Interfaces Between Peace Operations and Organized Crime[1]

Introduction: Organized Crime and International Peace and Stability

In the recent past, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has increasingly highlighted the threat organized crime[2] (OC) poses to international peace and stability. Already in 2010, the Council noted that it considers transnational organized crime, piracy and trafficking in drugs and human beings as 'evolving challenges and threats to international peace and security.'[3] A 2012 Presidential Statement noted that transnational organized crime 'negatively impact[s] the consolidation of peace in countries emerging from conflict.'[4] A year later, following a Council debate on drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel, the Council highlighted that organized crime is 'threatening to reverse peacebuilding advances'[5] and invited the Secretary-General '… to consider these threats as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions' assessments, planning and peacebuilding support.'[6] On numerous occasions, the Council also stressed the threats emerging from linkages between terrorism and organized crime.[7] Indeed, in December 2014, it convened a separate thematic debate on this topic which was followed, in

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[1] The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Challenges Forum Partnership or Secretariat. Parts of this paper are based on research initially published in: Wibke Hansen, 'Mehr Interaktion als geplant: Friedenseinsätze und Organisierte Kriminalität in fragilen Staaten,' Münster, 2012. An expanded version of this paper was published in PRISM, vol. 5, No. 1 (2014), pp. 63-79. This research draws on four case studies: Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

[2] The Palermo Convention defines an organized criminal group as follows: 'For the purposes of this Convention: (a) "Organized criminal group" shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit' (see United Nations General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/55/25, 15 November 2000, article 2).

[3] United Nations Security Council, S/PRST/2010/18, 23 September 2010, p. 1.

[4] United Nations Security Council, S/PRST/2012/29, 20 December 2012, p. 3.

[5] United Nations Security Council, S/PRST/2012/2, 21 February 2012, p. 1.

[6] United Nations Security Council, S/PRST/2013/22, 18 December 2013, p. 4.

[7] See for example United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2083, 17 December 2012, and 2129, 17 December 2013, as well as United Nations Presidential Statements, S/PRST/2012/17, 4 May 2012, and S/PRST/2013/5, 13 May 2013.

May 2015, by a report by the UN Secretary-General on the threat of terrorists benefiting from transnational organized crime.[8]

A glance at recent reports by the UN Secretary-General on various current operations mirrors this picture and illustrates how frequently peace operations are more or less directly confronted with OC whether it is in Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan or Haiti.[9] The serious strategic risk that the phenomena poses to upholding security and sustaining peace is also noted in *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People*, the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO), and the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. In the former, it is argued that OC is a 'mission-wide concern and a strategic risk to sustaining peace,' which is one of the key factors that are rendering conflicts more intractable.[10] However, though threat awareness is clearly increasing, this has not yet translated into the mandates of peace operations—nor into guidance, policy or tools for the field where these challenges are most prominent.[11]

Peace operations today are rarely explicitly mandated—and rarely equipped —to deal with organized crime even if the problem is recognised early on. While organized crime might be mentioned in Security Council resolutions as a threat, provisions for countering organized crime are missing from the operative paragraphs of the resolution. The resolution authorising the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is one of the most recent examples of this pattern.[12] Even where countering organized crime was initially not part of the mandate, references to OC are at times found in progress and exit benchmarks. This illustrates the significance that missions assign to countering organized crime in the host country but also discrepancies in current approaches of dealing with OC in the context of peace operations.

Why is it important to translate threat awareness into policy and instruments and what could be possible measures to do so? In order to answer these questions it is helpful to look at some of the interfaces between peace operations and organized crime. This paper suggests below an analytical model consisting of seven possible interfaces which can assist in structuring the various linkages as well as in assessing threats to peace operations, mandate

