeping was set up around then with the express purpose of encouraging closer and more interactive dialogue among those groups. The importance of triangular cooperation was reinforced in a 2004

⁵ UNSC Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2010/2, 12 February 2010.

⁶ Fatemeh Ziai, “A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping Initiatives in 2009: Strengthening Consultation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and Troop-and Police Contributing Countries”, Challenges Forum Background Paper, 9 November 2009.

⁷ UNSC Res. 1353 (2001) of 13 June 2001.

presidential statement and another in 2009.⁸ The latter stressed the progress that had been made to that point:

- improved dialogue with the Secretariat on the general challenges of peacekeeping;
- deeper consultations with T/PCCs;
- more political-military meetings on specific operations;
- and improved use of benchmarks.

It also identified areas where further reflection was required, highlighting the need for more systematic consultations in advance of the deployment of a technical assessment mission, and debriefing on its main findings on return. The Council also called for “more meaningful engagement” with T/PCCs before the renewal or modification of a mandate.

The 2009 Security Council Presidential Statement welcomed the “New Horizon” non-paper, including the call for a capability-driven approach, which “moves away from a numbers-intensive strategy to one that focuses on the skills, capacity and willingness of personnel, as well as material, to deliver required results”. The Security Council weighed in again with another presidential statement in August 2011, which added little other than to call for circulation of the agenda for T/PCC meetings by the 15th of each month.⁹

Meanwhile, triangular cooperation has been a major theme in C-34 debates and reports. In its 2010 report the Committee for the first time included a section on the topic and made a number of specific requests:

- that pre-deployment threat assessments be made available to potential T/PCCs;
- that potential T/PCCs take reconnaissance visits to new missions;
- meetings between the Secretariat and T/PCCs, ideally one week prior to Security Council consultations, on mandate renewals;
- regular comprehensive briefings for T/PCCs on the situation of each peacekeeping operation;
- that the Secretariat provide the Security Council and T/PCCs with an assessment of capabilities, force generation and logistical resource requirements prior to launching a new operation or reconfiguring a current operation;
- better guidelines for pre-deployment visits for military contributions and formed police units.

Many of those requests were reiterated in the 2011 report of the Special Committee. A significant new request was for the Secretariat to consult with T/PCCs when planning any change in “military and police tasks, mission-specific rules of engagement, operational concepts or command and control structure... to ensure that their troops have the capacity to meet the new demands”. Triangular cooperation was also a lively topic of discussion at the 2012 session of the C-34 and many new paragraphs were proposed. As of the time of writing, no report had come out due primarily to differences over the rates of reimbursement of peacekeepers.

⁸ UNSC Presidential Statement, S/PRST/1994/16, 17 May 2004; UNSC Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2009/24, 5 August 2009.

⁹ UNSC Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2011/17, 26 August 2011.

Bearing in mind the various specific requests that came out of these intergovernmental bodies, it is possible to compile a list of the progress achieved on triangular cooperation by the end of 2011¹⁰:

- Regular briefings by DPKO for the Security Council and T/PCCs before the renewal of mandates, and before and after every Technical Assessment Mission;
- Informal briefings by DPKO as required to inform T/PCCs about specific developments in a mission area;
- Routine updates of mission-specific planning documents as required by the Security Council; T/PCCs informed through meetings and individual briefings;
- DPKO and DFS maintain contacts at all levels with Member States to ensure that States are well-informed about events on the ground;
- Integrated Operational Teams hold informal consultations with Security Council members at the expert level to brief them on mission specific areas of interest;
- Relevant DPKO offices regularly offer briefings to TCCs/PCCs when there are significant events related to the missions;
- Situation Center weekly briefing to interested TCCs/PCCs on key developments; Office of Operations factual weekly briefing note to the Security Council;
- Security Council formal consultations with TCCs/PCCs ahead of each mandate renewal. The Secretariat generally issues reports of the Secretary-General one week ahead of those meetings to allow for meaningful consultation. DPKO also supports these consultations by providing a briefing;
- Occasional briefings by Force Commanders and Police Commissioners of both the Security Council and C-34;
- Completion of an initial assessment of the Secretariat's capability gap lists, currently the subject of consultations with Member States. As part of this process, DPKO has developed baseline capability standards and guidance under three pilot initiatives for infantry battalions, military staff officers and military medical support;
- Intermission cooperation to overcome critical capacity gaps on a temporary basis in the context of the 2010 presidential elections and post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, presidential and legislative elections in Liberia in 2011, and to deal with the crisis in Jonglei, South Sudan in 2011;
- DPKO's Police Division's development of a strategic guidance framework, to foster a common understanding on the full spectrum of police tasks in peacekeeping operations. This is in response to the continuing high demand for formed police units and specialized policing skills, such as experts in forensics and organized crime, as well as those with experience in mentoring, advising and institution-building.

