Interfaces Between Peace Operations and Organized Crime[1]

Implications for Police Work and Beyond[2]

BACKGROUND PAPER

Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping: Framing the Framework
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I. Introduction: Organized Crime and International Peace and Stability

Organized Crime and International Peace and Security

In the recent past, the Security Council has increasingly highlighted the threat organized crime[3] (OC) poses to peace and stability. Already in 2010, the Council noted that it considers transnational organized crime, piracy and trafficking in drugs and human beings as 'evolving challenges and threats to international peace and security'.[4] A 2012 Presidential Statement noted that transnational organized crime 'negatively impact[s] the consolidation of peace in countries emerging from conflict' [5]. A year later, following a Council debate on drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel, the Council highlighted that organized crime is 'threatening to reverse peacebuilding advances' [6] invited the Secretary-General '… to consider these threats as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions' assessment, planning and peacebuilding support.'[7] On numerous occasions, the Council also stressed the threats emerging from linkages between terrorism and organized crime.[8]

The Council has also voiced its concern about the detrimental impact of organized crime on various countries currently supported by peace

1 This paper is a commissioned background paper for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Challenges Forum Partnership or the Host.

2 Parts of this background paper are based on research initially published in: Wibke Hansen: Mehr Interaktion als geplant: Friedenseinsätze und Organisierte Kriminalität in fragilen Staaten. Münster, 2012. The author wishes to thank Anne Sophie Fendrich for her research assistance in support of this paper.

3 The Palermo Convention defines and organized criminal group as follows: 'For the purposes of this Convention: (a) 'Organized criminal group' shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit' (see A/RES/55/25, 15. November 2000, article 2).

4 S/PRST/2010/18, 23 September 2010, p. 1.

5 S/PRST/2012/29, 20 December 2012, p. 3.

6 S/PRST/2012/2, 21 February 2012, p. 1.

7 S/PRST/2013/22, 18 December 2013, p. 4.

8 See for example Security Council Resolutions 2083, 17 December 2012, and 2129, 17 December 2013, as well as Presidential Statements S/PRST/2012/17, 4 May 2012, and S/PRST/2013/5, 13 May 2013.

operations.[9] Most recently, West Africa and the Sahel region have come into focus in this regard,[10] though the challenge is not limited to one part of the world. The Security Council has expressed 'grave concern over the negative impacts of illicit drug trafficking and organized crime on Guinea-Bissau and the subregion' [11], highlighted the threat posed by transnational organized crime, including drugs and arms trafficking, to stability in Liberia and the subregion[12], pointed to the need for 'enhanced cooperation and coordination [...] in order to tackle transnational organized crime, including illicit activities such as drug trafficking' in Mali[13] and requested UNIPSIL to tackle transnational organized crime in Sierra Leone.[14]

It also drew attention to 'the threat posed by the production, trade and trafficking of illicit drugs to international peace and stability' in a 2012 resolution on Afghanistan[15] and encouraged MINUSTAH in Haiti to 'assist the Government in effectively tackling gang violence, organized crime, drug trafficking and trafficking of children'.[16] This is in addition to a number of statements and resolutions passed in 2012 and 2013 in relation to organized crime and anti-piracy efforts off the Somali coast.

While this is certainly not an exhaustive list, these select examples illustrate not only the extent to which organized crime is perceived as a threat to peace and stability but also that most of today's peace operation theatres seem to be affected.

Organized Crime and State Fragility

Growing attention to organized crime in the context of international security, however, is not an entirely new development. Over the past decade, and in the wake of 9/11, it has not least been the debate about transnational security threats emerging from fragile states that has brought organized crime back on the security policy agenda. Linkages between state fragility and threats such as organized crime but also terrorism have been increasingly subject to debate in academic as well as security policy circles.

