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ПРОБЛЕМЫ МИРОТВОРЧЕСТВА НА РУБЕЖЕ XXI ВЕКА

**Материалы международной конференции
14-17 марта 1998 г.**



CHALLENGES OF PEACE SUPPORT: INTO THE 21st CENTURY

**Documents on the international conference
14-17 March 1998**



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ОТ РЕДАКЦИОННОЙ КОЛЛЕГИИ

15—17 марта 1998 г. Фонд "Российский общественно-политический центр" совместно с Канадским международным миротворческим подготовительным центром Пирсона, Отделом прессы и информации НАТО, Шведским Национальным Оборонным Колледжем и Иорданским Институтом дипломатии провели в Москве международную конференцию "Проблемы миротворчества на рубеже XXI в."

Конференцию открыл Президент Фонда "Российский общественно-политический центр", член Президентского Совета РФ профессор *А.М. Салмин*. Участников конференции приветствовали заместитель директора Департамента международных организаций МИД РФ *Д.Г. Юдин*, первый заместитель начальника Штаба по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ генерал-лейтенант *Л.С. Мальцев*, заместитель начальника Высших офицерских курсов "Выстрел" генерал-лейтенант *В.Г. Авакумов*.

На пленарных заседаниях конференции, которые продолжались два дня, ее участники, представлявшие 21 государство мира, обсудили международно-правовую базу подготовки и использования многонациональных миротворческих сил, проанализировали практическое координирование в миротворчестве с участием смешанных объединенных вооруженных сил, дали оценку гражданско-военного сотрудничества, типа и способности, требуемых для миротворческих операций, а также обменялись практическим опытом по подготовке миротворцев.

Повестка дня включала ознакомление участников конференции с организацией подготовки офицеров для миротворческих операций на Высших офицерских курсах "Выстрел" и обсуждение роли национальных и международных миротворческих центров в миротворческих операциях, которое прошло в Штабе по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ.

После представления докладов и сообщений задавались вопросы и велись дискуссии между участниками конференции. Происходил откровенный обмен взглядами и мнениями, многие из них носили неофициальный характер, и поэтому не все стенографировалось.

Кроме того, третий день (17 марта) конференции был посвящен обширной культурной программе. Было организовано посещение Большого театра, экскурсии по Москве, осмотр Манежной и Красной площади, Мемориала на Поклонной горе, Центрального Музея Великой Отечественной войны и воссоздающегося Храма Христа Спасителя.

Есть основания полагать, что публикация материалов конференции будет способствовать более глубокому пониманию и осознанию проблем миротворчества на рубеже XXI века.

КРАТКИЕ СВЕДЕНИЯ О КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

Место и время проведения:

- Фонд "Российский общественно-политический центр" (Лучников пер., 4, Конференц-зал, тел. 206-81-40, 206-87-45);
- Гостиничный комплекс "Украина", конференц-зал (2 этаж, комната 208);
- Высшие офицерские курсы "Выстрел" (г. Солнечногорск);
- Штаб по координации военного сотрудничества государств-участников СНГ (Ленинградский проспект, 41).

Инициаторы:

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- Отдел прессы и информации НАТО;
- Шведский Национальный Оборонный Колледж;
- Иорданский Институт дипломатии.

Спонсоры:

- Фонд "Российский общественно-политический центр";
- Отдел прессы и информации НАТО;
- Канадский международный миротворческий подготовительный центр Пирсона.

Участники:

свыше 70 человек из 21 страны мира, в том числе из Армении, Белоруссии, Бельгии, Великобритании, Германии, Грузии, Индии, Иордании, Канады, Китая, Нидерландов, Норвегии, России, США, Таджикистана, Украины, Финляндии, Франции, Швеции, ЮАР, которые представляли 24 различные организации — правительственные, дипломатические, научные, военные, общественные. В международной конференции с российской стороны приняли участие видные военачальники, руководители и заместители руководителей крупных аналитических и политических структур, представители Администрации Президента РФ, органов государственной власти, Конституционного суда, Совета безопасности РФ, Совета обороны РФ и других организаций.

Цели:

изучение международно-правовой базы подготовки и использования многонациональных миротворческих сил, анализ (на основе конкретного мероприятия) того, как координирование в миротворчестве было применено на практике с участием смешанных объединенных вооруженных сил, оценка гражданско-военного сотрудничества, типа и способности, требуемых для миротворческих операций, а также обмен опытом по подготовке миротворцев.

Рабочие языки: русский и английский.

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2. *Абу-Джабер Камел*, Президент Института дипломатии Иордании, доктор наук.
3. *Алквист Лейф*, директор Исследовательского проекта Шведского Национального Оборонного Колледжа, капитан.
4. *Антоненко Оксана*, Международный институт стратегических исследований.
5. *Баев Павел Кимович*, старший научный сотрудник Института по миротворческим исследованиям (Норвегия), доктор наук.
6. *де Бошен Франсуа*, военный советник МИД Франции, полковник.

7. *Бриггс Ове*, представитель Шведского Национального Оборонного Колледжа, профессор.
8. *Вилсон Гордон*, научный сотрудник Института исследований безопасности (Франция), капитан.
9. *Григорян Степан Геворгович*, Чрезвычайный Посланник и Полномочный министр Посольства Республики Армения в РФ.
10. *Давенпорт Майкл*, первый секретарь (по полит. вопросам) Посольства Великобритании в РФ.
11. *Джонсон Терри*, представитель Военно-морской академии (Монтеррей, США), профессор.
12. *Диль Манфред*, советник Посольства Германии в Москве, полковник.
13. *Дучак Богдан Петрович*, помощник атташе по вопросам обороны при Посольстве Украины в РФ, полковник.
14. *Исакова Ирина*, кафедра военных исследований Королевского колледжа Лондонского университета.
15. *Кнежевич Любинко*, помощник военного атташе при Посольстве Союзной республики Югославии в Москве, полковник.
16. *Козн Ричард*, представитель Центра Джоржа Маршала (Германия), профессор.
17. *Ли Джихонг*, сотрудник Института международных стратегических исследований Китая.
18. *Малан Марк*, старший научный сотрудник Института исследований безопасности ЮАР.
19. *Малмквист Хакан*, заместитель директора Отдела Всемирной Безопасности МИД Швеции.
20. *Манелшус Яри*, помощник военного атташе при Посольстве Финляндии в РФ, майор.
21. *Аль Аббади Мухаммад*, военный атташе Посольства Иордании в Москве, бригадный генерал.
22. *Намбиар Сатиш*, директор Организации объединенных служб Индии, генерал-лейтенант.
23. *Нани Кристофер*, SHAPE, Отдел по миротворческим операциям (Бельгия), подполковник.
24. *Нурро Сари*, специалист отдела по миротворчеству Министерства обороны Финляндии.
25. *Петрович Михайло*, военный атташе при Посольстве Союзной республики Югославии в Москве, полковник.
26. *Сахни Арун Кумар*, помощник военного атташе при Посольстве Индии в Москве, подполковник.
27. *Силверс Джакобус*, директор Института Исследований безопасности Южно-Африканской Республики, доктор наук.
28. *Сингх Дэварадж*, военный атташе при Посольстве Индии в Москве, бригадный генерал.
29. *Спенс Архильд*, специалист по политическим вопросам Международного Секретариата НАТО (Бельгия).
30. *Торнберг Клаес*, директор Шведского Национального Оборонного Колледжа, контр-адмирал.
31. *Тумбай Ти*, представитель Швеции.
32. *Фридт Аниша*, атташе Политического отдела Посольства США в Москве.
33. *Фостер Лари*, директор Миротворческого института армии США, полковник.
34. *Халилов Таир Заирович*, советник посольства Таджикистана.
35. *Хансон Крэг*, помощник военного атташе при Посольстве США в Москве.
36. *Хеден Клаес-Горан*, представитель Шведского международного центра, бригадный генерал.
37. *Хедерстедт Дэсхаан*, военный советник Министерства обороны Швеции, генерал-лейтенант.
38. *Хильдинг Аниша*, научный сотрудник Лондонской школы Экономических и Политических Наук (Великобритания), Шведский Национальный Оборонный Колледж.
39. *Хульдт Бо*, профессор Шведского Национального Оборонного Колледжа.
40. *Шамсов Нуриддин Тоджиддинович*, заместитель начальника управления Министерства иностранных дел Республики Таджикистан.
41. *Шахтаминский Алексей*, представитель НАТО по вопросам информации в Москве.
42. *Шуллер Флорис*, начальник отдела по военной координации Штаб-квартиры НАТО (Бельгия), капитан 1-го ранга.
43. *Эйри Кен*, директор программ исследований и развития Пирсонского миротворческого центра (Канада), доктор наук.

Список участников конференции, приглашенных на 16 марта

1. *Арутюнян Вагаршак Варназович*, представитель Вооруженных Сил Республики Армения, заместитель начальника Штаба по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ, генерал-лейтенант.
2. *Мануилов Валерий Александрович*, заместитель начальника Высших офицерских курсов "Выстрел" по работе с иностранными военнослужащими, полковник.
3. *Николенко Алексей Юрьевич*, начальник курса подготовки военных наблюдателей ООН.
4. *Свирин Николай Алексеевич*, помощник руководителя внешних сношений и информации Штаба по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ.
5. *Чиковани Владимир Окропович*, представитель Вооруженных Сил Грузии, заместитель начальника Штаба по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ, генерал-майор.

LIST OF THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

From the Russian Federation

1. *Avakumov Vladimir Grigorievitch*, Deputy Chief of the Vystrel Academy, Lt.Gen.
2. *Belokopytov Vladimir Nikolaevitch*, Central Board of International Military Co-operation of the Ministry of Defence of the RF, Colonel.
3. *Butchinsky Yuri Ivanovitch*, Senior professor at the Military Academy of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the RF, Maj.General.
4. *Bytchkov Yuri Evgenievitch*, Deputy Head of the Analytic & Information Department of Foreign Affairs, Administration of the President of the RF.
5. *Gorainov Vladimir Vladimirovitch*, Senior operating Officer on Peacekeeping, Ministry of Defence of the RF, Lt.Colonel.
6. *Grishukov Vitaly Evgenievitch*, Director of regional Programmes of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation.
7. *Demurenko Andrei Vladimirovitch*, Russian State Service Academy with the RF President's Administration, Professor.
8. *Dorofeev Igor Borisovitch*, Consultant of the Administration, Security Council of the RF.
9. *Ermolaev Mikhail Mikhailovitch*, Research Fellow, USA and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Curator on Peacekeeping.
10. *Ivanova Olga Yurievna*, interpreter.
11. *Kapralov Vladimir Vasilievitch*, Deputy Head of Department, Military & Strategic Research Centre of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the RF, Maj.General.
12. *Kenin Vadim Gavrilovich*, interpreter.
13. *Khenkin Serguei Markovitch*, Dr. Sc. History, Director of Scientific & Research Programmes of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation.
14. *Kortunov Andrei Vadimovitch*, President of the Moscow Public Scientific Foundation.
15. *Laktionova Irina Valentinovna*, Coordinator of the programme "Local Self-Administration", Moscow Public Scientific Foundation.
16. *Lebedev Vladimir Vladimirovitch*, Advisor of the Administration of the Security Council of the RF.
17. *Makhlai Alexei Alexandrovitch*, Deputy Executive Director of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation.
18. *Maltsev Leonid Semenovitch*, First Deputy Chief of the CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation, Lt.General.
19. *Motchaikin Alexander Gennadievitch*, Assistant to the Chief of the CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation, C.Admiral.
20. *Potemkin Vladimir Konstantinovitch*, Head of the Military & Strategic Research Centre of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the RF, Lt.General.
21. *Salmin Alexei Mikhailovitch*, Dr. Sc. History, President of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation, Member of the Presidential Advisory Council of the RF, Professor.
22. *Sanchuk Ivan Nikolaevitch*, Deputy Executive Director of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation.
23. *Soloviev Vladimir Mikhailovitch*, Head of International Security Department of the Administration of the Security Council of the RF.
24. *Terentyev Valentin Nikolaevitch*, Head of Division, CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation, Maj. General.
25. *Tschugunov Vladimir Sergeevitch*, Senior Researcher Fellow, Military & Strategic Research Centre of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the RF, Colonel.
26. *Tuzmukhamedov Bakhtiar Raissovitch*, Advisor to the Board of International Law at the Constitutional Court of the RF.
27. *Vishnevsky Oleg Ivanovitch*, Executive Director of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation, Maj. General (Ret.).
28. *Yudin Dmitri Guennadievitch*, Deputy Director of the Department for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF.

Foreign participants at the Conference

1. *Hassan Abaza*, Royal Jordanian Air Forces, Brig.General.
2. His Excellency Dr. *Kamel Abu-Jaber*, President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy.
3. *Ahlquist Leif*, Director of Research Project, Swedish National Defence College.
4. *Antonenko Oxana*, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
5. Dr. *Baiev Pavel Kimovitch*, Senior Researcher Fellow, Institute for Peacekeeping Studies (Norway).
6. *Francois de Beauchaines*, Military Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France, Colonel.

7. *Ove Bring*, Swedish National Defence College, Professor.
8. *Gordon Wilson*, Researcher Fellow, Institute for Security Studies (France), Capt. (Res.).
9. *Grigorian Stepan Gevorkovitch*, Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in RF.
10. *Michael Davenport*, First Secretary (Political Affairs), Embassy of UK in the RF.
11. *Terry Jhonson*, Naval Postgraduate School (US, Monterey), Professor.
12. *Manfred Diehl*, Counsellor, Embassy of Germany in the RF, Colonel.
13. *Duchak Bogdan Petrovitch*, Defence Attache Assistant, Embassy of Ukrain in the RF.
14. *Isakova Irina*, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, UK.
15. *Lubinko Knezhevitch*, Military Attache Assistant, Embassy of Yugoslavia in the RF.
16. *Richard Cohen*, Geoge Marshal Centre (Germany), Professor.
17. *Li Zhihong*, Senior Researcher Fellow of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies.
18. *Mark Malan*, Senior Researcher Fellow, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.
19. *Hakan Malmquist*, Deputy Director, Global Security Department of the Ministry of Forcing Affairs, Sweden.
20. *Yari Manelius*, Military Attache Assistant, Embassy of Finland in the RF, Major.
21. *Muchamad al Abbadi*, Military Attache at the Embassy of Jordan, Br.General.
22. *Satish Nambiar*, Director, United Service Institution of India, Lt. General.
23. *Christopher Nunn*, Peacekeeping Section - SHAPE, Belgium, Lt.Colonel.
24. *Sari Nurro*, Expert on Peacekeeping, Ministry of Defence, Finland.
25. *Mikhailo Petrovitch*, Military Attache, Embassy of Yugoslavia in the RF, Colonel.
26. *Arun Sahni*, Military Attache Assistant at the Embassy of India in the RF, Lt.Colonel.
27. *Dr. Jakkie Cilliers*, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.
28. *Dev Paj Singh*, Military Attache, Embassy of India in the RF, Brig.General.
29. *Mrs. Arnhild Spence*, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ.
30. *Claes Tornberg*, Commandant of the Swedish National Defence College, Admiral.
31. *Ti Tumbay*, Sweden.
32. *Anita Fridt*, Attache (Political Division) of the US Embassy in the RF.
33. *Larry Foster*, Director of the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Colonel.
34. *Shalilov Tair Zairovitch*, Counsellor, Embassy of Tadjikistan in the RF.
35. *Craig Hanson*, Military Attache Assistant, US Embassy in the RF.
36. *Claes-Goran Heden*, Swedish International Centre, Brig.General.
37. *Johan Hederstedt*, Military Advisor of the Ministry of Defence, Sweden, Lt.General.
38. *Ms. Annika Hilding*, Researcher of the London School of Economics & Political Science (UK), Swedish National Defence College.
39. *Bo Huldt*, Swedish National Defence College, Professor
40. *Shamsov Nuriddin Todjiddinovitch*, Deputy Head of Departement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tadjikistan.
41. *Alexis Chahtahtinsky*, NATO Information Officer in Moscow.
42. *Floris Schuller*, Head of the International Military Staff, NATO HQ (Belgium), Commander.
43. *Dr. Eyre Ken*, Director of Research & Development, Pearson International Peacekeeping Centre, Canada.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS INVITED ON MARCH 16th

1. *Arutunian Vagarshak Varzanovitch*, Armed Forces of Armenia, Deputy Chief of the CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation, Lt.General.
2. *Manuilov Valery Alexandrovitch*, Deputy Commander of the Vystrel Academy, resp. for the Foreign Military Personals, Colonel.
3. *Nikolenko Alexei Yurievitch*, Chief of the UN Observers Training Centre.
4. *Svirin Nikolay Alexeevitch*, Deputy Head of Information & Exterior Relations Division of the CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation.
5. *Tchikovani Vladimir Okropovitch*, Armed Forces of Georgia, Deputy Chief of the CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation, Maj.General.

PROGRAMME OF THE CONFERENCE

Saturday, March 14th

4 pm Arrival, lodging at the hotel
 5 - 6 pm Dinner
 7 - 10 pm Attending the Bolshoj Theatre

First day of
 the Conference

Sunday, March 15th

Place of Workshop: Hotel Ukraina Conference Hall, 2-nd floor room 208.

8.30 - 9.00 am

Registration.

9.00 - 9.15 am

Welcome and Opening of the Conference.

9.15 - 9.30 am

Professor *Salmin* Alexei Mikhailovitch, Dr. Sc. History, President of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation.

9.30 - 9.40 am

Information on the series of achieved and forthcoming conferences on peace-keeping. Ms. Annika *Hilding*, Researcher, London School of Economics & Political Science, London.

9.40 - 9.50 am

Presentation by Mr. *Yudin* Dmitri Guennadievitch, Deputy Director of the Departement for International Organizations, MFA of the RF.

9.50 - 10.00 am

Presentation by Admiral Claes *Tornberg*, Commandant of the Swedish National Defence College.

10.00-10.30 am

Results of last conference workshops in Stockholm.

Professor Bo *Huldt*, Swedish National Defence College.

10.30 - 12.45

Coffee-Break.

Theme: International and national legal basis for training and using Multinational peacekeeping forces. Enhancing the part of international co-operation and co-ordination of peacekeeping operation.

Chair: His Excellency Dr. Kamel *Abu-Jaber*, President, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy.