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[8] See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2195, 19 December 2014, as well as the United Nations Secretary-General's Report S/2015/366, 21 May 2015, on the threat of terrorists benefiting from transnational organized crime.
[9] See for example United Nations, *Report of the Security Council on transnational organized crime and illicit drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel Region,* S/2013/359, 17 June 2013; United Nations Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, S/2014/403, 9 June 2014, and S/2015/426, 11 June 2015; United Nations, *Thirtieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire,* S/2012/506, 29 June 2012; United Nations, *Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia,* S/2012/230, 16 April 2012; or United Nations, *Special report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region*, S/2013/119, 27 February 2013, and United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region*, S/2015/172, 10 March 2015.
[10] United Nations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People,* Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (16 June 2015), para 160 and United Nations, *The Challenges of Sustaining Peace,* Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (29 June 2015), para. 11.
[11] In fact, the *Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions* from 1 February 2014 is one of the first official documents with explicit reference to responsibilities in an operational context, policy and tools.
[12] UN Security Council Resolution 2100, S/RES/2100 (2013), 25 April 2013, extended by S/RES/2164 (2014), 25 June 2014.

implementation and host nation stability. In doing so, this model can also help to structure our thinking on the corresponding need for action.

The Organized Crime-Peace Operations Nexus

#1: Organized Crime Fuels Conflict

Organized crime can prolong or exacerbate conflict by i) funding or resourcing armed groups or by ii) providing economic incentives for the continuation of conflict and the undermining of peace processes. Aspects of this have been thoroughly researched in the context of the debate on so-called 'war economies.' Terms such as 'blood diamonds' point to the linkages between illegal resource exploitation and armed conflict. Connections between organized crime and violent non-state actors have become more frequent since the end of the Cold War, when state funding for insurgent groups decreased. Today, more and more rebel groups are 'self-financed.' Illegal resource exploitation and the drug trade are probably the most significant streams in this regard.[13]

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In some cases, profits from criminal activities seem to have changed the motivational structure of these armed groups from political to criminal-economic motives, for example in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In a report on the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Secretary-General noted that: '[a]ll armed groups, whether Congolese or foreign, have also engaged in the illegal exploitation of the vast mineral and other natural resources of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as other criminal activities. For those groups, the benefits derived from the illegal exploitation of those resources not only finance their acquisition of illicit weapons, but have also become an end in themselves.'[14]

Such 'economic spoilers' are then particularly difficult to deal with as political strategies. Processes of inclusion or power sharing are not necessarily incentives for these groups whose business opportunities could be threatened by the end of conflict.

These dynamics, however, are not limited to the active conflict phase, or, in other words: 'war economies' do not cease to exist after the conclusion of a peace agreement. The proceeds from organized crime oftentimes provide incentives for the continued existence of non-state armed groups.

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[13] On the latter see for example Svante Cornell, 'The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42 (2005), pp. 751-760.
[14] United Nations, *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region*, S/2013/119, 27 February 2013, para 48, p. 12.

#2: Organized Crime Undermines Security

Assessments contained in the UN Secretary-General's reports on various peace operations indicate to what extent organized crime is seen as a challenge to security—and thus also to mandated tasks such as the establishment of a secure environment. In some cases, such as in Haiti, insecurity has prompted missions to take robust action against actors involved in or supported by organized crime. In other cases, criminal actors have targeted UN personnel directly. Attacks on UN police personnel in Kosovo, for example, were thought to be motivated by the missions' increasing activities in combating organized crime.[15]

Proceeds from OC can also fuel the emergence or prolonged existence of non-state armed groups—even in the absence of armed conflict or once a peace process is under way. One example is the drug trade and its impact on the proliferation of gangs and other armed groups in Haiti. In Liberia and Sierra Leone areas rich in natural resources were long controlled by armed groups—oftentimes ex-combatants—after the civil wars had ended. Sometimes these groups also acted as providers of security for certain segments of the population—a factor that needs to be taken into consideration when counter-strategies are devised.

