Police in UN Peace Operations: Evolving Roles and Requirements[1]

Introduction

Police personnel seconded from UN member states have a history in UN peace operations dating back to the early 1960s. Only since the end of the Cold War, however, have the roles of UN Police (UNPOL) evolved beyond monitoring and advising host state police services to consistently include reforming, rebuilding, and restructuring them; offering them tactical- and operational-level support; and (occasionally) taking the reins of law enforcement themselves. These and other changes have challenged UN Police since the mid-1990s and the challenges accelerated in this century, initially in the form of increasingly complex and ambitious mandates. However, complexity and ambition (in terms of depth and breadth of change sought) more or less plateaued by the mid-2000s.

The succeeding challenge, still unfolding, lies in the Security Council's tendency to confuse a tack hammer with a sledge hammer and to deploy UN peace operations to increasingly risky and unstable operating environments fundamentally unsuited to peacekeeping. This tendency, evident for some time, means that effective management of operating environments remains just beyond missions' grasp, despite increased efforts to deepen and professionalize their operating capacities, including UNPOL.

The final challenge is to increase UN and Police Contributing States' (PCCs') abilities to implement complex mandates competently, professionally and adaptively. Meeting this challenge spawned new efforts to evaluate, develop guidance for and train UN police, beginning with formed units, moving to individual officers and bringing efforts under the ambit of a single Strategic Guidance Framework.

This paper touches upon each of these areas as a stimulus to discussion.

Complexity and Ambition of Mandates, 1995 Onward

What became, by 2005, the 'new normal' for complexity and ambition in UN Police mandates can be traced to the creation and evolution of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and its International Police Task Force. Monitoring, advising and training of

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police was the only peace implementation function assigned to the UN in the voluminous annexes of the Dayton Agreement, reflecting the UN's recent, unenviable track record as keeper of peace in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. Although one could backdate the start of complex 'policekeeping' further, to UN missions in Namibia and Mozambique (UNTAG and ONUMOZ, in 1989 and 1992, respectively) the niche UNPOL filled there was still essentially monitoring, albeit with extended ground mobility. With UNTAC in Cambodia (1992-93), UN police had more expansive responsibilities but no training, strategy, or power to overcome local resistance to mandate implementation. UNPOL in Cambodia worked with a mission military component not intended for peace enforcement that was no match for the military capacities either of the government or of the Khmer Rouge.

UNMIBH started modestly, with few powers or responsibilities. It also benefitted from operating in proximity to a NATO military operation that very obviously overpowered local parties' military abilities. As a groundbreaking mission, however, it lacked a pool of experience upon which to draw and also lacked essential conceptual or doctrinal backup. The mission had to define for itself many terms of art used in the Dayton annex, including 'internationally recognized standards of law enforcement,' which it interpreted into rules by which to hold Bosnian communities' police forces to account[2]. The Security Council gave UNMIBH greater powers in 1997 and 1998, following the Sintra and Bonn sessions of Dayton's Peace Implementation Council. UNMIBH thereafter moved in tandem with the international High Representative, created by the Dayton Agreement, to involve itself more directly and forcefully in rule of law for Bosnia, vetting and downsizing the police forces of the two principal 'entities' of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation and Republic Srpska. UNMIBH investigated police abuse of human rights, seized non-permitted weapons, and built a national border security service.

UNMIBH's evolving mandate anchors Table 1 (see 'Figures and Tables', page 12), which also includes mandated police-related tasks of 15 other complex UN peace operations established between 1999 and 2013. Operational tasks or powers may be found in the first half of the table and capacity-building tasks may be found in the second half, grouped by level intrusiveness (institutional capacity development; training, advising or mentoring; monitoring, co-location and registration; and assessment, liaison and coordination).

Tasks listed in Table 1 are only those that can be traced directly to Security Council mandates, the Secretary-General's mission progress reports, or annual mission budget requests and performance reports, which contain extensive (if not always useful) reporting against 'results

2   Elizabeth Cousens and David Harland 2006, 'Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,' in William Durch (ed.), Twenty-first Century Peace Operations (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006): 72-73.

based budgeting' indicators[3]. In the field, any of these tasks would be broken down into much more detailed and varied activities.