Security policy documents from the US National Security Strategy (2002), to the European Security Strategy (2003) or NATO's new strategic concept (2011) have all stressed that organized crime constitutes a key security threat. Some of these documents emphasize that fragile states can provide a conducive environment to organized criminal groups; others stress the particular vulnerability of fragile states when it comes to the impact of organized crime. The notion of clear causal linkages between state fragility and transnational security threats has since come under criticism. However, while it is clear that fragile states do not

9 The term peace operations is used here as encompassing both, DPKO-led missions as well as DPA-led special political missions.
10 S/PRST/2010/4, 24 February 2010; S/RES/2039, 29 February 2012.
11 S/RES/2048, 18 May 2012, p. 2.
12 S/RES/2066, 12 September 2012.
13 S/RES/2071, 12 October 2012, p. 1.
14 S/RES/2065, 12 September 2012.
15 S/RES/2096, 19 March 2013, p. 6.
16 S/RES/2070, 12 October 2012, p. 6.

attract organized crime per se, certain features of fragility do provide opportunities for criminal groups and the conduct of illicit activities with impunity.

Within the UN, the 2004 Report on 'Threats, Challenges and Change' identified transnational organized crime as one of six clusters of threats 'with which the world must be concerned today and in the decades ahead'.[17] The report highlights, in particular, the connection between organized crime and conflict:

Combating organized crime serves the double purpose of reducing this direct threat to State and human security, and also constitutes a necessary step in the effort to prevent and resolve internal conflicts, combat the spread of weapons and prevent terrorism.[18]

It also notes that 'responses to organized crime during and after conflict have been decentralized and fragmented'[19] and that '[s]tatements about the seriousness of the threat have rarely been matched by action.'[20]

Implications for Peace Operations

In light of this increased attention and these different diagnoses – most notably the linkages between crime and conflict as well as crime and fragility – it is astonishing that there has not yet been a commensurate debate on how this impacts peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and indeed peace operations, one of the international community's primary tools for stabilizing fragile or conflict-ridden states.[21] In particular, increased threat awareness has not yet translated into guidance, policy or tools for the field though this is where these challenges are most severely felt.[22] During a Challenges Forum Workshop in Entebbe (2013) with practitioners from operations in the subregion, participants were asked to pass a vote on what they considered the major threats to peace operations. Organized crime was the most frequently mentioned threat. A glance at recent reports by the Secretary-General on various current operations mirrors this picture and illustrates how frequently peace operations are more or less directly confronted with OC whether it is in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan or Haiti.[23]

At the same time missions are rarely explicitly mandated – and equipped– to deal with organized crime even if the problem is recognized early on. While organized crime might be mentioned in Security Council

17 A/59/565, p. 25.
18 Ibid para 165, p. 49.
19 Ibid para 169, p. 50
20 Ibid para 167, p. 49
21 There are some notable exceptions, see for example the special issue of International Peacekeeping: James Cockayne, Adam Lupel (eds): Peace Operations and Organized Crime: Case Studies, Lessons Learned and Next Steps, International Peacekeeping, 16 (2009) 1; as well as other works on the subject by James Cockayne; see also Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw and Arthur Boutellis: The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime? International Peace Institute, June 2013.
22 In fact, the new UN police policy, which at the time of writing is only a few weeks old, is one of the first official documents with explicit reference to responsibilities in an operational context, policy and tools.
23 See for example S/2013/359, 17 June 2013, on the Sahel and West-Africa; S/2012/506, 29 June 2012, on Cote d'Ivoire; S/2012/230, 16 April 2012, on Liberia or S/2013/119, 27 February 2013, on the DRC.

resolutions as a threat, provisions for countering organized crime are missing from the operative paragraphs of the resolution. The resolution authorizing MINUSMA is the most recent example for this pattern. Even where countering organized crime was initially not part of the mandate, however, references to OC are at times found in progress/exit-benchmarks. This illustrates the significance that missions assign to countering organized crime in the host country but also discrepancies in current approaches of dealing with OC in the context of peace operations.

Why is it important to translate threat awareness into policy and instruments and to enable peace operations to better deal with the threat posed by OC and what could be possible measures to do so? – In order to answer these questions it might be helpful to look at some of the interfaces between peace operations and organized crime first. I suggest below an analytical roster or model made up of seven possible interfaces which might assist in structuring the various linkages and in assessing threats to peace operations, mandate implementation and host-nation stability. In doing so, it might also help structure our thinking on the corresponding need for action.