Organized crime can also have a long-term impact on security by weakening or undermining security sector reform: In his 2013 report on Security Sector Reform (SSR) to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General notes that '[c]urrent approaches to security sector reform have been confronted with a proliferation of transnational threats, including trafficking in humans, drugs and arms; terrorism; insurgency; climate change and environmental degradation, organized crime and armed violence; and cybercrime.'[16]

#3: Peacekeepers Participate in Organized Crime

There have been cases where peacekeepers themselves have been involved in organized crime. The issue attracted public attention notably during the 1990s Western Balkan peace operations—not least when an UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) contingent was redeployed due to its involvement in the drug trade.[17] However, the issue is neither limited to one particular operation nor to a particular troop or police contributing country (T/PCC). Such cases, when they become public, attract a considerable amount of media attention and fan public debates on the deficiencies of peace operations and peacekeepers. As a consequence, the public perception of the extent of this problem might not necessarily match reality. Even single cases show, however,

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[15] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, S/2003/421, 14 April 2003, para 14, p. 4.
[16] United Nations, *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform*, Secretary General's Report, A/67/970-S/2013/480, 13 August 2013, para 9, p. 5.
[17] See Mats Berdal, 'Whither UN Peacekeeping', *Adelphi Paper 281* (1993), p. 47.

that peace operations are vulnerable to infiltration by organized crime. Peace operations should be prepared for this, particularly as the impact on the credibility of a mission can be considerable.

#4: Peace Operations Fuel Organized Crime

Peace operations have 'side effects' or unintended consequences.[18] One side effect is that peace operations create opportunities for organized crime networks. The causal linkages between a rising demand for prostitution and an increase in human trafficking is well-known, fairly well-researched and documented, and has led the UN Secretariat as well as missions to adopt counter-measures.[19] In fact, this is one of the few areas where missions can have an impact on the demand side. However, the predominant OC activities in mission areas are generally driven by an international demand.

Decisions on strategies, instruments or measures employed in addition to or alongside a mission can also have side effects, one example being sanctions.[20] 'Embargo busting' is an important business for criminal networks.[20] This was nowhere more obvious than in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Sanctions on the export of Sierra Leonean diamonds at first primarily resulted in increased smuggling through Liberia. It was only after additional sanctions were imposed on the Liberian diamond trade that this dynamic could be reversed. Meanwhile, Liberian President Charles Taylor, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and wide international criminal networks benefited immensely from a flourishing diamond and weapons trade—to the detriment of attempts to end Sierra Leone's civil war.[21]

Similarly, decisions on the way a mission is deployed, particularly during its start-up, can advantage criminal actors. In Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone security gaps during the deployment phase provided criminal networks with opportunities to establish themselves. The Central Intelligence Unit of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has found that Kosovo came to be seen as a safe transit area for illegal goods in 1999 and 2000—a period of time during which the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and UNMIK were already deployed.[22]

Similar patterns can emerge when a mission withdraws. Regarding Afghanistan, the UN Secretary-General has noted that '[t]he financial

[18] For an in-depth discussion of unintended consequences see Chiyuki Aoi, Ramesh Thakur, *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (United Nations University, Tokyo/NY/Paris, 2007).
[19] See for example Sarah E. Mendelson, *Barracks and Brothels, Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Report (Washington D.C., 2005), p. 1; and United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Human Trafficking and United Nations Peacekeeping*, DPKO Policy Paper (New York, 2004).
[20] See Peter Andreas, 'Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions. Embargo Busting and Its Legacy', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49 (2005), pp. 335-360.
[21] This is documented in the United Nations reports of the Expert Panels that supported the sanctions committees on Liberia, see for example S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001; S/2002/470, 19 April 2002; S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002.
[22] See UNMIK, *Pillar 1 Police and Justice Presentation Paper* (July 2003), p. 36.

impact of the large-scale departure of international forces may make the illicit economy, notably that based on narcotics, even more attractive to those with large patronage systems to sustain.'[23]

#5: Peace Operations Co-opt Organized Crime

In principle, strategies of co-optation make sense in the context of peace operations—not least as capacities to act against spoilers are usually limited and broad-based local ownership is essential for the sustainability of peace-building efforts. However, co-opting groups of actors into the peace process is more likely to be successful where actors pursue a political agenda and can thus be motivated by political incentives. Such approaches might reach their limits quickly where actors are motivated by and hold on to a criminal-economic agenda.