10.10 - 10.45 am

Presentation by Representative from the Russian Federation.

Mr. *Tuzmukhamedov* Bakhtiar Raissovitch, Advisor to the Board of International Law at the Constitutional Court of the RF (ex-collaborator with UN forces for survey in the former Yugoslavia, advisor to the British UN sub-division in Bosnia (1994-1995)).

10.45 - 11.00 am

Presentation by Dr. Jakkie *Cilliers*, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

11.00 - 11.15 am

Presentation by Professor Ove *Bring*, Swedish National Defence College.

11.15 - 11.30 am

Presentation by Mrs. Arnhild *Spence*, Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ.

11.30 - 12.45

Discussion.

12.45 - 13.45

Lunch.

2.00 - 3.00 pm

Taking photographs for the participants of the Conference.

3.30 - 5.00 pm

Theme: Reforms of the NATO Commanding Structure: Presentation of "Multinational operational forces".

Chair: Dr. Jakkie *Cilliers*, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

3.30 - 4.00 pm

Presentation by Commander Floris *Schuller*, International Military Staff, NATO HQ.

4.00 - 4.15 pm

Presentation by Lt. Gen. Johan *Hederstedt*, Military Advisor, Ministry of Defence, Sweden.

4.15 - 4.30 pm

Presentation by Lt. Gen. *Potemkin* Vladimir Konstantinovitch, Head of the Military & Strategic Research Center of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the RF.

4.30 - 5.00 pm

Discussion.

5.00 - 5.30 pm

Coffee-break.

5.30 - 7.15 pm

Theme: Problems of implications in the reforming of National Military Forces. Types and abilities of Military Forces required for peacekeeping operations - civil and military interactions.

Chair: Mr. Alexis *Chahtahtinsky*, NATO Information Officer in Moscow.

5.45 - 6.00 pm

Presentation by Brig. Gen. Hassan *Abaza*, Royal Jordanian Air Forces.

6.00 - 6.15 pm

Presentation by Professor *Richard C.* George Marshall Centre (Germany).

- 6.15 - 6.30 pm Presentation by Maj.Gen. **Kapralov** Vladimir Vasilievitch, Deputy Head of Department, Military & Strategic Research Center of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the RF.
- 6.30 - 7.15 pm **Discussion.**
- 7.15 - 7.30 pm Presentation by Maj.Gen. **Vishnevsky** Oleg Ivanovitch, Exexecutive Director of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation.
- 8.00 - 10.00 pm **Dinner - Fourchette.**

Second day of the Conference

Monday, March 16th

Place of Workshop

- Academy Vystrel (Solnetchnogorsk)
- CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation (Leningradsky avenue 41).

8.30am - 2.00 pm

Theme: National & International Peacekeeping Centers: Opportunities of collaboration.

8.30 - 10.00 am

Transfer to the Vystrel Academy (Russian Peacekeeping Training Center). (Solnetchnogorsk)

10.00 - 12.00 am

Visit to the Russian Peacekeeping Training Center. Welcome by Lt. Gen. **Avakumov** Valery Grigorievitch, Deputy Commander of the Vystrel Academy.

12.00 - 1.30 pm

Transfer to the CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation (Leningradsky avenue 41).

1.30 - 3.00 pm

Lunch.

3.00 - 6.00 pm

Theme : Discussion on the role of National and International Peacekeeping Centers within Peacekeeping operations.

Chair: Maj.Gen.(ret.) **Vishnevsky** Oleg Ivanovitch, Executive Director of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation.

3.00 - 3.20 pm

Welcoming the Participants of the Conference by Lt. Gen. **Maltsev** Leonid Semenovitch, First Deputy Chief of the CIS HQ for Coordination of Military Co-operation.

3.20 - 3.35 pm

Presentation by Brig.Gen. Claes-Goran **Heden**, Swedish International Centre.

3.35 - 3.50 pm

Presentation by Colonel Larry **Foster**, Director of the US Army Peacekeeping Institute.

4.00 - 4.30 pm

Coffee-Break.

4.30 - 4.45 pm

Presentation by Mr. Mark **Malan**, Senior Researcher Fellow, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

4.45 - 5.00 pm

Presentation by Dr. Ken **Eyre**, Director of Research & Developement Studies Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada.

5.00 - 5.15 pm

Presentation by Col. **Bielokopytov** Vladimir Nikolaevitch, Central Board of International Military Co-operation of the Ministry of Defence of the RF.

5.15 - 6.00 pm

Discussion.

6.00 - 6.10 pm

Concluding Remarks.

Professor Alexei M. **Salmin**, Dr. Sc. History, President of the Russian Public Policy Centre Foundation.

6.10 - 6.20 pm

The forthcoming 3-rd Conference in Jordan

His Excellency Dr. Kamel **Abu-Djaber**, President, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy.

6.20 - 6.50 pm

Transfer to the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation (Lutchnikov Lane 4, Conference Room).

7.00-9.00 pm

Fourchette. Discussion on the future cooperation possibilities among the peacekeeping centres and the various experts.

Third Day of the Conference

Tuesday, March 17th

10.00 am — 2.00 pm

Excursions around Moscow.

10.00 - 10.30 am

Visit to the sight-seeing place Vorobievsky Gory, Overview of Moscow.

11.20 - 12.00 am

Visit to the Christ the Saviour Cathedral.

12.30 - 2.00 pm

Visit to the Memorial on Poklonnaya Gora and Central Museum of the Great National War.

2.00 - 3.00 pm

Lunch.

ПРОБЛЕМЫ МИРОТВОРЧЕСТВА НА РУБЕЖЕ XXI ВЕКА

CHALLENGES OF PEACE SUPPORT: INTO THE 21st CENTURY

А.М. САЛМИН,
Президент Фонда
"Российский общественно-политический центр",
профессор, доктор исторических наук

ВСТУПИТЕЛЬНОЕ СЛОВО ПРИ ОТКРЫТИИ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

Доброе утро, уважаемые дамы и господа!

Для меня большая честь открыть работу нашей конференции. Я рад приветствовать наших гостей, приехавших к нам из 21 государства мира, и прежде всего наших коллег по подготовке и проведению конференции из Канадского международного миротворческого центра Пирсона в лице г-на Эйри и Отдела прессы и информации НАТО в лице г-на Шахтактинского, контр-адмирала Торнберга из Национального Оборонного Колледжа Швеции, представителя Иорданского Института дипломатии во главе с Его Превосходительством д-ром Абу-Джабером. Мы также сердечно приветствуем наших гостей, представителей ряда посольств, аккредитованных в Москве, всех участников из стран СНГ, а также представителей России.

Организация Объединенных Наций, созданная после окончания второй мировой войны по инициативе стран-победительниц с целью объединения усилий мирового сообщества во имя мира и развития, уже в 1948 г. учредила первую миссию наблюдателей в Палестине, которая положила начало миротворческим операциям ООН. С тех пор ООН провела более 50 операций по поддержанию мира и десятки гуманитарных операций, в результате которых были спасены от гибели и голодной смерти многие сотни тысяч человек в различных "горячих" точках планеты.

История участия военнослужащих России в миротворческих операциях ООН ведет свой отсчет с 1973 г., когда 36 офицеров были включены ООН в группу по наблюдению за выполнением условий перемирия в Палестине. В сложной обстановке неустойчивого перемирия на Ближнем Востоке, благодаря помощи и поддержке со стороны международных военных наблюдателей ООН, этой группе, не имевшей специальной подготовки, удалось в кратчайший срок освоить азы миротворческой службы и успешно выполнить поставленные перед ней задачи. В мае 1973 г. все российские офицеры были награждены медалями ООН "На службе мира".

Начиная с 1973 г. в миротворческих операциях ООН приняли участие свыше 6 тыс. российских военнослужащих, работников МИД, МВД и МЧС. Эти люди и организации приобрели бесценный опыт международного сотрудничества, который находит достойное отражение в системе профессиональной подготовки миротворческих кадров, с которой вы будете иметь возможность познакомиться завтра в Солнечногорске. Там с целью подготовки миротворческих кадров на постоянной основе с 1974 г. открыты курсы военных наблюдателей ООН, которые за истекшие годы подготовили и выпустили около тысячи российских офицеров. На протяжении многих лет действия российских миротворцев в составе Сил ООН на Ближнем Востоке, в Камбодже, Западной Сахаре, Мозамбике, Югославии и многих других районах планеты вызывают у российских людей гордость за свою страну, вносящую значительный вклад в обеспечение всеобщего мира.

В то же время я должен сказать и думаю, что мои российские коллеги, присутствующие здесь, согласятся со мной, что мы сейчас в России далеки от переоценки того, как представители нашей страны участвовали в миротворческих операциях и, главное, каким образом налажена организация и подготовка самих миротворцев в России.

Многие из нас убеждены, что миротворческие операции не могут быть делом одного какого-то департамента, одного из министерств, будь то министерство обороны или министерство иностранных дел. Миротворческие операции в сегодняшнем мире, перешедшем от биполярности периода "холодной войны" к многополярности, становятся, увы, обычным делом. В этих условиях миротворчество все отчетливей, все определеннее превращается в дело всего государства и всего общества.

Речь сегодня идет не о каких-то отдельных акциях по поддержанию мира со своей особой логикой, а о поддержании постоянной "мироготовности", если можно так выразиться, за которым должно следить государство и которое должно находить понимание в обществе. Это не просто какие-то побочные вторичные действия части вооруженных сил, это действительно общественная задача, общественная программа и государственный долг. Государственный долг в двух отношениях. Это долг государства перед международным сообществом, перед системой международных институтов, перед ООН в первую очередь. Но это и долг государства перед участниками этих миротворческих операций, которых необходимо специально готовить. Нельзя просто послать офицеров и солдат выполнять миротворческую операцию, оторвав их на время от выполнения какой-нибудь другой миссии. Это очень сложная, очень специализированная задача, которую должны решать профессионалы, но этих профессионалов можно подготовить только в том случае, если основные сегменты общества, основные центры принятия решения в нем понимают эту задачу как особую и отдают должное миротворцам.

Естественно, что подготовка миротворцев, поддержание на должном уровне миротворческих сил, а также готовности к оказанию миротворческих операций — все это не дешевое и технически довольно сложное дело. Понимание того, что за поддержание мира надо платить, должно стать частью менталитета государственных деятелей, прежде всего представителей законодательной власти, которые разрабатывают и принимают государственный бюджет, но и представителей исполнительной власти тоже. Сегодня мы в России переживаем достаточно сложный период, мы видим как на наших глазах рождается, по сути, новая государственность, демократическая, основанная на современной, по международным стандартам, Конституции, принятой в 1993 г., мы являемся свидетелями и участниками процессов, в ходе которых наше государство сталкивается с целым рядом внутренних и внешних вызовов. К числу внешних вызовов относится нестабильность в целом ряде регионов, отдаленных от России, но также и находящихся достаточно близко к ее границам. И сегодня мы должны сказать, что Россия, государственные институты нашей страны должны быть готовы к принятию этих вызовов. А международное сообщество, я думаю, должно с пониманием отнестись к проблемам, с которыми сталкивается сегодня Россия в этом отношении. Но я не хочу предвещать нашу конференцию. В мою задачу сегодня не входит концептуальный доклад, это просто введение, и я надеюсь, что все мы, собравшиеся здесь в этом зале, сможем провести достаточно интересное обсуждение всех проблем, о которых я сказал, и многих других.

Полагаю, вы успели ознакомиться с планом конференции. Открывая общую дискуссию, мы надеемся, что она будет способствовать проработке и обмену опытом по вопросам миротворчества во всех аспектах. Мы надеемся, что собравшиеся здесь люди наилучшим образом подготовлены для подобного рода обсуждения. Мы не стремимся сделать нашу конференцию большой. Известно, что группа, превышающая некий разумный оптимум, не может работать эффективно. Нас здесь около 70 человек. Этого достаточно для того, чтобы представить многообразие мнений, и не слишком много, чтобы потеряться в дискуссии. Участники нашей конференции — люди очень разные, а разнообразие мнений, как известно, стимулирует обсуждение и приносит интересные и нетрадиционные идеи. Среди нас есть политики, ученые, юристы, военные, экономисты, дипломаты. Думаю, что в ходе конференции вы будете иметь возможность поближе познакомиться друг с другом. И я надеюсь, что конференция внесет определенный вклад в развитие контактов по этой проблематике между представителями различных стран и организаций.

Я еще раз приветствую всех присутствующих на нашей конференции и с удовольствием предоставляю слово моей коллеге, много сделавшей для подготовки конференции — г-же Хильдинг.

Ms Annika HILDING
London School of Economics & Political
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INFORMATION ON THE SERIES OF ACHIEVED AND FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES ON PEACE-KEEPING

Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very happy to see that so many guests attend our workshop in Moscow, "Challenges of Peace Support: into the 21st Century". So far I do not speak well enough Russian and therefore I shall make my report in English.

I would like to give a brief presentation of the purpose and structure of the Challenges of Peace Support Project as a whole. I would also like to make a few comments about the Moscow conference programme specifically.

You have to excuse me if I repeat a few small things that Prof. Salmin has already said, but you can take it as a reminder. The objective of conducting a series of conferences on the theme of Challenges of Peace Support is twofold. First, to generate creative and well-considered ideas and recommendations for dealing with regional conflicts. Furthermore, to promote and facilitate the exploration of possible processes of co-operation and co-ordination with the aim of their development across institutions and borders.

The Challenges of Peace Support Project originated here in Professor Salmin's Russian Public Policy Centre during the summer of 1996 with the objective to organize a Round Table Discussion. The Round Table was intended to address some of the complex issues facing international peace support operations today. Since then the Round Table has gradually grown into a series of workshops and conferences. The Challenges project is now organized by four co-hosts in association with three other partner institutions.

Future conferences will be held in Amman and in Pretoria and they have to continue the discussions already held in Stockholm and the one we have in Moscow today and tomorrow.

The Swedish National Defence College, headed by its Commandant Admiral Claes Tornberg hosted the first conference in Stockholm in September 1997. Prof. Bo Hultdt, on my left, Director of the National Defence College Strategic Institution, will shortly present a report from the first workshop in Stockholm.

We really enjoy seeing so many familiar faces: we appreciate that you have participated at the conference in Stockholm and that you have decided to join us here in Moscow. I am happy to welcome His Excellency Dr Kamel Abu Jaber, President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy and former Foreign Minister of Jordan, who is sitting across from here who will host the third conference in Amman. His Excellency will open and chair the second session of the Moscow conference in addition to taking over the chair from Professor Alexei Salmin in the concluding session of the Moscow conference.

NATO Information and Liaison Office in Brussels and its Contact Officer here in Moscow is one of the initial and continuing partners in the Moscow conference and we welcome their final contribution.

We also welcome two new partners in this project.

It is gratifying to have had the support of the Canadian Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre for the conference here in Moscow, who is represented here by Dr. Ken Eyre and to know that this support will continue in Amman and in Pretoria.

The fourth conference will be held in South Africa by the Institute for Security Studies, Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director of the Institute, he is also sitting across from here and he will open and chair the third session today.

Concerning the programme: Today the focus is geared towards theoretical discussions.

Tomorrow the emphasis is put on exploring possibilities of co-operation and co-ordination in more practical terms.

The key phrase during the conference is "the generation of new ideas": the unconventional mixture of partners with different interests and concerns, also different experiences should be a feasible ground and a good starting point for generating discussions and ideas both during, but also around, the working sessions, as Professor Salmin also said.

This morning's first session is on the international and national legal systems. In particular, it will focus upon an examination of the potentials as well as the constraints within the legislative system, in regards to peace support operations. The session is intended to set the framework for what options, actions and exchanges are possible in terms of co-operative and co-ordinative efforts.

The second session today is focused on a fairly fresh and challenging concept - the Combined Joint Task Forces. In the light of recent changes in the NATO Command Structure, the CJTFs have emerged as one of the key mechanisms of peace support operations. As the thinking on the matter is still not an established concept, the speakers have been invited to present their views, analysis and recommendations as to directions and structures, which would assist in the development of CJTFs as we enter the 21st century.

The third session today will address the complexities arising from civil and military interaction. We began examining the issue at the first workshop in Stockholm. Due to the fruitful discussions of this very important and complex subject matter, we have invited speakers to continue the debate and suggest possible strategies, which could be adopted by states for the improvement of civil-military interaction.

I would also like to outline that as you have noted in the programme, the time for the speakers to speak is very short, but the idea is to have a lot of opinions and a lot of ideas, new ideas that people can pick up and use how they like and pursue by continuing the contacts.

At the first workshop, we organised a visit to the Swedish International Peacekeeping Centre outside Stockholm. As this was well received by the participating delegates, we decided to organise a similar event for the Moscow conference. We would like to encourage those of you who decide not to come to Vestal tomorrow, to rejoin the conference in the afternoon when we continue the discussions at the CIS HQ for Co-ordination of Military Co-operation.

Their presentation will be made apart from the CIS Commanding Staff etc. also all visiting peacekeeping Centres and Institutions. We asked the speakers to present their Institute and activities in a very brief but concise manner, and following the visit to Vystrel in the morning and the CIS HQ for Co-ordination of military Cupertino, in the after-noon, there is a reception organised in the evening where we once again want to encourage further discussions on the topics of co-ordination and co-operation.

We have a very tight schedule, so I would like to end here by highlighting that the Conference is held under the very kind auspices of the Russian Public Policy Centre and under the guidance of Professor Alexei Salmin and Mr Oleg Vishnevsky, - here he is, over there - and who is the Centre's Executive Director to whom we should be indebted for their efforts. Therefore I would like to propose we express our thanks collectively.

Д.Г. ЮДИН,
заместитель директора
Департамента международных
организаций МИД РФ

ПРИВЕТСТВИЕ УЧАСТНИКОВ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ ОТ МИНИСТЕРСТВА ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ РФ

Дамы и господа!

От имени Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации я хотел бы поприветствовать Вашу конференцию и, естественно, отметить прежде всего то, что тема, которую вы намерены обсуждать сегодня и в ближайшие дни, на наш взгляд, является одной из чрезвычайно актуальных. Она актуальна прежде всего по своей сути, потому, что те действия, которые международное сообщество предпринимает для ликвидации кризисных ситуаций и урегулирования конфликтов, это действия восстанавливающие мир, возможность нормального развития и сотрудничества и, следовательно, нормальную жизнь населения. К сожалению, именно последние годы, последние десятилетия являются временем, когда такие усилия стали наиболее важными, наиболее насущными.