II. The Organized Crime – Peace Operations-Nexus

Box 1: Seven Possible Interfaces between Organized Crime and Peace Operations

- Organized Crime fuels conflict
- Organized Crime undermines security
- Peacekeepers participate in Organized Crime
- Peace Operations fuel Organized Crime
- Peace Operations co-opt Organized Crime
- Organized Crime corrupts elites
- Peace Operations combat Organized Crime

Organized Crime Fuels Conflict

Organized crime can prolongue or exacerbate conflict by a) funding or resourcing armed groups or by b) providing economic incentives for the continuation of conflict and the undermining of peace processes. Aspects of this have been thoroughly researched in the context of the debate on so-called 'war economies'. Terms such as 'blood diamonds' point to the linkages between illegal resource exploitation and armed conflict. A nexus between organized crime and violent non-state actors has become more frequent since the end of the cold war, when state funding for insurgent groups decreased – more and more rebel groups today are 'self-financed.' Illegal resource exploitation and the drug trade are probably the most significant streams in this regard.[24]

24 On the latter see for example Svante Cornell, The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict, in: Journal of Peace Research, 42 (2005), p. 751-760.

In some cases, profits from criminal activities seem to even have changed the motivational structure of these groups from political to criminal-economic motives. This seems to have been part of the scenario in Eastern Congo. In his last report on MONUSCO, the Secretary-General noted that: '[a]ll armed groups, whether Congolese or foreign, have also engaged in the illegal exploitation of the vast mineral and other natural resources of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as other criminal activities. For those groups, the benefits derived from the illegal exploitation of those resources not only finance their acquisition of illicit weapons, but have also become an end in themselves.'[25]

Such 'economic spoilers' are then particularly difficult to deal with as political strategies, processes of inclusion or power sharing are not necessarily incentives for these groups whose business opportunities could be threatened by the end of conflict.

These dynamics, however, are not limited to the active conflict phase, or, in other words: war economies do not cease to exist after the conclusion of a peace agreement. The proceeds from organized crime oftentimes provide incentives for the continued existence of non-state armed groups.

Organized Crime Undermines Security

Assessments contained in the Secretary-General's Reports on various missions indicate to what extent organized crime is seen as a challenge to security – and with that to mandated tasks such as the establishment of a secure environment. In some cases, such as in Haiti, insecurity has prompted missions to take robust action against actors involved in or supported by organized crime. In other cases criminal actors have even targeted UN personnel directly. Attacks on UN police personnel in Kosovo, for example, were thought to be motivated by the missions increasing activities in combating organized crime.[26]

Proceeds from OC can also fuel the emergence or prolonged existence of non-state armed groups – even in the absence of armed conflict or once a peace process is under way. One example is the drug trade and its impact on the proliferation of gangs and other armed groups in Haiti. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, areas rich in natural resources were long controlled by armed groups – oftentimes ex-combatants – after the civil wars had ended. Sometimes these groups also acted as providers of security for certain segments of the population – a factor that needs to be taken into consideration when counter-strategies are devised.

Organized crime can also have a long-term impact on security by weakening or undermining security sector reform: In his 2013 report on SSR to the Security Council , the Secretary-General notes that '[c]urrent approaches to security sector reform have been confronted with a proliferation of transnational threats, including trafficking in humans, drugs and arms; terrorism; insurgency; climate change and environmental degradation, organized crime and armed violence; and cybercrime'.[27]

25 S/2013/119, 27 February 2013, para 48, p. 12.
26 S/2003/421, 14 April 2003, para 14, p. 4.
27 S/2013/480, 13 August 2013, para 9, p. 5.

Peacekeepers Participate in Organized Crime

There have been cases where peacekeepers themselves have been involved in organized crime. The issue attracted public attention notably during the 1990s Balkan missions – not least when an UNPROFOR contingent was redeployed due to its involvement in the drug trade. However, the issue is neither limited to one particular operation nor to a particular TCC. Such cases, when they become public, attract a considerable amount of media attention and fan public debates on the faults of peace operations and peacekeepers. As a consequence, the public perception of the extent of this problem might not necessarily match reality. Even single cases show, however, that peace operations, too, are vulnerable to infiltration by organized crime. Peace operations should be prepared for this, particularly as the impact on the credibility of a mission – even of isolated cases – can be considerable.