The RUF in Sierra Leone is an example of a rebel group which pursued an economic agenda and proved resistant to political incentives. The peace process that followed the Lomé Peace Accord granted the RUF participation in a transitional government—which the group used to further their illegal economic agenda. Aspects of this are well-documented not only in the reports of the UN Secretary-General for the time period concerned but also in the reports of the independent expert panel working with the sanctions committee.[24] In Kosovo, too, a rebel group supported through illicit proceeds and with close linkages to the Albanian mafia was integrated into the administrative structures of Kosovo. In both instances the co-optation of groups involved in or enabled by organized crime had severe consequences. In Sierra Leone, this almost made the peace process falter. In Kosovo it led to close linkages between the emerging political elite and organized crime which were difficult to deal with for both UNMIK and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).

#6: Organized Crime Corrupts Elites

For peace operations, the politically relevant elite is one of the key partners in the host nation. Without the cooperation of this group, sustainable stabilization and peacebuilding processes are almost impossible to achieve. For organized crime groups, the corruption of a country's elite is a key strategy for conducting illegal activities with impunity. In various countries which currently host peace operations there is evidence of close linkages between members of the political elite and organized crime. The UN has on numerous occasions drawn attention to this. In relation to Guinea-Bissau, the UN Secretary-General argued that '[v]ery weak law enforcement capacity [...] continued to provide organized criminal groups with an avenue for the unchallenged use of the territory as a transit point for international drug traf-

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[23] The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/66/855-S/2012/462, 20 June 2012, para 69, p. 16.
[24] See for example United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), para 19, in relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000.

ficking. Allegedly, this happens with the support of members of the defense and security forces, as well as members of the political elite. This has led to the unabated spread of cocaine trafficking in Guinea-Bissau.'[25] In Haiti, members of the elite are not only suspected of involvement in the drug trade but also of employing the services of armed gangs for that purpose. Furthermore, the fact that also the police service was implicated in the cocaine trade raised questions about the sustainability or even the feasibility of police reform and capacity-building.

Such situations come with some very grave challenges for peace operations. Illicit income influences the preferences of elites and generally reduces their will for any genuine reform that could endanger their illicit income (no matter whether these serve pure enrichment or the financing of personal patronage networks or the pursuit of political projects).

#7: Peace Operations Combat Organized Crime

Over time, peace operations have employed a wide range of measures aimed at countering organized crime and illicit economic activities or reducing its most detrimental impact on the host nation and on mandate implementation. Obviously, most experiences in that regard rest with UN Police, be it in building the capacity of a host nation to combat organized crime, in providing planning and operational support to action against organized crime or in boosting a mission's own capacities to detect criminal spoilers and take action against them. However, some of the measures that missions have previously employed also fall outside the immediate activities of UN Police. They include observation and/or patroling of borders and coasts, control of ports and airports, policy advice to government and administration or even measures aimed at strengthening community resilience against organized crime. In some cases, missions were even able to compensate for some inherent restrictions in countering organized crime—such as the lack of intelligence capabilities or powers of arrest. Operations against gangs in Port-au-Prince, the use of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in gathering information in preparation of such operations and the cooperation between MINUSTAH and the Haitian police service can serve as one example.

In most cases, however, the measures adopted did not follow a strategy pursued from the outset of the mission. They were integrated into mandate implementation over time and in response to threats on the ground. This also means that at the outset, missions deployed in OC-affected environments were insufficiently prepared to deal with the threat that organized crime posed to security and stability in the mission area and, indeed, to mandate implementation. In Kosovo, for example, UNMIK's Organized Crime Bureau was established more than three years into the mission's life.

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[25] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau*, S/2012/887, 27 November 2012, para 32, p. 8.

Five years after its deployment, MINUSTAH was reinforced by a maritime component in order to support the Haitian Coast Guard in efforts to reduce cocaine smuggling. The time-lag that occurs until missions have strengthened their capacities to tackle the problem can easily be exploited by the criminal groups.

Some Cross-Cutting Observations

Organized Crime is not a Side Issue in Mission Areas

In fragile and post-conflict states, peace operations are frequently confronted with a whole array of illegal economic activities—some are organized crime, others are organized but not criminalized and yet others are criminal but not organized—the lines between those different phenomena are often blurred. While many of these activities (often the better organized ones) are of a transnational nature, 'local' organized crime—for example in the form of protection rackets, kidnapping or organized forms of robbery—is also a frequent phenomenon.