The numbers in the cells of Table 1 reflect the years in which each task became operative for a mission (either year mandated or, if implementation lagged, the year first implemented). Some missions, like UNTAET, had a full complement of tasks within their first year. Other missions, such as MONUC, accreted police-related tasks over a much longer period of time – 8 or 9 years – as the mission's duties evolved in reaction to needs on the ground.

A scan of Table 1 does not suggest a secular trend in either the number or kinds of tasks assigned to UNPOL. The greatest number or most complex of tasks do not necessarily fall to the newest missions. Rather, the tasking pattern looks more like the latter years of UNMIBH, adding substantial operational functions. These are by no means confined to the transitional administration missions for Kosovo and Timor-Leste. Indeed, minus those missions' explicit law enforcement capacities, a similar pattern of responsibility can be found in most of the operations established in the first decade of this century[4].

Those curious about relative frequency of task assignment to missions can find tasks arrayed by frequency in Table 2. At the top of the list are advising, basic training, liaison and the like, which are tasks common to all 16 missions reviewed. Institutional and infrastructural development is on a par with force protection. Protection of civilians counted only where directly stated or inferable as a police as opposed to military task. Other than riot/crowd control, most operations-related tasks have been assigned to fewer than half of the missions reviewed.

Increasing Difficulty of Operational Environments

Initial conditions mean everything to a peace operation, which is almost never strong enough to transform residual conflict into sustainable peace by its own military means or its own political leverage. Reforming, restructuring and rebuilding police services is hard enough in a relatively stable environment in which the police – and the judicial and political systems – more or less see the need for restructuring and reform and therefore support it. Contemporary complex operations almost never enjoy the luxury of such a stable operating environment and there are thresholds of violence beyond which the loosely woven structures of UN operations are poor substitutes for the more tightly wound and

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3   UN missions work according to two sets of progress indicators. One comprises benchmarks laid out in S-G reports for the Security Council and the other comprises similar but not identical 'indicators of achievement,' outputs and activities presented in the budget documents and performance reports that go to the General Assembly. Spreadsheets with several years' comparative data on both reporting streams for several missions are available upon request from the Future of Peace Operations program at the Stimson Center.

4   Correlation between numbers of operational tasks and year of mission start in table 1 is weakly negative (-.16); between institution-building and mission start it is also negative (-.29). While one should not read too much into the numbers, there is no strong positive correlation to be found, at least in this rendering, between policing tasks and the march of time at any level of task intrusiveness.

better armed and armored forces of national actors or close coalitions of same. The difficult experiences of coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 10 to 12 years does not mean that they cannot be effective in suppressing or deterring violence sufficiently well to make a difficult situation more workable for a UN operation serving in parallel or in sequence, as some of the following examples suggest.

In 1999, first the UN-authorized coalition force, INTERFET, and then the UN's Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) deployed into a place reduced to ashes by gangs affiliated with Indonesian occupation forces. But persons responsible for the damage and killing that followed the 'consultation' vote in August 1999 largely left the territory before INTERFET deployed, with Indonesia's consent. In 2002, the UN relinquished general administrative duties to the new Timor-Leste government but retained its law enforcement powers as the national police (PNTL) continued to develop. In 2005, the international community miscalculated the cohesion of Timorese police and security forces and agreed to withdraw operational police and troops from the country. Little more than a year later, the Timorese police service as well as public order in Dili, the capital, had disintegrated and most of the city's population fled to the surrounding countryside. An Australian-led regional military coalition and a UN policing mission with executive powers returned. UNMIT exercised its authority over a restive PNTL that sought to rapidly recover executive authority, despite repeated failures to meet performance standards to which it had agreed. The government resumed authority for policing in 2010 and invited UNMIT to leave by the end of 2012. UNMIT's environment was not so much hostile as impatient with the pace of internationally tutored reform, the frequent rotation of UN personnel, and the varying nature of the resulting advice drawn from UN officers' own national experiences.[5]

The other path-breaking coalition deployments in Kosovo and Haiti created space and stability for UN operations to flow in behind them – although several key partners in the 2004 coalition departed Haiti in unseemly haste after their 90 day mandate expired. UNMIK simultaneously created the first UN police operation with executive authority and built a police service for Kosovo itself but without benefit of a clear political end-point. As a result, as in Timor, local authorities lost patience with the international process and declared independence in February 2008. UNMIK turned over most of its responsibilities to the European Union at the end of 2008.

