Implementing *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace:*

An approach to benchmarking HIPPO recommendations in five key areas

WILLIAM DURCH

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THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The Challenges Forum is a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policymakers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. The Forum contributes to shaping the debate by identifying critical challenges facing military, police and civilan peace operations, by promoting awareness of emerging issues and by generating recommendations for solutions for the consideration of the broader international peace operations community. It is a global network of Partners representing 48 peace operations departments and organizations from 22 countries.

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Preface

This past year has been eventful and important for United Nations peace operations. The most thorough review of UN peace operations in 15 years was produced by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in the summer of 2015. Following close on the heels of the HIPPO Report, a series of expert reviews were issued with direct relevance to peace operations, including the Secretary-General's response to the HIPPO Report; the Advisory Group of Experts' Review on the Organization's Peacebuilding Architecture, and; the Global Study on the Implementation of the Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Moreover, underlining Member States' commitment to UN peace operations and the weight attached to continue the process of strengthening capabilities and capacities, Member States made new and improved pledges at the Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit in September 2015, including 40 000 troops and police, 40 helicopters, 15 engineer units and 10 field hospitals.

2016 has also been a milestone year for the Challenges Forum Partnership. Today the Challenges Forum consists of 22 Partner Countries and 48 organizations. The purpose of the endeavor remains steadfast—to enhance the planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations, and second, to strengthen and broaden the international network of actors involved in and supporting UN peace operations. On 8-9 May, the Challenges Forum marked its 20th anniversary with the event *United Nations Peace Operations 2020: The United Nations Reviews and Their Implications for Tomorrow's Missions.* The two-day meeting in New York, co-hosted by the Permanent Missions to the UN of Armenia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sweden and the United States, focused on the recent expert and high-level reviews of UN peace operations and what they mean for future peace operations. The timeliness of the meeting was highlighted by the fact that it took place back-to-back with the General Assembly High-level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security, on 10-11 May. At the opening of the General Assembly debate, the Challenges Forum disseminated a summary of the deliberations held at the Challenges 20th Anniversary Forum.

The current commitment and devotion to UN peace operations is encouraging. It is now key that the momentum is sustained in order to

ensure efficient and effective peace operations for tomorrow. This occasional paper aims at contributing to the momentum of the reviews, and to ensure that words are turned into action. By offering a framework which allows for measuring and evaluating the implementation of recommendations found in the HIPPO Report, it offers a concrete path to progress. The author has been able to draw on his extensive experience from analysis of international organization and peacekeeping, and most notably from having served as Project Director for the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the 'Brahimi Report' – the extensive and groundbreaking review that has had a major impact on the way in which UN peacekeeping has been conducted during the past 15 years.

The benchmarks set out in this paper will enable us to keep track of whether needed changes and developments are actually taking place, and, importantly, shed light on which actors have the key to make the recommendations come true. That is, while some of the recommendations will require action of the Secretary-General and UN Secretariat, others will require action of a much larger group of actors, including e.g. individual Member States, the General Assembly, regional organizations, and UN agencies, funds and programmes. Distinguishing the different actors responsible for carrying out the various recommendations will help us to follow up on implementation but may also indicate which recommendations are more complex to achieve.

I would like to thank Dr William Durch, Challenges Forum Senior Adviser, for authoring this important and timely paper, which we hope will be of both interest and utility as the international community continues to work on implementation in the coming months and years ahead.

Annika Hilding Norberg
Director, Challenges Forum

July 2016

Executive Summary

This paper considers how one might best track the implementation of the recommendations generated by the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO), which in June 2015 issued the first comprehensive review of United Nations (UN) peace operations in 15 years.[1]

The HIPPO Report contains 125 separately listed recommendations, counting all sub-recommendations separately. It also includes other important policy prescriptions that were not pulled into recommendations lists. This paper develops and discusses benchmarks for 61 of those recommendations, both listed and embedded, in five substantive areas—Women, Peace and Security; UN Police; staff safety and security; strategic communication; and financing of peace operations. Each of these areas has been a focus of the Challenges Forum Partnership for a number of years and each is a subject of intense current debate. The full text of the HIPPO recommendations in these areas and one or more implementation benchmarks for each are included in the Annex to this paper.

The methodology used here builds on one developed by the Stimson Center to track the implementation of the so-called Brahimi Report— the extensive review of UN peace operations conducted in 2000.[2] It allows for tracking, rating and comparing the implementation of each recommendation, noting the number and variety of actors involved. In general, the more actors that are responsible for implementation, the more complex the implementation process. Many of the initiatives in the HIPPO Report require not only the agreement of the UN's intergovernmental bodies but the support of other UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes or actions by regional bodies and individual Member States. The framework facilitates comparisons of progress within and between sets of recommendations and within and between categories of implementing agent: Is the General Assembly favoring one class of

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[1] United Nations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People*. Report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 16 June 2015.
[2] United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, Annex.

concepts but not another? Is the Secretariat leading on some issues but lagging on others? Have Member States stepped forward in those areas only they can address? In just some of those areas or all of them? The paper thereby provides a compact toolkit for tracking progress made by the UN in implementing the important and necessary goals set out in the HIPPO Report. The framework allows for implementation progress to be scored at different points in time and can easily be expanded to accommodate more categories of actors or greater detail within categories. It does not evaluate outcomes achieved by implementation or their longer-term impact, however; these are logical but separate analytical next steps.

Abbreviations

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question
AGE	Advisory Group of Experts (on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture)
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peace operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FPU	Formed Police Units
GEM	Gender Equality Marker
Global Study	*Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace – A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
ICC	International Criminal Court
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IPO	Individual Police Officer
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPTF	Multi-Party Trust Fund
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PC	Programme Criticality

PCC	Police Contributing Country
ROLIP	Rule of Law Indicators Project
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SPC	Standing Police Capacity
SPM	Special Political Mission
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNCOPS	United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDSS	UN Department of Safety and Security
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSMS	UN Security Management System
XB	Extra-Budgetary

1. Introduction

In June 2015, the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) issued the first comprehensive review of United Nations peace operations in 15 years.[1] The Panel's report was released in time to feed into preparations for the UN's 2015 World Summit[2] and the Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit 2015[3] in New York, which unfolded at the end of September 2015. Its release coincided with the report of the UN's Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the Organization's disjointed efforts to build and sustain peace after conflict.[4] The Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Global Study) was also released in 2015.[5] The AGE Report, the HIPPO Report and the Secretary-General's reply to it, and the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 offer common points of departure for all stakeholders weighing the UN's present and future roles in the field of peace and security. In parallel with the UN Reviews, a range of complimentary workshops and seminars were hosted and reviews and reports developed by Member States and the non-governmental community to contribute to the overall momentum for change and reform.[6] On May 8-9 2016, the Challenges Forum Partnership hosted its 20th

[1] United Nations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People. Report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 16 June 2015. (Hereafter, HIPPO Report.) The Secretary-General's initial reply to the HIPPO Report is, *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/70/357–S/2015/682, 2 September 2015.

[2] United Nations General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015.

[3] Hosted by the Heads of States of Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uruguay and the United States and opened by the UN Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the United States. See summaries of results from the Challenges Forum, at http://www.challengesforum.org/en/About/News/Leaders-Peacekeeping-Summit-20151, and the International Peace Institute, at http://futurepeaceops.org/pksummit/. For the summit declaration, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/declaration-leaders-summit-peacekeeping.

[4] United Nations, *Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, A/69/968-S/2015/490, 30 June 2015. (Hereafter, the AGE Report.)

[5] UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace – A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, 2015. (Hereafter, Global Study.) Available Available at: http://wps.unwomen.org/en.

[6] See for example, the Challenges Forum Report on *Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations*, presented to the UN Secretary-General, New York, 26 January 2015, available at: http://www.challengesforum.org/en/Reports--Publications/, and the report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and The Stimson Center, June 2015, available at: http://www.stimson.org/programmes/global-security-justice-and-governance.

Anniversary Forum specifically focusing on what impact the several reviews and recent developments may have on future peace operations. A summary of the outcomes from the Forum, including a session on benchmarking the implementation of the HIPPO Report, was shared with the General Assembly as it convened in New York for a High-level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security on the following two days.[7]

This paper focuses on the HIPPO Report and how one might best track its implementation. The paper has several parts. Following this introduction, the Evolving Context of Peace Operations section places the HIPPO Report in its historical and operational context; the Selecting Topics to Benchmark section lays out reasons for benchmarking five sets of recommendations rather than the entire Report; Monitoring Implementation describes the methodology proposed for benchmarking and scoring the implementation of those recommendations; and Building Benchmarks discusses the choice of specific measures to benchmark specific recommendations. The consideration and implementation of such a broad array of policy and institutional reforms in as complex and high-stakes an endeavor as UN peace operations will require many years. The paper concludes with some observations on the HIPPO Report and the future of peace operations as benchmarks for its various recommendations are met (or not) by the UN system and UN Member States.

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[7] United Nations, Office of the President of the General Assembly, *High-level Thematic Debate – In a World of Risks: A New Commitment for Peace*, http://www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/, accessed on 4 July 2016.

2. Evolving Context of Peace Operations

The HIPPO Report defines peace operations broadly, including,

> special envoys and mediators, political missions (including peacebuilding missions), regional preventive diplomacy offices, [and] observation missions (both ceasefire and electoral missions) to small, technical specialist missions (such as electoral support missions), multidisciplinary operations both large and small drawing on civilian, military and police personnel to support peace process implementation (and have included even transitional authorities with governance functions), as well as advance missions for planning. All these missions draw upon expertise mobilized by the Secretariat, including mediation and electoral specialists, and human rights, rule of law, gender, police and military experts.[8]

In the 70-year history of UN efforts to prevent conflict and to restore and sustain peace, never have its assignments been more daunting or its resources more strained than in roughly the last decade. UN obligations and their attendant stresses show no sign of abating soon. This may be one sign of a bad or worsening global political or economic environment, or the lengthening duration of UN missions could indicate an inadequate model for coping with that environment. Evidence from economic development that positive change takes a long time to embed suggests that a worsening environment plays a strong role in longer-duration missions; and no outside actor has come close to developing an especially effective approach to either preventing conflict or rebuilding peace. It is in this context of unprecedented demand, growing complexity, and doubts about the efficacy of operations that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon invited the HIPPO to take a fresh look at the UN's tasks, roles and capabilities. The expert panel built on the precedents set by a similar panel convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in March 2000, following the release of searing, UN-commissioned reports in late 1999 on the UN's poor performance in the face of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and failure to prevent a massacre of civilians in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995. The

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[8] United Nations, Hippo Report, para. 18.

2000 Panel was led by UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi and its report was released in August that year.[9]

The reforms proposed by the Brahimi Panel led to new capacities for peace operations at both Headquarters and field levels. In the wake of the 'Brahimi Report,' UN Headquarters staffing for all aspects of peacekeeping planning and support expanded considerably, but not by enough to raise Headquarters spending above 5 per cent of the cost of field operations. No effective modern business, military or diplomatic enterprise runs global operations with just 5 per cent of spending allocated to such things as strategic intelligence and analysis; long-range and short-term planning; recruitment and staffing; training; infrastructure; headquarters operations; and procurement.[10] On a per capita basis, support for uniformed peacekeepers remains even thinner: about 10 officers in New York for every 10,000 troops deployed in missions. The ratio is somewhat better for UN Police, but police are recruited and managed for UN service in much smaller batches than the military, with a broader range of skills and experience needed, as UN military forces rarely train their host state counterparts or try to rebuild ministries of defense.

Perhaps above all, the Brahimi Panel urged the UN and its Member States to be prepared for crises to come, from arranging for special standby military and police contingents (not implemented), to developing a serious in-house information and strategic analysis capacity, if only to manage and utilize the voluminous information that the UN's field personnel generated or observed every day (rejected by Member States).[11] Some of that capacity is now coming together in the wake of the HIPPO Report's similar call for better analysis, foreknowledge and knowledge management, the better to support a strategic conflict prevention strategy, protect civilian staff, troops and police from violent extremist threats, and find ways to implement effective strategies for protection of civilians in mission areas, with limited resources by comparison to needs.[12]

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[9] United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, Annex.

[10] William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle and Moira K. Shanahan, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (The Stimson Center: Washington, DC, 2003), table D1. United Nations, *Financing of the support account for peace operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. Note by the Secretary-General*, A/C.5/69/23, 23 June 2015, p. 2.

[11] United Nations, HIPPO Report, esp. paras. 164–166. United Nations, *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/70/357–S/2015/682, 2 September 2015, para. 54.

[12] UN DPKO has developed a three-tiered policy for protection of civilians, but resource requirements for its effective execution are rarely met, especially in missions with large areas of operation. For discussion, see

In 2000, the need for more robust UN knowledge generation, mission planning and operational capacity was already clear from two Security Council-mandated forays in temporary governance, in Kosovo and East Timor, and from the armed resistance encountered by a new UN operation in Sierra Leone. The UN's observer mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) evolved, between 2001 and 2005, from peace observation to peace enforcement in the country's eastern provinces. The UN took on other operations in Liberia, Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire originated by the African Union, to help implement agreements; deployed in Haiti to help prevent large-scale political violence; and sent troops and police into Darfur (Sudan), Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) to damp down ongoing or rising violence. These newer 'stabilization' operations are tasked to help contain conflicts and protect the most vulnerable potential victims of violence while trying to create space for political settlements. The UN's mission in South Sudan started as implementation support to such a settlement but refocused on civilian protection as the new country fell victim to politically accelerated inter-ethnic violence. In Somalia, meanwhile, the UN has been giving logistical and other support to counterinsurgency operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against the Islamist terrorist group al Shabaab. AMISOM supports the fledgling government in southern and central Somalia and has been both taking and inflicting casualties at rates that a UN mission could not tolerate, politically or operationally. Because the regional troop contributors have serious stakes in stabilizing Somalia and restoring a functional government there, they have been willing to shoulder the corresponding cost in lives.