And it is not only mafia-like groups that benefit from organized crime in these environments. A diverse range of actors draws on criminal activities for different purposes. For criminal groups the motive is purely financial, for rebels it can be a way of funding a political agenda, for elites it can be a way to cement political influence, for ex-combatants organized crime can be a way of earning a living in a post-conflict situation. The specific motivation that drives actors to engage in organized crime is not necessarily decisive for the impact of such actions on the state. Ex-combatants occupying resource-rich areas create zones out of state control just as drug-cartels controlling strategic territory. However, the motivation is a key factor when it comes to devising appropriate counter-strategies. In some cases, a narrow focus on law enforcement might end up criminalizing whole segments of society where the creation of job opportunities might have been a more effective counter-measure. Yet, such measures will prove futile where greed is the main driver, in light of the high profits organized crime yields.

Organized Crime Affects the Core Business of Peace Operations

A peace operation as such is no sufficient deterrent for OC groups. None-theless, there are cases where missions are believed to have a deterrent effect against the spread of organized crime, e.g. in Liberia which seems less affected by the growing cocaine trade through West Africa than its neighbors. Still, in other places—including in Kosovo—a sizeable international presence did not deter criminal networks.

Peace operations are severely affected by the presence of organized crime in the mission area. This seems self-evident for the police component. However,

the impact is in no way limited to those dealing directly with crime related issues. In fact, OC affects many areas of mandate implementation and, indeed, the core business of peace operations. OC can undermine a secure environment. Spoilers motivated by criminal proceeds can undermine the implementation of peace agreements and—perhaps most critically—OC threatens to undermine peacebuilding processes and with that the sustainability of a peace operation's efforts—and its exit options.

It is well-established by now, that legitimate, functioning and reliable institutions are critical for long-term peace and stability. Peace operations today are also concerned with supporting the emergence of such institutions and with the extension of state authority. The UN itself has highlighted, in relation to various mission environments, how severe a threat organized crime and the accompanying corruption are. In some cases, peace operations—or the international community overall—have employed some fairly intrusive measures to counter this threat—for example the international oversight provided in the context of the Liberia Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) or the deployment of international judges to guarantee the independence of the judiciary—particularly in cases involving organized crime—to Kosovo.

Ahead of the deployment of a peace operation, as well as during its course, the answers to two questions are 'mission-critical:' Which actors are involved in organized crime and what is their relationship with the state? If non-state actors profit, there is a danger that they turn into spoilers of the peace process. If state-actors are involved, there is a danger that state institutions are hollowed out from within.

In Haiti, corruption in the police service fueled the local cocaine trade and at the same time weakened the population's confidence in the security sector. This led to an increased use of and reliance on non-state or private security actors by parts of the population which weakened the state's monopoly on violence further. The example illustrates that corruption or infiltration of institutions by criminal actors—undertaken to protect their own operations —can further weaken the fragile relations between states and their citizens. It also directly affects the implementation of mandated tasks such as police reform or the extension of state authority.

Conclusions: Is Peacekeeping also Crime Fighting?

Neither the problem of organized crime nor the detrimental impact it can have on security, stability and the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions will go away by itself. Indeed, the challenges OC poses for peace operations will most likely continue to grow. Yet, the current approach to organized crime in the context of peace operations is characterised not only by a lack of strategy but also by a number of discrepancies as a few examples illustrate.

- Peace operations are rarely mandated or equipped to deal with organized crime, yet they frequently have to do so in order to avoid a further destabilization of the host nation, to be able to fulfill their mandate and to safeguard their achievements.

- Peace operations are limited to their area of operation while OC networks act transnationally.

- Neither the local economy nor the international community can match the profits that OC offers.

- Countering OC becomes almost impossible, when actors in government—on whose consent the peace operations is based—are involved.