Peace Operations Fuel Organized Crime

Peace Operations have 'side effects' or unintended consequences.[28] One of such side effects can be that peace operations – or accompanying measures – create opportunities for organized crime networks. The causal linkages between a rising demand for prostitution and an increase in human trafficking is well-known, fairly well researched and documented, and has led the UN Secretariat as well as missions to adopt counter-measures. In fact, this is one of the few areas where missions can impact the demand side. However, the predominant OC-activities in mission areas are generally driven by an international demand.

Decisions on strategies, instruments or measures employed in addition to a mission can also have side effects, one example being sanctions. 'Embargo busting' is an important business for criminal networks.[29] This was perhaps nowhere more clear than in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Sanctions on the export of Sierra Leonean diamonds at first primarily resulted in increased smuggling of Sierra Leonean diamonds through Liberia. It was only after additional sanctions were imposed on the Liberian diamond trade that this dynamic could be reversed. Meanwhile, Liberian President Charles Taylor, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and wide international criminal networks benefited immensely from a flourishing diamond and weapons trade – to the detriment of attempts to end Sierra Leone's civil war.[30]

Similarly, decisions on the way a mission is deployed, particularly during start-up, can advantage criminal actors. In Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone security gaps during the deployment phase provided criminal networks with opportunities to establish themselves. UNMIK's Central Intelligence Unit has found that Kosovo came to be seen as a safe transit area for

28 For an in depth discussion of unintended consequences see Chiyuki Aoi, Ramesh Thakur: Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, Tokyo/NY/Paris 2007.

29 See Peter Andreas: Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions. Embargo Busting and Its Legacy, in: International Studies Quarterly (2005) 49, p. 335-360.

30 This is fairly well documented in the reports of the Expert Panels that supported the sanctions committees on Liberia and Sierra Leone, see for example S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001; S/2002/470, 19 April 2002; S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002.

illegal goods in 1999 and 2000 – a period of time during which KFOR and UNMIK were already deployed.[31]

Similar patterns can emerge when a mission withdraws. Regarding Afghanistan, the Secretary-General has noted that '[t]he financial impact of the large-scale departure of international forces may make the illicit economy, notably that based on narcotics, even more attractive to those with large patronage systems to sustain.'[32]

Peace Operations co-opt Organized Crime

In principle, strategies of co-optation make sense in the context of peace operations – not least as capacities to act against spoilers are usually limited and broad-based local ownership is essential for sustainability of peacebuilding efforts. However, co-opting groups of actors into the peace process is more likely to be successful where actors pursue a political agenda and can thus be motivated by political incentives. Such approaches might reach their limits quickly where actors are motivated by and hold on to a criminal-economic agenda.

The RUF in Sierra Leone is an example of a rebel group which pursued an economic agenda and proved resistant to political incentives. The peace process that followed the Lomé Peace Accord granted the RUF participation in a transitional government – which the group used to further their illegal economic agenda. Aspects of this are well documented not only in the reports of the Secretary-General for the time period concerned but also in the reports of the independent expert panel working with the sanctions committee. In Kosovo, too, a rebel group supported through illicit proceeds and with close linkages to the Albanian mafia, was integrated into the administrative structures of Kosovo. In both instances the co-optation of groups involved in or enabled by organized crime had severe consequences. In Sierra Leone, this almost made the peace process falter. In Kosovo it led to close linkages between the emerging political elite and organized crime which were difficult to deal with for both UNMIIK and EULEX.

Organized Crime Corrupts Elites

For peace operations, the politically relevant elite is one of the key partners in the host nation. Without the cooperation of this group, sustainable stabilization and peacebuilding processes are almost impossible to achieve. For organized crime groups, the corruption of a country's elite is a key strategy for conducting illegal activities with impunity. In various countries which currently host peace operations there is evidence of close linkages between members of the political elite and organized crime. The UN has on numerous occasions drawn attention to this. In relation to Guinea Bissau, the Secretary-General argued that '[v]ery weak law enforcement capacity […] continued to provide organized criminal groups with an avenue for the unchallenged use of the territory as a transit point for international drug trafficking.