In Haiti, MINUSTAH assumed de facto responsibility for public order in mid-2004, upon withdrawal of an interim coalition force led by the United States. The situation on the ground more closely resembled anarchy than civil war, the government having lost control of most parts of the country to a loosely-organized opposition movement. Over the next few years, MINUSTAH both actively policed the country (under an agreement remarkably similar in wording to that reached with the

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5   For concise treatments of rule of law issues and programs in nine UN mission areas, including Timor-Leste, see www.stimson.org/books-reports/un-police-justice-and-corrections-programming-summarizing-recent-practice/.

government of Timor-Leste) and attempted to raise up the Haitian National Police. Both national politics and nature itself fought the creation of public order, with repeated hurricanes (especially in 2008) and the January 2010 Port au Prince earthquake destroying both public infrastructure and public servants, national and international.

The UN Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) began as an observer mission with substantial self-protection capacity, mandated to monitor the separation of pro- and anti-government armies and their local militia proxies. After the withdrawal of foreign armies, the proxies remained, open to the highest outside bidder, even as their leaders initially won vice-presidencies in a transitional government. UNPOL joined the operation to train Congolese police in Kisangani after serious armed clashes between rival groups there in 2002. MONUC's serious troop buildup began when the northeastern district of Ituri exploded in ethnic violence, but police always seemed an afterthought in mission planning. Local personnel were trained to guard polling stations for the 2006 and 2011 elections but, with fewer than 500 officers in a country of 70 million, and with more than 100,000 persons self-identifying as police in a 2010 census, training programs barely scratch the surface, even when disparate bilateral programs are thrown into the mix.

When the government of the DRC launched a stabilization program for the eastern DRC in 2008, it ran headlong into entrenched local (and neighboring state) interests in continuing instability, the better to sustain the creation of illicit wealth that instability facilitated. Only when a capable and willing military mini-coalition within MONUSCO (the 'Force Intervention Brigade' or FIB), deployed within MONUSCO, supported by a high-level regional political initiative and threats to withhold development aid, was political-military success in the east visible, at least temporarily.

Overshadowed by the late-2013 FIB engagement with the Rwanda-supported M23 militia, the UN Security Support and Stability Strategy for eastern Congo and MONUSCO's subsequent (2010) program to train 1,500 Congolese police has run up against the reluctance of police to deploy to relatively isolated posts in still-unstable areas. While MONUSCO can occasionally 'clear' an area of trouble, it has too few assets to 'hold' more than a few smallish places and relies on other entities, such as the International Organization for Migration or the UN Development Programme, to build police facilities.

When UNAMID was established in July 2007, Darfur remained in open rebellion against the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The mission was to offer some measure of security to the region's population, which had been subject to brutal ethnic cleansing campaigns – labeled genocide by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in September 2004. UNAMID, authorized to deploy nearly 20,000 troops and 6,400 UNPOL, largely absorbed a smaller African Union mission but was never able to exert much security influence in its area of operations. Nor did it ever reach authorized troop or police levels. Facing resistance to its deployments and operations by the government in Khartoum, UNAMID has not been able

to meet any of its major benchmarks and the mission was reduced in size in 2012 by the Security Council to levels that, for the police component at least, reflect what UNPOL has been able to recruit and sustain.

A few months after the Security Council established UNAMID, it established MINURCAT, which implemented a UN agreement with the government of Chad to let UNPOL train and equip a special police organization (the 'Détachement Intégré de Sécurité', DIS) to provide security of IDP camps in the lawless reaches of eastern Chad near the Sudan/Darfur border, and to escort the humanitarian convoys that served those camps. MINURCAT also assessed and developed programs to rehabilitate and restore courts and corrections systems in the region.