Some of these discrepancies will be difficult to resolve. However, others could be tackled through a more strategic approach to countering organized crime in the context of peace operations.[26] This would require—in principle—the acknowledgement or understanding that countering OC is also a task for peace operations. As a first step in this direction, the HIPPO report calls on peace operations to aquire expertise in the area of transnational organized crime and in partnership with others to support national police capacity and explore multi-pronged responses.[27]

It is clear that peace operations are not primarily a crime-fighting tool. It is also clear that organized crime in fragile and post-conflict states cannot be contained through measures employed by peace operations alone. However, if the overall aim is to avoid a further destabilization of these countries through organized crime and, at the same time, to limit the space for transnational criminal groups in those states, then peace operations—with their security, peacebuilding and statebuilding tasks—play an important role. As peace operations are—nolens volens—already involved in countering crime in various ways, it only seems logical at least to enable them to do so more effectively. It could also be a way of supporting effective mandate implementation.

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[26] For concrete recommendations and suggestions for measures in this regard see Wibke Hansen, 'The Organized Crime–Peace Operations Nexus', *PRISM*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2014), pp. 63-79 (pp. 73 ff.); see also James Cockayne, Adam Lupel (eds.), 'Peace Operations and Organized Crime: Case Studies, Lessons Learned and Next Steps', *International Peacekeeping*, Special Issue, vol. 16 (2009) 1, pp. 151-168; Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, Arthur Boutellis, *The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime*, International Peace Institute (June 2013), pp. 56 ff.
[27] United Nations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (16 June 2015), para 160.

Table 1. Measures Employed by Peace Operations to Curb Organized Crime and Illegal Economic Activities – Selected examples

Area of Activity	Specific measures	Examples
Operations against OC Operational support to local actors	Law enforcement, operations, arrests Planning and operational support to local law enforcement Support to local law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations	UNMIK MINUSTAH UNMIL
Monitoring, surveillance	Monitoring, surveillance, control of smuggling activities—aerial and ground Patrolling coasts	Diamond fields UNAMSIL, UNMIL; Rubber smuggling UNMIL Maritime Component MINUSTAH
Information gathering	Increase information gathering capacities in mission	KOCB UNMIK, JMAC MINUSTAH, MINUSMA
Capacity-building police	Training and capacity-building in specialised areas for police Support in the creation of specialised units to combat OC	UNMIK and Kosovo Police Service MINUSTAH and Haitian National Police Transnational Crime Unit, Liberia/ Côte d'Ivoire; Diamonds Crime Intelligence and Investigation Unit, Sierra Leone
Capacity-building of and support to justice/criminal justice systems	Deployment of international judges Witness protection programs Provision of legislation for fighting OC Conduct of criminal investigations	UNMIK UNMIK UNMIK UNMIK
Support to border control, border security (including costs, ports, airports)	Establish presence at borders Strengthen border security management Support to coastal guards Control ports and airports	UNMIK; MINUSTAH MINUSTAH MINUSTAH UNMIL (Monrovia Freeport)
Advice for government and administration	Joint committees/mechanisms Support in developing policies and strategies	Rubber Task Force Liberia UNMIL
Operational support to state control over resources/ resource governance	Support to building cadaster systems Security presence in areas of resource exploitation	UNAMSIL Security presence rubber plantations/UNMIL
Local and global control mechanisms/supply chain integrity	International control over concessions Certification processes diamond sector; Kimberley process Other supply chain integrity mechanisms	GEMAP, UNMIL Support to building up certification centers, Liberia MONUSCO, DRC

Support sanction regimes	Supporting compliance	UNMIL
	Support to expert panels	UNMIL, UNAMSIL
Regional and international cooperation	Strengthen regional police cooperation and cooperation with Interpol	UNMIK
	Inter-mission cooperation	UNMIL, UNAMSIL, UNOCI
Awareness, public education, building social resilience	Provision of services and infrastructure	QUIPs in Slums, Haiti MINUSTAH
	Public relations campaigns	'Not for sale' campaign UNMIK
Employment	Creation of training and employment opportunities for actors in illegal economies	Adjustment of MINUSTAH's DDR program to include gang members; reopening of Liberia's DDR program in 2008
Reducing demand/ unintended consequences	Zero-tolerance policy	All missions
	Training, sensitisation for staff	UNMIK
	"Off-limits" lists	UNMIK

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