But not all peace operations deploy troops. A newer kind of UN operation—the 'special political mission'—has been growing in importance, although the number of people involved (about 3,700) is modest.[13] This category includes UN special envoys (e.g., for Syria or Yemen), who are tasked to mediate an end to conflicts; Panels of Experts—small missions of four or five people who investigate and document violations of UN sanctions (often targeted sanctions growing out of internal/regional conflict); small political advisory missions of 15 to 50 people; and a handful of larger missions charged with multiple tasks related to rebuilding post-conflict governance, with up to 1,500 personnel

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Hilde F. Johnson, *Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?,* Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:4, December 2015.
[13] UN Department of *Political Affairs, Political and Peacebuilding Missions. Fact Sheet,* 30 November 2015, available at: http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/ppbm_November_2015.pdf.

(a majority recruited locally, a significant fraction of whom are security personnel).

Part of the evolving context for peace operations is the structure of the UN system itself. Efforts to make that system more efficient and effective at doing peace operations or 'delivering as one' run up against the system's structure as its Member States have built it, a piece at a time, for a wide array of purposes. As the HIPPO Panel stresses at several points, the UN is a sprawling, decentralized system that is loosely coordinated and subject to the authority of no single decision-maker. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the Secretariat, but not of the UN's other Agencies, Funds and Programmes with a stake in peace operations environments, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), or the World Food Programme. The UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination says flatly that 'No central authority exists to compel compliance by organizations of the system to act in a concerted manner.'[14] Since each entity's governing body of Member States approves its own budget and issues its own appeals for (largely voluntary) funding to Member States, the stage is set for competition within the system for limited funds, regardless of nominal commitments to coordinate. Tensions between competing agency, fund, programme and departmental interests are baked into the system.

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[14] 'The Membership of the CEB includes the United Nations; 15 Specialized Agencies established by intergovernmental agreements; 2 Related Organizations - World Trade Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency; and 11 Funds and Programmes created by the United Nations General Assembly. UN Women, established by the General Assembly in 2010, is the newest member to join the CEB.' http://www.unsceb.org/content/ceb (accessed on 20 February 2016).

3. Selecting Topics to Benchmark

The HIPPO Report contains 125 separately listed recommendations, counting all sub-recommendations separately. It also contains other important policy prescriptions that were not pulled into recommendations lists. This paper develops and discusses benchmarks for 61 recommendations, both listed and embedded, in five substantive areas, to serve as pilot cases for developing a method for measuring, tracking and following up on implementation. Each of the areas selected has been a focus of the Challenges Forum Partnership for a number of years and each is a subject of intense current debate. In the 15th year of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, issues related to women's security in zones of conflict and women's roles in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sustaining peace are only growing more salient, with great attention paid not only by the HIPPO Report, the AGE review of peacebuilding and the UN Women Global Study, but also the Special Committee on Peace operations. UN Police is the second focus of the HIPPO Report selected for developing thinking on benchmarking, given the growing attention paid to the essential role that international police peacekeepers play in complex peace operations, the role of the Challenges Forum in contributing to the development of police strategic guidance, the Police Division review completed in May 2016, and the anticipated UN Secretary-General's Report on policing due in the fall. Staff safety and security was selected for benchmarking because of the increasingly violent environment for peace operations, the broad support for safety and security enhancement, and in light of the current reorganization of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and of the UN system's overall approach to the problem. Strategic Communication is the fourth area, because it is, in peace operations, an often neglected area, that in this digital and communicative era needs to be an integral and increasingly pro-active element of mission strategy. Funding mechanisms round out the selection, because without more effective funding some of the thornier issues in the HIPPO Report will never be able to be addressed.

A. Women, Peace and Security

As a matter of importance for UN peace operations, Women, Peace and Security dates formally from the passage of UN Security Council resolution

1325 in October 2000, but in 1992–1995, societal violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina threw an ugly spotlight on rape as a weapon of war and a tool of genocide. Shortly thereafter, the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, recognized the importance of increasing the role of women in conflict resolution and the need for greater 'protection of women living in situations of armed conflict.'[15] In fall 2015, reports and initiatives addressing women and conflict, and women and peacebuilding included, in addition to the HIPPO and AGE reports and UN Women's Global Study, the Sustainable Development Goals passed by the General Assembly in September and the Secretary-General's latest report on implementation of the resolution 1325 agenda.[16]

In furthering the goals of Women, Peace and Security, the UN has stressed the importance, in policy development and practice, of focusing on gender: how women and men, girls and boys are defined or limited by respective social norms, roles and power. *A gender perspective* focuses attention on the power relationships between and among women and men and, as an analytical tool, 'sheds light on who has access to and control of resources, who participates fully in decision making in a society, what the legal status of men and women is, and what the beliefs and expectations are of how men and women live their daily lives.'[17] Gender *mainstreaming* uses a gender perspective to promote greater equality between women and men.

The Global Study cautions that dealing with gender per se only takes women part way down the road to effective equality—and security—in society. Gender is only one 'axis of difference' that

> intersects with many other forms of identity and experience. Nationality, ethnicity, political and religious affiliation, caste, indigeneity, marital status, disability, age, sexual preference; all of these, and others, are important factors in determining women's lived experiences of conflict and recovery. It is well understood that these identities can intersect to amplify vulnerability….[18]

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[15] UN Women, Global Study, p. 30.

[16] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*, S/2015/716, 16 September 2015. The UN Sustainable Development Goals are available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1300 (accessed 1 August 2016).

[17] S. Dharmapuri, *Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping*, Providing for Peacekeeping No. 4, International Peace Institute, July 2013, p. 23; and Challenges Forum, Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peace operations (Stockholm, 2010), p. 34.

[18] UN Women, Global Study, p. 34.

The recommendations embodied in the HIPPO Report related to Women, Peace and Security build on a growing body of research, analysis and field experience that documents how women are targeted for conflict-related sexual violence.[19] That violence can reappear, once major fighting ends, as an epidemic of rape and domestic abuse. Women also participate in fighting or bear double burdens as heads of households whose husbands, partners or fathers have been conscripted or killed. Unless the difficult economic, social and security burdens borne by women in conflict-affected environments are reduced significantly, it is difficult to see how the effects of conflict can be said to have been reduced. The Women, Peace and Security agenda addresses all of these issues. The Challenges Forum has stressed the importance of Member States implementing gender-related UN guidelines not just at the strategic level but in the field, with appropriate 'tools and measures to detect and monitor gender-related issues in peacekeeping' that can also show the 'effect and impact that an incorporated gender perspective has had in an operation.'[20]

B. UN Police

UN Police are seconded by Member States either as individual police officers (IPOs) or as members of formed police units (FPUs). The current trend toward deploying police in formed units started with the uneasy security situations of Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 and the recognition that military units are not trained or equipped to provide public security. At the end of 2015, the UN deployed about 13,900 police peacekeepers, of which 9,000 (65 per cent) were deployed in FPUs.[21] Formed units 'have three core tasks: public order management, protection of United Nations personnel and facilities, and support for police operations that may involve a higher risk above the general capability of an IPO.'[22] IPOs in turn carry out all other UN policing tasks, as mandated, ranging from direct law enforcement to operational support for local authorities and reform or restructuring of local police services

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[19] In addition to the UN Women Global Study, recent contributions include Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Louise Olsson, *Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325* (Routledge: London and New York, 2015) and Valerie M. Hudson, et al., 'The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States', International Security Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 7–45.

[20] Challenges Forum, *Designing Mandates and Capabilities*, pp. 42–43.

[21] UN DPKO, *Mission Summary Detailed by Country*, 31 December 2015. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.

[22] United Nations Department of Peace operations and Department of Field Support, G*uidelines – Police Operations in United Nations Peace operations and Special Political Missions*, Ref. 2015.15, 1 January 2016, para. 20 (accessed 1 August 2016).

and supporting institutions.[23] The HIPPO Report recommendations with respect to UN Police cover a wide range of issues, in turn, from urging rapid completion of consolidated operational guidelines[24] to the need for training and administrative improvement, continuing performance evaluation, and both greater advance consultation by the Secretariat and Security Council with police contributing countries (PCCs) and greater accountability for police behavior in missions. Inasmuch as UN Police may work closely with the local population in places where conflict has had a devastating impact on women, the Report places appropriate emphasis on gender sensitivity and gender balance in UN Police policy and practice. UN Police may be the most visible presence of a peace operation in communities, making UN Police competence, comportment and accountability of paramount importance not only to the mission but to the people they serve. Yet UN Police have serious issues of leadership, recruitment of appropriate specialist expertise, and keeping up with the sheer numbers of officers mandated for UN missions globally. As is well known, countries do not routinely train police for international service, nor are most routinely trained to train other police in their own services, let alone rebuild administrative structures and operational practice, in a foreign land and language. Yet that is the expected routine for UN Police. A UN Secretary-General-appointed external panel in May finalized a review of the Police Division's structure, staff and functions,[25] the first ever United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit (UNCOPS) was held on 2 June, and later in 2016, the UN Secretary-General will present his own report on UN policing, where the issue of benchmarking development could indeed constitute one important element.

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[23] United Nations, DPKO/DFS, *Guidelines - Police Operations in United Nations Peace operations and Special Political Missions*, Section D. [shortened form]

[24] The UN Police Division, in cooperation with Member States, has developed strategic guidelines for international police peacekeeping at the strategic and operational levels. The HIPPO Report urged the Secretariat to finalize also the third phase—tactical operationalization of the guidelines. The Challenges Forum Partnership contributed to development of operational-level guidelines, in particular, in the areas of capacity-building and development and police command. See also Mark Andrew Reber, *Challenges with Assessing Impact in International Police Reform and Assistance*, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper No. 1, March 2014; Marina Caparini, *Capacity-building and Development of Host State Police: The Role of International Police*, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper No. 3, May 2014; and Maureen Brown, William Durch and Henrik Stiernblad, *Principles of International Police Command*, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper No. 5, May 2015. Available at: http://www.challengesforum.org/en/Reports--Publications/?r=2 (accessed 1 August 2016).

[25] United Nations, *External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division*, 31 May 2016. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/policereview2016.pdf (accessed 1 August 2016).

C. Staff Safety and Security [26]

UN personnel have been operating in dangerous environments for many years. Some have worked amidst natural disasters or situations of mass forced displacement due to conflict. Others try to keep, build or sustain peace in places where armed groups are either not party to a peace accord, rejected that accord, or use violent tactics to maneuver for advantage in the course of its implementation.[27] More recent is the rise of violent extremist groups like al Qaeda or ISIS/Daesh, for whom the United Nations is one element of a system they seek to replace. At a less apocalyptic, but still critical level, decisions and actions (or failures to act) on the part of the Security Council have undermined the image and credibility of the UN in places where its services and programmes matter to the lives of millions. What Great Powers do in pursuit of their interests, or what their politicians say to satisfy domestic constituencies, can also expose UN personnel and UN Programme beneficiaries to increased levels of physical threat.

The UN system took a decade to respond to the evolving threat environment post-9/11. A deadly attack on the UN headquarters compound in Baghdad (August 2003) led to the UN security management system being assessed as 'dysfunctional' and to the creation of the DSS in January 2005 to pull that system together.[28] Yet another vehicle bombing of a UN compound, in Algiers (December 2007), demonstrated that security remained inadequate in process and attitude. The 2008 Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, found:

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[26] One of the key contributions by the Challenges Forum for enhancing safety and security for UN and Associated Personnel is the Tokyo Challenges Seminar and Report 2001, findings of which were included in the Report of the Secretary-General, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peace operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/977, 1 June 2001, and a formal document of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, entitled *Letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*, A/55/950–S/2001/512, 23 May 2001. See also William R. Phillips, T*he UN Reviews and What Should be Done to Improve the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel?*, Policy Brief, Challenges Forum, June 2016, and Background Paper for the 2014 Forum on *Enhancing Peace Operations' Capacity to Face Threats Against Peacekeepers*.

[27] For a good review of historical and contemporary safety and security issues, see Haidi Willmot, Scott Sheeran and Lisa Sharland, *Safety and Security Challenges in UN Peace Operations*, International Peace Institute, July 2015.

[28] *Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq*, 20 October 2003. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf (accessed 1 August 2016). (The 'Ahtisaari Report.')

a kind of passivity of the System that the Panel finds difficult to understand, let alone explain. For example, absolutely everyone agrees that in some duty stations the UN has too many offices and too many staff. Many agree that quite a few of these staff are probably not needed at all. And with the benefit of today's communication tools, quite a few who are necessary could very well work out of other, safer locations. And yet, no one moves, no one suggests solutions, no one brings these issues to the higher echelons of the hierarchy, up to the Secretary-General himself, if necessary.[29]

Through 2009, UN 'security phase' assessments also remained tightly coupled to a sequence of automatic constraints on UN activities that were unaffected by considerations of risk mitigation or the criticality of UN programmes to the local populations that they served (or the mandates they worked under). Since 2010, UN security management has been decoupling the assessment of risks posed by threats from the implications of risk for programming. Since 2013, security management system reform efforts have been substantial. The implications of threats for programming are now determined by contrasting residual risk (what remains after protective measures are taken) with 'Programme criticality,' or importance to local clients. This is the context in which the HIPPO Report's further recommendations on safety and security were made. Terrorist targeting of UN operations is not decreasing. Improving safety and security of all staff—international and locally hired—is of paramount importance, even as the UN system as a whole implements risk assessment and threat management procedures that allow it to better 'stay and deliver' in difficult circumstances.

D. Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is, in its simplest formulation, 'the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfil its mission.'[30] But, as Robert Gordon and Peter Loge observed in a recent Challenges Forum Occasional Paper, within peace operations:

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[29] *Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability*, The Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, 9 June 2008. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/PanelOnSafetyReport.pdf (accessed 1 August 2016)

[30] Hallahan et al., 'Defining strategic communications', *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 1:1 (2007), p. 3, cited by Robert Gordon and Peter Loge, *Strategic Communication: A Political and Operational Prerequisite for Successful Peace Operations*, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper No.7, p. 7.