Сегодня Ваша конференция обсуждает эту тему не только с точки зрения ее сущностной значимости, но, на мой взгляд, она весьма актуальна потому, что совпала с празднованием 50-летия миротворчества ООН. Именно ООН первой открыла этот путь. В ее арсенале, как все мы знаем, есть немало средств урегулирования конфликтов, причем их можно разделить на несколько типов. Это и посредничество, добрые услуги, арбитраж и т.д., что принято называть превентивной дипломатией. Это и определенные силовые воздействия, но без использования вооруженных сил, санкций и других мер, которые предусмотрены в Уставе. Это также и то, что не предусмотрено в Уставе, (то, что журналисты и ученые привыкли называть главой "шесть с половиной"), что формально никогда не было записано в основополагающем документе ООН, но стало одним из мощнейших орудий урегулирования конфликтных ситуаций, особенно тогда, когда они доходят до кровопролития.

Я имею в виду миротворчество. 50 лет тому назад ООН впервые начала миротворческую операцию, которая длится до сих пор. Да, это были робкие шаги. Да, это была только миссия наблюдения за условиями перемирия на Ближнем Востоке. Но эта миссия за 50 лет своего существования еще раз доказала, что действия ООН могут быть эффективными, что миротворчество (присутствие представителей международного сообщества в зоне конфликта) есть нечто такое, что является дисциплинирующим элементом, воздействующим на конфликтующие стороны.

В последние годы эти робкие шаги, которые, как все мы помним, были предприняты в определенных политических условиях (когда главным самодовлеющим элементом развития международной обстановки было противостояние между Советским Союзом и Западом), то есть, когда решения ООН принимались не в Совете Безопасности, а на Генеральной Ассамблее. Однако в настоящее время ситуация кардинально изменилась. И тем не менее, несмотря на все усилия международного сообщества в лице ООН, мы видим, что этого недостаточно. В начале 90-х годов, когда локальные конфликты, угрожающие либо региональной, либо международной безопасности, стали резко взрываться по всему миру, ООН стала задыхаться от тех усилий, которые ей были предложены. Как в смысле человеческого фактора, когда не хватало людей, специалистов, которые умели заниматься миротворчеством (а это особый вид привлечения вооруженных сил), не хватало также и финансов, поэтому одним из главных направлений в этой области сейчас является так называемая "децентрализация миротворчества". Это означает привлечение к этим усилиям прежде всего основных региональных и континентальных организаций. Я думаю, что это правильное направление, но при этом, на наш взгляд, необходимо сохранить те главные наработанные принципы и критерии миротворческих операций, которые были согласованы именно в ООН. Сохранить на благо международного сообщества тот политический контроль со стороны ООН, Совета Безопасности, который не позволил бы отдельным государствам использовать данный метод урегулирования конфликтов для своих, может быть, иногда корыстных или национальных целей.

Еще одним важным моментом, является необходимость сохранения контроля со стороны ООН, Совета Безопасности за таким чувствительным аспектом, как использование силы в миротворчестве. Я думаю, что вы посвятите значительные усилия Вашей "мозговой атаки" именно этому вопросу, ставшему чрезвычайно актуальным буквально в последние годы. Вспомните какие коллизии, какие словесные баталии происходили и в Нью-Йорке, и во многих из наших столиц, когда использовалось оружие в бывшей Югославии. Применялись разные подходы, были сделаны разные выводы, но мы исходим из одних и тех же фактов, поэтому я думаю, что обмен мнениями, в частности, неофициальный, подобный Вашей конференции,

которая имеет высокий уровень, позволит нам лучше понять друг друга, лучше понять логику, которую мы используем при поиске решений, а эти решения должны быть естественными, возвышенными и взаимными. Без этого нам трудно будет достичь те цели, которые мы ставим. А цель у нас обычно одна — восстановление мира, восстановление нормальных условий для жизни населения.

Сегодня только ООН проводит 14 миротворческих операций. Они не такие масштабные, как недавние операции в Сомали, бывшей Югославии или в Камбодже, где временная администрация ООН в целом успешно справилась со своей задачей. Бывают успехи, бывают и неудачи, поэтому надо проанализировать как положительные моменты, так и отрицательные. Может быть, именно мы, международное сообщество, виноваты в неудачах, потому что у нас нет достаточного единства и сплоченности, или эта сплоченность и единство только видимые, только на потребу международному общественному мнению, а внутри где-то все-таки есть остатки сомнений, подозрений друг к другу. Я думаю, в частности, о миротворчестве на территории СНГ. Ведь сколько России приходилось доказывать нашим партнерам отсутствие каких бы то ни было неоимпериалистических амбиций и использование наших миротворческих усилий именно в целях восстановления мира. Но постепенно мы начинаем понимать друг друга лучше и я думаю, что в этом залог наших будущих успехов.

А сейчас хотелось бы пожелать от имени Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации больших успехов в работе Валей конференции. Мы с удовольствием будем ждать тех отчетов, которые, несомненно, будут изданы, будем их внимательно изучать. Мы вообще стремимся изучать все то, что нарабатывается на неофициальных встречах и форумах потому, что часто люди в более раскованной обстановке, когда за спиной нет жестких правительственных инструкций, высказывают интересные мысли, которые могут принести свежий подход в решении тех или иных конфликтов. Удачи вам, и надеюсь, что Ваша "мозговая атака" принесет хотя бы те принципы, которые наши министерства иностранных дел смогут использовать, как в Нью-Йорке для миротворчества ООН, так и для миротворчества тех региональных организаций, которые сейчас постепенно вовлекаются в него.

Claes TORNBERG,
Swedish National Defence College,
Commandant, Admiral

INFORMATION ON PEACE-KEEPING ACTIVITY OF THE SWEDISH NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

Thank you very much, it's certainly great that this workshop is going on and continues and that we can see so many participants who also participated in the conference in Stockholm.

In my introduction, I thought of focusing on some of the thoughts that we have found in the researches that we are carrying out at the Defence College in co-operation with our commanders. But before I do so, I thought to comment on some courses that, as I thought were interesting in a conference held by ECIC and Belgium Government in Brussels: the headline of this conference was "The relationship between the humanitarian action and political military actions". The President of the Belgium Centre of ECIC, Dr Samoruga, suggested that we establish a more systematic structure for consultations at every stage of crisis situations and I will quote him, because I think it's quite interesting to see the ECIC standpoint: "This will help us to make better acquainted with each other and with all our respective cultures and working methods, it also may help to break tendency for humanitarian organisations to become politicised and for its national political and military actors to enter the humanitarian arena and subordinate humanitarian action to political direction and consideration. Every actor is uniquely qualified to carry on its role. Parallel but distinct actions were leaded to a comprehensive approach to crisis management, it is the key to maximizing every-one's specific potential and to meeting victims needs in a most effective way".

I think it very interesting that we are talking about co-operation. General Clark, The Supreme Commander in NATO, he very clearly stated some key principles that the NATO had developed during the military operations in Bosnia. And he talked about unity of command, the unity of efforts, clear mission statement, clear guidance, co-operation between military and civilian efforts and also the need for a truth of engagements. He also talked about the educational gap between military and civilian organizations, and that is one thing we are focusing at in my College. Most delegates at the Conference spoke about the need of co-ordination and they also found apart from me a new definition when they talked about co-ordination by consensus. But co-ordination by consensus is for me just co-ordination. Anyhow definitions will always be different, tricky.

There have been of course many lessons learnt but only very few would be implemented in real things. And I think one objective we also have found in our research project is differences in objectives among different actors and I will be coming to that a bit later.

So what are the hidden difficulties for real co-operation and co-ordination in the missions for preserving the peace for today and yesterday? In what way we can overcome the difficulties of these missions for tomorrow? My believe is that we cannot change the basic way the United Nations works or the national system itself. We must instead accept and put our effort into a deep and broad understanding and knowledge of the system, by doing so we will hopefully gradually implement a methodical co-operation between the participating organisations and perhaps, in the long term create changing in the system it-self.

We have differences in regional and professional cultures, different organisations have their own agendas and their professional reasons for achieving their goals.

In all operations, we have started in our project that there is a need for co-operation due to an extended lack of co-operation and unwillingness to co-operate. There are of course many reasons for that. One key issue is the impact of co-operation of different cultures and languages. Difference in language may have less impact on co-operation than culture. However, in the operational field there is a barrier if you are not able to understand each other and to communicate. An other barrier is the difference in culture and there are many kinds of differences, the obvious difference the geographical orientation, and it is noticeable but it is sensitive to accept this as a difficulty. With regards to the differences, there are many things to consider with respect to the issues of co-operation. I think that the differences in professional concept are far more over-barried than those of geographical origins. The professional cultures are very different, certain professions attract certain character types which in turn are reinforced by the educational process and the particular passions of behaviour.

The special representative of the Secretary of the expressed it in the following way and I think it is worth listening to: "Human Rights" specialists tend to be opiniatre and independent, individualistic and not too disciplined, even if they are doing well working in team. Police officers have an absolute tendency to be operational and not necessarily inclined to engage in institution building. The military accustomed to acting within a command structure have the strongest tendency to behave like a structure within a structure. This is unfortunate given that the analytical skills, discipline and the ability to quickly complete tasks would greatly benefit from the interaction of the sections of the missions.

I think that one of the key parts is the difference in the mission-orientated objectives, that military and the police normally have. Versus victim orientated objectives, as the humanitarian organisations have, of course.

Secondly, there is the different nature and actors starting with the humanitarian organisations: there are two big groups, there are humanitarian organisations within the UN family and the Non-Governmental Organisations.

Marking out the peace support environment based on unity of effort has to be seen in long perspective. Probably there are no short concepts. Establishing an understanding and respect of each other's professional and cultural origin must not only be in a training process. We have to understand that a new enemy might be famine, lack of water, lack of food, electricity etc etc. The struggles are different from those we are trained for. This can be done by co-operation in the broad field on training and I normally have the example in Bosnia when the just started telephone net and the military went in with the whole command control structure but haven't been able to use the telephone system and improve co-operation.

At the Swedish National Defence College we have established training where we bring representatives of different actors together, which are to offer scenarios for discussion and interaction between actors and people who are not used to work together. Discussions or possible solutions should be focused on efforts in training and information outside missions. It takes time and should be directed to long-term objectives. To increase knowledge of other professional geographical cultures, languages and organisations, and the organisational legends takes time but is necessary in order to give solid base for improved co-operation. So for us at the College, this type of seminars is of a great interest.

Bo HULDT,
Swedish National Defence College,
Professor

RESULTS OF LAST CONFERENCE WORKSHOPS IN STOCKHOLM SEPTEMBER, 1997

Let me say for the start that we are in the process of documenting this conference and there will be a document coming out of it what you will hear will really be an interim report.

The themes that have been addressed were actually three. The first one is comparing peace support documents, among other we are discussing terminology, planning, methods etc. The second session deals with civil-military relations, commander control, co-operation and integration in the field and the third session there was information on technology, media and crisis management. And let me make a few observations on this.

In the first place each session is organised so as to see to it that the participating partners are well represented. There were with us in each session a Westerner, a Swede as well as a Russian participant. But we were also well provided with contributions from the, what I would refer to as is used to be called: "the Third World representatives"; there were four of them and we also had the pleasure to have the Namibia's overview of the field in the very particular environment of the Swedish horse guards.

About doctrines: all what we said about peacekeeping or the different national cultures of peacekeeping could be summarised as: whether there is a middle-ground between traditional peacekeeping and Chapter 7 of the operations. And here I think we agreed about identifying three existing comprehensions, that is in the first place - the traditional peacekeeping with the concept of a minimum of violence etc. tradition which is going back to the fifties, second the more muscular type of peacekeeping that we have seen since the late eighties and which tends to struggle Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter. And third, the real challenge of Chapter 7 is the peace enforcement.

While there was agreement about the clarity of these different categories, there was also certainly a great understanding of the fact that the real world in this case as in all others, tends to be populated by great problems. There was less belief, I think in new doctrines resulting from academic enterprises which I, of course as an academic deplore, but rather to be a result of a sort of balance achieved between various national interests' tradition and what was referred to by the speakers before as "culture".

There was much discussion on the balance between regional peacekeeping and the role of the regional organisations on the one hand and the role of the UN on the other. Already last autumn we, were of course aware very well that the situation was changing, that we were a sort of returning to the low figures of the UN troops committed in the field that we had in 1988 - that is somewhere between 10-20 000 soldiers. I think, the current number is 15 000 soldiers. A peak figure we heard was in 1994 about 70 000 persons in the field.

So a greater role was for the regions, was certainly foreseen by everybody, on the other hand there was a wish to see a bit of a balance in the way UN was being regionally engaged. When we talk about the regionalization of the United Nations, through various regional centres, through the establishment of colleges on peacekeeping or perhaps regional colleges also. So now I am quite sure that UN is appearing on field, but having perhaps a slightly different role in the future, supervising - not only recommending but supervising - the activities, also those undertaken by regional organisations.

I refer to one of the sessions dealing with information, media, technology and crisis management. The emphasis is here on modern technology, on the role of the media, of course a very clear emphasis was made on the need of training and more professionalism. And this brought us into what had already been discussed here - to convene with international standards, the necessity to have a higher degree proficiency through training and training internationally organized. It was underlined that there was a necessity actually for every peacekeeping contribution to provide true capacity to cover the whole of the three ranges of challenges (I refer to traditional peacekeeping, the muscular type and possibly real challenge to Chapter 7 operations).

Still there was no belief at the conference in the establishment of permanent or standing international forces, and you are all familiar with this discussion that has been conducted within the UN and proposing the engagements of legions of at least 5000 men. We did not, in Stockholm see much hope for that materialising.

Military-civilian relations were discussed and it was, I think de-facto stated that co-operation between the military and civilian elements of peacekeeping operations or in peace operations had never worked very well. The record was not a glorious one but on the other hand this may not be the fault of the military on all occasions. We also underlined that the civil-military dimension had many different aspects - it was a problem which has become acute through the enormous commitment in the field of the NGO organisations. In the Congo of the sixties - there were about four non-governmental organisations in the field - in Bosnia about 400, which of course changed the whole map - drastically.

No one foresaw the full swing back to peacekeeping of the extratraditional style of 1950-ties, which is sometimes referred to as the Canadian -Nordic model. Rather one foresaw a development of various brands of complex peacekeeping operations such as we have seen during the difficult years of the late eighties and the early nineties.

Finally there was an underlining of the value of the process itself. And of course we were very happy to hear that we were coming here, Mr Chairman, and that there would be other conferences in the backline. So the value of the process is the continuing of discussion and dialogue. The real value of the participation in peacekeeping operations not, of course to solve the problems in sight but also is a way to promote an international confidence.

So-far, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Тема: Международные и национальные правовые базы подготовки и использования многонациональных миротворческих сил. Усиление роли международного сотрудничества и координации в миротворческих операциях.

Theme: International and national legal basis for training and using Multinational peace-keeping forces. Enhancing the part of international co-operation and co-ordination of peace-keeping operation.

Dr. Kamel ABU-JABER,
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy,
President

WELCOMING AND OPENING

Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen - Salam Aleikum in the name of the gracious and charitable Allah. This is the traditional and usual greeting of an Arab when he meets anybody else, whether he is an Arab or a non-Arab. Peace be upon you...

I am very impressed in the presence of so many military men - I was always fascinated by uniforms anywhere. So whether you are in your or out of your uniforms - this is for me a new experience. I never have sat in the same room with so many military people and I hope that we will see most of you or all of you in Amman where we will host our next conference.

Please let us first thank our hosts, the Russian Public Policy Centre, and in particular its President Mr Alexei Salmin and the staff of the Centre: Mr Makhlai was very very helpful as well as the other people. I would also like to thank Ms Annika Hilding for organising everything and who is the driving force behind these international seminars. Also I would like to thank our Russian hosts perhaps not only on my behalf but also on behalf of my Jordanian colleague and perhaps on yours for the fantastic and extravagant performance of last night, when we could attend the Opera at the Bolshoi Theatre. This was my first experience at the Bolshoi and I must say it has been may be one of the most interesting and most beautiful, beautifying experiences of my life.

Please allow me to share with you a few words and then I will ask our speakers.

I think that since the World War I it was supposed that this War was ending all the wars. Of course this opinion was a farce. And you all know it very well, especially that you who still are in uniforms. My second thought is that peace is really a matter of attitude - well, you see, war and peace start here, in the hearts and in the minds of men, before tanks and planes do not carry war on themselves, it is people who make war. And I must say men and women too, because in history of men there have been a few women who assumed the top leadership, but they were just as good or just as bad as men were. In our Middle East we had, in our history five or six queens, such as Cleopatra or others, very warlike women. I must say, and they completed very well with the best of generals and admirals. The absence of peace is a terrible thing, because it spoils security and you cannot have progress without security. Which reminds me of the British philosopher Thomas Hops when he said: "The absence of security makes life nasty, brutish and short." And this was true for us in this old world, because Americans and America is a new world, for us, in our old world, I think the absence of security has been a terrible experience of our lives. So it seems to me that as we talk about peace, we must define what peace is.

What is peace? Is peace absence of violence, or is peace something else?

So please, forgive me if I share with you some of my philosophy and ethics. Because peace for me seems to be the most cherished values or should be one of the most cherished values of the human beings. And in our area, I come from Jordan, it is a small country but a few years ago we celebrated 9000 years of History, continuous history. In the south of Jordan, I hope some of you will come thereover, there are paintings on the rocks, similar to the paintings that have been found in the Central France, made some 15 000 -20 000 years ago. - But there were recorded very few moments of peace, and today we suffer also from lack of peace. I had the honour and the pleasure of leading the Jordanian and Palestinian Delegations to the Madrid peace process. And what? Nine years ago, seven years ago, 90 or 200 years ago - Why should we have such processes when we are talking about war and peace?

I thought it would not take so much time to bring about peace - There is a tend in our regions to have fear about peace. Well, one thinks that fear is of war but there is fear of peace and I think on both sides, on Arab and Israeli sides.

But now what are the challenges for peace in the twentieth century? And this is something you have to define. I am not a military man so I can share some ideas I suppose just enough to confuse you.