MINURCAT's area of operation was both a local security vacuum and the rear area for a neighboring war zone (Darfur), 1,500 km from the nearest supply head. MINURCAT's unarmed personnel (civilian and police) were protected for the first year by a European Union military force, some of which rehatted as blue helmets when the Chadian government agreed, in late 2008, to host armed UN personnel. The operation's training, equipping and infrastructure programs (for police and courts) were supported – unusually for a DPKO mission – by a Secretariat-managed multi-donor Trust Fund. (Most such funds are managed by UNDP.) MINURCAT also established a security stakeholder coordination mechanism in the east that was highly regarded by its participants, which included the government, the mission, the country team and NGOs. Once Chad and Sudan reached an accord about their mutual border in January 2010, the government invited MINURCAT to leave, which it did by the end of the year. To sustain the security gains made by the DIS program, UNHCR and UNDP initiated a follow-up 'Joint Support Program for the DIS' that sustained the operation through at least 2013, perhaps the best evidence available that MINURCAT provided a valuable service under difficult circumstances.[6]

The first of the two newest missions – UNMISS – deployed into a politically unstable, insecure and logistically austere operating environment. UNMISS has since been fully enveloped by South Sudan's unresolved, worsening, communally rooted but politically propelled governance crisis, guarding impromptu IDP camps holding 75-85,000 persons, in and around several of its bases. The UN has declared its equidistance from all parties, including the government, while attempting to pull in military and police reinforcements (four formed police units) from other UN operations in Africa.[7]

The mission's initial 900 police were charged with restructuring vetting, advising, and mentoring the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and have undertaken some joint patrols with UNMISS military units. Owing to the predominance of former soldiers in the SSPS, reform faces a certain cultural lock-in from several decades of exposure to civil war and a need on the government's part to placate these former guerrilla mostly lacking

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6   A concise history of the Joint Support Programme may be found at: http://procurement-notices. undp.org/view_notice.cfm?notice_id=10692.

7   Letter dated 23 December 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2013/758, 23 December 2013.

in marketable skills, except in South Sudan's unfortunately large market for violence. That market is now thriving at the expense of South Sudan's population.

In Mali, MINUSMA is slowly deploying into a situation of slowly resolving political uncertainty in the southern population core of the country and continuing political-military instability in the large northern part of the country, where the central government's reach has long been tentative. Its mandate includes security for UN personnel and installations, protection of civilians, patrolling with local police and dismantling of illegal checkpoints, as well as restructuring, rebuilding and (re)training Malian police.

MINUSMA is also intended to support the stabilization of and (re-)extension of government authority in the northern half of the country, where a combination of ethnic grievance and hardline Islamist opportunism dominates the security situation. The Tuareg secessionist question is longstanding but may prove negotiable; the violent Islamist groups that sacked a number of northern cities before French intervention last year present a different problem. French, Malian and UN forces alike have been targeted by hardline guerrillas. Opportunistic banditry is a further hazard to mission and public security. The climate of violence in the north has undermined government efforts to restore basic services, as judicial and educational personnel are reluctant to return. School attendance in Kidal at the end of 2013, for example, was reported at 3 percent of pre-conflict levels[8]. MINUSMA's eight (to be nine) formed police units may be able to contribute a semblance of public security, in certain places at certain times, but prospects for capacity-building in the Malian police rely thus far on fewer than 80 of the 320 individual police personnel authorized for the mission.

MINUSMA still has French military backup at this writing. The relatively small, mobile Operation Serval may prove effective in temporarily clearing relatively large swaths of northern territory but holding and building, to use the terminology of US counter¬insurgency, is difficult in the face of determined groups willing to use terrorist violence. The circumstances in which Serval has operated are beyond the ken of normal policing, indeed, beyond the capacities and mobility of even armed formed police units. Such circumstances require at least temporary military control, which is itself of uncertain value when attempted without sufficient and sustained political backup. Fortunately, MINUSMA has been linked to high-level political and development initiatives for the country, and has endeavored to make planning and programming a joint effort with the UN Country Team. When capacity-building for police and justice gets underway in Mali, it will have the benefit of this joined-up approach and a built-in mechanism for transition from peacekeeping to longer-term recovery and development.