> Strategic communication … is more often regarded as a thing to do, rather than as a holistic way of thinking about doing things … [or] to be about the use of Twitter, and not about the role of social media in policy formation or in the construction and maintenance of communities.[31]

This is, as argued, a mistake. As the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping stressed in its December 2014 report, 'A mission's strategic communications capacity plays a critical part in conveying key messages both internally, and externally, as well as undertaking effective outreach to the host population, national authorities and international audiences.'[32] Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous has also recognized effective strategic communication as a key component of an effective political strategy, to dispel misconceptions that can undo months of work on the ground and even lead key constituencies to become 'spoilers.'[33]

In short, communications theory, as well as communications tools, need 'to be central to [peace operations] research, planning and practice.'[34] A mission that cannot explain itself to the people or elites where it is deployed, that does not listen to the voices of the people surrounding it, or learn about its environment from them and adapt its methods and messages in response, has no business being deployed.

The HIPPO Report's section on strategic communication is relatively brief, but very much in the spirit of the above observations, considering strategic communication as a tool to make peace operations more people-centered as well as more effective, proactive and situationally aware.

E. Financing Peace Operations

Few subjects related to peace operations are as rational and irrational, simultaneously, as its financing. The importance of restructuring peace

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[31] Gordon and Loge, 2015, p. 5.

[32] United Nations, *Performance Peacekeeping – Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping*, December 2014, pp. 70–71.

[33] Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous, 'Keynote Address', Conference on Strategic Communications for a New Era of U.N. Peace Operations, Challenges Forum workshop hosted by the United States Institute of Peace and the Folke Bernadotte Academy, , Washington, DC, 23 June 2015. Available at: http://www.usip.org/events/strategic-communications-new-era-of-un-peace-operations (accessed 1 August 2016).

[34] Gordon and Loge, 2015, pp. 9; 20. For a cogent summary of the Challenges Forum workshop on the subject, see *Strategic Communications for the New Era of Peace Operations*, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:1, July 2015.

operations finance can be made clearer by following the money over time.

Initial observer missions (Kashmir and Palestine) were funded from the assessed regular UN budget. Payments for the first operations using armed soldiers became a matter of East-West contention, leading to a ruling by the International Court of Justice that assessments for the UN Operation in the Congo (1960–1964) were a regular expense of the Organization that Member States were obliged to pay. Still, non-payment was sufficiently widespread that the UN issued a $200 million bond to cover operating costs and new operations in the 1960s were largely funded outside UN channels. In the wake of the 1973 Middle East War, UN peacekeeping missions on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai were funded by a new, ad hoc assessment system that removed much of the financial burden of peacekeeping from developing states, shifting it to the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The arrangement was otherwise based on the scale of assessments that allocated shares of the regular budget across the UN's membership. That ad hoc solution, and a fixed monthly per capita reimbursement to troop contributing countries, was replicated for each new mission and each renewal of an ongoing mission's mandate for nearly three decades.

Headquarters capacity to support peacekeeping was slow to materialize. A small (fewer than 100 person) Field Operations Division inside the Department of Administration and Management in New York worked logistical support issues for peacekeeping. When demand increased rapidly at the end of the Cold War, the UN pulled peacekeeping resources together into the Department of Peace operations (DPKO). Various formulas were tried for adding Headquarters support surcharges to assessed peacekeeping mission budgets. In 1994, Member States settled on the Support Account for Peacekeeping as a separately derived and approved budget whose cost was pro-rated across missions in proportion to their share of the total peacekeeping budget. The Support Account paid not only for DPKO personnel but for other 'temporary posts' throughout the Secretariat having to do with recruitment, budgeting or procurement for peace operations. All mission budget cycles were eventually synchronized in a 1 July – 30 June budget year. Member States finally formalized and better rationalized the peacekeeping scale of assessments in January 2001.

Member States have insisted over the years that peacekeeping budgets should pay only for peacekeeping, that is, for direct costs of staff and operations. This philosophy worked well when UN operations were mostly military

and not directly involved in rebuilding host-state governance capacity. 'Capacity-building' is considered development, and development funders have generally insisted that it remain voluntary, which has left peace operations without programmematic funding. The disjunction also arises in part because the Security Council decides what missions should do, but does not vote their budgets. So missions end up with unfunded mandates. Much recent innovation has been focused on trying to bridge this funding gap between what missions are directed versus funded to do. The Brahimi Report recommended that at least some disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) funding be put into mission budgets so that DDR could get underway in a timely manner, without waiting for voluntary funding to come through. The 2012 UN Secretary-General Decision that created the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections at Headquarters level was an effort to get DPKO and UNDP to collaborate so as to better match up operations' mandates and fundraising for mandated programmes, including through the use of Multi-Party Trust Funds (MPTF) for field operations. Since that time, one or two missions have been given their own MPTF through which to accumulate still-voluntary programming money. One effort attempted to bridge Secretariat and UNDP human resources policies and plans by creating joint posts for rule of law advisers in the UN's new Assistance Mission in Somalia. Incompatible human resources and financial rules snarled the effort for the better part of a year.[35]

For 2015–2016, the UN budget for peacekeeping, including its support to AMISOM and 15 other peace operations and UN Headquarters support for those operations, is about $8.3 billion.[36] In addition, as of this writing 11 special envoys or advisers, 11 panels of experts, and 10 field missions are funded as special political missions (SPM), with a total budget of about $566 million for 2016.[37] Both of these budgets use assessed contributions from Member States. Headquarters support is chronically underfunded, however, as there is no equivalent, for SPMs, to the Support Account for Peacekeeping.

[35] William Durch et al., *Independent Progress Review on the UN Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections*, Stimson Center and Clingendael Institute (UNDP: New York, June 2014), p. 41.

[36] $8 billion was the approximate marginal cost (or 'war cost') to the United States of deploying one Brigade Combat Team of 9,000 troops to Afghanistan for a year. For $8 billion, the UN maintains about 124,000 personnel (including 105,000 uniformed personnel) in the field for a year. US Congressional Research Service, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001–FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues*, R40682, 2 July, 2009, pp. 1 and 53–54. United Nations, *Financing of the support account for peace operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy,* A/C.5/69/23, 23 June 2015. UN peacekeeping's budget year is 1 July to 30 June.

[37] United Nations, *Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*, 16 October 2015, pp. 33–34.

This official budgeting process is supplemented frequently, informally and on a small scale, by individual Member States that agree to provide temporary 'extra-budgetary' (XB) funding for specific initiatives at Headquarters and in the field. For example, the new 'Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell', established in April 2015 in DPKO, ran on XB funding until picked up by the Support Account in July 2016.[38] Because XB funding is an option that is, in practical terms, available to developed but not to developing states, there are unspoken limits as to how much XB money can flow without risking political and financial backlash. Because XB money is voluntary, it can also be cut off with little warning.

There is a long way to go to rationalize the funding of peace operations and the tasks they undertake. Some of the change has to come from Member States and some from the disjoint elements of the UN system that guard their own roles at the expense of greater systemic functionality. The HIPPO Report attempts to deal with this problem not through organizational change but through funding, by recommending that assessed mission budgets be given programme funds and that all peace operations be funded by a single 'peace operations budget'. Changing the financial arrangements would change a fundamental structural element of peace operations, and financial arrangements are both concrete and traceable. Thus the HIPPO Report's budget ideas, dry as they may seem, are among its most important.

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[38] UN, A/70/357–S/2015/682, para. 86; United Nations, B*udget for the support account for peace operations for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. Report of the Secretary-General*. A/70/751, 22 February 2016, paras. 110–119; without objection from the General Assembly's watchdog Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/70/837, 28 April 2016, para. 41.).

4. Monitoring Implementation

This paper builds on a methodology developed by the Future of Peace Operations Project at the Stimson Center to track the implementation of the Brahimi Report at the three-year mark.[39] The paper develops a set of benchmarks (significant threshold levels of achievement) for 61 recommendations in the five selected areas or dimensions of the HIPPO Report. Benchmarks are means by which the implementation of recommendations may be monitored and judged over time, as may the actions of those responsible for implementation. In the language of monitoring and evaluation, the paper sets out an approach to monitoring *outputs* from the Report—signs of entry into force—rather than its broader *outcomes*—field results and their contribution to sustainable peace, as intended, or to some other visible end product.[40]

Assessing outcomes and longer-term impact involves larger issues of data availability, validity and objectivity; direct versus indirect causality ('attribution' versus 'contribution', or assigning relative credit or blame across likely sources of influence); and competing theories of change (assumptions about cause and effect). For purposes of this paper, the theories of change (explicit or implicit) that underlie the Panel's recommendations are accepted, and focus is instead placed on how best to decide whether the Panel's recommendations have been realized.

In some instances, topically related recommendations occur in more than one place in the HIPPO Report, and some important proposals were not highlighted in the Report's recommendation lists. Those proposals were drawn out of the text and gathered together with related, listed recommendations, in Annex I. Each recommendation listed in Annex I is associated with its paragraph of origin in the Report. Because the HIPPO Report did not assign unique numbers to its recommendations, Annex I uses a topic tag and

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[39] Durch et al., 2003.

[40] For a clear discussion of benchmarks and benchmarking, and clear definitions of terms, see United Nations, *Monitoring Peace Consolidation. United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking,* UN Peacebuilding Support Office in cooperation with the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, 2010, pp. 18–19. For a good review of problems and approaches in evaluation, see Jeni Whalan, *Evaluating Integrated Peace Operations*, Challenges Forum Occasional Papers No. 2, April 2014, and Michele Lipner and Ann Livingstone, *Impact Evaluation and Assessment of UN Peace Operations: What is the State-of-the-Art?* Challenges Forum Occasional Papers No. 6, June 2015.

sequence number for each recommendation and sub-recommendation, for ease of reference.

The heading entries in Annex I (reproduced in Table 1), reading left to right, are the tag-sequence number, the Report paragraph of origin, the full text of the recommendation, the text of one or more benchmarks for that recommendation, space in which to mark one or more columns representing different UN system entities or activities with potential roles in implementation, and space for scoring implementation over time.

The benchmarks are largely self-indicating, that is, are themselves measurable without a proliferation of subsidiary indicators. The most intuitive such benchmarks are tangible, visible, and binary: something that can be sensed and that either functions or does not (e.g., mission gender adviser reports directly to Head of Mission or does not; funding authorities are changed or not). More often, even tangible benchmarks are met by degrees (e.g., a threshold percentage of female senior UN Police officers; new budget authorities but with insufficient funds; an institution that has new buildings but an old bureaucratic process). Behavioral or attitudinal change is harder to achieve and to assess and is itself neither tangible nor binary, but still measurable by various means (public opinion surveys in person or via media; focus groups; surveys of expert observers). Recall that this effort is not trying to measure outcome or impact, just existence. Existence is the cue to go looking for the other two. Just not yet.

Table 1: Annex Column Headings

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations	Benchmarks	Implementation Responsibility (or Support Needed)											Implementation Scores		
				Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	GA: non-budgetary	GA: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years

Each benchmark has a different combination of columns marked as relevant to its implementation. In general, the more columns checked, the more complex the implementation process. Some benchmarks may be met by decision of the Secretary-General alone, if the initiative applies only to the UN Secretariat and does not require bureaucratic reshuffling or additional people (posts) or funds. Reforms that involve posts or assessments involve the General Assembly, its 5th (Financial) Committee, and the powerful Advisory

Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question (ACABQ).[41]

Many of the initiatives in the HIPPO Report require not only the agreement of the UN's intergovernmental bodies but the support of other UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes or actions by regional bodies and individual Member States. States may need to agree to earmark standby military or police capacity for peacekeeping or to implement UN standards in their peacekeeping training programmes. Recommendations that depend upon such distributed implementation efforts are, by and large, the hardest to implement widely and consistently. However, in the case of third party peacekeeping training and equipping programmes, donors' embrace of UN standards raises the prospect of those standards becoming common usage.

The rightmost columns in Annex I are for scoring implementation quality according to scaling guidelines reproduced in the Table 2. Each benchmark for each recommendation is intended to be scored at one, three and five years after the HIPPO Report's release to develop comparative trends. Repeat scoring at intervals allows development of summary implementation trends. Each category of actor with a role in implementing a recommendation could be scored separately and scores could be averaged to generate an implementation quality score for each benchmark. That accounting could become rather onerous, as some categories (e.g., Member States) comprise many actor-members, risking a plunge down the analytic rabbit-hole. But informed-impressionistic category scoring could serve the rough and ready intent of the scoring system better than a single, even fuzzier judgment encompassing all actor categories, and could offer a quick reminder as to which actor categories were leading and lagging on implementation of which issues.

Since relatively few benchmarks are fully binary, one needs to be able to score partial implementation, either plateaued at an interim level or reflecting a process of change that is still underway, as well as full implementation and even over-fulfillment (it has happened). These sentiments are all reflected in the scoring guidelines in Table 2.

One could also, in principle, try to establish consensus on implementation

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[41]The ACABQ is a group of 16 Member State representatives serving 3-year appointments on a rotating basis that reviews in detail every budget bill that goes before the 5th Committee, down to the level of individual posts, with the help of a permanent staff headed by an Under-Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly, *Appointment of members of the [ACABQ]. Note by the Secretary-General*, A/68/101, 12 March 2013.

priorities by adapting the common UN system 'programme criticality framework' for risk assessment. The criticality framework was developed to help determine when to 'stay and deliver' which programmes under different levels of residual security risk in the field. Only 'most-critical' programmes, for example, are to be implemented in 'very high residual risk environments.' Risk and criticality are determined independently.[42] The programme-criticality (PC) measure is:

(Contribution to *strategic result* if implemented) x (likelihood of implementation with available resources, in specified time frame)

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Table 2: Scoring Guidelines

0.0 = No implementation action taken.

1.0 = Proposed by Secretariat; rejected by inter-governmental bodies.

1.5 = Proposed by Secretariat; pending decision by inter-governmental bodies.

2.0 = Proposed by Secretariat; accepted by inter-governmental bodies in reduced initial form.

2.5 = Proposed and accepted; awaits mission-specific implementation.

3.0 = Implementation/rollout underway of reduced-form concept.