What are the challenges - because this is the title of this international conference. I must say that the challenges are great, because I think that the most important challenge is how will you build civil society. Russia has just embarked to building or rebuilding civil society. Russia has undergone two fantastic revolutions in less than 80 years: the communist revolution and now the liberal revolution. God bless them. I do not know how they can cope with this fantastic changes. And to me it seems that - and I pride myself, I know a little bit of Russian history and Russian culture, I don't know unfortunately the language, - but the task is great. We in Jordan are trying also to build a civil society. In a small country like ours with 4 million of people - less than in a suburban of New York, Paris or Moscow - and still we face fantastic challenges. How can you get people acclimated with the idea of a civil society? This is a new experience, because our history, the destiny of manhood shows very few exceptions. History is not civil, and we have a lot of "mis": mis-politeness, mis-taste, mis-educated, mis-how can I do to be civil with other people. So if such a small country like ours has to encounter such challenges, how can it be on the international level where we are trying to build a civil society?

So it seems for me that for the peace-keeping it is alright - but for meeting the challenges the international community must truly co-operate and here I see that here are represented people from 23 nations This is I think a beautiful and very edifying exercise.

I can talk more than this, but I suspect that my audience and colleagues will think that I remiss. I have the great honour, we have 4 speakers and I do hope that they will adhere to the time which they have, which is about 15 minutes each. Our first speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen is my friend. I just have met him but we have become I think intellectually engaged, Mr. Bakhtiar Tuzmukhamedov who is from the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

Б.Р. ТУЗМУХАМЕДОВ,
советник Управления международного права
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МЕЖДУНАРОДНО-ПРАВОВЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ПРОВЕДЕНИЯ ОПЕРАЦИЙ ПО ПОДДЕРЖАНИЮ МИРА

Прежде всего я хотел бы высказать благодарность организаторам конференции за предоставленную мне возможность выступить.

Я считаю очень важным достижением организаторов этой конференции то, что они решились начать "мозговую атаку" на очень актуальную тему с обсуждения правовой канвы этой проблемы.

Хочу сразу оговориться. В списке участников конференции я представлен как сотрудник Конституционного суда РФ. Однако все то, о чем я буду говорить в своем выступлении является моей личной точкой зрения.*

Двадцатилетний опыт работы с проблемами, связанными с международным правом, личное участие в миротворческих операциях ООН в Боснии позволяют мне поставить несколько вопросов по обсуждаемой проблеме.

1. Существует ли в международном праве понятие "операция по поддержанию мира"?

Поддержание международного мира и безопасности есть главная цель ООН, сформулированная в ее Уставе. Достижение этой цели — задача ООН и всех ее органов. "Операции по поддержанию мира" (далее — ОПМ) — всего лишь одно из средств достижения главной цели ООН. Особенность именно этого средства в том, что оно не предусмотрено ни Уставом, ни каким-либо иным юридически обязывающим актом. Конечно, операции по поддержанию мира неоднократно анализировались в трудах авторитетных ученых на основе документов ООН. Практика их проведения показывает, что достижения международно-правовой доктрины пока еще не воплотились в норму международного договора.

Неурегулированность ОПМ в международном праве тесно связана с неустойчивостью терминологии, употребляемой в связи с этим явлением. Один и тот же русский термин "поддержание мира" имеет одно значение, когда он употреблен в Уставе ООН, и другое, когда он входит в словосочетание "операции по поддержанию мира". В английском языке в этих случаях используются разные термины: в первом случае это "maintenance of peace", во втором — "peace-keeping". В русском языке происходит смешение понятий, которое по формальному признаку затрудняет помещение ОПМ в определенную ячейку в сложной структуре современного международного права.

Проблема понятийного аппарата усложнилась после обнародования доклада бывшего Генерального секретаря ООН г-на Бутроса Гали "Повестка дня для мира" и дополнения к нему.

В этих документах была предложена достаточно сложная градация операций ООН, включающая превентивную дипломатию, миротворчество, поддержание мира, послеконфликтное

* Б.Р. Тuzmukhamedov был сотрудником сил ООН по поддержанию мира в бывшей Югославии, а также советником Британского подразделения сил ООН в Боснии в 1994—1995 гг.

мироостроительство, разоружение, санкции и принудительные меры. Границы между этими терминами размыты, а некоторые из современных операций носят настолько многокомпонентный характер, что могут включать элементы нескольких или даже всех перечисленных выше типов операций. Актуальность проблемы понятийного аппарата резко возросла после того, как собственные операции стали проводить региональные организации, прежде всего НАТО и СНГ. Всегда ли ООН, с одной стороны, и региональные организации, с другой, вкладывают одинаковый смысл в то, что они называют ОПМ?

Таким образом, приходится признавать, что в международном праве отсутствует четкое понимание ОПМ. Оно и невозможно, поскольку отсутствует устоявшееся и единообразное мнение о содержании самого этого понятия.

2. Существует ли устойчивое международно-правовое регулирование проведения операций по поддержанию мира?

Уже было отмечено, что в международном праве отсутствует юридически обязательный источник, который определял бы ОПМ, как они сформировались и осуществлялись до настоящего времени. В отсутствие такого источника бывшим Генеральным секретарем ООН г-ном Дагом Хаммаршельдом была предложена квазиправовая концепция "Шестой с половиной главы" Устава ООН. Смысл ее в том, что неспособность ООН использовать потенциал мер по поддержанию мира и принуждению к миру, заложенный в ее Уставе, вызвал к жизни меры, выходящие за пределы мирных средств, очерченных в главе 6, но и не достигающие уровня использования вооруженных сил, предусмотренного в главе 7.

С точки зрения международного права такая концепция является плодом весьма либерального толкования Устава ООН. Как уже отмечалось, Устав не содержит достаточной и стабильной правовой основы для проведения ОПМ. Правовой основой для каждой операции являются резолюции Совета Безопасности, санкционирующие ее проведение и определяющие ее мандат. Такие резолюции безусловно несут правовую нагрузку, но они являются административными актами, имеющими достаточно целевое назначение и ограничения по времени действия. Нельзя отрицать значения других документов ООН, в частности, материалов Совета Безопасности, докладов Генерального секретаря, где выдвигаются принципы проведения ОПМ, обобщается их опыт, выдвигаются идеи по их совершенствованию и развитию. Однако, в юридическом смысле такие документы в лучшем случае могут расцениваться как вспомогательные средства толкования, иными словами, как материалы, помогающие понять суть ОПМ, но не определяющие их правовой статус, права и обязанности сторон, так или иначе причастных к их осуществлению и т.д.

Иными словами, между основополагающим документом — Уставом ООН, прямо не предусматривающим ОПМ, и резолюциями Совета Безопасности, санкционирующими операцию и формулирующими ее мандат, существует значительный пробел. В условиях растущего числа и многообразия ОПМ отсутствие стабильной правовой основы затрудняет выработку мандата, снижает эффективность операций, пагубно влияет на доверие мирового сообщества к такой форме поддержания международного мира и безопасности.

На первый взгляд может показаться, что наиболее практичным способом восполнения этого пробела стало бы принятие поправок к Уставу ООН путем изменения отдельных статей или даже включения новой специальной главы. Например, почему бы не внести поправку в статью 40 или 41 Устава, дополнив одну из них абзацем, в общих чертах регулирующим проведение ОПМ? Напомню, что в статье 40 речь идет о полномочии Совета Безопасности предпринимать временные меры для предотвращения ухудшения ситуации, угрожающей международному миру и безопасности. Статья 41 регулирует принятие мер, не связанных с использованием вооруженных сил. Силы, участвующие в ОПМ под руководством ООН, нельзя назвать вооруженными силами, как их понимает Устав, так что такая поправка могла бы оказаться вполне уместной.

В реальности принятие поправок является наименее вероятным путем нормативного урегулирования ОПМ. Об этом свидетельствует опыт долгих и безрезультатных попыток изменения некоторых положений Устава. Рассчитывать на способность ООН принять поправки по такому важному и чувствительному вопросу, как правовое обоснование ОПМ, едва ли приходится. Кроме того, многокомпонентный и многофункциональный характер современных ОПМ делает нереальной и нецелесообразной их жесткую фиксацию в той или иной главе или статье Устава ООН. Современные ОПМ могут состоять из военного, гражданского, полицейского компонентов, могут выполнять функции по поддержанию мира, принуждению к миру или восстановлению мира. Более реальным вариантом могла бы быть разработка конвенции ООН, конкретизирующей положения Устава ООН применительно к операциям по поддержанию мира. Например, речь могла бы идти о разработке рамочного документа, устанавливающего прежде всего понятийный аппарат, а также общие и оперативные принципы проведения ОПМ, основы статуса их участников. Рамочный документ в дальнейшем дополнялся бы специальными соглашениями, более подробно регулирующими отдельные аспекты ОПМ.

С юридической точки зрения такая конструкция вполне корректна и применяется нередко. Наглядный пример — Конвенция 1981 г. о запрещении или ограничении применения конкретных видов обычного оружия, которые считаются наносящими чрезмерные повреждения или имеющими неизбирательный характер. Текст Конвенции содержит общие положения, конкретные запреты на необнаруживаемые осколки, мины-ловушки, зажигательное оружие, ослепляющие лазеры включены в протоколы, прилагаемые к Конвенции.

В рамках ООН существуют органы, где такой документ может быть разработан — это Специальный комитет по операциям по поддержанию мира и Комиссия международного права. Есть уже и отдельные документы, которые могли бы составить как рамочную конвенцию, так и конкретизирующие ее положения. Это рабочие документы Совета Безопасности, например, Записка его Председателя от 28 мая 1993 г., содержащая перечень оперативных принципов проведения ОПМ. Сюда же можно отнести доклад Генерального секретаря ООН (1990 г.), включающий типовое соглашение о статусе сил при проведении ОПМ. К предлагаемой структуре в принципе могла бы быть отнесена уже заключенная Конвенция о безопасности персонала ООН и связанного с ней персонала (1994 г.). Наконец, это растущая группа соглашений, в которых государства-члены ООН уполномочивают Секретариат ООН о ресурсах, которые они смогут предоставить для проведения ОПМ.

3. Регулирование участия в операциях по поддержанию мира в соответствии с российской Конституцией и законодательством.

Конституция Российской Федерации 1993 г. специально не регулирует вопросы участия России в подготовке и проведении ОПМ. Деятельность органов государственной власти в этой области регулируется положениями Конституции, которые определяют их полномочия в области внешней политики и обороны. Как и во всякой президентской республике в России именно Президент руководит внешней политикой и обороной и является Верховным главнокомандующим Вооруженными Силами. Таким образом, именно по приказу Президента российские воинские контингенты могут направляться для участия в ОПМ. Это полномочие главы государства уравнивается прерогативой верхней палаты российского парламента — Совета Федерации — решать вопрос о возможности использования Вооруженных Сил за пределами российской территории. Роль нижней палаты — Государственной Думы — не столь значительна, хотя в принципе она может использовать свои бюджетные полномочия для влияния на решение главы государства.

Статьи Конституции конкретизируются и дополняются актом, специально регулирующим использование российского персонала в ОПМ. Это закон "О порядке предоставления Российской Федерацией военного и гражданского персонала для участия в деятельности по поддержанию или восстановлению международного мира и безопасности" (1995 г.). Закон регулирует предоставление российского персонала для участия в операциях по поддержанию мира, осуществляемых по решению Совета Безопасности ООН региональными органами или на основании двусторонних или многосторонних договоров Российской Федерации, которые не являются принудительными действиями в соответствии с Уставом ООН. Он определяет процедуру взаимодействия между органами государственной власти при принятии решения о направлении российского персонала для участия в международных операциях.

Можно сказать, что закон отчасти основывается на концепции "шестой с половиной" главы, в соответствии с которой проводятся ОПМ, выходящие за пределы дипломатических методов, но еще не приобретающие характера принудительных действий. В той части, в которой закон касается принудительных действий, он отличается некоторой недосказанностью: упоминает "международные принудительные действия с использованием вооруженных сил, осуществляемые по решению Совета Безопасности ООН", однако умалчивает, применяется ли он к аналогичным действиям на региональном уровне в рамках ч.1 статьи 53 Устава ООН. Это актуальный вопрос для СНГ, в рамках которого действуют собственные документы о порядке осуществления региональных принудительных мер.

Примечательно, что закон о порядке предоставления персонала избегает ситуаций, к которым применима резолюция Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН "Единство во имя мира", принятая в период войны в Корее, когда парализованный Совет Безопасности ООН не мог исполнять свои уставные функции. Неясно, находились ли составители закона под влиянием традиционного в нашей стране негативного отношения к этой резолюции или же попросту не знали о ее существовании. Как бы то ни было, резолюция создала прецедент, к которому ООН впоследствии неоднократно обращалась и может обратиться в будущем. Закон такую возможность не учитывает.

Некоторые из положений закона вызывают сомнения с точки зрения Конституции. Закон может вступить в конфликт с некоторыми важными, хотя и дремлющими положениями Устава ООН. Например, если когда-нибудь вступит в действие статья 43 и между членами ООН и Советом Безопасности будут заключены соглашения о предоставлении вооруженных сил, соответствующие воинские контингенты должны будут предоставляться Совету Безопасности по

его требование. Несмотря на это положение Устава ООН российский закон устанавливает общее правило, в соответствии с которым Россия "самостоятельно с учетом ее обязательств по Уставу ООН и другим международным договорам определяет в каждом случае целесообразность своего участия в деятельности по поддержанию или восстановлению международного мира и безопасности". Иными словами, обязательства по международному праву лишь учитываются при выработке окончательного решения. Таким образом, возможна, хотя и теоретически, ситуация, когда России придется выбирать между применением национального закона вопреки ее международным обязательствам, либо, напротив, подчинением норме Устава ООН вопреки национальному закону. Конституция Российской Федерации допускает только второй вариант. В соответствии с ней "если международным договором Российской Федерации предусмотрены иные правила, чем предусмотренные законом, то применяются правила международного договора".

Все же, несмотря на отмеченные недостатки, закон о порядке предоставления персонала восполняет пробел в законодательстве по вопросам внешней политики и обороны. Предусмотренные им процедуры применялись уже неоднократно, в частности, в связи с участием российского контингента в международной операции IFOR/SFOR в Боснии и продлением его мандата, а также при направлении контингента в район грузино-абхазского конфликта.

Подобное законодательство или иные формы правового регулирования существуют и в других странах. По процедуре принятия решения с российским законом сходен японский закон "О международном сотрудничестве в деле мира" (1992 г.). В США еще в 1945 г. был принят закон об участии в ООН, разрешающий Президенту заключить с Советом Безопасности соглашение о предоставлении воинского контингента в соответствии со статьей 43 Устава. Впрочем, этот закон остается дремлющим, как и сама статья 43. В Германии решением Конституционного Суда от 1994 г. определены условия, при соблюдении которых контингенты бундесвера могут участвовать в операциях по поддержанию мира или по принуждению к миру.

Сравнительный анализ национального правового регулирования направления персонала для участия в ОПМ имеет практическую ценность как для Секретариата ООН, координирующего ОПМ, так и для потенциальных партнеров в проведении многонациональных операций. Взаимное знание национальных процедур выработки и принятия решения повышает предсказуемость, а значит и доверие к партнеру. Например, для вероятных партнеров России по многонациональной операции могут представлять интерес особенности взаимодействия между Президентом и Советом Федерации при утверждении и продлении мандата. Они таковы, что контингент, уже участвующий в операции, может на некоторое время остаться без мандата и формально без финансирования. Но это вовсе не означает, что Россия выходит из данной операции.

Немалую практическую ценность имеет и более широкая осведомленность о национальном законодательстве. Например, американское законодательство запрещает, за отдельными исключениями, использование вооруженных сил в качестве *posse comitatus*, иными словами, в качестве временного правоохранительного органа. Действует ли этот запрет только на территории США или же он также запрещает американским военнослужащим, участвующим в ОПМ, заниматься поиском и задержанием местных граждан, подозреваемых в совершении военных преступлений, принимая на себя функцию полиции? Могут ли американские военнослужащие выполнять полицейские функции по поручению международного органа?

Любопытно было бы изучить тенденцию к более активной роли законодательных органов в принятии решения об участии в операции. Важное значение, особенно в условиях необходимости быстрого развертывания операции, может иметь осведомленность о порядке принятия такого решения в государстве с президентской, парламентской или монархической формой правления. Например, в Великобритании или Японии парламентское большинство формирует правительство, соответственно, премьер-министр ищет поддержку среди законодателей — соратников по партии. А в США президенту, представляющему одну партию, порой приходится иметь дело с Конгрессом, на две трети состоящим из оппозиции.

Представляется, что Секретариат ООН выиграет, если создаст банк данных национального законодательства и практики его применения, снабженный авторитетным комментарием. Если ООН это в нынешних условиях не под силу, такую работу, возможно, могли бы взять на себя профильные научно-практические центры, занимающиеся изучением опыта ОПМ и подготовкой персонала для будущих операций.

Хотелось бы обратить внимание еще на одну правовую проблему, которую не следует упускать из виду при подготовке и проведении операций. Операции, даже если они проводятся в условиях распада государства, паралича власти и полного отсутствия правопорядка, осуществляются при сохранении хотя бы остатков правовой системы. Знание этой правовой системы, как и знание местных обычаев, поможет успеху операции, облегчив взаимопонимание с местным населением, и создаст более выгодные условия для выполнения поставленной задачи. Практический пример: когда в начале 1995 г. в Боснии и Герцеговине местные власти попытались воспрепятствовать использованию Британским кавалерийским батальоном Сил ООН территории

и помещений, выделенных для его основной базы, командир батальона и его гражданский советник — автор этих строк, проанализировали местное законодательство и судебные решения. Это позволило выработать аргументы, с помощью которых удалось предотвратить назревающий конфликт, сохранить за батальоном его базу и дать местным властям возможность спасти свое имущество.

4. Международное гуманитарное право и операции по поддержанию мира

Юристы, и особенно юридическая служба Международного Комитета Красного Креста, уделяли внимание применению норм международного гуманитарного права (далее — МГП) в условиях операций по поддержанию мира. Однако современные и прогнозируемые операции требуют новых подходов с точки зрения МГП.