One other important development in the ambit of triangular cooperation was a strategic dialogue held with a delegation from India in 2011. The Indian delegation comprised senior representatives of the Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs and Defense. They met with the DPKO Offices of Operations, Military Affairs, Rule of Law and Security Institutions, and Policy Evaluation and Training, as well as DFS. This dialogue went beyond day-to-day operational issues to touch on strategic, policy and other substantive matters that go to the heart of contemporary peacekeeping.

¹⁰ This list draws on reports of the Secretary-General to the 2011 and 2012 sessions of the C-34; the "New Horizon" Progress Report No. 2, December 2011; speech of Under Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous to the C-34 and talking points prepared by the Office of Operations in December 2011, as well as interviews with DPKO officials on 19 March, 21 March and 24 April 2012.

Despite this substantial progress in the last several years, triangular cooperation remains a source of contention. The reasons for this are complex and not necessarily founded on deep substantive differences. The divisive C-34 meeting in 2012 suggests that the peacekeeping partnership is fraying. The negotiations on triangular cooperation had a somewhat surreal quality, where the number of paragraphs and arcane matters like the placement of references to PCCs in relation to TCCs seemed more important than content. Economic pressure is part of the problem. Those who foot the bill for peacekeeping want to see cost efficiencies (including for example greater use of drones for surveillance), whereas large TCCs and others do not want to see decisions about peacekeeping driven entirely by money. More generally, giving the TCCs more say through triangular cooperation may be seen by the donors as a way to deflect criticism for the decline in financial support, but TCCs do not see “voice” as a substitute for funding.

Moreover, the vehicles for triangular cooperation that do exist are not used to maximum advantage. The meetings the Secretariat holds with TCCs and PCCs are well attended but interaction on policy and mandate questions – the questions that originally gave rise to demands for more consultation – tend to be minimal. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping, after a promising start in 2009,¹¹ has not lived up to expectations. And some of the issues that do arise in formal and informal interactions with TCCs and PCCs are more appropriately dealt with at the field level, for example the sequencing of contingents to be repatriated.

A more substantive source of contention is the extent to which internal and working documents in the Secretariat should be shared. Understandably, UN member states would like to see everything that would be useful for decisions about deployment and the like. But some information, like threat assessments, is too sensitive to put in writing. A related concern is the appropriate scope of engagement with T/PCCs on the design of technical assessment missions (TAMs). Briefings before and after TAMs are now standard practice, but too much encroachment on the prerogatives of the Secretariat may hinder its ability to make objective recommendations to the Security Council.

Finally, an important part of the current context for these debates is that emerging powers and large TCCs – most notably India – are insisting on playing a role as decision-makers as well as decision-takers. China, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia and Egypt are substantial contributors to UN peacekeeping as well, and are not likely to be satisfied with serving as mere resources. This suggests the need for a more proactive approach to dialogue with major and potential T/PCCs on policy and strategic issues, as well as on operational matters.

Civilian Capacity Review

The civilian capacity review is rooted in the proposition that sustainable peace requires strong civilian capacity and resilient institutions, one of the animating themes of the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding. The CivCap review was undertaken by a Senior Advisory Group led by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, whose team was housed in the UN’s Peacebuilding Support Office, signaling that it is not directed only at peacekeeping but rather the entire UN system’s support for post-conflict societies. It resonates with the 2011 *World Development Report* as well as the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’s report *A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*. The former emphasizes

¹¹ See “Report of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations on the enhancement of cooperation with troop contributing countries, police-contributing countries and other stakeholders”, S/2009/659, 17 December 2009.

the importance of security, justice and jobs to sustainable peace – all of which require legitimate institutions that can take a generation to build. The latter is an initiative of fragile states that have lived through conflict. They call for a commitment to five peace-building and state-building goals: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services. The civilian capacity review process also aligns closely with recent peacekeeping initiatives, including the “New Horizon” Process, the Global Field Support Strategy and the “early peacebuilding” paper produced by DPKO/DFS in June 2011.