3.5 = Implementation/rollout underway of full concept.

4.0 = Fully/widely implemented per Report recommendation.

5.0 = Implementation exceeds Report recommendation.

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The methodology is designed to be implemented in a particular field setting, by consensus of the UN entities operating there. An effort to apply similar methodology to prioritizing HIPPO recommendations would lack the geographic constraint, and the security crisis time frame, both of which help to link estimates of cause, effect and priority to immediate context. The criticality of HIPPO's higher-level recommendations is harder to determine, as are the 'strategic results' against which their implementation might be judged. The highest-level result would of course be 'sustaining peace'. While advocates for a high-level programme goal can lay out the logics of their positions and make good cases for their contribution to that goal, the specific

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[42] United Nations General Assembly, *Conclusions of the High-Level Working Group on Programme Criticality. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)*, A/69/786, 19 February 2015, Annex.

cascade of influence from policy change to field impact is hard to trace. Many other variables intervene along the way. Lower-level strategic results might be specified within categories like policing or staff security, so that recommendations compete for priority within categories. Yet without some prior sense of which categories contribute how much to sustaining peace, prioritizing categories of activities would likely devolve to decision-makers' political power and preference.

5. Building Benchmarks

This section provides background and other support for the benchmarks presented in Annex I, listing the corresponding recommendations labeled with their individual sequence numbers for ease of cross-reference to the Annex tables. Related recommendations within each major category are clustered under 'short title' sub-headings here and in Annex I.

A. Women, Peace and Security

1. Gender-sensitive force generation strategy

> **WPS-1** The Secretariat should develop a gender-sensitive force and police generation strategy, including by encouraging troop and police contributing countries to develop and/or implement national action plans on Security Council resolution 1325.

In a separate report, the Secretary-General recommended that troop contributing countries (TCCs) and PCCs receive extra reimbursement if their contingents exhibit willingness to take greater risks or contribute key enabling capacities to operations, especially if those units are at high readiness for deployment to UN operations.[43] UN Women has argued that a similar premium arrangement should be devised to encourage the selection, training and deployment of women military and police personnel to UN missions.[44]

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[43] United Nations, *Results of the revised survey to establish the standard rate of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries…Report of the Secretary-General*, A/68/813, 26 March 2014, paras. 59–69. Risk premiums are paid by the UN directly to the members of units in missions. Enabling unit premiums are paid to TCCs and PCCs.
[44] UN Women, Global Study, p. 142.

2. Gender-sensitive mission analyses

> **WPS-2** The Secretariat and missions should carry out gender-sensitive analysis throughout the analysis, planning, implementation, review, evaluation and mission drawdown processes.

The Gender Equality Marker (GEM) methodology promulgated by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) could be used for periodic assessment of the gender content and focus of mission analyses and policies. Expected outcomes of programming are rated from zero (no gender impact anticipated) to three (gender impact is the primary focus of the policy).[45] The Marker system is defined in Annex II.

3. Expertise and advice in missions

> **WPS-3.1** Missions should integrate gender expertise within all functional components requiring gender knowledge and experience.
>
> **WPS-3.2** The mission senior gender adviser should be located in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, reporting directly to the SRSG.
>
> **WPS-3.3** The mission senior gender adviser should advise the SRSG and senior mission leadership at the strategic level on integrating a gender perspective in mission activities.

The Secretary-General supports having senior gender advisers report to the Head of Mission and advise the senior mission leadership team, but noted in his Women, Peace and Security 2015 report that seven of nine senior gender adviser posts in peacekeeping missions were vacant at the end of 2014, suggesting a lack of priority on the ground. Attention to gender dimensions of policy should be routine within UN missions and not relegated just to the gender focal point or adviser. GEM could also be used to evaluate the effects of gender advice in missions by periodically scoring mission policies and programming.

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[45] UNICEF, *Guidance Note: Gender Equality Marker: Tracking of Resource Allocations and Expenditure for Gender Equality Results*, 16 September 2010, available at: http://www.unicef.org/gender/gender_57305. html.

4. Expertise and advice for missions

> **WPS-4** Missions should have full access to policy, substantive and technical support from UN Women on implementation of Security Council resolution 1325, together with support currently received from the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace operations.

Headquarters-level advice and support for missions are important as an extension of mission gender resources, to extend the perspective beyond the immediate mission area, and to find and coordinate potential donors for Women, Peace and Security programming. A good way to benchmark implementation of this recommendation might be the creation of a Headquarters-level Global Focal Point for Women, Peace and Security, hosted by UN Women and complementing the current Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections.[46]

5. Leadership

> **WPS-5.1** The Secretariat should ensure that compacts between the Secretary-General and heads of mission specify performance indicators relating to gender.
>
> **WPS-5.2** The Secretary-General should continue to appoint more women to senior mission leadership positions.
>
> **WPS-5.3** The Secretary-General should review the obstacles and structural factors preventing women's recruitment and professional advancement and the promotion of serving female staff to senior leadership roles.

No issue is more important to women's equality in mission host states, or to taking the discussion of women's rights and interests beyond issues of victimization, than promoting leadership roles for women in UN field missions and Country Teams, which, to succeed, must effectively address remaining obstacles to that objective. An implementation benchmark is

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[46] The latter was developed using existing posts and resources, though an initial external review concluded that modest administrative resources could substantially improve its performance. See Netherlands Institute of International Relations and Stimson Center, *Independent Progress Review on the UN Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections*, 2014, pp. 27–30.

suggested of 50 per cent women for mission senior leadership positions, including at least 30 per cent women as heads or deputy heads of mission,[47] and benchmarks of 10 to 15 per cent increases in the rates of recruitment, advancement, and placement of women in senior UN leadership roles in general, by the third anniversary of the HIPPO Report's release, as evidence of obstacle reduction.

B. UN Police

1. Gender-sensitive approach to policing

UNP-1.1 The Secretariat and Member States should develop a strategy with concrete measures to increase the percentage of women police in deployments to UN peace operations, in particular senior officers.

UNP-1.2 Member States should accelerate these efforts both through generic recruitment and by providing specialized personnel to units for the protection of women and children against sexual violence.

UNP-1.3 Mission police components should coordinate closely with women protection advisors, gender advisers, and child protection advisers within the mission.

In 2009, the UN Police Division set a goal of 20 per cent female UN Police deployed in UN operations. As of December 2015, 15 per cent of IPOs were women, and 7 per cent of FPUs, for an average of 10 per cent for all UN Police. The dominance of FPUs in UN deployments obviously drags down the numbers. UN Women's Global Study endorsed the HIPPO Report's recom¬mendation to incentivize PCCs' contributions of female officers and suggested consideration of special measures (e.g., relaxing the minimum number of years in police service as an eligibility criterion) to boost recruitment of female officers.[48] Concrete measures to increase the percentage of women police in UN deployments could include 'gender balance awards' to PCCs when at least 20 per cent of their IPOs qualifying for and deploying to UN peace operations are female, and reimbursement bonuses when the

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[47] "Currently 23 per cent of heads of mission and 17 per cent of deputy heads of mission are female.' UN, A/70/357–S/2015/682, para. 114.
[48] UN Women, Global Study, p. 143.

percentage of female officers in qualifying and deploying FPUs is at least 15 per cent. UN Police Division should aim for 25 per cent senior police leadership in missions by 2020. Indicators of Member State collaboration to these ends would include 10 per cent increases in female police officers on domestic police rolls by 2020 and contribution to missions of specialized protection units that are at least 20 per cent female by 2020.

2. Transnational organized crime expertise

UNP-2 Missions should acquire expertise in [trans-national organized crime], when requested and in partnership with others to support national police capacity.

This is an implicit recommendation, not drawn out into a bolded/numbered list but important nonetheless. A nascent peace in many zones of conflict is threatened by organized criminal entities trafficking in drugs, guns, timber, minerals and people, sometimes in league with corrupt officials.[49] UN Police must have the ability to collect and use police intelligence, and as necessary interdict such criminal conspiracies, not only to execute their mandates effectively but for purposes of self-protection.

3. Police strategy: evidence-based, optimally staffed, continuously evaluated

UNP-3.1 UN police strategies should be based on capacity assessments in country, reflected in mission planning, staffing and recruitment, and should include specialized teams and the use of long-term civilian experts.

UNP-3.2 Police contributing countries supporting police development and reform should be encouraged to extend rotation cycles to 12 months.

UNP-3.3. The Secretariat should complete the strategic guidance framework on UN Policing currently under preparation and propose commensurate resources for its implementation.

UNP-3.4 Mission leadership should consistently monitor and evaluate police development efforts, taking into account the assessment of the host government and civil society.

[49] Wibke Hansen, *Interfaces between Peace Operations and Organized Crime*, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:2, September 2015.

The approach stressed in UNP-3.1 was taken up in detail by the external review of the Police Division recommended in UNP-5. (The review's recommendations are discussed in that section.)

Among the first four police-related recommendations, 12-month rotational cycles for UN Police have been phased in by the Police Division.

The top tier of the Strategic Guidance Framework for UN Police was put into effect in 2014 and three of four pieces of operational guidance were signed into effect in 2015 and early 2016. The last operational piece, on Police Administration, should be put into effect by the end of 2016.[50] For the first time, UN Police will have a single, consistent set of guidance at the operational level that pulls together or replaces disparate segmented guidelines produced over the past 10 to 15 years. More detailed manuals on critical topics like police intelligence—12 in total—will be written and issued between 2016 and 2018.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are perennial issues for UN operations at large and not just for police. Over a period of years, the Vera Institute and DPKO's Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) developed a Rule of Law Indicators Project (ROLIP) designed to measure mission area progress in policing, judicial, and corrections matters, drawing on a combination of public records and public surveys. While sound in concept, ROLIP has proved too time-consuming to be regularly applied by missions that generally lack M&E budgets or by Headquarters evaluation teams that are too small to execute it or to manage its execution by contractor teams with any regularity. Nonetheless, a mission that cannot tell how well it is doing in either providing public security or training local counterparts to provide it can never know when its job is done. Missions should be able to measure the effectiveness of local police development on a regular (e.g., semi-annual) basis, and be budgeted to do so, with some combination of public safety perception surveys (e.g., using cell-phone surveys), officer competency testing, and trends in crime statistics (consistency in crime reporting and bookkeeping being one element evaluated).

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[50] The operational guidelines on Police Administration were to be developed in July 2016 at a DPKO workshop hosted by the UN Standing Police Capacity at the UN Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy.

4. Formed police units: expand the base, assist training, improve performance

UNP-4.1 The Secretariat should expand the base of formed police unit (FPU) contributors and encourage partnership arrangements between potential contributors and donor countries.

UNP-4.2 The Secretariat should assist police contributing countries in strengthening pre-deployment preparation.

UNP-4.3 The Secretariat should improve performance and oversight management, including adherence to agreed policies and standards.

FPUs constituted 65 per cent of all UN Police (9,000 out of 13,900) deployed at the end of 2015. Unlike IPOs, FPU personnel are always armed, and equipped with armored vehicles. For these reasons, and because FPUs may interact with the population of the host state at times and places of tension, it is critical that FPU personnel be well-trained and professional. DPKO promulgated a new standard operating procedure for assessing the operational capability of FPUs in 2012, which followed new, temporary training guidelines (2011) and a revised Policy on FPUs in peace operations (2010). The underlying guidance may be strong but the Panel's findings suggested that PCCs need further assistance to meet UN requirements. Since 2013, the base of FPU contributors has grown from 13 to 20 countries, as indicated in Table 3. Many of these PCCs look to third countries for assistance in equipping and training their units. With a record 64 FPUs deployed as of late 2015, demand for such 'triangular' assistance has never been higher. A minimum of 64 units need to be prepared, trained, tested and deployed each year, for as long as demand for FPUs remains high and the UN process for meeting that demand is to pull foreign police units into a mission area.[51]

The 20 FPU contributing countries provided 82 per cent of all police to UN missions (FPU and individual). On average, 79 per cent of the officers they provided were members of FPUs. Percentages of female FPU officers varied considerably by country. The fact that six countries deployed at least 12 per

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[51] For a concept of how the UN can reduce demand for FPUs by enabling missions to build mission-managed public order police capacity locally, see W. Durch and M. Ker, *Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment*, Providing for Peacekeeping No. 6, International Peace Institute, October 2013.

cent female officers suggests that an overall goal of 15 per cent for FPUs by 2020 is not unreasonable. Most of the new contributors' FPUs included female officers and all of the countries with high percentages of women in contributed police ranks in 2015 had improved those percentages since mid-2013.

Table 3: Formed Police Units in UN Peace Operations, with Percentage of Female Officers, as of 31 December 2015

Missions → PCCs ↓	Darfur	CAR	Haiti	Liberia	Côte d'Ivoire	D.R. Congo	Mali	So. Sudan	Total FPU Officers, by PCC:	Average Percentage Female Oficers in FPUs	
										2015	2013
Jordan	279		319	240	483				1321	0%	0%
Senegal	276	279				268	280		1103	2%	3%
Bangladesh	279		300		180	180	140		1079	16%	11%
India			439	243		270			952	12%	11%
Nepal	139		140	259				319	857	9%	6%
Rwanda		420	160						580	13%	3%
Pakistan	140		140		189				469	0%	0%
Egypt	140					140			280	0%	0%
Mauritania		140			140				280	0%	-
Togo	140						140		280	5%	3%
Burundi		274							274	6%	-
Cameroon		273							273	3%	-
Nigeria				118			140		258	26%	14%
Ghana								167	167	19%	-
Indonesia	154								154	0%	0%
Benin							140		140	0%	-
Burkina Faso	140								140	3%	4%
China				140					140	4%	-
Congo (B)		137							137	6%	-
Congo, DR		118							118	14%	-
Mission total:	1687	1641	1498	1000	992	858	840	486	9002	**7%**	**6%**

Note: *Italics* indicate French, underlining indicates Arabic as an official language of the PCC or mission area. Both English and French are official languages of Rwanda and Cameroon. Sources: UN DPKO, 'Mission Summary Detailed by Country,' 31 December 2015.