Участники ранних ОПМ — невооруженные военные наблюдатели или легковооруженные контингенты ООН, с точки зрения Женевских конвенций не имели статуса комбатантов и теоретически могли рассчитывать на защиту, предоставляемую этими конвенциями. Однако ООН, как субъект международного права, не участвует в этих конвенциях, хотя именно ООН несет первоочередную ответственность за военнослужащих, выступающих от ее имени. Означает ли это, что участники ОПМ, не решающие задач по принуждению к миру, лишены защиты, предоставляемой Женевскими конвенциями? С другой стороны, если такая защита предоставляется, совместим ли статус военнослужащего Сил ООН со статусом военнопленного — ведь силы являются вспомогательным органом ООН, а следовательно на них должны распространяться положения Конвенции о привилегиях и иммунитетах ООН 1946 г., гарантирующие их неприкосновенность.

Появление в операциях нового поколения элементов принуждения ставит новые вопросы. Например, становились ли военнослужащие ООН в бывшей Югославии комбатантами во время эпизодов применения сил против участников конфликта, не вызванного потребностями самообороны? Положительный ответ на этот вопрос означал бы, что "голубые каски", участвующие в ОПМ с элементами принуждения, можно захватывать в плен и удерживать их в качестве военнопленных, соблюдая правила Женевских конвенций.

Если исходить из того, что персонал ОПМ подпадает под защиту современного МГП, то неизбежно возникает вопрос: какой из двух дополнительных протоколов к Женевским конвенциям предоставляет такую защиту — первый, касающийся международных вооруженных конфликтов, или второй, применяемый в условиях вооруженных конфликтов немеждународного характера?

Недавно принятая и еще не вступившая в силу Конвенция о безопасности персонала ООН и связанного с ней персонала, непосредственно направленная на защиту военного, полицейского и гражданского компонентов операций ООН, не распространяется на принудительные меры, осуществляемые на основании главы 7 Устава, в которой персонал участвует в качестве комбатантов. Получается, что на предоставляемую ею защиту можно рассчитывать лишь при проведении достаточно ограниченной номенклатуры операций.

Вопрос о применении норм МГП встает в связи с операциями, проводимыми региональными организациями, такими как НАТО и СНГ, которые, кстати, как и ООН не являются участниками Женевских конвенций.

Еще одна проблема, требующая решения, — это возможная роль персонала ОПМ в обеспечении соблюдения норм МГП участниками конфликта. Нередки случаи, когда нарушения тех или иных норм случаются в присутствии персонала. Например, весной 1995 г. в зоне ответственности Британского кавалерийского батальона Сил ООН в Боснии в непосредственной близости от линии фронта были замечены группы военнослужащих правительственных войск в головных уборах, имитирующих голубые каски сил ООН. Приблизительно в то же время в Сараево небольшая группа боснийских сербов, переодетых в захваченное ранее обмундирование французского батальона, напала на контрольно-пропускной пункт, взяв в заложники нескольких французских военнослужащих.

В обоих эпизодах (а подобных им можно привести немало) налицо акт вероломства, как оно определено в статье 37 Дополнительного протокола 1 к Женевским конвенциям, и нарушение запрещенного статьей 38 протокола использования эмблемы ООН. В первом случае батальон ограничился сообщением в штаб сектора, во втором — была предпринята операция, целью которой было исключительно освобождение заложников, но не преследование нарушителей норм МГП.

Юридическая квалификация второго эпизода несколько затруднена. Жилой квартал боснийского города в зоне ответственности автора этих строк подвергся артиллерийскому обстрелу, в ходе которого применялись боеприпасы, содержащие белый фосфор. Несколько гражданских лиц получили серьезные ожоги. Предположительно, это были дымовые боеприпасы, которые случайно или в результате преднамеренных манипуляций оказали ожоговое действие. Так или иначе, эти боеприпасы не подпадали под запрет, установленный Протоколом о запрещении или ограничении применения зажигательного оружия к Конвенции о запрещении

некоторых видов обычного оружия 1981 г. Однако, очевидно, что их применением были нарушены нормы Женевских конвенций, запрещающие применение методов и средств ведения боевых действий, причиняющих излишние страдания или повреждения. И вновь подразделение Сил ООН ограничилось извещением штаба сектора об инциденте, а затем туда же направило осколки снарядов для квалифицированной экспертизы.

Вопросы применения МГП в условиях ОПМ заслуживают специального внимания с учетом особенностей операций и статуса принимающего в них участие персонала. Речь должна идти как о совершенствовании правового регулирования, так и о подготовке персонала и усилении юридической службы будущих операций. Возможно, имело бы смысл приступить к мнению некоторых экспертов, предлагающих разработать еще один Дополнительный протокол к Женевским конвенциям, который охватывал бы разнообразные варианты ОПМ.

Dr. Jakkie CILLIERS,
Institute for Security Studies,
South Africa, Executive Director

ENFORCING OF THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNITY WITHIN THE SOLUTIONING OF SECURITY PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the organizers for inviting me to this Conference and the South African Institute on Security Studies which I hope will become a partner of the programme ahead.

I am going to make a few remarks as indicated on the programme. Mr. Malan is also from the Security Institute of South Africa. My name is Jakkie Cilliers and I have been Director of the Institute for Security Studies and Mr Malan will speak on some other activities tomorrow and hopefully you will understand why we have been invited to this Conference. I mean to briefly speak to you on what have been the developments not at the level of the UN but in Africa at the level of the Organization of the African Unity and Southern Africa at the level of the SADC the South African Development Community and then conclude with some remarks on South Africa itself, a relatively new-comer to the peacekeeping circle if I can use those words.

I speak against the background of the remarks of the towards Secretary General of the UN that the training is to be removed and reinforced when we move into peace-enforcement and multi- functional peace operations. Of coalitions of the willings, leading peacekeeping in Africa in particular. And the trend that we clearly see in Africa, is trends towards the use of Chapter 8 of the Charter in participation in peacekeeping. And after the events, particularly in Somalia, the high-marks of peacekeeping, particularly in Africa perhaps is come and gone. And we see increasingly a trend that we, Africans are expected to provide for peace by ourselves. And that is for that reason that I am addressing my remarks to you on the behalf of the South African Development Community.

The global peacekeeping community appears to be focused extremely and intensively and sometimes narrowly. On events for example in Bosnia - the level of genocide slaughter and death in Central and West Africa make the events in Bosnia appear of a felicitous more less scale. They are not reported in the same extend and therefore the responsibility of the International Community and the vital interest that might be involved are of an appropriate low level, if one would look at the developments.

Let me start with a few remarks on the Organization of the African Unity which was established in 1961 and in 1963, at the time of decolonisation of Africa, at the time when there were great hopes and expectations of the growing of African States, that met in Addis Abeba to establish the Organization of the African Unity. The OAU record of preventing or containing conflicts was certainly a disappointing one when measured against the total of ambitions settled in OAU Charter itself. It has occasionally played a significant diplomatic role, for example in achieving temporary peace in the Sudan in 1972 but it has failed to prevent some Member States from breaking ranks to support the succession in Biafra in the 1960. The OAU's peace-keeping operations in Thad (1981-1982) also collapsed, debist from undertaking dialogue - Nor could the OAU persuade all African States to avoid the dialogue with whites ruling South Africa or to support sanctions against that regime.

The end of the bipolar era and the move towards the multipolar world has served to revigorate the Organization of the African Unity as has the end of the Apartheid in South Africa and of course, as I remarked initially the loss of interest or commitment or perhaps the frustration of the international community to involve themselves in peace-support operations in Africa. As a result, at the 26th ordinary session of the OAU in July in 1990, delegates have reported to the Secretary General on the fundamental changes they can place in the world and their implications for Africa, proposals for an African response which led to the adoption of a declaration of African political and economic situation, in which the heads of States and Governments committed themselves to tranform Africa in order to lay a foundation for self-reliant, human centered and sustainable development.

In essence what was happening in this trend, we see very clearly in South Africa. Is there a greater acceptance by African countries of their responsibility for their own conflict management, conflict resolutions in Africa. In the actual fact this meeting in 1990 and the declaration that emanated from it, was a watershed and still is a watershed. The OAU has moved from its preoccupation with liberalisation and decolonization to use the issues as a whole of economic integration and development, conflict prevention, management and reduction. And it's final communiqué of the 1991, summit of the Heads of States and Governments the OAU would publicly acknowledge that, and I quote: "There is a link between security, stability, development and co-operation in Africa... And, of course, instability and insecurity have encountered, have overused compassy to achieve continental co-operation. In March 1992, the OAU established a division of conflict prevention, management and resolution, as part of its political department. And this division has now been split into two sections, one dealing with conflict resolution, defence and security, and the other one with conflict prevention and research. Africans have to take primary responsibility for managing conflicts in their regions, and there was in part an understandable quite pure annoyance by the Africans sad to the world: yes, we may continue to need outside help in dealing with our problems, but we would be essentially involved and provide leadership and efforts for conflict resolution, we can no longer fold our angles and wait for the foreigners to come and resolve our problems". End of quote.

What is happening is that the OAU moved away from a doctrine which said that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of the various Member States. But this is accepting that the internal political and security concerns and developments within any of these countries significantly could and will impact upon that of the neighbourhood countries.

Secretary General takes now a much more active role in conflict prevention and mediation. The mechanism is also based on the premise that the overview is better placed and will take action and anticipate and prevent conflicts rather than wanting to resolve them once they are on their way.

Relations between the United Nations and the OAU of course are governed by Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. And the most recent and important developments related to the establishment of the Circle of Chief of Staff of the Organization of the African Unity which was made in two meetings the second of these meetings which occurred in Orara in last year October drafted a set of some 15 principles for participation of African States in peacekeeping in Africa. Mr Mallan wrote down these principles and will make some brief remarks tomorrow.

But what is happening is that the Organisation for African Unity is positioning itself at a doctrinal and a standard operating procedure level for co-ordination of peacekeeping in Africa and this is evident not only through the various regional peacekeeping exercises that are happening in Africa, but also within Southern Africa. But in Southern Africa, you will probably know that the Southern African Development Community which comprises countries as Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, Swaziland, Zambia, the Seychelles, has established apart of its development site a certain organ on politics to face security. This organ on politics to face security is aimed to try and deal with security issues almost following the model of the OSCE, but it is within this organ that operational co-ordination is occurring. Zimbabwe has been recognised in Southern Africa as a lead-nation to establish a certain circle-excellence for peacekeeping training in Southern Africa. There is some dispute about this in the region, but the global Community is pouring significant resources into Southern Africa to try to participate, both in co-ordination, doctrine development as well as the practical capabilities of African countries to participate in peacekeeping operations. South Africa itself, and Chair, I will conclude with a few remarks on that in the limits of time, - became a democracy in April 1994. South Africa therefore is by African standards the continental power or certainly therefore South Africa is very careful in its contribution and involvement in peacekeeping on the continent. In the past, South Africa was a source of instability on the continent. Therefore, South African involvement, governed now by a Constitution with very strict supervision of the Armed Forces is a very careful one. At the moment the South African military are finalizing the integration of its former guerrilla military forces and has started to prepare it-self for participation in peacekeeping operations. In spite a large number of mapping exercises and even tactical exercises, the largest regional peacekeeping exercises to be hosted in Southern Africa will occur later this year in November, in South Africa, called the operation "The Blue Crane". It will in essence signal the readiness of South Africa to participate in peacekeeping operations in Africa and to meet its commitments within the global community.

And, Chair, let me simply to conclude with the remark that in South Africa has suffered, that the South African military have suffered from budget cuts of 50 %. Its ability to help in peacekeeping is perhaps overestimated, but it certainly, within African context can make its contribution. But we only would do so under strict UN overview and possibly the SODEC framework.

Chairman, thank you very much.

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THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF MULTINATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

This presentation is concerned with the legal aspects of multinational peace operations, or peace support operations (PSO's). Whatever terminology is used, the idea is to cover everything from preventive deployment to peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. Since the speaker has not been active as a peace-keeper himself, but has studied the aspects of peace operations from a distance and from a legal perspective, the information presented and the views put forward will have to be of a general nature.

The international and national legal basis for multinational peace support operations is to be found in a mix of mandates and requirements of legal regulations. I am referring to mandates of an enabling nature and requirements of a restrictive nature. This is, for example, reasonably clear with regard to multinational regional action, where Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter permits and encourages regional co-operation relating to peace-keeping and peace building, but does not allow peace enforcement in a regional setting unless the Security Council has given its *ad hoc* approval to such action. Similarly, in national law and regulations a normative framework often exists that enables the Government to participate in multinational action but also places restrictions on such co-operation and participation. The international and the national legal framework, respectively, have to be kept apart.

National Law. The Swedish Case.

Many countries have introduced their own national legislation relating to participation in military operations abroad, be they categorised as peace-keeping, peace support or peace enforcement operations. In certain situations, when decisions have been taken in the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, states may be more or less obliged to take part in such operations. From a legal and practical point of view it is of course useful if national law and regulations exist and are elaborated in such a way that they will facilitate a speedy implementation of UN resolutions or regional decisions in this respect.

The Swedish law of 1992 on national troops serving abroad (SFS 1992:1153) enables the Government to send troops abroad on peace-keeping missions without the need for prior authorisation by Parliament. The law refers to situations where Sweden is not under any obligation to provide armed forces in an international crisis. When there is such an obligation (the Chapter VII scenario already referred to), the Government has already the necessary authority under the Constitution (RFIO:9). According to the law, the Government may, at the request of the UN Organisation or in conformity with decisions taken by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), provide armed forces for peace-keeping operations abroad. The reference to the OSCE is an extension of the scope of the law as compared to a former law of 1974 which referred only to UN decisions.

The phrase "peace-keeping" in the Swedish law seems to exclude "peace-enforcement" operations. If the activities abroad later turn out to include elements of enforcement (mandated, for instance, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), the Government will have to take the matter to Parliament for approval. But where, as indicated above, Sweden is bound by an international obligation (for instance, in accordance with Article 48 of the UN Charter) to take part in an enforcement action, the Constitution does not require the Government to obtain the prior approval of Parliament.

The Swedish law of 1992 makes it clear that volunteers only are to be employed as military personnel in peace-keeping tasks. The personnel shall be part of a special contingent within the Swedish armed forces intended for service abroad. Another law (1994:588) has introduced provisions for the training of the personnel abroad and in Sweden.

Although Sweden has participated in IFOR/SFOR activities and PFP exercises, there are no additional laws or ordinances to cover this kind of multinational co-operation (i.e. in the field of peace-keeping or peace support operations). An ordinance relating to confidence building activities under the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was introduced in 1995 (1995:336). So far Sweden's role in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), introduced in 1993, or in the preparations for a UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), has not resulted in any new legislation. Although matters of multinational co-ordination and co-operation could up to a point be the subject of useful national legislation, it seems that variances between different countries in this respect have to be accepted as something natural due to differences in politico-military traditions and circumstances. Problems that have arisen in multinational operations due to a participating country's national legal restrictions, relating to what that country's own troops are allowed to do or not to do, could in the future be alleviated through new national legislation of a more flexible nature. Even so, there is a need for an internationally agreed normative framework as regards the co-operation of different national units in a multinational operation.

International Law. The Universal Dimension.

There is a wide spectrum of possible measures in the field of crisis-prevention and crisis-management, not all of which are foreseen under the universal legal framework of the UN Charter. Chapter VI of the Charter is focused on the peaceful settlement of existing disputes, and before applying that Chapter the UN can resort to early warning systems, information gathering, fact finding missions, preventive deployment of "blue helmets", humanitarian assistance programmes and other forms of preventive diplomacy, none of which are mentioned in the Charter. A number of these "prechapter VI" measures can be initiated by the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter, while others can be undertaken by the Security Council or the General Assembly under a less specific mandate.

Between the tasks of conflict prevention and peace-keeping lie the efforts of handling existing disputes by bringing disputing parties to an agreement by peaceful means. Here Chapter VI of the Charter and the concept of peace-making come into the picture. Although Chapter VI contains a legal obligation for States to settle their disputes by peaceful means, its peace-making strategy is not based upon enforcement of this legal obligation but upon the good will and consent of the parties in a dispute. Peace-making, it has been said, "is the fashioning of a political settlement".

The concept of peace-keeping goes beyond Chapter VI. As everyone knows, there is nothing in the UN Charter on peace-keeping, or on the relating principles of consent from the parties, UN neutrality and UN non-use of force except in self-defence. Peacekeeping operations (PKO's) were not foreseen under either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter; they fell somewhere in between, and not surprisingly the unwritten Chapter VI 1/2 has been suggested as their legal basis. It is submitted that this "VI1/2" perception is legally defensible and politically useful; legally defensible because, even if based on consent, PKO's signify a more ambitious level of UN involvement than anything provided for in Chapter VI; politically useful because it shows that innovations, even without textual support, can be legitimised under a multinational system if they fulfil fundamental purposes of the international community. Effective co-operation and co-ordination between participating units in a multinational operation are necessary ingredients in the peace support system in order to fulfil the ambitions of the international community. Innovations in this context probably need to be tangible (e.g. an international agreement on binding rules regarding the chain of command) in order to offset any disadvantages created by national legal restrictions.

A new generation of PKO's emerged in Bosnia and Somalia, namely operations that started as peace-keeping but were later mixed with elements of peace-enforcement (UNPROFOR), or transformed into peace-enforcement in support of humanitarian actions (UNOSOM II). In 1992 the UNPROFOR peace-keeping operation in Bosnia was given some specific Chapter VII authority to assist in the delivery of humanitarian relief and the protection of "safe areas". Again in February 1993, the Security Council decided to give UNPROFOR some additional enforcement authority, this time in the context of the protection of its own personnel.

To the extent that mandates for enforcement are given under Chapter VII of the Charter, the operations by definition do not require the consent of the governments concerned. Since Chapter VI is consent-based and Chapter VII is not, mixed operations will run into difficulties due to the loss of real or perceived impartiality - and UN neutrality is an essential requirement for obtaining the co-operation of the parties to a conflict.

This does not mean that enforcement measures in support of humanitarian objectives, or to protect the mission or its personnel, should always be avoided. But such action has to be conducted as a separate Chapter VII operation in order not to risk the lives of peacekeepers who, as a rule, will not be equipped or otherwise prepared to deal with a situation that escalates into violent conflict.

Mixed operations are only advisable if, at the time of establishing the peace-keeping operation, peace-enforcement needs were foreseen and a decision was taken to grant the force commander the necessary military resources. But even so, the original purpose of the PKO - to initiate a process of co-operation through peaceful measures - would have to be abandoned. The introduction of heavy weaponry and enforcement measures would create a new situation, and the efforts of peace-makers would probably have to be started from scratch.