The report of the Senior Advisory Group frames its proposals in terms of four elements: national ownership; civilian partnerships; expertise; and nimbleness.¹² The Review team mapped the international civilian capacities available in the five priority areas identified in the 2009 peacebuilding report (listed above). It broke each down into subcategories and identified UN agencies, regional organizations, bilateral donors and civil society actors that had personnel with the requisite expertise who could be deployed quickly. From that, it produced a list of functions where capacity gaps in the UN system existed, from DDR, SSR and JSR, to political party development and public financial management, through to employment generation and private sector development.

The Secretary-General followed up with his own report, setting out a roadmap for action along three axes:

- developing greater national capacity and ownership;
- building external partnerships and making the necessary adjustments within the UN system;
- and exercising organizational agility.¹³

The roadmap includes a set of priority actions that could be taken by August 2012, at which point the Secretary-General will report back the General Assembly and Security Council. A small team under the authority of Under-Secretary General Susana Malcorra, is charged with following up on those recommendations. A partial list of the priority actions and a brief review of their status follows.

Developing guidelines for better use and development of national capacity. This is currently being undertaken by the UNDP-led interagency working group. Part of the exercise requires orienting the many existing guidelines to post-conflict situations.

Giving a stronger strategic direction to new planning processes. The Integrated Mission Planning Process guidelines will be revised by the year 2012, giving clearer instructions on how to engage national actors in planning processes, and how to ensure that national perspectives and capacities are taken into account.

Review of how gender expertise is structured and deployed. This is being undertaken within the mainstreaming mandate of UN Women.

Consulting states and regional organizations on developing stronger partnerships; establishing an online platform to broadcast civilian needs and available capacities. The principal vehicle for this is CapMatch, an online “virtual marketplace” designed to share

¹² “Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict”, Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.

¹³ “Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/311–S/2011/527, 19 August 2011.

information that will help to match mission needs with potential providers of niche capabilities in short supply. Initially it will be open only to Member State providers, but eventually regional and other multilateral organizations may use the device, as could nongovernmental organizations. Ideally, CapMatch will facilitate South-South cooperation, perhaps with financial assistance from wealthy countries. The platform has been designed and will go live soon.

Exploring modalities to broaden the scope for deploying personnel provided by governments and other entities. The CivCap team is currently examining what can be done within existing regulations and what modalities would require adaptation of the rules. Various models are being explored for four categories of partners: open market consultants; member states; intergovernmental organizations; and nongovernmental organizations. Among the innovative ideas being considered are: systems contracts for consultants; letters of assist with governments; memorandums of understanding with regional organizations; and institutional cooperation contracts with nongovernmental organizations.

Detailing critical capacity gap areas and ensuring that designated UN focal points engage with external partners to address them. The capacity gap mapping undertaken by the Senior Advisory Group is a work in progress. Identifying “focal points”, as proposed by the Secretary-General as an alternative to the cluster system, has become bogged down in predictable turf battles.

Pursuing a corporate emergency model in the UN Secretariat for the purpose of rapid deployment. The idea here is to replicate the Haiti experience for the purpose of rapid deployment in emergencies, allowing for lateral movement of staff across the UN system as well as fast-track recruitment mechanisms. The Office of Human Resources is working on this.

Piloting these approaches in the field. Many of the above initiatives and others listed among the Secretary-General’s priority actions, like financial agility, are being put to the test in pilot projects. Thus local procurement is being piloted in UNMISS. UNSMIL has established a “civilian partnership cell” in the Libyan transitional government. Financial agility is being experimented with in UNMIT, as is South-South cooperation with Peacebuilding Fund resources. Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia are also pilots for South-South cooperation on security sector reform.

It is too soon to judge the efficacy of the civilian capacity implementation process. As noted, the Secretary-General will submit a report to the General Assembly in August 2012. The goal is for much of the foundational work to be done by the end of the year. At this stage several general comments can be made, which may shed light on the prospects for success and stimulate discussion at the Challenges Forum.