5. Review the Police Division

> **UNP-5** The organizational structure, staffing and capacity of the Police Division should be reviewed to better meet new approaches to supporting national police..

The external review team for the Police Division began its work in January 2016 and released its report on May 31. The team grounded its recommendations in a wide-ranging series of meetings and interviews with practitioners as well as other experts and stakeholders at UN Headquarters and in the field. The review reinforced the HIPPO Report but also broke important new ground, having a chance to devote as much research and analysis to police-related issues as had been available to the HIPPO for the full scope of peace operations. The result was a much deeper dive into issues and constraints in UN police peacekeeping and a broader yet complementary set of recommended reforms. The analysis laid out the problems of the current mode: high-volume saturation of mission areas with largely 'generalist' police personnel with limited background and aptitude for the development of conflict-damaged foreign police services; militarization of UN policing with high numbers of FPUs; poor accountability for field performance; and limited strategic advice or oversight, all of which limited the ability of UN Police to implement their mandates. The review team stressed that, 'For the United Nations, the ability to support a host-State to develop a functioning police service meeting basic standards is a measure of success', but it questioned the ability of 'the current UNPOL operating model to deliver on such objectives'. The review recommended a much more prominent role for UN Police in mission planning and for the Police Adviser in strategic oversight of UN police components and advice to UN leaders; greater emphasis on police development skills in recruiting personnel for missions, sharing responsibility for recruitment with missions; building the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) in Brindisi, Italy, into a UN Police knowledge management and policy development center; and restructuring the SPC to focus more on substantive advice and support to missions than on mission start-up.[52]

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[52] United Nations, *External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division*, Executive Summary.

6. Strengthen consultations with troop and police contributors

UNP-6 The Security Council and Secretariat should strengthen efforts to establish inclusive and meaningful consultations with troop and police contributing countries to ensure unity of effort and a common commitment to the mandate. These consultations should take place at senior levels, including with specialized personnel, experts and high-level military officials from capitals as needed.

This recommendation reflects a long-standing wish of troop and police contributors for more input into the design and structure of missions to which they commit their people. The main difficulties are not ones of principle but of politics.

Alexandra Novosseloff has proposed six principles to guide such 'triangular' consultations between the TCCs/PCCs, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat. They should be regular (though informal and private, to build working relationships); held before mandates are developed or substantially changed; convened at the level of experts; have an operational focus ('as concrete as possible'); involve the top 10 contributors to the mission in question; and be convened by the President of the Council, not the Council member who is the principal drafter of the mandate (or 'pen-holder', usually one of the five permanent members).[53] Implementing such a consultative structure could help rebuild trust between the Council and TCCs/PCCs as well as generate informed buy-in for difficult missions and potentially lead to more effective mandate execution.

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[53] Alexandra Novosselof, Triangular Cooperation – Key to All, 10 November 2015, available at: http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/ (accessed 1 August 2016).

7. Strengthen accountability in the field

UNP-7.1 The Secretariat should develop standard transparent approaches to deal with troop and police personnel contributions from countries whose human rights record and performance present challenges. Governments whose forces are listed in the annual reports of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict and on Conflict Related Sexual Violence should be barred from contributing troops to UN missions until de-listed.

UNP-7.2 Member States, in particular troop and police contributors, and the Secretariat should ensure urgent and robust implementation of the recommendations of the recent report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) into sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel of peace operations.

Equally important is implementing the Panel's recommendation (UNP-7.1) for dealing with countries whose troops or police have records of human rights abuses sufficient for them to be listed in the indicated reports of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's initial response to the HIPPO Report pledged to implement these procedures. Given the recrudescence of reports about sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers posted to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and elsewhere, the Organization needs to be willing to risk the wrath of some troop and police contributors in order to save its reputation and credibility with others, with mission area populations and with its major government funders.

UNP-7.2 references six relatively lengthy recommendations made by the UN's investigative watchdog office, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), with respect to accountability of troop and police contributors for serious field misconduct by their personnel, especially involving SEA. The Panel views two of these as 'critical': writing more thorough accountability investigation standards and competency requirements into UN Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with contributing countries; and improved services and compensation for recognized victims of exploitation or abuse. On average, just 12 per cent of victims identified by the UN's slow-to-be-implemented 'victim assistance architecture' were referred for support or assistance in 2014 but, as OIOS notes, 'little is known of what assistance, in reality, was provided to them' from the Organization; a few missions have done better, according

to OIOS, but most have done little or nothing.[54] The recommendations are reproduced in full in Annex I. The Secretary-General's annual report for 2015 on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse contained an expanded array of measures to increase the efficacy and reduce the completion time for field investigations into SEA allegations. The Secretary-General sought greater freedom for OIOS to pursue investigations in a timely manner, greater cooperation from Member States to ensure that their criminal laws include extraterritorial jurisdiction for sex crimes committed by their nationals abroad, suspension of [UN] payments to units with which an 'implicated individual' was assigned if a criminal investigation has not been completed within one year, suspension of deployments to UN operations by units from Member States whose investigations of abuse cases extend beyond one year, and repatriation of units 'where there is credible evidence of widespread of systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit.'[55] The UN has begun to take such steps with the repatriation of units deployed to MINUSCA from the Republic of Congo and DRC.[56]

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[54] United Nations, Office of Internal Oversight Services, Inspection and Evaluation Division, *Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peace operations*, Evaluation report OIOS-IED-15-001, May 2015, pp. 24-25.

[55] United Nations, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/729, 16 February 2016. UN Security Council, Resolution 2272 (2016), S/RES/2272, 11 March 2016, esp. OP1–5.

[56] BBC, Central African Republic peacekeepers to be sent home over 'sex abuse'', 4 February 2016, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35496785. Aljazeera, Congo to probe alleged sex abuse by peacekeepers in CAR', 6 February 2016, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/congo-probe-alleged-sex-abuse-peacekeeers-car-160206034927670.html. '[T] the UN said it would repatriate 120 peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo, a month after asking DRC to send home its contingent.'

C. Staff Safety and Security

1. Key areas meriting particular attention

UNSEC-1.1 Application of the [security management] system to military and police contingents.

UNSEC-1.2 Capabilities, technologies and force preparation necessary to cater for asymmetric threat environments in the next five years.

UNSEC-1.3 Provisions for national staff, including administrative constraints and insurance considerations, and the impact on national staff who often bear considerable risk with little recompense and support in emergency situations.

These three items are embedded in text but 'merit particular attention' as implicit recommendations: Coverage of the UN Security Management System (UNSMS), which already applies to civilian staff and individual UN Police Officers, should be expanded to FPUs and smaller static military units. UN Police, and FPUs in particular, can be significant risk management and mitigation factors for other mission components and non-mission UN personnel. UNSEC-1.2 would complement the Panel's recommendations elsewhere to review and fix longstanding constraints on use of military aircraft, including helicopters, to better meet operational and medical emergencies and adapt to the dynamic risk environments of contemporary operations.[57] Increasingly, that means preparedness to face asymmetric threats, which in some newer missions include repeated raids by armed groups on UN camps, outposts, offices and convoys, and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on convoy routes.

UNSEC-1.3 is the HIPPO Report's only reference to safety and security of national staff and other locally hired people who constitute 75 per cent of UN civilian personnel in the field[58] and bear the brunt of armed violence and criminal acts against UN premises and personnel. The objective of benchmarking here is to ensure that crisis management planning includes considerations of personal security for local staff and contractors and their

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[57] United Nations, HIPPO Report, paras. 212–215.
[58] Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability, p. 9. Citing United Nations, Chief Executives Board for Coordination Headcount of Field Staff as of 31 December 2006, CEB/2007/HLCM/30, 13 October 2007.

immediate families as well as compensation for material loss incurred in consequence of UN employment.

2. Integrate and update security management resources

UNSEC-2.1 The Secretariat should implement expeditiously the recent decision to integrate the security resources of the Department of Safety and Security and of missions under a single integrated management model and implement updated methodologies for security risk assessments and incident reporting.

UNSEC-2.2 The Secretariat should review the implementation of the UN security management system to ascertain that it is 'fit for purpose' for contemporary threat environments and make sure that the programme criticality framework is implemented to help peace operations take decisions on acceptable risk to stay and deliver.

The Secretary-General reported in September 2015 that, 'The development of a significantly improved security risk management process is nearly complete, along with relevant training and an e-tool module. Its roll-out has been set for December 2015 and, by December 2016, security professionals across all duty stations will have been trained in the process.'[59]

Benchmarks track the scheduled implementation and availability of funding.

3. Make guard units available to missions

UNSEC-3 Where necessary, missions without military components should be provided with small military or police contingents as guard units.

Budgets of all operations (peacekeeping and special political) should include funds for guard units for environments assessed as 'high risk' or 'very high risk'. Funding guard units would be simplified were the Organization to adopt the Panel's recommended single budget for all peace operations (see BDG-6).

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[59] United Nations, *Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel.* Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/383, 21 September 2015, para. 51.

4. Establish a medical performance framework and standards for operations

> **UNSEC-4** The Secretariat should establish a medical performance framework for UN peace operations, including clear capability standards, minimum standards for all UN medical capabilities, civilian and military.

Medical performance frameworks and capacities feature prominently in the recommendations of the 2008 Independent Panel on Safety and Security;[60] peace operations have needed such a framework since more dangerous operations began 25 years ago. It strains credulity that the Organization has not managed to implement such a framework in that time; interviews suggest that a paper on a UN 'duty of care' for medical support has been developed but is moving forward slowly.

5. Develop and exercise crisis management plans

> **UNSEC-5.1** The Secretariat should develop a comprehensive crisis management policy for its peace operations.
>
> **UNSEC-5.2** UN Country Team partners should ensure rigorous crisis management plans and procedures, including mass casualty incident plans, are in place and are reviewed and exercised regularly.

As with the slow establishment of a medical performance framework, crisis management capacity within peace operations and coordination of crisis management policies and plans with UN Country Teams have lagged. The need for such policy and planning, together with the lag on medical standards, suggests an Organization that has been deeply reluctant to recognize that it is putting people in harm's way, while taking inadequate responsibility for that fact, and relying too heavily on the kindness of strangers to fill the gaps.

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60   *Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability*, p. 56.

6. Improve fatalities management and death/disability compensation

UNSEC-6.1 The Secretariat should centralize responsibilities for fatalities management to ensure better information management and oversight of administrative processes in support of the next of kin of the deceased.

UNSEC-6.2 The General Assembly should keep the rates of compensation for death and disability under regular review and adjust accordingly.

There should never be lack of clarity, either inside the system or in its dealings with next of kin, regarding management of fatalities and their consequences, whatever the cause.

7. Host state responsibilities in cases of attacks against the United Nations

UNSEC-7 States hosting UN peace operations must vigorously pursue those responsible for attacks against the United Nations, including through prompt investigation and effective prosecution in accordance with international human rights law, including the right to due process.

The HIPPO Report and the Secretary-General's reports on special measures to combat SEA recognize that the circumstances under which many UN missions deploy are precisely those circumstances in which impartial and effective justice, well-functioning institutions, and commitment to redress wrongs done to outsiders are least likely to be found. Nonetheless, the UN should write into MOUs with host states a collaborating role in investigating attacks against UN persons or facilities, including power to protect crime scenes, evidence, and testimony.

D. Strategic Communication

1. Build and maintain two-way communications at multiple levels

SC-1.1 The Secretariat and missions should put in place at every stage of the mission lifecycle strategies for planning, recruitment, resourcing of mission communications teams aimed at ensuring interactive two-way communications with the local people.

SC-1.2 Each peace operation should work closely with the UN Country Team and the local communities, including civil society actors, to develop strategies for community engagement at various stages of the mission cycle.

The four recommendations in this group come from four different parts of the Report but share an emphasis on elements of two-way communications: explaining, advocating, listening and learning.

The UN has traditionally dealt with host state authorities and armed opposition groups when mediating peace accords or negotiating terms of reference for a mission, but should also give high priority to other voices, including a wider swath of civil society, for early learning about potential mission areas and their sources of conflict and post-conflict needs. Missions should therefore have civil affairs teams ready to work from an early date with communications specialists. Missions should also work closely with Country Teams to absorb accumulated local knowledge and utilize already-built bridges to civil society.

SC-1.3 Missions should communicate continuously with host authorities on all threats to civilians, in all dimensions, including child protection, sexual violence, and the full range of protection issues facing women and girls, as well as men and boys.

SC-1.4 Missions must build relationships of trust with local people, leading to more effective delivery of protection of civilians mandates and better protection for peacekeepers.

Effective implementation of civilian protection mandates requires close and continuing communications with host state authorities as well as the public. The Panel points out that effective communication ties with the local people can foster protection of civilians and missions alike. Missions should be capable of gathering community input daily, and of informing communities about mission activities in a tailored fashion on a bi-weekly basis.

2. Develop key communications tools and techniques

SC-2.1 The strategy should include the creation of fora in which senior mission leadership can participate in structured, regular engagement with local communities, including women, youth, religious and other leaders who can provide feedback to the mission on its work.

SC-2.2 Each mission should have or be able to identify resources for the regular commissioning of independent surveys of local perceptions of the mission and progress towards mission objectives, linked to strategic communications efforts.

This grouping emphasizes the how of strategic communications. Senior leadership should arrange to engage on a not less than monthly basis with local communities, including outside the capital, security conditions permitting. Meetings should be supplemented by regular perception surveys taking advantage of locally prevalent communications (e.g., cell phones) consistent with personal security of the polltakers and participants as well as validity of results. Radio programming has proven effective in a number of missions, especially as a source of objective news. Non-governmental organizations like Fondation Hirondelle have collaborated successfully with missions to build local broadcast infrastructure and experience. Radio Okapi in the DRC also developed quasi-two-way communications for separated families via call-in programmes.

SC-2.3 The Secretariat and missions should … [ensure that] UN peace operations use modern and appropriate communication approaches and technologies.

SC-2.4 [Mission and Country Team strategic communications strategy should use] local engagement and feedback ... to measure the impact of the mission and … ensure that the mission does no harm [and] makes immediate course corrections as required.