In the UN report *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (1995) the then Secretary-General made the following remark:

"In reality, nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distant from those of enforcement; ... To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its personnel".

This does not mean, however, that mixed operations are impossible from either a legal or military point of view. The Security Council could simply decide that a mixed operation is appropriate and match a new mandate with the appropriate military resources. Nor does it mean that peace-keeping operations should never be transformed into peace-enforcement operations. But as has been pointed out, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement can never be seen as close options permitting easy transition from one to the other.

One argument repeatedly put forward in the context of peace operations is the one related to the UN image (or obligation) of neutrality and impartiality. In my view this argument has been overstated. It is true that a UN obligation of neutrality flows from Chapter VI. And it is true that UN impartiality in the eyes of the local population is essential for any peace-keeping operation. Success requires local support, but impartiality is only an argument for continuously linking an ongoing peace-keeping operation to consent. Impartiality is thus an argument against mixed operations. It is not an argument against completely moving an operation from Chapter VI (or VP1/2) to Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VII is neither based upon consent nor impartiality; it is based upon the need for the Organisation to be able to take a position and to enforce that position (against any member state or other international actor) if this is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Organisation shall also, under its own Charter, promote and defend certain values like human rights standards. Should violations of human rights and humanitarian law be of such serious and massive nature that they under an innovative but reasonable interpretation of Article 39 of the Charter constitute a threat to international peace and security, enforcement action could be taken to remove that threat. In such situations the Organisation would not be impartial. Nor would its member states be impartial or neutral, as they are obliged under Article 2(5) of the Charter to give the UN "every assistance in any action it takes" in accordance with the Charter.

Any decision to cross the line from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement should, therefore, be made only after all relevant factors have been considered and balanced. Consent and impartiality will form part of such a decision, but should not be determinative of it.

At this point, we should note that a UN peace-keeping force may come to a point where one has to reassess the whole situation (as happened in Bosnia). The basic options would then be to: (1) continue in a peace-keeping role; (2) change the peace-keeping nature of the force's mandate to peace-enforcement; (3) replace the UN force with a regional force; or (4) simply withdraw altogether. In Bosnia, as we know, withdrawal was followed by re-deployment.

Regional Action. The New Dimension of Peace Support Operations.

In 1992 and 1993 there was talk about a trend from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement. But soon the UN and its member states became more cautious and selective with regard to collective action. The trend was reversed, from peace-enforcement back to peace-keeping, and in Bosnia from universal action to a form of regional peace-keeping. In fact, regional action is the trend to day, often in combination with a UN presence at some stage. Italian and other troops from OSCE countries were entrusted with a peace-keeping role in Albania; the Organization of American States (OAS) fulfilled an initial function in Haiti; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been active in "military crisis-management" in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In early 1997 it was reported that the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan had endorsed a proposal for an all-Africa Military force to respond to crises on that continent.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is devoted to regional arrangements and agencies dealing with maintenance of peace and security. Article 52 of the Charter states that nothing, from the UN Charter perspective, precludes regional action, provided that such regional activities "are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations".

The former Secretary-General, in the UN report *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), pointed out that regional arrangements "in many cases possess a potential that should be utilised" in peace-making generally, and also in preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. In the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (1995) it was noted that co-operation between the UN and regional organisations had taken a number of forms, including operational support (NATO air power to support UNPROFOR), co-deployment (UN field missions with ECOWAS in Liberia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia), and joint operations (the mission in Haiti where staffing, direction and financing was shared between the UN and OAS). The Carlsson-Ramphal Report on Global Governance (1995) noted that there had been an increase in the number of organisations willing to offer their good offices in bringing together parties to disputes and to work with other organisations to look for solutions.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter requires that any regional peace operation intended to achieve some kind of military enforcement, needs a clearance from the Security Council in order to have international legitimacy. Article 53 of the Charter states that the Security Council shall, "where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority". But it is made very clear that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council".

The fundamental legal principles of UN peace-keeping should also be applied with regard to regional peace-keeping. The individual right of self-defence, for example, should also in the regional context be supplemented by the principle of mission defence. The recent Swedish Study on joint military doctrine on Peace Support Operations (1997) states that each PSO force "is expected to function as a single integrated unit, and an attack on any one of its members or sub-units engages the right to self-defence of the force as a whole."

The legal status of a PSO force, its military and civilian personnel, should be secured by a legally binding

agreement with the host government, if a government exists. The type of agreement needed depends on the situation in the country, the most ambitious variant being a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), i.e. a formal treaty. When such an agreement is not attainable or not needed, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or an Exchange of Letters may suffice. If the regional force is involved in peace-enforcement, no agreement will be neither possible nor necessary, since peace-enforcement is not based upon consent and agreement with the territorial state, even if it could not be ruled out that some form of agreement under pressure materialises later on during the conflict.

The four fundamental issues to be addressed in a SOFA or similar agreement are: (1) The independence of the Force in relation to the authorities of the territorial state; (2) Freedom of movement of the Force; (3) Total or partial exclusion of criminal jurisdiction of the territorial state in relation to members of the Force; (4) Rules of Engagement (ROE).

States have developed their own national rules of engagement and tend to apply them as they are, without necessarily adapting to the need for and principle of consistency which is valid for any multilateral operation. This problem may be more acute with regard to regional operations than with regard to UN operations, where the Office of Legal Affairs in New York will push for common rules as far as possible.

Suggestions for the Future.

The experience of the UN operation in Somalia, for example, has highlighted some problems of coordination in peace support operations. Troop-contributing governments, who are responsible to their parliaments and electorates for the safety of their troops, may tend to give priority to matters of national concern (as perceived in a short-term perspective) instead of striving for multilateral consistency and common standards. The principle of *unity of command* should be strengthened. Command in the field is in UN operations entrusted by the Secretary-General to the Chief of Mission. As has been pointed out by the former Secretary-General of the UN, there must be no attempt by the troop-contributing governments to steer or give orders to their contingents on operational matters.

"To do so creates division within the force, adds to the difficulties already inherent in a multinational operation and increases the risk of casualties. It can also create the impression amongst the parties that the operation is serving the policy objectives of the contributing Governments rather than the collective will of the United Nations ... Such impressions inevitably undermine an operation's legitimacy and effectiveness" (*Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, 1995).

It is now time to deal with the matter of command and control in international negotiations.

It is suggested that the UN Military Staff Committee (MSC), which is established under the UN Charter to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the military aspects of maintenance of international peace and security, but has not been active for years (if ever), should be entrusted with the task of preparing some guidelines (or even legally binding norms) on the matter of command and control generally. It is in the interest of the international community, including the regional organisations, to strengthen and specify the existing principles in this area. The Military Staff Committee, which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives, is a body well suited to undertake this task. In fact, the so far non-applied Article 47 of the UN Charter states the following in its 3rd paragraph:

"The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently."

Nothing has ever been worked out under the auspices of the MSC, simply because no armed forces have ever been placed at the disposal of the Security Council. However, it is submitted that the UN Charter should be interpreted in a flexible and dynamic fashion, as has been the practice of the Security Council since the end of the Cold War, in order to facilitate solutions to problems and needs of the international community.

Article 47 also provides that UN member states not represented on the committee may be invited to take part in the work of the committee. Article 47 further provides that the MSC, after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees. These provisions could be used to activate the committee in the PSO field in a constructive and politically broad fashion.

Similarly, the issue of rules of engagement (ROE) could usefully be handled by the MSC. There is a need for some kind of agreement between troop-contributing states on ROE in incidents and combat situations. Rules for the different categories of peace support operations should - within the framework of an international document - be tailored to suit both the political considerations and the military requirements of the international community. A new document, formally applicable in UN operations, should serve as a guideline also for regional operations.

This suggested drafting activity should not be limited to the international scene. Governments should be encouraged to adapt their national legislation to the international norms already in existence or being agreed upon. Regional or other multilateral meetings with exchanges of views to this effect should be initiated. In Europe the OSCE could be useful in this context. Its High Level Planning Group, responsible for OSCE peace-keeping, could embark upon the new task of facilitating peace operations through the

means of consistent national legislation. Consistency already at the different national levels is one way of achieving unity of command at the multilateral operational level. Many countries will not need to introduce new legislation, but all countries that contribute to peace support operations should take an interest in the objective to achieve common standards in this area. In such a way the effectiveness, co-ordination and co-operation of multinational peace operations could be enhanced.

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**INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGAL BASIS FOR PREPARING AND
USING MULTINATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:
ENHANCING MULTINATIONAL CO-ORDINATION AND CO-OPERATION.
A NATO PERSPECTIVE**

PART I

NATO's Legal Basis for conducting peacekeeping operations:

Washington Treaty:

— NATO was established under Art. 51 of UN Charter, not as regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty requires NATO members to report measures which they may take in response to an attack to the UN Security Council and subsequently to terminate such measures when the UNSC resolves to take action itself.

UN Charter:

Art. 51, UN Charter, recognizes the right of states to make arrangements for individual and collective self-defence against armed attack:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. <...>"

Political Context for NATO's evolving role in peacekeeping:

Gulf crisis:

- reasserted the political utility and value of the UN
- demonstrated to Western governments the value of NATO's joint operational assets, procedures and habits of co-operation
- sparked off the first NATO debate on possible revision of the accepted out-of-area prohibitive norms

UN leadership:

— 1992 election of Boutros-Boutros Ghali as Secretary General of the UN brought new thinking on potential burden-sharing between UN and regional arrangements. He opened a direct channel of communication with his opposite number in NATO.

— Kofi Annan, then Under Secretary General for peacekeeping operations, was particularly enthusiastic about co-operating with NATO.

Security Council:

Key members of the Alliance, US, UK, France, are among the permanent five members of the Security Council. This provided, from the beginning of the Bosnia war, a direct link between decision-making processes of UN and NATO, although formal links between the two organisations were absent.

Political basis for NATO's role in peacekeeping:

- | | |
|------------|---|
| 1991: | The Alliance's New Strategic Concept did not mention the word "Peacekeeping".
[The strategic concept is currently under review] |
| June 1992: | NATO Foreign Ministers announced their readiness "to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE"
This included making available Alliance resources and expertise for peacekeeping operations. |
| Dec. 1992: | The Alliance stated its readiness to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. |
| June 1993: | NACC Ministerial agreed the report of the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, which set out a common understanding on conceptual approaches and a common programme for practical peacekeeping arrangements in cooperation with Partners. A follow-on to the Athens Report which referred to multifunctional peacekeeping operations was endorsed by |

Jan. 1994.

Ministers in Dec. 1995.

NATO Summit in Brussels reaffirmed the offer to support UN or OSCE peacekeeping operations and directed the North Atlantic Council to examine how political and military structures and procedures could be adapted to conduct Alliance missions, including peacekeeping, more efficiently.

NATO's institutional and operational innovations for handling new missions:

— CJTF: 1994 Summit endorsed this concept as a means of facilitating contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.

PFP: 1994 Summit launched the PFP programme, which provides for joint planning and joint military exercises and the development by PFP partners of capabilities which would enable them to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, rescue and humanitarian operations.

1992 Ministerial Declarations - implications for NATO's legal basis for peacekeeping:

— UN or OSCE mandate is necessary, NATO is not prepared to undertake a peacekeeping operation on its own initiative. It is essential to work closely with the UN which has, in accordance with its Charter, the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and can mandate the peacekeeping and, if necessary, enforcement action. The UN and OSCE alone can provide the necessary legitimacy as they can express and bring to bear the collective will of the international community.

— NATO cannot be instructed by UNSC to undertake a peacekeeping operation: ["on a case-by-case basis" "in accordance with its own procedures"]

— NATO Ministers had decided it was possible to institute a formal relationship between NATO and UN without accepting the restraints implied in declaring the former to be a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of UN Charter

NATO's self-perception vis-a-vis the UN:

(M. Woernes speech, Venice May 1993):

"Actions in support of the UN do not mean that NATO now sees its role mainly as that of a sub-contractor for international peacekeeping duties. The Alliance, in the security interests of its own members, is prepared to assist the UN, but it cannot commit itself to supporting globally every peacekeeping operations; especially where the conditions for success are absent, where it believes that the mandate and rules of engagement are inadequate, and where it cannot exercise unity of command."

Key elements:

Conditions for success, mandate and rules of engagement, unity of command. The importance of these aspects were illustrated by NATO's support to the UN during UNPROFOR.

Background to NATO's involvement in Bosnia under UNPROFOR:

UN Initiative:

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made first contacts with NATO, there was no formalised relationship to build on at the outset of UN-NATO co-operation in Bosnia.

— Supplement to an Agenda for peace:

Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command or control [enforcement] operations except perhaps on a very limited scale... It would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the organisation is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peace-making and peacekeeping responsibilities entrusted to it."

Experiences from NATO's involvement in UNPROFOR:

Three traditional principles of peacekeeping:

- consent
- impartiality
- limited use of force

Principles of peacekeeping were violated during UNPROFOR:

— UN safe areas in Bosnia violated two of these principles, while air strikes(enforcement action implemented by NATO on UN Secretary General's request) violated the third principle. The situation was characterised by an ambiguous mandate, a dangerous situation on the ground combined with a UN ground force unable to protect itself or the civilians.

— A tendency on the part of the Security Council to improvise, threatening force to achieve unforeseen objectives, significantly distorted the mandate. The UN Security Council decided in June 1993 to create safe areas in Bosnia, without providing the means to implement the decision. After the fall of Srebrenica the UN's credibility was seriously undermined.

— Supplement to An Agenda for Peace:

"Nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so"

Command and control - unity of command

UNPROFOR experience:

- Disagreement between UN and NATO over with whom authority to initiate (and prevent) possible NATO air strikes should rest.

- A consistent UN objective until summer 1995 was to assert UN primacy, not only in political sphere but also over key command and control decisions, through the Secretary General and his special representative to former Yugoslavia.

Dual key arrangement:

- 1993 UN-NATO understanding over the use of air strikes
- Gave an effective veto to the UN Special Representative Mr. Akashi

Peacekeeping vs. peace enforcement - mandate and control:

Gap opened between NATO staffs in Brussels and its members governments on the one hand, and the UN Secretariat in NY. Whereas B.B. Ghali was concluding that UN operations in Bosnia were already straying too far from basic peacekeeping norms and should be brought under firmer UN control if the UN was to stay involved, the NATO agenda favoured much looser real UN operational control and a stronger mandate which would take the operation beyond peacekeeping and into the realms of peace enforcement.

May 95:

UN Secretary General B.B. Ghali announced that he was ready to give up his right from 1998 to a "droit de regard" over the initial use of NATO air power if the western Allies were willing to organise a Bosnian peace enforcement themselves within the looser framework of authorization from the Security Council.

Nov. 95:

Dayton peace agreement provided for UNPROFOR to be replaced by NATO-led I FOR, which has the power to oversee and enforce the agreements, without the need to seek further approval from the UN Secretary General.

Dec. 95:

- Authorization of IFOR - UN Security Council Resolution 1031: Authorised Member States, acting through or in cooperation with NATO, to establish a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to oversee the implementation of the agreements.

Command and control under IFOR/SFOR:

- Under Dayton, NATO is in charge of military implementation of the peace agreement.
- The authorization of IFOR in 1995 launched operations mandated by the UNSC but executed independently of UN Command and I Control.

Rules of Engagement under IFOR/SFOR:

- IFOR/SFOR mandated under Chapter VII of UN Charter, provides for robust rules of engagement

The following principles for NATO-led peacekeeping operations have been developed, building on the Bosnia experience:

Clear and Precise Mandate:

- Mandates should be achievable and realistic and linked to clear political goals, and should define a clear end-state.
- When the operating environment changes substantially, mandates should be changed, new missions established or mission ended.

Political Control and Guidance:

- The overall political control of a peacekeeping operation will be the responsibility of a single, internationally recognised political organisation; the UN or the OSCE.
- The responsible international organisation will request support for the conduct of the mission from a regional organisation and/or NATO.

Consent of the Host Nation:

- Operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are conducted with the consent of, or at the request of the recognised government, where one exists. In the case of enforcement action, where there may not be consent for intervention or there is an expectation that consent may be withdrawn the conditions for NATO involvement should be specified in the mandate.
- The legal status of the peacekeeping force is normally established by the negotiation of a SOFA which has the standing of a treaty. Where there is no consent for a SOFA, a MOU or an exchange of letters may be agreed. The mandate, SOFA or equivalent and ROE, as well as national and international laws conventions and agreements will control the conduct of operations.

Unity of Command:

- The relationship between the mandating authority and NATO will be determined by the North Atlantic Council.
- In theatre the Force Commander will be responsible for all military aspects of the mission in the area of operations. The Force Commander will have in principle operational control over all military contingents.

Unity of effort - CIMIC:

- recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents and between the military and civilian components of any operation.

Credibility - ROE's:

- While the peacekeeping force should not appear to pose a direct threat to any of the parties, there must be no doubt that the military is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and is supported by a political willingness to do so.
- The peacekeeping force must be employed with a sound concept of operations and robust ROE's, based upon the mandate to guarantee the mission success.

Use of force:

- The use of force in any peacekeeping operation shall be in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, the mandate, and the rules of international law; only the minimum force necessary should be used.
- In all peacekeeping operations the use of force is clearly permitted for self-defence; any further use of force such as to guarantee the freedom of movement other than in self-defence, must be authorised explicitly by the mandate.
- When used, force should be precise, timely, appropriate and proportionate.

Peace enforcement:

- Peace enforcement differs from war in that military victory is not the ultimate measure of success. Enforcement operations are coercive in nature, using force or the threat of force, if needed, to maintain or re-establish peace or to enforce the terms of the mandate. Coercive techniques should be used with constraint and in conjunction with other techniques designed to promote cooperation and consent.
- A peace enforcement force must be organised, equipped, trained and deployed to achieve its operational objectives. Should the conflicting parties not be deterred and fail to comply with the mandate, the peace enforcement force must be able to react adequately, based upon robust Rules of Engagement.

PART II

Enhancing co-ordination and co-operation

NATO's relationship with UN

Lessons from UNPROFOR

- Unity of command in operations involving UN and NATO was absent. NATO believed that such unity of command should be exercised through NATO structures alone and not through the UN.
- Absence of formalised relationship no obstacle to close informal working relations. These are being

maintained and enhanced, for example between UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and NATO's International Staff.