Table 3 attempts to capture the above narrative in a single, notional chart that ranks mission operating environments according to expected levels of violence and the degree to which likely violence perpetrators are under

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8   Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, S/2014/1, 2 January 2014, para. 43.

central control. A mission may have more than one box ticked if the security climate differs substantially from one part of its area of operation to another. Readers are invited to re-rank the situational descriptions and draw their own trend line through the boxes but as presented, table 3 suggests a trend line of rising instability and danger in UN mission operating environments, over time. The professionalization of UN Police, discussed in the next section, will help UNPOL cope with more difficult environments. Police cannot be effective in such environments without substantial military backup, however, and the international community's willingness or ability to provide such backup has varied widely over time and place, both in size and timing of commitment, and commitment relative to size, population, or volatility of the mission area of responsibility.

Professionalizing UNPOL and UN Police Peacekeeping

Improved public security should, of course, be a critical national and international objective in every conflict transition. Having a UN police component embedded in a complex operation can lead to better public security outcomes if it gives the operation the ability to address public security in ways and at levels where military forces do not normally operate and are neither trained nor motivated to operate. However, for far too long, political authorities responsible for establishing UN and other peace and stability operations have had little familiarity with the actual capacities needed to enhance, let alone create, public security within a mission's area of operation. This has been especially true of police functions. DPKO has begun to acknowledge that fact in the last three or four years, paying for the needed staff specialists in a number of missions (requests for which, from missions, can be traced at least to UNMIBH in 1997).

Historically, donors have not been willing to part with the resources needed to adequately provide such capacity, following instead the military model of recruitment, secondment and reimbursement established in the early 1970s for military observers and formed military units. Contributing countries donate observers' time and, for personnel in formed military units, receive per capita reimbursements at a common fixed rate. This system, added to the kinds of operating environments faced by UN missions in the last decade, has favored the secondment of formed police units to those missions. The rising deployment of FPUs in turn presented issues of fitness for purpose, as sharply escalating demand exceeded the supply of seasoned units. Seasoned units with mission-appropriate language backgrounds were rarer still and often allocated to missions not matching their language background. Despite efforts by UN Police Division, evolving since 2008, to evaluate and ensure the proper training and equipping of FPUs, language capacities remained mismatched at the end of 2013 (see Table 4). This is a critical failing that is most likely to show itself in a public order crisis, where FPU personnel are up against demonstrators or worse, and can neither understand what is being said to them nor communicate effectively in return. Even having a 'Language Assistant' with every section of FPU (roughly ten officers) may not suffice

in a fast-moving or otherwise dangerous situation, both because the model expects the Language Assistant to be at least as exposed to danger as the officers themselves, and because the LA cannot be everywhere at once.

In general, sending UNPOL into circumstances for which they are not fully prepared is unlikely to yield good results in the short to medium term, which is the time frame in which UNPOL mostly works; even within that time frame, rotation rates guarantee that any given advisory relationship needs to be rebooted every 12 months or so. Evolving UN police strategic guidance, better pre-deployment training based on that guidance, and better selection and induction training will likely improve overall UNPOL performance and make serial advisory and mentoring relationships more consistent. If, however, mission is struggling against an indifferent or unfriendly operating environment, investing more in FPUs than in local capacity development, then UN Police will be hard put to demonstrate that lasting gains for the host country have resulted from their presence and work. Relying too much on paramilitary-style police units may also send the wrong signal to host governments and populations, where the typical objective of a peace accord and thus of a UN mission is to pull the military out of internal security functions and to remodel police services from regime agents to community protection agents.

Since 2009, Police Division has aimed to have 20 percent female participation in UNPOL deployments. They had reached roughly 15 percent by fall 2013, though FPUs overall tend to be heavily male dominated. India has deployed an all-female FPU in Liberia and Bangladesh has an all-female unit in Haiti. Rwanda, Nigeria and Senegal, however, are fielding mixed units that are 8-15 percent female. Assuming that these are operational rather than support personnel, an image of male and female police working together may be a better model to strive for.

There is no single linchpin needed to improve UNPOL performance but many links in a chain of accomplishment:

The UN needs to practice what is preached in terms of 'democratic' or 'community' policing supportive of human rights and intolerant of abuse, and to preach it consistently, using a common strategic approach that is made more likely by the release of the new Policy on Police.[9] It needs to train to that approach; implement it flexibly; improve its procedures for gaining, keeping and passing along local knowledge; have substantially better local language capacity, accessed locally or remotely; and build and rely on partnerships with program agents across national and international institutions. MINUSMA appears to be carrying this model forward at present, hopefully to good effect.