Newer digital communications technologies, including social media, can enhance mission effectiveness if linked to an informed communication policy and strategy.

Effective community relations and communications channels can be used, finally, for early detection of unintended programming consequences.

3. Secretariat-Security Council communications

SC-3 The Secretariat should keep the Security Council informed in a timely manner of new threats and limits imposed on the mission´s ability to act at every stage of the operation.

Acute threats to mission performance should be communicated to the Security Council within 24 hours and strategic impediments within one week, on the assumption that it is better for the Secretariat to own the message than for Council members to hear it from their own sources or third parties, even if immediate action by the Council is neither needed nor, necessarily, wise. These timelines imply a rapid planning and crisis management capability within the Secretariat that can in turn answer the question, 'What next?'.

4. Security Council-Host State communications

SC-4 The Security Council must draw upon its individual and collective influence and leverage on the conflict parties to ensure they refrain from targeting civilians directly or indirectly, and swiftly condemn and take steps to bring to justice those who commit or condone such crimes.

No peace operation has the intrinsic political clout needed to twist arms of powerful but recalcitrant local parties. The Security Council should prepare in advance both targeted sanctions and International Criminal Court (ICC) referral cases to deploy, or threaten to deploy, in the face of backsliding on agreements or recourse to violence against civilians.

E. Financing Peace Operations

1. Reinforce UN Secretariat conflict prevention and mediation capabilities

BDG-1.1 Utilize the Regular Budget for the Secretariat's core prevention and mediation capacities including: (a) monitoring and analysis, (b) support to the Secretary General's good offices and mediation support, including the standby mediation team, and (c) the deployment of peace and development advisers and small multidisciplinary teams of experts to support the UN Country Team when needed.

BDG-1.2 Access the Peacekeeping Support Account for mediation and electoral support to peace operations.

Although it would seem that this recommendation would have a lot going for it, as the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is already funded primarily by the Regular Budget, prevention and mediation are not high-cost, high-volume endeavors, and DPA already has a small standby mediation capacity, this concept met early resistance from the ACABQ.[61] Yet consistent crisis

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[61] United Nations, *Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. Eleventh report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/70/7/Add.10, 4 December 2015, para. 53.

intervention for conflict prevention or mediation implies a standing capacity.

Access to the Peacekeeping Support Account for mediation and electoral support functions is a natural extension of the kinds of operational support (e.g., polling place security or transport of ballots, ballot boxes, election staff or monitors) that field operations already provide, but with greater flexibility and funding assurance. (DPA's Electoral Assistance Division has traditionally functioned largely on the basis of earmarked Member State donations.)

2. To enhance UN financing in support of sustaining peace

BDG-2.1 Scale up the fast track window ('Immediate Response Facility'), of the Peacebuilding Fund, building on a clear UN vision, enhanced flexibility in its implementation partners, and fast-track procedures.

BDG-2.2 Establish pooled country-level UN funds linked to a political road-map and integrated strategies.

BDG-2.3 Clarify practical aspects of cooperation between missions and UN Country Teams, such as co-location in remote areas, including cost-sharing and reimbursement arrangements for shared services and other aspects of support and administration.

BDG-2.4 Enable the use of assessed contributions by partners based on comparative advantage.

The Peacebuilding Fund emerged from phase one of the Peacebuilding Architecture Review in better shape than the rest of the architecture. It was 'simply too small to achieve the impact required', namely, catalyzing larger resource flows for post-conflict investment.[62] Annual disbursements could usefully be doubled to $200 million, and a focus on being 'risk-taker of first resort'.

MPTFs can be strategically useful, especially if mission budgets do not receive programmematic funding, but all programme stakeholders must have an agreed say in the disbursement of funds. (Past experience has seen voluntary funding of Party A's plans land, of necessity, in Party B's trust fund and then come under Party B's sole control.) A structure and process for multi-stakeholder decision-making should also be created for applying any assessed mission programme funds.

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[62] AGE Report, 40–42.

3. Build programme funding into mission budgets for select mandated tasks

> **BDG-3** The Secretary-General should include, within proposed mission budgets, programmematic resources when these are necessary for the effective implementation of mandated tasks. Such programmematic funding should be implemented by the entity capable of most effectively delivering results, whether the mission directly, the UN Country Team or other implementing partners.

Programme resources complement a mission's ability to recruit and pay for programme managers. But programme execution may best be undertaken in collaboration with the UN Country Team. And to minimize resistance from major funders, programme funds should be 'first resort' funds in the first two or three years of mission budgets but allocable to a mission trust fund so that they do not go away if projects are delayed, as often happens in post-conflict settings. The three-year cap on such start-up funding should assuage major funders, and give them enough time to both monitor progress and plan voluntary follow-up funding.

4. Use assessed contributions to fund peace operations partnerships with the African Union

> **BDG-4.1** [The Secretary-General should propose and the General Assembly should provide] United Nations-assessed contributions ... on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union (AU) peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.
>
> **BDG-4.2** Any African Union peace support operation receiving United Nations assessed contributions should provide regular reports to the Security Council, as well as appropriate financial reporting to the Organization, and comply fully with UN standards, such as the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, and UN conduct and discipline frameworks.

The first of these propositions essentially regularizes the exceptional

arrangements by which the United Nations has funded the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia.

The high cost in civilian lives of the fight against al Shabaab makes the second proposition essential. The United Nations should deploy military observers empowered to accompany AU forces, observe decision making and operations, and report their observations without interference. UN civilian and police observers should play parallel roles in their respective areas of the operation.

5. Use assessed contributions to launch and to backstop special political missions

BDG-5.1 Establish a special and separate account for the funding of special political missions that would be budgeted, funded and reported upon on an annual basis with a financial period of 1 July to 30 June.

BDG-5.2 Authorize special political missions, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee, to access the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for up to $25 million per decision of the General Assembly or the Security Council relating to the start-up or expansion phase of field-based special political missions.

BDG-5.3 Authorize special political missions, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee, to access up to $25 million in strategic deployment stocks in advance of the corresponding budget appropriation if a decision of the General Assembly or Security Council relating to their start-up or expansion results in the need for expenditure.

BDG-5.4 Make the support account available to all departments and offices to fund their fluctuating back-stopping requirements in relation to field-based special political missions and confirm the responsibility to support special political missions, while maintaining the existing arrangements for the financing of the support account and the Global Service Centre.

If BDG-6—a single peace operations account—were to be realized, then the first and last propositions in this set would be superseded. If not, then the argument is for an account like the peacekeeping budget. One argument for keeping it separate is the sheer number of budget entities that would appear in

a combined list (SPMs include envoys and sanctions-investigating Groups of Experts as well as regional field offices and political missions).

It is reasonable to give new SPMs access to the Reserve Fund and strategic deployment stocks; missions repay those advances from their budgets, once appropriated.

Lack of dedicated Headquarters support for SPMs is a long-standing complaint of both DPA and the Department of Field Support. Both have been asked to give support and guidance to SPMs pro-bono. Building SPMs into the Support Account relieves that stress.

6. Develop a single peace operations account

BDG-6 Develop a proposal for a single 'peace operations account' to finance all peace operations and related back-stopping activities in the future.

The 35 elements in the 2016 SPM budget total $566 million for the year. The 15 elements in the 2016 peacekeeping budget total $8.26 billion. It would contribute fiscal clarity to have all peace operations under a single budget, consistent with the Panel's notion of a common continuum for peace operations, from strategic conflict prevention to sustaining peace. On the other hand, it would, from one perspective, drag political operations into the same zone as the heavily militarized and 'securitized' realm of peacekeeping—or whatever it is that peacekeeping has evolved into that lacks a good label. With all such operations under one budget, the rationale for separate Departments of Peacekeeping and of Political Affairs would likely weaken substantially—consistent with the Panel's call for a serious rethink of the UN's peace and security architecture that Secretary-General Ban is presenting to his successor.

On a smaller canvas, this proposal, if implemented, would render a special account for SPMs (BDG-5.1) unnecessary, and would loop SPMs into a common Headquarters support structure for peace operations.

Creation of a single peace operations account would not resolve the question of whether to include funds for field programmes in mission budgets. That is, it would not extinguish the debate about what kinds of expenses can or should be treated as organizational 'dues' and what kinds should remain voluntary.

6. Concluding Remarks

The HIPPO Report not only covered a great deal of policy ground but delivered a broad range of advice that was effectively mirrored in many respects by the other major reviews that were feeding into the General Assembly's May 2016 High-level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security. The General Assembly, like the Security Council, had the rare opportunity to consider a set of consistent advice from several different vectors. The reviews all make clear that human rights, and fair treatment and equal opportunities for women, are critically important to creating and sustaining peace everywhere; that rule of law and community-oriented public security is essential to recovery from conflict; and that clear communication with strategic purpose is a critical peace multiplier.

The messages in the HIPPO Report are clear but troubling if one considers that, 17 years after the present surge in UN peace operations began, the United Nations has not been able to get a consistent grip on, let alone eliminate or, even better, prevent the eruptions of political violence that have engaged so many missions and so many peacekeepers over the past decade and a half. In fairness to the United Nations, far more powerful national actors have not had much better luck in State-building over the last decade, either. State-building is very hard work that takes a long time to bear fruit even if the effort is not under constant threat of armed attack. Of the Panel's four 'essential shifts' in how the UN should approach peace operations, two are straightforward and doable—seeing operations as a single spectrum of engagement and seeing peace and security in terms of global and regional partnerships—and two are more difficult to do right, namely, the primacy of politics and making Headquarters more field-focused and operations more people-centered.

The Panel was right to urge that 'politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations,'. But to a troubling degree, the United Nations gets the mandate for a Mali or a Central African Republic mission, faute de mieux, when governmental structures are teetering or have fallen, the region cannot manage the chaos and no more powerful national actors care to step up in a more than peripheral way—for fear of being stuck themselves or of earning a neo-colonial label. That is, the politics that drive mission mandates seem too often the politics of last resort.

In mission areas, the politics of corrupt governments, exploitable natural resources, transnational organized crime, and widespread denials of opportunity to women—whether in education, ownership of property or businesses, or access to reproductive health services—stunt whole societies and divert their wealth into relatively few, well-connected pockets.[63] There seems to be an underlying assumption that local parties need only see the utility of non-violence to adopt it, even though the places where peacekeepers deploy of late are in shambles because violence works, corruption works, ignoring human rights works, and crime pays for those in charge, those fighting to be in charge, or those using disorder to build their smuggling and trafficking networks. These are the incentive structures that must be dismantled if the politics—and with it the economies—of corruption- and conflict-affected states are to change for the better for their peoples.

So if missions really are committed to helping turn their mission areas right side up, they will energetically take up the Women, Peace and Security agenda and focus their growing strategic communication skills on making it happen on their watch. They will apply the same degree of focus to rebuilding local police and criminal justice institutions and to rooting out the petty corruption that blackens the reputation of governments in the eyes of their citizens and eliminates the trust in government needed to make the UN's 'community-oriented policing' strategy—or a two-way strategic communication strategy—work. Missions must actively solicit, receive, and act upon citizen input; make an effort to keep the public informed of what they are doing and why; and demonstrate how the change that is on the table—in a peace plan or a joint programme—will work better for them than the long-suffering status quo.

The purpose of this paper was to create a framework for tracking and evaluating the implementation of the HIPPO Report's recommendations in the five key areas of Women, Peace and Security; UN Police; staff safety and security; strategic communication; and funding. Its framework of benchmarks and implementation scoring should facilitate tracking, rating and comparing the implementation of large numbers of recommendations, including the respective implementation track records of the UN Secretariat, Security Council, General Assembly, regional organizations and Member States. The framework can easily be expanded to accommodate more categories of actors or greater detail within categories. It facilitates comparisons of progress within

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[63] Carnegie Endowment Working Group on Corruption and Society, *Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, 2014).

and between sets of recommendations and within and between categories of implementing agent. Is the General Assembly favoring one class of concepts but not another? Is the Secretariat leading on some issues but lagging on others? Have Member States stepped forward in those areas only they can address? In just some of those areas or all of them? It was not the purpose of the paper to evaluate the HIPPO Report's theories of change or to assess the likelihood of its recommendations generating the sorts of outcomes that the Panel was clearly seeking, especially making UN Headquarters more field-oriented and UN missions more people-centered. But it does provide a compact toolkit for tracking whatever progress the UN is making toward those important and necessary goals.

Appendix 1

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
Women, Peace and Security		
1. Gender-sensitive force generation strategy		
WPS-1	204	*The Secretariat* should develop a gender-sensitive force and police generation strategy, including by encouraging troop and police contributing countries [TCCs and PCCs] to develop and/or implement national action plans on Security Council resolution 1325.
2. Gender-sensitive mission analyses		
WPS-2	243	*The Secretariat and missions* should carry out gender-sensitive analysis throughout the analysis, planning, implementation, review, evaluation and mission drawdown processes.
3. Expertise and advice in missions		
WPS-3.1	243	*Missions* should integrate gender expertise within all relevant functional components requiring gender knowledge and expertise.
WPS-3.2	243	*The mission senior gender adviser* should be located in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General [SRSG], reporting directly to the SRSG.
WPS-3.3	243	*[The mission senior gender adviser* should advise] the SRSG and senior mission leadership at the strategic level on integrating a gender perspective in mission activities.