NATO's relationship with OSCE

— Security model work

— practical cooperation in Bosnia as SFOR provides support for civil implementation of the peace agreement

OSCE's role as mandating authority for peacekeeping operations has so far failed to materialise. Current Polish Chairmanship of OSCE has as one of its priorities an examination of OSCE's role in peacekeeping.

NATO's own programmes:

PFP — Partnership for Peace

EAPC — Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

PJC — NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council

Свободная дискуссия участников конференции по данной теме

Discussion on the theme of the conference

Satish NAMBIAR,

United Service Institution of India,

Director, Lt.General

I am not too aware that the NATO is a regional organisation in terms of Chapter 8 of UN Charter. To the best of my knowledge it is a military Alliance and you will acknowledge this, but you said something else a little later, which led to a little confusions therefore it doesn't fall into that framework itself. So I will tell you why the most of us, of you sitting at this table have some problems, the moment NATO is thinking of involving itself in areas outside its areas of interest they should consult people like us and governments like ours. Whether they will consider our concerns or not is another story...but this the point. And I say this because even in the context of some remarks you made about NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia. I think the prospective got lost I think that during the last 6-7 years, history has been a sort of butchery rewritten in manuals may be by repetitions of various declarations.

The first point, I was commanding the forces when the Bosnia operation was set out. And the member States who contributed, that was Britain, France and Spain and others. They did not come up as a NATO force, they came up as individual partners so it was not a NATO commitment in that sense. Yes, the forces had orders because it was on a very short notice, then nucleus was drawn out from non existing and we had elements by Egyptians, the Ukrainians and others of that particular part. So I am making that, if you would wish to answer to some of my remarks, may be your words have not been understood - it needs to be clarified.

In fact one of the reasons why the UN operations went a little evil was of course in the first place that the Bosnia operation has been conducted without taking into account the opinions of the participating actors. The whole thing was upset...the NATO came in and those and others came in - but that is a different story. But the context in which we are talking today is a legal basis of all that. The legal basis is very important aspect. Because, if you come to Court, the operations in Bosnia have to supplement some of the points we are trying to discuss and learn essence from the past, and we might draw out lessons which might be not the true indicator for future. And that turns us back to what Mr Silliers said yesterday about the African continent. In fact, I and many of you must know Dr Ali Masrui who is a very eminent person. At a seminar in Vienna in 1995 he made the statement that the UN should place an embargo upon peacekeeping operations outside Africa for 15 years, and he said with all seriousness, because he meant that. But it now is not as important as that and it remains outside our theme. Still this is how things are. One other point, there will be two rather, one is the use of the military staff committee, I think Professor Bring mentioned it. I am not too sure again, like a representative of one of this so called developing countries, this military staff committee comprising the same great five will let us to the commanding control... The troops will be us I wonder what these structures should be. I think you must have a seeing of this. I am just talking as a private individual, not even representing my country, but still who will define them. But I think that these questions must be solved.

And the last thing. I think that the NATO should not carry out the sort of operations you briefly mentioned. I spent 3 days in New-York and I confirm that my presence there was used just for sitting there at some discussions which were held between UN and NATO, because there were some representatives, I have forgotten their names, but they were discussing exactly how the NATO would assist the operations. And I think that everyone can understand that countries that are contributing their forces must be comfortable on an international legal basis for such operations.

I think I have said enough, Chairman.. Thank you.

Ms Arnhild SPENCE,
Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ

I shall partly respond to your questions or observations, regarding NATO representatives in New York and their force, about the mandate and the responsibilities. The truth is that when this all started, we had no structures, for talking to UN Organisation, this had to be developed under way and it was a huge challenge to us, we didn't even had the telephone numbers of the various people to whom we had to talk. Colleagues of mine walked over to the UN and said "here we are and whom should we talk to", this was really so in the very early days. But when it came to the developments of the mandates and of the dated operations itself, of course NATO representatives in the meantime had obtained the mandates from the North Atlantic Council which is the Supreme Policy Bureau of NATO and which is more or less the interface between UN mandate and NATO operation. They will interpret the UN Security Council mandate and translate the policies into military language and transfer to the development instructions for the forces. But the North Atlantic Council, which consists of the Ambassadors of all Allies in Brussels at the NATO Head Quarters, certainly develops their operation as a body. It is very interesting how the allies are reacting, because, of course the major allies are heavily involved in drafting the annexe 1 of the peace agreement and in a way designed their own mandate on it. This has never happened before.

Ove BRING,
Swedish National Defence College,
Chair of International Law,
University of Stockholm,
Professor

Yes, with regard to the military staff committee, I would like to comment on that question. Because the idea is only that the military staff committee should initiate a process which would then go on for some time in order to take it into account of the UN. We don't have so many bodies which are up to do that sort of many things, the International Commission which is a body of international lawyers and here you need a body with a military input. By the way, article 47 of the UN Charter provides that Member-States can be invited to take part in the military role and regional agencies fore-mentioned in this context. So, the idea was that we could lead to a regional organisation, and later on, sometimes would have some diplomatic and negotiation status. You don't have to actually come out with the final solution with the legal status, you can just as well have a politically advice, in fact that's the only thing which is feasible.

Richard COHEN,
George Marshal Centre (Germany),
Professor

Some questions which shall concern mainly terminology. Mr Tuznukhamedov mentioned the fact about confusion of terminology and people who just came to speak now were using the word "peace keeping" in different meanings. I think that we should use the lexicon produced by John Mc-Kelly from the Brown University and which has become to be considered as the exact terminology. I think that the organizers of this workshop, certainly very aware of the peace-support operations. I think that given even the number of languages spoken here, we are to use English, then we should have an asserted terminology. I think that a working group of this workshop should do nothing else, but just produce terminology, so that we all understand what the terms mean., and not use different terms for the same operation, and confusing terms.

I would like to put up for what Dr. Cilliers said about African Peace-keeping and Peace-support concerns. And he is quite right, because he said that the scale of disasters is towards anything else we come to see around the Western world, yet he tends to be neglective because it's a bit different.

The other thing is that the Africans have to sort it out their problems themselves, because it is too complicated, except for one or two high profile disasters. Three countries which are France and UK and the US are helping to develop the capabilities of Africans to be able to cope themselves with African disasters. I also would like to mention the fact that the Western European Union has had a dialogue with some Saharan nations and partially carried out...it was done some 18 months ago and stopped half-way in some countries, for example where a new agenda had to be addressed, like the Botswana - who was rather concerned and then upset when the course itself was court-tailed. But I do think that if you look at this yourself, and we come to Combined Joint Task Force, if outside help is needed in somebody's major peace-support operations, - this may arise in Africa, - then I think the Europeans are in the very position to do it and participate if the political will is there.

I think that at the start there has to be concerned, and if you actually search for some scenarios where Combined Joint Task Groups could be used then you always can call on the Europeans who might help in Africa and conduct Joint Task Forces, with the Americans, giving political and diplomatic support, but

not involving themselves. All that depends on the dialogue between the African Nations and the Europeans but it is certainly one of the areas in which the potential for the use of this concept gives great possibilities, provided there is a dialogue among the countries especially the participation from the European side for peace support operations in the whole world.

Б.Р. ТУЗМУХАМЕДОВ,

советник Управления международного права
Конституционного суда РФ

Прозвучавший комментарий по поводу терминологии как раз иллюстрирует то, о чем я сказал в своем сообщении. Всегда ли юристы, военные, политики и дипломаты могут договориться о терминах? Я как юрист чувствовал бы себя спокойно, если бы передо мной была бы терминология, воплощенная в норму закона, национального закона или международного договора. В данном случае этот комментарий подталкивает к продолжению дискуссии о терминологии. Вы обратили внимание на доклад бывшего Генерального секретаря ООН г-на Бутроса Гали "Повестка дня для мира и дополнение к нему". В оригинальном документе было предложено четыре типа операций ООН. В дополнении к нему было уже, по-моему, шесть типов. Теперь уже г-н Бутрос Гали не является Генеральным секретарем ООН. У меня такое впечатление, что доклады Генерального секретаря ООН сейчас не то чтобы сняты с повестки дня, но в общем-то к ним сейчас обращаются гораздо меньше.

Возьмите, пожалуйста, программу конференции, которая лежит перед нами. Посмотрите, по-русски она называется "Проблемы миротворчества на рубеже XXI века". Если мы примем терминологию г-на Бутроса Гали, то это понятие надо переводить как "peace making", между тем, в английском названии сегодняшней нашей программы, написано "peace room". Поэтому, я думаю, что дискуссия о терминологии будет продолжаться до тех пор, пока мы ее юридически не закрепим, потому что, на разных подходах к терминологии можно строить целые концепции. В этом смысле политологи, к которым я отношусь с большим уважением, все-таки гораздо свободнее, чем юристы.

Ms Arnhild SPENCE,

Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ

I would like to provide you the comments from NATO on terminology issue. We have in fact been working on terminology in the peace-keeping field since 1993 with all our specialists of all our groups of co-operation on peace-keeping. And we managed to come to a common understanding already then, because it was agreed by all ministers of these times. A peace-keeping operation did not figure out in our documents. In the meantime peace-support operation became a popular term, especially among the military. But we recognise that there are particular sensitivities with the use of this term, and the latest political signal from NATO's Ambassadors was that we should try to harmonise our use of terminology to that of the UN... we should use to apply the term "peace-keeping operations" as the general term, understood in a broader sense and to see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 operations as sub-categories of peace-keeping. This is something we have finalised at NATO and the discussion will go on.

Dr. Jakkie CILLIERS,

Institute for Security Studies,
South Africa, Executive Director

Just a few remarks in response to some questions raised on the various initiatives to build African capacity. I was trying to sketch the institutions of a framework, I think Mark Mallan tomorrow will say some remarks on these very initiatives. One of the monographs that we have brought around for distribution at the conference to the interest for eventual partners are probably up-to date and you can get them. The actual fact is that it is now being collapsed into the UN-Africa Support Group and more specific American training initiatives, the British training initiatives and the French initiatives, these three collectively are the three largest direct contributors to the building of African Peacekeeping Capacity providing support of 20 and 30 million dollars per annum. There are of course also Nordic initiatives in Africa and Canadians are also involved in building African Capacity, but these initiatives are at a slightly smaller scale. A big challenge which I would like just place on the table here is that if you look at the various attempts made to compassionate African countries to look after their own problems, you are looking at the most conflictual, the poorest continent and the continent which has the least institutional capabilities. There is also that we so easily quit being used to either the French or British initiatives, so we pay no significance in the demands. And the first goal of the global politics is to try to get Africa accept increased responsibility for its own conflict prevention and conflict management. The inevitable result would be a military intervention, not a peace-keeping, because of the situation on the continent and in its major military powers, you have only to look at an example of Nigeria's involvement in Liberia - to see

what would be the results of in-area interference in peace-keeping operation. And that unfortunately is something which is not unfamiliar to Russia, will be the future of peace-keeping in Africa the way the trends are going at the moment.. Having seen that in South Africa we have had Blue Helmet, and I don't remember the name the French exercise which I have referred to and we are going to have Blue Crane in South Africa, what we are concerned in Africa, is the idea of trying, in a sense, to duplicate UN stand-by arrangements with the establishment of an African type of system of stand-by arrangements. The linkage to the United Nations should be maintained. South Africa, others, the OAU, others are not organisations who have the capability to resist, and they are to be capacified to have the level of having a stand-by arrangements. That's what the UN stand-by arrangements systems are for. And that system should be both, and expand, including the other national initiatives. It is a great danger in what we referred to as the ghettotization of peace-keeping in Africa, because there is no term of an international community. For wide understandable reasons it is not that interested in providing real resources. Because what is happening is that you have the privatisation of peace-keeping in Africa, where you have multi-national companies in association with local African governments, hiring private companies to provide keen security around economic installations. South Africa was recently producing a legislation to regulate this kind of occupation, but unfortunately was not ready to present it in a legislative form. We in Africa, are very concerned about peace-keeping by Africans in Africa and mainly for the wealth of Africans.

Richard COHEN,
George Marshal Centre (Germany),
Professor

May I refer very quickly to the concept of "peace-keeping" and "peace-support" operations. It was interesting to learn that on the part of NATO you are considering to have "peace-keeping" as a basic term and Chapters 6 and 7 as a sort of "sub-categories" on peace keeping. And to me as to an international lawyer that's a very strange conception, because Chapter 6 and a half is based on consent, and as soon as you enter Chapter 7 which is not based on consent, or not necessarily based on consent. But peace-keeping has always been a concept which is related to consent and I think it's a little late in the history to change that now. I noted that in a recent Swedish study, on a joint military doctrine on peace-support operations were used the concept of peace-support operation, don't be late...when covering peace-keeping and peace support.

Ms Sari NURRO,
Expert on Peacekeeping,
Ministry of Defence, Finland

I think we have a tendency when we are talking about peace-support operations to focus just on the ground part and forget about the embargo and the air denial part and all that other things. As to my believe, I think that the Dayton Agreement was not just to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table, it was not just because they are bound to it, it was also the embargo that made the conflicting parties to come to the negotiation table. And we have the Iraqi, the embargo towards Iraq and there was quite a lot of humanitarian problems in that. Could you please comment on the legal aspects of the embargo parts of peace support attitude in this sort of operations? Thank you.

Ms Arnhild SPENCE,
Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ

I would like to pick up some points raised by the General. If I understood correctly, you are saying that NATO is hesitant to inform partners, including Russia of its structural changes. I would like to inform you that last week we had a meeting with colleges whom we invited to participate in a council working group on peace-keeping. They had an information briefing on different concepts. There were lots of questions asked by our colleges and we shall return to that later this year. Of course we shall also inform the participants of this present meeting by our letter.

This interacts with other processes of adaptation within NATO which is the new command structure and the European Security and Defence Entity. All these elements are a part of the internal adaptation of the Members which is an ongoing process and we are in front of examples, such as Russia and other partners of the processes. About NATO's role, or about NATO not having an official role in peacekeeping and recognized by the UN. Actually NATO hasn't even defined its own role. We started with one experience which is Bosnia, and even the Allies of the South have to decide how did this correspond with other roles of their lines. How does this correspond with our commitment. This is also an ongoing process. And in the revue of all these processes Allies will certainly be able to define whatever limits of these new missions, both geographically and politically and military. But we have to wait to next spring. It is an ongoing process.

Ove BRING,
 Swedish National Defence College,
 Chair of International Law,
 University of Stockholm,
 Professor

Just to say something in addition with regard with the embargo operations to may be continue the discussion. I mean that any kind of decision which implies an embargo which is an economic sanction is a decision under Chapter 7 of the Charter and that contains certain risks and possibilities. Like with regard to the Dayton example, you can say that the embargo forces parties to a conference table, and that you were able to continue after that with peace keeping operations, based this concept. But embargo is not based on concept, it's just the opposite. So there is a risk also that you don't get the co-operation of the people in the area, if you try to have a peace-keeping operation later -on, after having had the embargo. So, you never know, but it is not the case that any time of an embargo, which is a sanction under Article 41 of the Charter necessarily leads you up to more enforcement operations under Chapter 7. But it is also something you have to keep in mind to go from Article 41 to Chapter 6, and whether it is possible to do this depends on political services.

Hassan ABAZA,
 Royal Jordanian Air Forces,
 Brig. General

I shall make sure that my question will be a short one. My question to Ms Spence is as follows: we know all the nations who participated in operations with the UN as peacekeepers they did not put conditions or rules to participate in those. I could understand from your presentation that NATO has its own rules and conditions to participate.. Don't you think, by putting those conditions, people might translate this as NATO is trying to use them, and to achieve their objectives under the UN umbrella.

Ms Sari NURRO,
 Expert on Peacekeeping,
 Ministry of Defence, Finland

I would like to ask some questions to Ms Spence. It is strictly, or almost strictly on legal issue. I would like to know from the NATO prospective concerning the IFOR for rules of engagement. What difficulties have you experienced in implementing items in national legislation concerning the rules of engagement? And then the following question: how have you then dealt with those problems that you in a sort have encountered with the national restrictions.

Ms Arnhild SPENCE,
 Political Affairs Division, NATO HQ

There have been many questions, this means that I have been provocative.

I can understand why Russia and other nations might be very suspicious to NATO putting down their own conditions for conducting peace-keeping. And they might suspect that NATO is doing this in order to protect its own and not the interests of the international community as a whole. But we have to consider that if we talk about conditions such as unity of command under IFOR it was a very bitter experience for very bad organisation under ASFOR. NATO put as a condition to take on the military implementation, because this would be actually achievable, and NATO as a military organisation had to define how those aims of peace agreements and the manhood would be achievable. One of those conditions was the unity of command. And NATO had not preferred their own command to that of the UN in that case.

What can I say on the agenda... they certainly pursue their own procedures, but not only their own agenda, they are asked by the UN to do this.

Other questions : about the exchange of information on the military to military basis, I am very pleased to handle this work as well, and I know that for example General is very satisfied with the experience of co-operation. As far as the political dialogue is concerned, this is indeed pursued in the Committees I have mentioned. There is a permanent joint council which works as a whole on the Ambassadorial level where they discuss peace-keeping as well as other issues. But there is as well a specialised expert working group on peace-keeping established under the permanent Joint Council. The Russian Federation has recently communicated to us their anxiety and wanted to address to that working group - and they in particular wanted to focus on the problems encountered during IFOR and ASFOR operations, areas where the co-operation could be better..

And we will certainly explore those areas and try to make some recommendations for the future whereby co-operation would be even more smoothed. That is on our agenda.

As far as the rules of engagement or other restrictions are concerned, I think there are two levels : one is the NATO aid-lines and there are all the others non-NATO ASFOR contributors. They don't fall into the same category, they don't have the same habits of working together. The objective of course is that the rules of engagement will be united or that there will be an overall risk of engagement. And the force of mandatement has to respect that certain nations have restrictions and that they will then opt to not participate in certain operations. And this seems to work. I don't want to mention examples, because this is quite sensitive. If some of my colleges like, they can get those from the library, I am not reading these documents.