31 See UNMIK, Pillar 1 Police and Justice Presentation Paper, p. 36.
32 S/2012/462, 20 June 2012, para 69, p. 16.

Allegedly, this happens with the support of members of the defense and security forces, as well as members of the political elite. This has led to the unabated spread of cocaine trafficking in Guinea-Bissau.'[33] In Haiti, members of the elite are not only suspected of involvement in the drug trade but also of employing the services of armed gangs for that purpose.

Such situations come with some very grave challenges for peace operations. Illicit income influences the preferences of elites and generally reduce their will for any genuine reform that could endanger their illicit income (no matter whether these serve pure enrichment or the financing of personal patronage-networks or the pursuit of a political projects). In Haiti, the fact that also the police service was implicated in the cocaine trade raised questions about the sustainability or even the feasibility of police reform and capacity building.

Peace Operations Combat Organized Crime

Over time, peace operations have employed a wide range of measures aimed at countering organized crime and illicit economic activities or reducing its most detrimental impact on the host nation and on mandate implementation. Obviously, most experiences in that regard rest with UN Police, be it in building the capacity of a host nation to combat organized crime, in providing planning and operational support to action against organized crime or in boosting a mission's own capacities to detect criminal spoilers and take action against them. However, measures that missions have previously employed also fall outside the immediate activities of the UN police. They include observation and/or patrolling of borders and coasts, control of ports and airports, policy advice to government and administration or even measures aimed at strengthening community resilience against organized crime. In some cases missions were even able to compensate for some inherent restrictions in countering organized crime – such as the lack of intelligence capabilities or powers of arrest. Operations against gangs in Port-au-Prince, the use of MINUSTAH's Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) in gathering information in preparation of such operations and the cooperation between MINUSTAH and the Haitian police service can serve as one example.

In most cases, however, the measures adopted did not follow a strategy pursued from the outset of the mission. They were integrated into mandate implementation over time and in response to threats on the ground. This also means that at the outset, missions deployed in OC-affected environments were insufficiently prepared to deal with the threat that organized crime posed to security and stability in the mission area and, indeed, to mandate implementation. In Kosovo, for example, UNMIK's Organized Crime Bureau was established more than three years into the mission's life. Five years after its deployment, MINUSTAH was reinforced by a maritime component in order to support the Haitian costal guard in efforts to reduce cocaine smuggling via sea. The time-lag that occurs until missions have strengthened their own capacities to tackle the problem can easily be exploited by the criminal groups.

33 S/2012/889, 27 November 2012, para 32, p. 8.

III. Some Cross-Cutting Issues

Organized Crime is not a Side Issue in Mission Areas

In fragile and post-conflict states, peace operations are frequently confronted with a whole array of illegal economic activities – some are organized crime, others are organized but not criminalized and yet others are criminal but not organized – the lines between those different phenomena are often blurred. While many of these activities (often the better organized ones) are of a transnational nature, 'local' organized crime – for example in the form of protection rackets, kidnapping or organized forms of robbery – is also a frequent phenomenon.

And it is not only mafia-like groups that benefit from organized crime in these environments. A diverse range of actors draws on criminal activities for different purposes. For OC-groups it is purely an end in itself, for rebels it is a way of funding a political agenda, for elites, those profits can also be a political resource, for ex-combatants, it could be a way of earning a living in a post-conflict situation. The specific motivation that drives actors to engage in organized crime is not necessarily decisive for the impact of such actions on the state. Ex-combatants occupying resource-rich areas create zones out of state control just as drug-cartels controlling strategic territory. However, the motivation is a key factor when it comes to devising appropriate counter-strategies. In some cases, a narrow focus on law enforcement might end up criminalizing whole segments of society where the creation of job-opportunities might have been a more effective counter-measure. However, where greed is the main driver, such measures will prove futile in light of the high profits organized crime yields.

Organized Crime Affects the Core Business of Peace Operations

A peace operation as such is no sufficient deterrent for OC-groups. However, there are cases where missions are believed to have a deterrent effect against the spread of organized crime, e.g. in Liberia which seems less affected by the growing cocaine trade through West-Africa than its neighbors. In other places – including in Kosovo – a sizeable international presence did not prevent criminal networks establishing roots and business in the area.