Score Key:

0 = No implementation action taken.
1 = Proposed by Secretariat; rejected by inter-governmental bodies.
1.5 = Proposed by Secretariat; pending decision by inter-governmental bodies.
2 = Proposed by Secretariat; accepted by inter-governmental bodies in reduced initial form.
2.5 = Proposed and accepted; awaits mission-specific implementation.
3 = Implementation/rollout underway of reduced-form concept.
3.5 = Implementation/rollout underway of full concept.
4 = Fully/widely implemented per Report recommendation.
5 = Implementation exceeds Report recommendation.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Implementation Responsibility (or Support Needed)										Implementation Scores				
	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years	As of…,	Due on…
(a) Development and entry into force of a gender-sensitive UN force generation strategy.	X				X		X								
(b) More Member States implement 1325 National Action Plans that address force generation for peace operations.										X					
Missions' strategic and operational-level plans, policies, assessments and reviews often merit Gender Equality Markers (GEMs) of 2 and on *average* 1.5 or better.	X	X						X		X					
All relevant mission components (including political affairs, human rights, police, justice, and civil affairs) have access to host-state-sensitive gender expertise within their component.	X						X	X		X					
Senior gender adviser in mission reports directly to SRSG or equivalent head of mission.	X						X								
Gender adviser's effectiveness is reflected in the GEM scores of mission activities.	X														

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
4. Expertise and advice for missions		
WPS-4	243	*Missions* should have full access to policy, substantive and technical support from UN Women on implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 and successive resolutions, together with support currently received from the Departments of Political Affairs (DPA) and Peace operations (DPKO).
5. Leadership		
WPS-5.1	243	*The Secretariat* should ensure that compacts between the Secretary-General and heads of mission specify performance indicators relating to gender.
WPS-5.2	257	[*The Secretary-General* should] continue to appoint more women to senior mission leadership positions.
WPS-5.3	257	[*The Secretary-General* should] review the obstacles and structural factors preventing women's recruitment and professional advancement and support the promotion of serving female staff to senior leadership roles.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years	As of…, Due on…
(a) Secretary-General decision directs UN Women to develop and host Headquarters-level Global Focal Point for Women, Peace and Security, with the co-located support of gender advisers from DPA, DPKO and UN agencies, funds and programmes.	X						X	X						
(b) UN Women continues to participate in the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections to promote a consistent gender perspective on these issues.	X						X	X						
Gender sensivitity requirements are written into HoM compacts and evaluated against mission activity GEM scores and gender-related programmematic achievements.	X	X												
Percentage of women on senior mission leadership teams meets or exceeds 50 per cent of total team, and at least 30 per cent of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) and Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSGs) are women.	X								X					
(a) Rates of recruitment and professional advancement of women in UN professional staff positions increase by 10 to 15 per cent within three years of Report release.	X				X	X	X							
(b) Proportion of women in senior UN leadership roles increases by 15 per cent within three years of Report release.	X													

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
UN Police		
1. Gender-sensitive approach to policing		
UNP-1.1	(159)	The *Secretariat and Member States* should develop a strategy with concrete measures to increase the percentage of women police in deployments to UN peace operations, in particular senior officers.
UNP-1.2	(159)	*Member States* should accelerate these efforts both through generic recruitment and by providing specialized personnel to units for the protection of women and children against sexual violence.
UNP-1.3	(159)	*Mission police components* should coordinate closely with women protection advisors, gender advisers, and child protection advisers within the mission.
2. Transnational organized crime expertise		
UNP-2	(160)	*Missions* should acquire expertise in [transnational organized crime (ToC)], when requested and in partnership with others to support national police capacity.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
(a) UN Police (UNPOL) strategy offers PCCs gender balance awards (for individual officers) and reimbursement bonuses (for formed units) when their percentages of officers qualified for and deployed to UN peace operations exceed 20 per cent female for individual officers and 15 per cent female for FPU officers.	X		X		X			X	X	X					
(b) Percentage of female police officers in command positions in UN missions is at least 30 per cent by 2020.	X							X	X						
(a) PCCs increase the number of female officers on their domestic police rolls by 10 per cent by 2020;								X		X					
(b) At least 20 PCCs offer specialized protection units to UN missions that are majority female officers.	X									X					
Mission performance reviews show routine (daily to weekly) collaboration between police components and protection and gender advisers.	X	X													
Missions in areas with significant ToC threats are able to monitor and analyze those threats in collaboration with partners, support host-state intelligence-led operations against ToC, and facilitate host state cooperation with Interpol and regional ToC initiatives.	X	X		X			X	X	X	X					

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
3. Police strategy: evidence-based, optimally staffed, continuously evaluated		
UNP-3.1	161	*UN police strategies* should be based on capacity assessments in country, reflected in mission planning, staffing and recruitment, and should include specialized teams and the use of long-term civilian experts.
UNP-3.2	161	*Police contributing countries* supporting police development and reform should be encouraged to extend rotation cycles to 12 months.
UNP-3.3	161	*The Secretariat* should complete the strategic guidance framework on UN Policing currently under preparation and propose commensurate resources for its implementation.
UNP-3.4	161	*Mission leadership* should consistently monitor and evaluate police development efforts, taking into account the assessment of the host government and civil society.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Implementation Responsibility (or Support Needed)										Implementation Scores					
	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…,	Due on…
(a) All strategic assessments for new missions meet UNPOL informational planning needs, drawing on Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF).	X	X		X			X	X	X							
(b) Police components of missions utilize specialized teams and long-term (>12 month contract) civilian experts routinely.	X						X	X	X	X						
Individual police and formed police unit (FPU) rotation cycles equal or exceed 12 months.	X						X		X	X	3.5					
(a) Operational tier (II) of SGF completed (2016).	X						X	X								
(b) Procedural tier (III) of SGF completed/ signed (12 manuals, 3/year, 2016-2018).	X						X	X								
(c) Secretariat develops plan for implementing SGF in missions, in pre-deployment and induction training of UNPOL, and in curricula of regional police peacekeeping centers.	X						X	X	X	X						
(d) SGF rollout is funded through peacekeeping support account and Global Focal Point multi-partner trust fund.	X						X	X		X						
(e) Co-operation with and use of SGF by African Union and European Union.	X							X	X	X						
The development of host state police is evaluated for intended effects using context-sensitive sampling (e.g., public surveys, officer competency testing, & crime statistics) on a rolling basis at six-month intervals across the mission area.	X						X									

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
4. Formed police units: expand the base, assist training, improve performance		
UNP-4.1	161	(a) *The Secretariat* should expand the base of FPU contributors and encourage partnership arrangements between potential contributors and donor countries.
UNP-4.2	161	(b) *[The Secretariat* should] assist police contributing countries in strengthening pre-deployment preparation.
UNP-4.3	161	(c) *[The Secretariat* should] improve performance and oversight management including adherence to agreed policies and standards.
5. Review the Police Division		
UNP-5	161	[UN Police Division] organizational structure, staffing and capacity … should be reviewed to better meet new approaches to supporting national police.

	Implementation Responsibility (or Support Needed)										Implementation Scores				
Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
Number of FPU-contributing PCCs expands 25 per cent, to roughly 20, with corresponding increase in associated equipment and training donors.	X				X			X	X	X					
UN Police Division and Standing Police Capacity work with FPU providers and potential donor countries, as necessary, so that all deployment-designated units meet UN equipment and performance standards in timely fashion prior to deployment, without delaying mission startup.	X						X	X		X					
Mission police components themselves or with support from the Standing Police Capacity test FPU mission performance capacity within one week of deployment and at 3-month intervals thereafter, retest two weeks following a failed performance test, and repatriate units that fail consecutive performance tests. Accountability and oversight mechanism to ensure this happens.	X						X			X					
Recommended review of Police Division is conducted.	X							X			4				May 2016

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
6. Strengthen consultations with troop and police contributors		
UNP-6	183	*The Security Council and Secretariat* should strengthen efforts to establish inclusive and meaningful consultations with troop and police contributing countries to ensure unity of effort and a common commitment to the mandate [including] specialized personnel, experts and high-level military officials from capitals as needed.
7. Strengthen accountability in the field		
UNP-7.1	269	*The Secretariat* should develop standard transparent approaches to deal with troop and police personnel contributions from countries whose human rights record and performance present challenges. Governments whose forces are listed in the annual reports of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict and on Conflict Related Sexual Violence ... from contributing troops to UN missions until de-listed.
UNP-7.2	269	*Member States,* in particular troop and police contributors, *and the Secretariat* should ensure urgent and robust implementation of the recommendations of the recent report of [the] Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) into sexual exploitation and abuse [SEA] by personnel of peace operations.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
Security Council establishes a mechanism for substantive consultation with troop - and police-contributing countries prior to finalizing a new mission mandate or altering an existing mandate in ways that may substantially increase mission military or police contingents' operating tempo or risk of casualties.	X		X		X			X		X					
(a) DPKO does not accept contributions of police from countries or police services listed in the Secretary-General's annual reports on Children and Armed Violence and on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.	X		X		X				X	X					
(b) The Secretary-General establishes transparent, objecive and impartial criteria and decision processes, including time frames, for listing and delisting countries and police services in his annual reports on Children and Armed Violence and on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.	X		X		X				X	X					
[See entries for 6.3.1 - 6.3.6.]	X		X		X		X			X					

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
UNP-7.2.1	OIOS	*DPKO and Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS)*, in consultation with Office of Legal Affairs as appropriate, should introduce the necessary revisions to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enable quick decisions at the mission level to respond immediately to SEA allegations in a more objective, reliable, timely and transparent manner. ["Critical," per OIOS] Appropriate issues to be considered for revision include, but are not limited to: · When troop contributing countries report the findings of their investigation (as currently envisaged in Article 7.19 of the MOU) they should outline the evidence upon which their conclusions of the investigation rely. · The MOU should define the minimum investigative standards and protocols to be followed by TCCs and require their compliance. · The MOU should define the investigation competencies and experience of National Investigation Officers (NIOs) and DFS should monitor compliance. · The MOU should include a target period for completing investigations. · The MOU should include an appropriate role for the host country.
UNP-7.2.2	OIOS	*DPKO/DFS* should ...provide appropriate Assistance and Support to Victims of SEA. ["Critical", per OIOS]
UNP-7.2.3	OIOS	*DPKO/DFS* should analyse whether different uniformed contingents exhibit varying levels of discipline in relation to SEA and use the results to improve the effectiveness of TCC and PCC pre-deployment training and in-mission preventive measures. ["Important", per OIOS]

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
TCC/PCC MOU is revised and updated as recommended by OIOS, in the following ways: (a) MOU requires that TCCs/PCCs outline, in reports to the UN made under MOU Article 7.19, the evidentiary basis for conclusions reached by investigations of peacekeeper misconduct;	X				X					X					
(b) MOU defines or references, and requires use of, minimum standards and protocols for investigations of cases of peacekeeper misconduct;	X				X					X					
(c) MOU stipulates minimum competencies for National Investigative Officers;	X				X					X					
(d) MOU stipulates a target period for completing investigations into peacekeeper misconduct;	X				X					X					
(e) MOU keeps open a role for the host country in misconduct investigations.	X				X					X					
Percentage of substantiated victims referred to remedial services by missions increases from 12 per cent, on average, to 100 per cent.	X						X								
DPKO/DFS develop impartial criteria by which to evaluate factors affecting unit discipline with respect to SEA and use the results to inform SEA training (pre-deployment, induction and other in-mission).	X									X	3.5				

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
UNP-7.2.4	OIOS	*DPKO/DFS* should strengthen its protocols to non-responsive Member States and routinely include full information on the extent of non-responsiveness for those who fail to comply with the terms and conditions of the MOU. ["Important", per OIOS]
UNP-7.2.5	OIOS	*The Secretary-General* should routinely identify in his annual Special Measures protection from SEA report, all failures in command and control based on completed SEA allegations and the related disciplinary measures taken by TCCs. ["Important", per OIOS]
UNP-7.2.6	OIOS	*The Secretary-General* should clarify the provisions in his bulletin (ST/SGB/2003/13) that strongly discourage sexual relations between United Nations personnel and beneficiaries of assistance. ["Important", per OIOS]
UN Staff Safety and Security		
1. Key areas meriting particular attention:		
UNSEC-1.1	(276)	Application of the system to military and police contingents [by the Secretariat, with the necessary support of UN inter-governmental bodies].
UNSEC-1.2	(276)	Capabilities, technologies and force preparation necessary to cater for asymmetric threat environments in the next five years. [All parties share responsibilities].
UNSEC-1.3	(276)	Provisions for national staff, including administrative constraints and insurance considerations, and the impact on national staff who often bear considerable risk with little recompense and support in emergency situations.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
DPKO/DFS reports on SEA include information on Member State non-responsiveness to SEA-related terms and conditions of the MOU with TCCs/PCCs.	X									X					
S-G's annual SEA report identifies command and control failures related to completed SEA allegations and related disciplinary measures taken by TCCs.	X									X					
The Secretary-General clarifies paragraphs 3.2(d) and 4.5 of ST/SGB/2003/13, especially regarding the definition of "beneficiary of assistance" and the discretion of Heads of Department, Office or Mission to justify exceptions to the policy.	X														
DPKO/DFS, UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and TCCs/PCCs negotiate the application of UN risk assessment and risk mitigation methodologies to military and police units and other personnel.	X		X		X	X	X			X					
DPKO/DFS policy, unit equipment requirements and training materials regarding asymmetric threat environments developed and distributed to TCCs and taken up by TCCs.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					
Development of emergency support policies and procedures for national staff, to include considerations of personal security for staff and immediate family and compensation for material loss incurred in consequence of UN employment.	X	X		X	X		X								

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
2. Integrate and update security management resources		
UNSEC-2.1	281	*The Secretariat* should implement expeditiously the recent decision to integrate the security resources of UNDSS and of missions under a single integrated management model and implement updated methodologies for security risk assessments and incident reporting.
UNSEC-2.2	281	*The Secretariat* should review the implementation of the UN security management system to ascertain that it is 'fit for purpose' for contemporary threat environments and make sure that the Programme criticality framework is implemented to help peace operations take decisions on acceptable risk to stay and deliver.
3. Make guard units available to missions		
UNSEC-3	281	Where necessary, *missions without military components* should be provided with small military or police contingents as guard units.
4. Establish a medical performance framework and standards for operations		
UNSEC-4	281	*The Secretariat* should establish a medical performance framework for UN peace operations, including clear capability standards, minimum standards for all UN medical capabilities, civilian and military.
5. Develop and exercise crisis management plans		
UNSEC-5.1	281	*The Secretariat* should develop a comprehensive crisis management policy for its peace operations.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of..., Due on...
(a) UNDSS and mission staff security resources are integrated under a common management model.	X	X			X	X	X	X			3.5				Dec. 2015
(b) Staff security risk assessments and incident reporting use current ISO/IEC recommended methodologies.	X	X			X	X	X	X			4				Dec. 2015
(a) Implement a "significantly improved" UN security management system by December 2016.	X	X			X	X	X				3.5				Dec. 2016
(b) "Programme criticality framework" is implemented in all high-risk or very-high-risk operating environments.	X	X			X	X					4				Dec. 2015
(c) Framework implementation has adequate funding.	X	X			X	X	X								
Budget requests for missions in high-risk environments include guard unit personnel.	X			X	X		X		X	X					
(a) Peace operations medical performance framework establishes minimum standards of care.	X	X			X	X	X								
(b) Operations implement at least minimum medical standards indicated by their threat environment.	X						X								
Secretariat develops a comprehensive crisis management policy for UN peace operations.	X	X	X		X	X				X					