First, the initiative was widely embraced by Member States when launched because of its breadth and the inherent appeal of its underlying concepts: ownership, partnerships, expertise, and nimbleness. The emphasis on national ownership was appreciated by the global South, led by the g7+ group; donor countries had been developing their own rosters and were anxious to find ways of using them; and emerging powers like India and Brazil were looking for modalities to contribute more to the civilian aspects of peacekeeping and peace building.

Second, facilitating South-South cooperation has become a major impetus in the implementation process – the idea being that countries from the South have expertise to share

that may not reside in the global North. This is in line with *The New Deal* initiative referenced above, whereby those who have lived through conflict seek to share knowledge and experience with countries in similar situations. The challenge here is not necessarily funding but rather making the right match: getting post-conflict societies to identify what they need and finding the right southern supplier.

Third, enthusiasm for the initiative within the UN system has been mixed. One of the foundational elements of the CivCap process is to strengthen interoperability and flexibility across the UN system, in order to make better use of the resources the organization in support of peacebuilding. Yet perennial tension between the crisis management side of the house (operating on the basis of Security Council mandates) and those involved in development has obstructed progress. Moreover, the emphasis in the report on creating a more professional, agile United Nations by drawing on outside expertise has met with some resistance from within. Thus one of the great opportunities – and challenges – for the CivCap process is to push the UN system further down the path of “delivering as one”, in partnership with the World Bank, regional organizations, donors and non-governmental organizations.

Fourth, the civilian capacity process is closely intertwined with other initiatives underway at UN headquarters. It did not emanate from the “New Horizon” process but fits within that vision. It relates to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office, as well as WDR 2011-inspired activities. Procurement and human resources reform is part of the equation, including the various standing capacities and standby rosters that are being built: the Standing Police Capacity, the UN roster of security sector reform experts, the new standing Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity and the Human Rights Rapid Response and Peace Mission Section. In a climate of fiscal austerity, it is important to maintain coherence among these overlapping reform efforts and to resist the temptation to seize the least expensive but not necessarily best option.

Issues for discussion and recommendations

General

1. Revisit the question “capabilities for what?” Is the goal to do peacekeeping better, to do more with less, or to do less by scaling back on the ambitious peacekeeping agenda that emerged in the last decade?
2. Consider the alternatives or successors to large-scale multidimensional peace operations. What capacities are needed for political and peacebuilding missions? Without a large troop presence, what sources of leverage does a mission have to advance its political, security, justice and development goals?

Triangular cooperation

3. Identify the substantive differences that are at the core of on-going debates over triangular cooperation. Are the TCCs and PCCs mainly concerned with Secretariat practices or those of the Security Council? What are the limits on open, triangular consultation, for example with respect to threat assessments, the terms of reference of technical assessment missions, etc.?
4. Consider how to improve existing mechanisms. Can the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping be used better as the principal venue for triangular consultations?

5. Engage in strategic dialogue with major troop contributors, as well as those whose contributions may grow in the years ahead. The dialogue with India in 2011 is a useful model. As the demand for formed police units and specialized policing skills is unlikely to decline in the near future, similar efforts should be made with those contributing countries – actual and potential.

Civilian capacity

6. Reflect on time frames. If the *World Development Report 2011* is correct that building legitimate institutions and governance takes a generation, what are the implications for peacekeeping and early peacebuilding? What level of national capacity can realistically be built during the relatively brief period when a peacekeeping mission is deployed?

7. Ensure coherence among the many reform efforts underway in the UN Secretariat, funds and offices, a responsibility that naturally resides in Executive Office of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's office could also serve as catalyst for a wider "whole of system" effort extending to the Peacebuilding Commission, UN specialized agencies, the World Bank, regional organizations and development banks, and other partners.

Key documents

- "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping", DPKO and DFS, July 2009.
- "The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1", October 2010.
- "The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 2", December 2011.
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- "Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the Recommendations of Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations", A/65/680, 4 January 2011.
- "Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the Recommendations of Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations", A/66/619, 19 December 2011.
- Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/65/19, May 2011.
- Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, (forthcoming 2012).
- Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009.
- "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict", Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.
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