Missions are severely affected by the presence of organized crime in the mission area. This seems self-evident for the police component, its core functions and corresponding activities (see box 2 below). However, the impact is in no way limited to the police component or those dealing directly with crime related issues. In fact, OC seems to affect many areas of mandate implementation and, indeed, the core business of peace operations. OC can undermine a secure environment, spoilers motivated by criminal proceeds can undermine the implementation of peace agreements and – perhaps most critically so – OC threatens to undermine peacebuilding processes and with that the sustainability of a peace operation's efforts – and its exit options.

It is well established by now, that legitimate, functioning and reliable institutions are critical for long-term peace and stability. Peace operations

today are also concerned with supporting the emergence of such institutions and with the extension of state authority. The UN itself has highlighted in relation to various mission environments how severe of a threat organized crime and the corruption that accompanies it pose to this core aim. In some cases, peace operations – or the international community overall – have employed some fairly intrusive measures to counter this threat – for example the international oversight provided in the context of GEMAP or the deployment of international judges to guarantee the independence of the judiciary– particularly in cases involving organized crime – to Kosovo.

Ahead of the deployment of a peace operations, as well as during its course, two questions thus seem 'mission-critical': Which actors are involved in organized crime and what is their relationship with the state? If non-state actors profit, there is a danger that they turn into spoilers of the peace process. If state-actors are involved, there is a danger that state institutions are hollowed out from within.

In Haiti, corruption in the police service fueled the local cocaine trade and at the same time weakened the population's confidence in the security sector. This led to an increased use of and reliance on non-state or private security actors (gangs, etc.) by parts of the population which weakened the states' monopoly on force further. The example illustrates that corruption or infiltration of institutions by criminal actors – undertaken to protect their own operations – can further weaken the fragile relations between states and their citizens. It also directly affects the implementation of mandated tasks such as police reform or the extension of state authority.

Box 2: UN Police Policy: Core Functions and Activities of UN Police

UN Police Core Functions	• Operational support/interim executive policing and other law enforcement • Support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of host State police
UN Police Activities	• Interim executive policing and law enforcement • Establishing basic building blocks for public safety • Public order management • Protection of civilians • Protection of UN personnel and facilities • Providing technical and operational support to host State police • Supporting the provision of security to electoral processes • Support against serious and organized crime • Providing material support • Training • Monitoring, advising and mentoring • Developing the organizational infrastructure and management system in host State police • Strengthening governance, accountability and integrity

Source: United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions. Policy. DPKO/DFS, 1 February 2014.

Is Peacekeeping also Crime Fighting?

Neither the problem of organized crime nor the detrimental impact it can have on security, stability and the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions will go away by itself. Indeed, the challenges OC poses for peace operations will most likely continue to grow. Yet, the current approach to organized crime in the context of peace operations is characterized not only by a lack of strategy but also by a number of discrepancies as a few examples illustrate.

- Peace operations are rarely mandated or equipped to deal with organized crime, yet they frequently have to in order to avoid a further destabilization of the host nation, to be able to fulfill their mandate and to safeguard their achievements
- Peace operations are limited to their area of operation while OC-networks act transnationally
- Neither the local economy nor the international community can match the profits that OC offers
- Countering OC becomes almost impossible, when actors in government – on whose consent the peace operations is based – are involved.

Some of these discrepancies will be difficult to resolve. Others, however, could be tackled through a more strategic approach of countering organized crime in the context of peace operations. This would require – in principle – the acknowledgement or understanding that countering OC is also a task for peace operations.

It is obvious that peace operations are not primarily a crime-fighting tool. And it is obvious, that organized crime in fragile and post-conflict states cannot be contained through measures employed by peace operations alone. However, if the overall aim is to avoid a further destabilization of these countries through organized crime and, at the same time, to limit the space for transnational criminal groups in those states, then peace operations – with their security, peacebuilding and statebuilding tasks – play an important role. And, as peace operations are – *nolens volens* – already involved in countering crime in various ways, it only seems logical to at least enable them to do so more effectively. It could also be a way of supporting effective mandate implementation

IV. Questions for Discussion

- How can peace operations be enabled to deal with organized crime?
- Which capacities and capabilities are required in peace operations for a more strategic approach in countering organized crime and illicit economic activities?
- What is needed from the Security Council, the Secretariat and from member states (TCCs, PCCs) in that regard?
- Can previous experiences serve as starting point for a more strategic approach?