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
UNSEC-5.2	281	*UN Country Team partners* should ensure rigorous crisis management plans and procedures, including mass casualty incident plans, are in place and are reviewed and exercised regularly.
6. Improve fatalities management and death/disability compensation		
UNSEC-6.1	281	*The Secretariat* should centralize responsibilities for fatalities management to ensure better information management and oversight of administrative processes in support of the next of kin of the deceased.
UNSEC-6.2	281	*The General Assembly* should keep the rates of compensation for death and disability under regular review and adjust accordingly.
7. Host state responsibilities in cases of attacks against the United Nations		
UNSEC-7	281	*States hosting UN peace operations* must vigorously pursue those responsible for attacks against the United Nations, including through prompt investigation and effective prosecution in accordance with international human rights law, including the right to due process.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
(a) Country Teams have plans for crisis management, including mass casualty incidents, that meet or exceed DSS standards/requirements for crisis management.	X	X				X	X	X							
(b) Country Teams exercise crisis management plans on a regular basis (e.g., quarterly).	X	X						X							
Secretariat establishes a responsibility centre for all facets of fatalities management.	X	X			X	X	X								
General Assembly reviews and if necessary adjusts rates of compensation at five-year intervals.	X	X				X	X								
MOUs give missions a collaborating role in investigating attacks against UN persons or facilities with host state authorities, including power to protect attack/crime scenes, gather and protect evidence, and standing to testify in host state investigative and trial proceedings.	X			X	X					X					

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
Strategic Communication		
1. Build and maintain two-way communications at multiple levels		
SC-1.1	284	*The Secretariat and missions* should put in place at every stage of the mission lifecycle strategies for planning, recruitment, resourcing of mission communications teams aimed at ensuring interactive two-way communications with the local people.
SC-1.2	(238)	*Each peace operation* should work closely with the UN Country Team and the local communities, including civil society actors, to develop strategies for community engagement at various stages of the mission cycle.
SC-1.3	(97)	*Missions* should communicate continuously with host authorities on all threats to civilians, in all dimensions, including child protection, sexual violence, and the full range of protection issues facing women and girls, as well as men and boys.
SC-1.4	(96)	*Missions* must build relationships of trust with local people, leading to more effective delivery of protection of civilians mandates and better protection for peacekeepers.
2. Develop key communications tools and techniques		
SC-2.1	(238)	*[Mission and Country Team* strategic communications] strategy should include the creation of fora in which senior mission leadership can participate in structured, regular engagement with local communities, including women, youth, religious and other leaders who can provide feedback to the mission on its work.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
Full mission lifecycle communications strategy is developed in initial mission plan and evolves with the mission. Mission teams for two-way communications strategy are adequately resourced.	X				X	X	X								
Missions and Country Teams develop strategies for regular engagement by mission leadership with a wide range of civil society groups.	X	X					X								
(a) Mission leadership meets at least weekly with host authority counterparts on protection issues.	X	X								X					
(b) Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) develop standard reporting channels to/ from counterparts in host governments.	X	X								X					
Mission civil affairs teams and protection teams develop means for gathering and utilizing community inputs on a daily basis and for informing communities about mission activities and goals on at least a bi-weekly basis.	X	X						X							
Community engagement strategy includes regular community meetings with women, youth, religious and other leaders to generate feedback about the mission's work.	X	X					X	X							

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
SC-2.2	(148)	*Each mission* should have or be able to … identify resources for the regular commissioning of independent surveys of local perceptions of the mission and progress towards mission objectives, linked to strategic communications efforts.
SC-2.3	284	*The Secretariat and missions* should … [ensure that] UN peace operations use modern and appropriate communication approaches and technologies.
SC-2.4	(238)	*[Mission and Country Team* strategic communications strategy should use] local engagement and feedback ... to measure the impact of the mission and … ensure that the mission does no harm [and] makes immediate course corrections as required.
3. Secretariat-Security Council communications		
SC-3	(97)	*The Secretariat* should keep the Security Council informed in a timely manner of new threats and limits imposed on the mission´s ability to act at every stage of the operation.
4. Security Council-Host State communications		
SC-4	(97)	*The Security Council* must draw upon its individual and collective influence and leverage on the conflict parties to ensure they refrain from targeting civilians directly or indirectly, and swiftly condemn and take steps to bring to justice those who commit or condone such crimes.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
Missions undertake local perception surveys quarterly to help gauge progress toward mission objectives and the continued appropriateness of those objectives.	X	X					X	X							
Secretariat and missions implement communications technology recommendations of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping (2014), pp. 34-37, 58-61.	X	X					X								
Missions use local feedback to inform a "do no harm" approach to mandate implementation and to adapt mission activities in response to that feedback.	X	X					X								
Secretariat informs the Security Council of new threats or limitations to mission performance within 24 hours of acute threats and one week of strategic impediments to a mission's ability to carry out its mandate.	X		X	X			X								
Security Council prepares targeted sanctions tools in advance for rapid application to conflict parties who target civilians, and invokes them as needed; and develops procedures for rapid referral of egregious criminal activities to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor.			X	X											

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
Financing Peace Operations		
1. Reinforce UN Secretariat conflict prevention and mediation capabilities		
BDG-1.1	79	Utilize the Regular Budget for the Secretariat's core prevention and mediation capacities, including: (a) monitoring and analysis, (b) support to the Secretary General's good offices and mediation support, including the standby mediation team, [and] (c) deployment of peace and development advisers and small multidisciplinary teams of experts to support the UN Country Team when needed.
BDG-1.2	79	Access the peacekeeping support account for mediation and electoral support to peace operations.
2. To enhance UN financing in support of sustaining peace:		
BDG-2.1	144	*[The General Assembly* should] Scale up the fast track window ('Immediate Response Facility') of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), building on a clear UN vision, enhanced flexibility in its implementation partners, and fast-track procedures.
BDG-2.2	144	*[The Secretariat, and agencies, funds and programmes* {AFPs}, with the concurrence of inter-governmental bodies, should] Establish pooled country-level UN funds linked to a political roadmap and integrated strategies.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
UN conflict prevention and mediation capacities are funded through the assessed Regular Biennium Budget, including: (a) monitoring and analysis	X					X					1.5				
(b) good offices and mediation support, including standby mediation team	X						X								
(c) deployment of peace and development advisers and teams of experts	X						X								
UN mediation and electoral support functions are funded through the Peacekeeping Support Account.	X						X								
(a) PBF Immediate Response Facility resources double to facilitate annual disbursements of $200 million.	X				X			X		X					
(b) PBF focuses on being "risk-taking investor of first resort" in post-conflict economies.	X				X										
(a) Multi-partner trust funds (MPTFs) are established in mission areas.	X	X			X			X		X					
(b) MPTF-[Mission Area] disbursement strategies are determined by joint decision of mission and Country Team, consistent with applicable integrated strategy.	X	X													
(c) MPTF funds include mission programmematic budgets.	X	X					X								

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
BDG-2.3	144	[*The Secretariat and AFPs,* in support of missions and UN Country Teams, should] Clarify practical aspects of cooperation between missions and UN Country Teams, such as co-location in remote areas, including cost-sharing and reimbursement arrangements for shared services and other aspects of support and administration.
BDG-2.4	144	[*The Secretary-General* should propose and *the General Assembly and AFP Executive Boards* should] Enable the use of assessed contributions by partners based on comparative advantage.
3. Build programme funding into mission budgets for select mandated tasks		
BDG-3	154, 302	*The Secretary-General* should include within proposed mission budgets programmematic resources when these are necessary for the effective implementation of mandated tasks. Such programmematic funding should be implemented by the entity capable of most effectively delivering results, whether the mission directly, the UN Country Team or other implementing partners.
4. Use assessed contributions to fund peace operations partnerships with African Union		
BDG-4.1	232	[*The Secretary-General should propose and the General Assembly should provide*] United Nations-assessed contributions ... on a case-by-case basis to support *Security Council-authorized* African Union (AU) peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
(a) Mission-UN Country Team joint senior management teams establish co-location and cost-sharing arrangements.	X	X	X			X	X	X							
(b) Field arrangements facilitated at Headquarters level by appropriate 'Global Focal Points,' using police-justice-corrections Global Focal Point as a model.	X	X					X	X							
MPTF disbursement strategy distributes assessed and voluntary funds in accordance with partners' comparative advantage in spending funds effectively.	X	X				X	X								
(a) Mission budgets include programmematic funding as required for early mission effectiveness, on case by case basis.	X	X			X		X								
(b) Mission programmematic funds are distributed by MPTF arrangements as outlined above.	X	X					X								
UN and AU sign memoranda of agreement for agreed level/fraction of matching UN financial support to AU peace support operations.	X			X	X		X		X						

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
BDG-4.2	232	Any *African Union peace support operation* receiving United Nations assessed contributions should provide regular reports to the Security Council, as well as appropriate financial reporting to the Organization, and comply fully with UN standards, such as the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, and UN conduct and discipline frameworks.
5. Use assessed contributions to launch and to backstop special political missions		
BDG-5.1	(304)	[*The Secretary-General* should propose and *the General Assembly* should] Establish a special and separate account for the funding of special political missions that would be budgeted, funded and reported upon on an annual basis with a financial period of 1 July to 30 June.
BDG-5.2	(304)	[*The Secretary-General* should propose and *the General Assembly* should] Authorize special political missions, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee [on Administrative and Budgetary Questions] to access the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for up to $25 million per decision of the General Assembly or the Security Council relating to the start-up or expansion phase of field- based special political missions.
BDG-5.3	(304)	[*The Secretary-General* should propose and *the General Assembly* should] Authorize special political missions, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee, to access up to $25 million in strategic deployment stocks in advance of the corresponding budget appropriation if a decision of the General Assembly or Security Council relating to their start-up or expansion results in the need for expenditure.

Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Implementation Responsibility (or Support Needed)										Implementation Scores				
	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
UN-supported AU peace support operations: (a) provide regular operational progress reports to UN Security Council;	X		X	X			X		X						
(b) provide regular financial reporting to UNDFS/DM;	X								X						
(c) embed UN civilian, military and police observers to track and document compliance with UN human rights due diligence policy, conduct and discipline frameworks.	X						X		X						
Support account for UN special political missions (all categories) is established as a separate annual budget, using assessed contributions and the same budget year as UN peace operations (1 July - 30 June).	X			X			X								
New political missions authorized to access the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for startup funding.	X			X	X		X	X							
New political missions authorized to access the Strategic Deployment Stocks (Global Service Center, Brindisi) for startup equipment and supplies.	X			X	X		X								

Recommendation Sequence	Preceding (or Actual) Para. in Report	Recommendations
BDG-5.4	(304)	[*The Secretary-General* should propose and *the General Assembly* should] Make the support account available to all departments and offices to fund their fluctuating back-stopping requirements in relation to field-based special political missions and confirm the responsibility to support special political missions, while maintaining the existing arrangements for the financing of the support account and the Global Service Centre.
6. Develop a single peace operations account		
BDG-6	312	[*The Secretary-General* should] develop a proposal for a single 'peace operations account' to finance all peace operations and related back-stopping activities in future.

	Implementation Responsibility (or Support Needed)										Implementation Scores				
Implementation Benchmarks (indication that the idea was put into practice)	Secretary-General & UN Secretariat	UN Agencies, Funds & Programmes	Security Council cooperation	Security Council mandate	General Assembly, non-budgetary	General Assembly: Regular Budget	GA: Mission budgets, Support Acct. & other	Voluntary, extra-budgetary donor cooperation	Regional Organization cooperation	Individual Member States implement	At One Year	At Three Years	At Five Years		As of…, Due on…
Backstopping offices for special political missions are brought into the scope of coverage of the peacekeeping support account; OR Backstopping offices for special political missions are provided resources as a surcharge on a new account for special political missions (see BDG-5.1), in parallel to the peacekeeping support account.	X	X			X		X								
LONGER RANGE, IN LIEU OF BDG-5.1, 5.4: A single 'peace operations account' is created to encompass the current budgets for peace operations, the budgets for special political missions, and their respective back-stopping activities.	X	X			X		X								

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IMPLEMENTING *UNITING OUR STRENGHTS FOR PEACE:* AN APPROACH TO BENCHMARKING HIPPO RECOMMENDATIONS IN FIVE KEY AREAS

In June 2015, the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) issued the first comprehensive review of United Nations (UN) peace operations in 15 years. This occasional paper considers how to best track the implementation of the recommendations generated by the HIPPO Report. It does so by developing and discussing benchmarks for the recommendations, both listed and embedded in the HIPPO Report, in five substantive areas – Women, Peace and Security; UN Police; staff safety and security; strategic communication; and financing of peace operations. The methodology used allows for tracking, rating and comparing the implementation of each recommendation. Moreover, it highlights which agencies are responsible for making sure that various goals are achieved. This occasional paper provides an important toolkit for making sure that words are turned into action and that the present momentum to strengthen UN peace operations is sustained.

On 8-9 May 2016, the Challenges Forum marked its 20th anniversary with the event *United Nations Peace Operations 2020: The United Nations Reviews and Their Implications for Tomorrow's Missions*. This report was originally written as a background paper for that event, and incorporates deliberations and results of the meeting.

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