The UN needs to face up to organized crime as a common conflict legacy and acknowledge its intimate ties to official corruption. The West Africa Coast Initiative is a step in the proper direction but needs to be replicated in every sub-region in which UN missions operate.

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9   UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 'United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions,' Policy Ref. 2014-1, 1 February 2014.

There is much emphasis in mandates and strategies on meeting local demand and promoting national and local ownership but less reflection on how to use advisory leverage to develop local demand for police support that is consistent with UNPOL/mission strategic principles. International organizations traditionally pay closest attention to persons in office, but in post-conflict settings where representative, responsive and accountable policing (and other governance) is the mission goal, popular sovereignty and peoples' needs must be weighed against national sovereignty and governmental prerogative. Thus the question: who determines – or how to determine – the appropriateness of 'local' demands or of 'local' owners? Being able to make such determinations requires deep knowledge of local influence networks and suggests that support to host state police development be conditioned and directed to a substantial degree by the needs and views of populations with respect to public and personal security, rather than the will or interests of post-conflict elites, especially if the purpose of UN police assistance is to create the sort of responsive, representative and accountable police services that is the goal of the new UN Policy on Police. Such an approach recognizes that the requirements of popular sovereignty – the ultimate basis of democratic governance – may compete or clash with demands serving central state authority.

The new UN Policy on Police places heavy emphasis on inculcating respect for human rights, including the rights of women and children, investigation of human rights violations, not tolerating corruption and fighting impunity. Yet most of the UN's seconded police personnel come from countries with at best indifferent human rights records themselves (Fig. 1). The proportion of UNPOL from countries considered 'free' in annual Freedom House ratings has been dropping for over a decade, though it may be stabilizing at roughly 25 percent of both individual officers and members of formed police units. As groups, some 40 'free' countries and 14 'not free' countries contribute roughly equal numbers of police to UN peacekeeping (see Fig. 2). Since 2001, the number of police contributed by the average 'free' PCC has dropped by more than half, while the average number contributed by a 'partly free' PCC has roughly doubled and the number contributed by the average 'not free' PCC has roughly quadrupled.

Over the long haul, either the constant rotation of police through rights-promoting UN police components may begin to have a collective effect on policing at home, or the UN will continue to have a difficult time developing consistent message and behavior from UNPOL as regards issues of rights, corruption and accountability. In the meantime, induction training and close supervision and enforcement of available, if limited, tools for accountability will be critical to the consistent implementation of UN policing mandates according to the stated principles of the Policy on Police.

Figures and Tables

Fig. 1: Percentages of UNPOL by Freedom House Rankings, 2001-2013

Fig. 2: Number of Police Contributing Countries, by Freedom House Rankings, 2001-2013

Table 1: Mandated and Reported UNPOL Tasks, 1995-2013: Operations and Operational Support

		UNMIBH	UNMIK	UNTAET	MONUC	UNAMSIL	UNMISET	UNMIL	UNOCI	ONUB	MINUSTAH	UNMIS	UNMIT	UNAMID	MINURCAT	UNMISS	MINUSMA	No. of Missions with Task
	Year established:	95	99	99	99	99	02	03	04	04	04	05	06	07	07	11	13	
Interim Admin.	Law Enforcement; powers of arrest		99	99			02						06					**4**
	Detention, management of		99	99									06					**3**
Operations / Operational Support to Host State Police	Border/customs control		99	00	06		02	12	04		06		06					**8**
	Assist Illegal checkpoint removal																13	**1**
	Community policing			99			02	03			10			08	08			**6**
	Crowd/riot control		00	99	04		02	04	10		06		06	09			13	**10**
	Assist demobilization & reintegration				00					05								**2**
	Disarmament, weapons inspection/destruction		99							06	04		06					**4**
	Election security (as applicable)		99	99	06	02		06	10	05	06		06					**9**
	IDP/refugee security/repatriation (minority protection)		99	99						05	10		06	08	08	13		**8**
	Investigate host state police and government abuses and corruption	96	99				02				06	07	06					**6**
	Support or conduct criminal investigations		99	99			02			05	06		06			11		**7**
	Anti-gang operations										05		06					**2**
	Anti-trafficking operations		99								06							**2**
	Organized crime prevention/disruption	97	99					11	08									**4**
	Conduct independent patrols		99	99	07			03			04		06	08		13	13	**9**
	Joint patrols with international military		99					12	12		04					13		**5**
	Joint patrols (with local police)	95	99		07				04	05	06		06		08		13	**9**
	Humanitarian/UN personnel security		99	99	07	00	02	04	04		04		06	08	08	11	13	**13**
	Protection of civilians (by UNPOL)		99	99	07		02	04	04		04		06	08	08	11	13	**12**
	Airport/Seaport security		99	00				05										**3**
	Weapon inspections & seizures	97			04						04							**3**