- What would the UN require to build capacity to combat OC in a way that is contextually-specific and appropriate? How can this be reflected in policy guidelines?
- Rather than concentrating on single criminal actors or activities, should peace operations concentrate more on those factors that create a beneficial working environment for criminal actors on changing opportunity structures?
- Which components outside of/ in addition to the police component need strengthening?
- What are the right instruments? What role for punitive measures/ robust law enforcement in combating OC?
- If operational law enforcement support is provided to the host State police, what are the implications for personnel selection and functional tasks?
- What does capacity building in combating organized crime mean, which are suitable methods, where are limits?
- How can peace operations – and police components in particular – assist host nations without taking away local responsibility?
- How can police components deal with corruption and criminal activities in the police service?
- Do we need to differentiate more clearly between transnational organized crime and local organized crime? Should peace operations focus on one rather than the other?
- In terms of sequencing and priorities, what priority should a peace operation assign to combating organized crime? How can this be placed within a broader rule of law/SSR strategy

Annex:
Table 1. Measures Employed by Peace Operations to Curb Organized Crime and Illegal Economic Activities – Selected examples

Area of Activity	Specific measures	Examples
Operations against OC	Law enforcement, operations, arrests	UNMIK Kosovo
Operational support to local actors	Planning and operational support to local law enforcement	MINUSTAH Haiti
	Support to local law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations	UNMIL Liberia
Monitoring, surveillance	Monitoring, surveillance, control of smuggling activities – aerial and ground	Diamond fields UNAMSIL, UNMIL; Rubber smuggling UNMIL
	Patrolling coasts	Maritime Component MINUSTAH
Information gathering	Increase information gathering capacities in mission	KOCB UNMIK, JMAC MINUSTAH, MINUSMA
Capacity building police	Training and capacity building in specialized areas for police	UNMIK and Kosovo Police Service
		MINUSTAH and HNP
	Support in the creation of specialized units to combat OC	Transnational Crime Unit, Liberia/ Cote d'Ivoire; Diamonds Crime Intelligence and Investig. Unit, Sierra Leone
Capacity building of and support to justice/criminal justice systems	Deployment of international judges	UNMIK Kosovo
	Witness protection programs	UNMIK Kosovo
	Provision of legislation for fighting OC	UNMIK Kosovo
	Conduct of criminal investigations	UNMIK Kosovo
Support to border control, border security (including costs, ports, airports)	Establish presence at borders	UNMIK Kosovo; MINUSTAH Haiti
	Strengthen border-security -management	MINUSTAH Haiti
	Support to coastal guards	MINUSTAH Haiti
	Control ports and airports	UNMIL (Monrovia Freeport)
Advice for government and administration	Joint committees/mechanisms	Rubber Task Force Liberia
	Support in developing policies and strategies	UNMIL Liberia
Operational support to state control over resources/ resource governance	Support to building cadaster systems	UNAMSIL Sierra Leone
	Security presence in areas of resource exploitation	Security presence rubber plantations/ UNMIL Liberia
Local and global control mechanisms/ supply chain integrity	International control over concessions	GEMAP, UNMIL Liberia
	Certification processes diamond sector; Kimberley process	Support to building up certification centers, Liberia
	Other supply chain integrity mechanisms	MONUSCO, DRC
Support sanction regimes	Supporting compliance	UNMIL Liberia
	Support to expert panels	UNMIL Liberia, UNAMSIL SL
Regional and international cooperation	Strengthen regional police cooperation and cooperation with Interpol	UNMIK
	Inter-mission cooperation	UNMIL, UNAMSIL, UNOCI
Awareness, public education, building social resilience	Provision of services and infrastructure	QUIPs in Slums, Haiti MINUSTAH
	Public relations campaigns	'Not for sale' campaign UNMIK
Employment	Creation of training and employment opportunities for actors in illegal economies	Adjustment of MINUSTAH's DDR program to include gang members; reopening of Liberia's DDR program in 2008.
Reducing demand/ unintended consequences	Zero-tolerance policy	All missions
	Training, sensitization for staff	UNMIK Kosovo
	'Off-limits' Lists	UNMIK Kosovo