Table 1: Mandated and Reported UNPOL Tasks, 1995-2013: Operations and Operational Support

			UNMIBH	UNMIK	UNTAET	MONUC	UNAMSIL	UNMISET	UNMIL	UNOCI	ONUB	MINUSTAH	UNMIS	UNMIT	UNAMID	MINURCAT	UNMISS	MINUSMA	No. of Missions with Task
		Year established:	95	99	99	99	99	02	03	04	04	04	05	06	07	07	11	13	
Capacity-building of Host State Police	Institutional Capacity Development	Dismiss or deactivate local police	97	99		04			03			04							**5**
		Recruitment assistance (including screening and certification)	97	99	00	08	02	02	05			04		07		08	11		**11**
		Restructure/reform police force	97	99	00	04	02	02	04			04	05	07	09	08	11	13	**14**
		Create Border Security Service	98	00	00	09		02				06							**6**
		Institution/infrastructure development	97	99		08	02	02	05		05	06		07	09	08	11	13	**13**
		Women's & children's rights &/or domestic violence unit development				07			05			06		06		08	13	13	**7**
	Training, Advising or mentoring	Basic training for local police	95	99	00	02	01	02	04	05	05	04	05	06	09	08	11	13	**16**
		Advanced training: refugee return	97																**1**
		Advanced training: org'd crime, counter-terrorism	98	99					08	12									**4**
		Advanced training: public security crisis mgt. (including crowd control)	97	99		05		02	05	08			07	07	09			13	**10**
		Advise national (or other non-UN) police	95	99	00	04	01		04	08	05	04	05	06	08	08	11	13	**16**
		Mentor local police Forces	97	99	00	04	02	02	04	11		04	05	06	08	08	11	13	**15**
	Monitor, Register	Monitor/assess host state police conduct and performance	95	99	00	04		02	03	04	05	04	05	06	08	08	11		**14**
		Co-locate with local police	98		00	05		02	05	11		05	07	06	09		11	13	**12**
		Register local police	00			05			03			04	07	07			11		**7**
	Assess, Liase, Coordinate	Mission planning support		99	00	01	00	02	03	04	04	04	05	06	08	07	11	13	**15**
		Needs/capacity assessment	95		00	03	02	02	05	11	04	04	09	08		07	11	13	**14**
		Coordination of aid to host state police			00	04	02	02	07	11	05	09	?	10		08	11	13	**13**
		Liaise with Int'l Orgs or humanitarian community	95	99	00	07	02	02	09	09	05	06	09	06	08	08	11	13	**16**
		Liaise with UNPOL in other Missions				05			07	07	05						11		**5**
Judicial & Corrections		Correctional reform/assessment		99		08			03	06	04	04	07	08	09	08	11		**11**
		Legal/judicial reform and monitoring	98	99	00	07		02	03	05	04	04	09	07	09	08	11		**14**
		Judicial & witness protection	00	99		07													**3**
		Assist development of legal codes		99	00	06		02	05	05		06		07			11		**9**

Table 2: UNPOL Task Frequency, 1995-2013

No. of missions with task	Task Description
16	Advise national (or other non-UN) police
16	Basic training for local police
16	Liaise with Int'l Orgs or humanitarian community
15	Mentor local police Forces
15	Mission planning support
14	Monitor/assess host state police conduct and performance
14	Needs/capacity assessment
14	Restructure/reform police force
13	Coordination of aid to host state police
13	**Humanitarian/UN personnel security**
13	Institution/infrastructure development
12	Co-locate with local police
12	**Protection of civilians (by UNPOL)**
11	Recruitment assistance (including screening and certification)
10	Advanced training: public security crisis mgt. (including crowd control)
10	**Crowd/riot control**
9	**Conduct independent patrols**
9	**Election security (as applicable)**
9	**Joint patrols (with local police)**
8	**Border/customs control**
8	**IDP/refugee security/repatriation (minority protection)**
7	Register local police
7	**Support or conduct criminal investigations**
7	Women's & children's rights &/or domestic violence unit development
6	**Community policing**
6	Create Border Security Service
6	**Investigate host state police and government abuses and corruption**
5	Dismiss or deactivate local police
5	**Joint patrols with international military**
5	Liaise with UNPOL in other Missions
4	Advanced training: org'd crime, counter-terrorism
4	**Disarmament, weapons inspection/destruction**
4	Law Enforcement with powers of arrest
4	**Organized crime prevention/disruption**
3	**Airport/Seaport security**
3	Detention, management of
3	**Weapon inspections & seizures**
2	**Anti-gang operations**
2	**Anti-trafficking operations**
2	**Assist demobilization & reintegration**
1	Advanced training: refugee return
1	**Assist Illegal checkpoint removal**

Table 3: Notional Trends in UNPOL Operating Environments

Level of Hostilities	Description of Levels	UNMIBH	UNMIK	UNTAET	MONUC	UNAMSIL	UNMISET	UNMIL	UNOCI	ONUB	MINUSTAH	UNMIS	UNMIT	UNAMID	MINURCAT	UNMISS	MINUSMA
10	No Cease-fire; major armed violence in some or all of the AOR																
8	Partial cease-fire (between certain groups or in parts of AOR)													X			X
7	All armed parties sign accord, but one or more sign in bad faith*				X											X	
6	Significant, hostile armed groups are not parties to peace accord								X			X		X			X
5	All armed parties sign in good faith, but one or more violent factions break away					X						X				X	
4	General cease-fire but no peace accord (internal conflict/fragile state)									X			X				
3	Other states/criminal entities recruit ex-fighters for coercive/criminal purposes					X	X	X					X		X		X
2	All armed parties sign accord but one or more obstruct mission	X	X						X			X		X		X	
1	All armed parties sign in good faith; minimal spoiler activity of any sort			X				X							X		

Notional trend line

*Indicators of bad faith: resumption or continuation of violence against political, ethnic or religious foes.

Table 4: Contributors of Formed Police Units, December 2013

FPU PCCs	FPU Contributions by Mission (Personnel)							Total FPU Personnel	FPUs as Pct of Each Listed PCC's Police Contributions to UN
	UNAMID	*MINUSTAH*	UNMIL	*MONUSCO*	*MINUSMA*	*UNOCI*	UNMISS		
Bangladesh	559	317		269	177	179	73	1574	88%
<u>Jordan</u>	<u>274</u>	<u>279</u>	<u>240</u>			<u>481</u>		1274	84%
India		437	243	270				950	97%
Senegal	*280*	*140*		*250*	*280*			*950*	*90%*
Nepal	140	140	380					660	76%
Nigeria	278		120		140			538	83%
Pakistan	140	139				149		428	73%
Togo	*140*				146			286	88%
Rwanda		140			140			280	58%
<u>Egypt</u>	<u>139</u>			<u>140</u>				279	65%
Burkina Faso	*140*							140	47%
Indonesia	140							140	92%
<u>*Djibouti*</u>	<u>*137*</u>							137	78%
By Mission and Overall	2367	1592	983	929	883	809	73	7636	79%

Notes: *Italics* indicate francophone UN missions, host states, and PCCs. <u>**Underline**</u> indicates Arabic speaking PCCs and missions where Arabic is an official national language. Use of both indicate PCCs with both as official languages.
Sources: UN, "Mission's Summary Detailed by Country," UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2013; UN,