Ove BRING,
Swedish National Defence College,
Chair of International Law,
University of Stockholm,
Professor

These will be very short comments. From the legal prospective, if we sum this up, we know that there is no need for revision of the UN Charter. I mean the Chapters 6 and the half conception works quite well as it is.. But there are needs for doing something with regards to the commanding control and the rules of engagement. And, if I even don't think it's appropriate to aim for an agreement on every time on the aspect of this matter, some comments should be striven for. I think it could be useful if the States could pursue what kind of bodies could take on this task to start discussions and hang up with soft law or hard law, as the lawyers are putting it, I mean it should not be necessarily a hard law by binding everyone, it could be a more soft law in the reglamentations.

В.К. ПОТЕМКИН,
начальник Центра военно-стратегических
исследований Генерального Штаба
ВС РФ, генерал-лейтенант

Я хочу, чтобы вопросы, которые мы задаем друг другу и комментируем, правильно воспринимались оппонентами. И замечания г-жи Спенс в мой адрес говорят о том, что она не совсем точно восприняла мои слова.

Я могу с уверенностью сказать, что взаимная осведомленность и информированность российских вооруженных сил сегодня оценивается мною и моими коллегами недостаточно. Речь идет о том, чтобы на фоне этой взаимной информированности мы шли по пути конструктивного диалога, учитывая интересы своих сторон.

**Тема: Реформа командной структуры НАТО: представление
"Многонациональных оперативных сил".**

**Theme: Reforms of the NATO Commanding Structure:
Presentation of "Multinational operational forces".**

Floris SCHULLER,
Chief of the Capabilities Coordination Cell,
International Military Staff,
NATO HQ, Commander

Slide 1 on

In the sequence of impressive presentations I am honoured and pleased to present the evolving concept of Combined Joint Task Forces which continues to play an important role in the NATO Alliance's internal adaptation process and which will form one of its most important cornerstones in the next decade. Before I address my topic in detail, a quick look at the organization I come from;

Slide 2 on

The Capabilities Coordination Cell (CCC) is an individual body in the International Military Staff (IMS) which is the military side of the house of NATO's Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The CCC is separate from other IMS divisions under the direct authority of the Director of the International Military Staff.

Officially established on 1 Oct 96, its key responsibility is to provide staff support to the MC on contingency related matters, especially with regard to CJTF.

The IMS supports the Military Committee (MC), which primary role is to provide military advice to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and translate political guidance to the Major NATO Commanders (MNCs).

Briefing Outline

Slide 3 on

In the first part of my presentation I will

- provide you with an overview on the pol-mil background which led to the development of NATO's new Command Structure (CS) and its CJTF

Concept

- I will then address the new Command Structure itself
- and continue with a description of the CJTF Concept including the parameters for participation of non-NATO countries and a synopsis covering the current status of its implementation and, finally,

I will end up with some thoughts on the interrelationship between NATO's new command structure and the CJTF concept.

1. BACKGROUND

You are certainly aware that NATO, as a primarily political alliance, has since 1990 gone through several tremendous changes at unparalleled speed of their development,

Slide 4 on

To quote the opening paragraph of the London Declaration of the NATO Heads of State in July 1990:

"Europe has entered a new, promising era. ... As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt."

This signalled the beginning of the most far-reaching changes in the Alliance's history and indeed the beginning of a new NATO. And, as events in Europe continued to unfold, they established the basic principles and objectives which would guide, first development of the new Strategic Concept, then its military implementation and the basic precepts in the mandate that we now know as the Alliance adaptation of new structures and procedures.

Furthermore, the London Declaration, whilst reaffirming the pre-eminent defensive nature of the Alliance, reflected recognition of the requirement to reach out to the countries of the East and to extend to them the hand of friendship, overcoming decades of suspicion and also through military contacts,

Slide 5 on

The first practical result of this political direction from the London Summit was the development and promulgation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept at the Rome Summit in November 91. It is worthy of note that this new concept was published as an open document, available to everybody.

The Strategic Concept reviewed the objectives and functions of the Alliance in light of the new security environment and outlined a broad approach to security based on maintaining the peace in Europe through co-operation and dialogue, conflict prevention, crisis management and collective defence. It is premised on the proposition that the prospect of Alliance-wide defensive operations no longer provides the focus of Alliance Military strategy, and that NATO no longer considers itself an adversary of any nation. It was also to form the basis for the development of the "Military Committee Directive for the Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept" in December 1991.

An updated version of this document was endorsed by the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session in November 1995 and approved by Council in May 96. It transformed the political guidance into clear strategic objectives reaffirming the requirement for Alliance solidarity and cohesion through multi-nationality and the preservation of the transatlantic link.

Let me now turn to the new command structure.

Slide 6 on**2. THE NEW NATO MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE****BACKGROUND**

In their declaration at the January 94 Brussels Summit, the Alliance Heads of State and Government gave direction to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping.

Based on the Brussels Summit guidance, the Military Committee approved the Terms of Reference for a NATO Study in September 94 to examine the Integrated Military Structure and to make proposals for change to the NAC.

A NEW COMMAND STRUCTURE

The earlier mentioned update of the military implementation of the Strategic Concept was the first major achievement.

This initial work was followed by the development of a variety of generic options and structural alternatives which were then costed and evaluated against a series of some 24 command structure criteria.

Slide 7 on

- Political guidance required the structure to be effective, preserve the transatlantic link, allow for ESDI within the Alliance, and to be
- able to accommodate all the new Alliance roles and missions,
- It must meet the principles of flexibility, force effectiveness, promote cohesion, be multi-national and affordable,
- And the new structure must be able to meet CJTF requirements and accommodate new member nations.

In December 1997, the Chiefs of Defence agreed on a new command structure which was approved by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial level.

It will comprise three levels:

At the Strategic Command level, we will retain two strategic commands, as is the case today - SC ATLANTIC and SC EUROPE - as well as the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group.

Slide 8 on

In SC ATLANTIC, there will be only two levels of command with a total of six headquarters instead of the current 25. Besides the strategic command in Norfolk and the three Regional Commands, WEST in Norfolk, SOUTHEAST in Lisbon (PORTUGAL) and EAST in Northwood (UK), there will be two Combatant Commands - STRIKING FLEET ATLANTIC and SUBMARINES ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC, both located in Norfolk (USA).

These Combatant Commands will provide coordination and/or command and control functions in specific operational warfare areas of strategic relevance.

Slide 9 on

In SC EUROPE, there will be three levels of command representing 14 headquarters instead of 40 in the current structure. The strategic and regional command level will comprise the three headquarters SC EUROPE in Mons, RC NORTH in Brunssum (NL) and RC SOUTH in Naples (ITALY).

Concerning the third level, each RC will command one Component Command Air and one maritime Component Command; their locations will be Ramstein (GE) for CC AIR NORTH, Northwood (UK) for CC NAV NORTH and Naples (IT) for both CC AIR as well as CC NAV SOUTH. [Please note, that CC NAV NORTH will be: double-hatted with the ATLANTIC RC EAST in Northwood]. Subordinate to RC NORTH will be three JSRCs, North in Stavanger(NO), NorthEast in Karup (DA) and Centre in Heidelberg (GE).

RC SOUTH will, in addition to his two Component Commands, command four JSRCs, SOUTHWEST in Madrid (SP), SOUTH in Verona (IT), SOUTHCENTRE in Larissa (GR) and SOUTHEAST in Izmir

FORMING A CJTF HQ

Slide 16 on

A cardinal principle in the development of the CJTF Concept is that no separate structures and systems are to be created. The capability needed for CJTF HQs will be drawn from the integrated military structure of the Alliance, whilst retaining the overall functioning of the donor HQ.

Slide 17 on

In this respect, a modular approach has been adopted for CJTF HQs based on "nuclei" (or core staffs) and "modules" in general formed by dual hatting personnel in various NATO Headquarters.

The nucleus staffs, the core of a CJTF HQ, must be of sufficient size to give the forming CJTF HQ an immediate functional staff capability. The nucleus should be able to operate in theatre until the arrival of augmentation and support modules provided by other NATO HQs or by nations.

The readiness requirements are very demanding. In view of the need to be able to respond effectively and quickly to unforeseen crises, lead elements have to be ready to be deployed at very short notice. The exact size and composition of the nuclei are still under development: this also applies to precise equipment requirements for CIS, mobility, and any other support components such as maintenance, medical etc.

Although the integration of nuclei and modules coming from various sources into an operational CJTF HQ requires considerable organisational efforts, this approach was chosen to foster the Alliance's overall cohesion, to reflect its multinationality, and to guarantee a continued availability and functioning of all in-place HQs to support NATO's broad approach to security.

INTEGRATION OF NON-NATO NATIONS

Slide 18 on

In accordance with the goals of the concept, implementation work also foresees the participation of non-NATO nations, and in particular, Partner involvement in CJTF operations, and establishes the procedures.

The participation of non-NATO nations in a NATO-led CJTF operation has to be approved by the North Atlantic Council. The according steps for the integration of these willing nations are detailed in NATO's military CJTF implementation concept, and will be quite similar to the procedures used for IFOR and SFOR in the former Yugoslavia.

CJTF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION

Slide 19 on

The CJTF Concept is being implemented in a three step approach:

Phase 1, the Initial Establishment of so-called "Parent HQs", which provide the nucleus, has allowed the MNCs to conduct CJTF HQ trials and exercises, and also create the basis of an initial Alliance capability to deploy land- and sea-based CJTF HQs.

Phase 2, which will probably commence in summer this year, will comprise

the Assessment of Capability. Taking into account MNC's assessment and proposals, the MC will advise Council on the Alliance capability to deploy small and large-scale land and sea-based CJTF HQs, and on the nomination of additional CJTF nuclei Parent HQ, if necessary.

The Final Phase will consist of the Full Implementation of the CJTF concept.

TRIALS

Slide 20 on

The first phase of the implementation of the Alliance's CJTF concept is already on track. In accordance with the Implementation Directive, three Parent CJTF HQ - AFCENT (Brunssum), AFSOUTH (Naples), and STRKFLTANT (Norfolk) - have been selected so far.

NATO conducted a full scale land based trial for ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE) in November last year. Partner nations were invited to observe some of the building blocks leading to the exercise and also the culmination point of the trial - the Command Post Exercise (CPX) ALLIED EFFORT under direction of CINCENT.

The live exercise STRONG RESOLVE, which is currently going on, allows the full demonstration of a sea-based CJTF. The platform for the sea-based CJTF HQ is being provided by SACLANT's C2 ship, USS Mt. Whitney.

Some 10 Partner nations participate in STRONG RESOLVE with forces and with representatives in the CJTF HQ on board Mt. Whitney as active players.

VISUALIZING CJTF IN THE NEW NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

slide 21 on

In order to visualize the CJTF Concept within the new command structure, I would like to offer a generic example. As I stated earlier, we have three parent headquarters selected at this time. In the new structure these parent headquarters will have a role similar to their present responsibilities.

Let me give you an example of how a land-based CJTF might be formed from, and supported within, the new command structure through a generic example.

Slide 22 on

As you can see in the land-based case, one Parent HQ has been used to mount the CJTF HQ nucleus.

Within the same RC Area of Responsibility, two headquarters have been tasked in the supporting role,

Component Command Air and an adjacent JSRC.

Augmentation of the nucleus is then drawn from around the command structure, headquarters of member nations and from Contributing non-NATO nations. Notionally, this augmentation could be depicted as this slide shows:

Slide 23 on

The sources of augmentation are on a case-by-case basis.

Depicted on a generic map, several elements can be drawn from this notional representation.

Slide 24 on

- First, while augmentation will come from anywhere within the NATO Alliance, National Headquarters of members and from Participating non-NATO nations, the conduct of the operation could require support from both the second and third level of command.
- In this case, the operation is in an area adjacent to a Regional Command Area of Responsibility. An adjacent JSRC has been selected as the supporting command along with CC Air for the conduct of the operation. In this way, the operation makes best use of the JSRC's regional expertise as well as his command and control assets.
- CC Air could support the operation in a number of ways such as providing a Combined Air Operations Centre to the operation, supporting the CJTF commanders operation through the management of air resources going to and from the Joint Operations Area, etc.
- Let me also explain what the significance of an assigned Joint Operations Area is to a CJTF HQ. A JOA assigned to a CJTF is merely the area of land, sea and airspace in which a designated CJTF Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. It will be defined by time, scope and geographic area and may overlap an AOR.
- The increased jointness at the third level of command ensures our joint sub regional commands provide the sub-regional C2 resources and planning capability needed in NATO's increased regional focus;
- The assets of the Maritime and Air Component Commands could provide modules for a CJTF HQ to be given command duties between CJTF HQ and the the forces.
- Flexible command and control arrangements will allow the establishment of a joint operations area within or beyond the NATO area of responsibility allowing the CJTF Commander to conduct his operations.

Slide 1 on again

While the pre-implementation phase of the new command structure is now underway taking account of ongoing CJTF work, the CJTF Concept itself should be implemented with little or no increase in manpower requirements,

since a CJTF HQ is an integral part of the command structure, mostly achieved through dual-hatting of existing personnel.

The essential issues still to be resolved are related to readiness, augmentation sources and the capability of headquarters once a CJTF operation is mounted.

Let me conclude by saying that the new command structure and CJTF are the products of the 1991 and 1994 Meeting of Heads of State and Government in London and Brussels, respectively. That is, the recognition that the Alliance must and will adapt.

I hope you have seen in this presentation that tremendous progress the Alliance has made in meeting the challenges in the new security environment in which we all now exist. The implementation of the CJTF concept and the agreement on and implementation of a new, more flexible command structure ensures NATO is able to meet the challenges of its new missions in which peace support operations now occupy an increasingly important role.

Thank-you very much for your attention - I look forward to your questions in the discussion period!

REFORM OF THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE: VISUALIZING COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES

Capt(N) Schuller, RNLNA
Chief Capabilities Coordination Cell
International Military Staff

"Reform of the NATO Command Structure: Visualizing Combined Joint Task Forces" - Briefing Outline -



- 1. Pol-mil Background**
- 2. New NATO Command Structure (CS)**
 - Background
 - Structure
 - Key Features
- 3. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)**
 - The Concept
 - Contribution of non-NATO Nations
 - CJTF Trials
- 4. Linkage new NATO CS and CJTF**

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF

MILITARY COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN MILITARY COMMITTEE

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MC



NATO HQ, IMS

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

LONDON DECLARATION ON A TRANSFORMED NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

JULY 1990


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CHAIRMAN MILITARY COMMITTEE

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MC

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF




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LONDON DECLARATION ON A TRANSFORMED NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

JULY 1990



- *cooperation & dialogue*
- *conflict prevention*
- *crisis management*
- *collective defense*

THE NEW NATO MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE

Design of the New NATO Command Structure

- **Political Guidance**
 - Military Effectiveness, Preservation of Transatlantic Link, and Development of ESDI Within the Alliance
- **New Alliance Roles and Missions**
 - Collective Defence **PLUS** Peace Support Operations, Expansion of Stability and Counter-Proliferation
- **Structural Principles**
 - Flexibility, Force Effectiveness, Alliance Cohesion, Multi-Nationality and Affordability
- **Meet Anticipated CJTF Requirements**
- **Accommodate New Members**

NATO HQ, IMS

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SC EUROPE

Mohs

53



RC NORTH

Brunssum

CC AIR NORTH

Ramstein

CC NAV NORTH

Northwood

JSRC NORTH

Stavanger

JSRC NORTHEAST

Karup

JSRC CENTRE

JSRC SOUTH
Heidelberg

RC SOUTH

Naples

CC AIR SOUTH

Naples

CC NAV SOUTH

Naples

JSRC SOUTHWEST

Madrid

JSRC SOUTH

Verona

JSRC SOUTH CENTRE

Larissa


JSRC SOUTHEAST

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ATO HQ, IMS

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HQS IN THE NEW MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE





COMMAND STRUCTURE CONCEPTS



- **Regional Focus**
- **Increased Jointness**
- **Flexible Command and Control**
 - No AORs below SC level in SC Atlantic
 - No AORs below RC level in SC Europe
- **Supported-Supporting Principle**

Definition CJTF

"A CJTF is a multinational (Combined) and multi-service (Joint) task force, task organized and formed for contingency operations which require multi-national and multi-service command and control by a CJTF HQ."

Differences

- **Arrangements for setting up the HQ**
- **Potential for inclusion of non-NATO assets**
- **Multinationality in some support functions**

Mission

1st Priority:

Non-Article 5 -
Missions
mandated by
UN or OSCE

2nd Priority:

Article 5

XXX



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
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NATO HQ IMS

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
Forming a CJTF HQ



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Modular Approach



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Integration of non-NATO Nations

- Envisaged
- NAC Approval
- Detailed Procedures (Similar to IFOR/SFOR)

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CJTF Concept Progress

3-Phased Implementation Process:

Phase 1 - Initial Establishment

Phase 2 - Assessment of Capability

Phase 3 - Full Implementation

NATO HQ, IMS

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CJTF Trials



Parent HQ with nuclei

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NATO HQ

VISUALIZING CJTF

A GENERIC EXAMPLE



RC

Parent HQ

Supporting

CC Nav

CC Air

JSRC

JSRC

JSRC

CJTF HQ

Supporting



National HQs of Member Nations



CC Nav
Northwood

JSRC
North
Stavanger

JSRC
NorthEast
Karup

EUR
SC
Mons

EUR RC
North
Brunssum

CC Air
Ramshein

JSRC
Centre
Heidelberg

JSRC
SouthCentre
Larvik

JSRC
SouthEast
Larvik

JSRC
SouthWest
Madrid

JSRC
South
Verona

CC Army
Naples

CC Air
Naples

EUR RC
South
Naples

Partner Nations



CC AIR

RC

JSRC

RC AOR

CJTF

CJTF JOA

Johan HEDERSTEDT,
 Military Advisor of the Ministry of Defence,
 Sweden, Lt.General

POSSIBILITIES OF FUTURE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES — A SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE AND THE NEED FOR A POLITICO-MILITARY FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. I have the impression that Swedes or Scandinavians at international meetings are perceived as being somewhat too direct or even blunt. I will not disappoint you in this respect - I will go directly to the subject matter.

2. Let me begin with why I see a need for a politico-military framework for PIP operations.

- I see it as unlikely that future peace-support operations in Europe will take place without the participation of partner countries. I believe that this is a view shared by most NATO members. The successful cooperation in Bosnia has set a pattern.

- Sweden has a strong will to make a contribution to European security. But Swedish soldiers are not deployed in Bosnia for fun. Shared risks in a peace-support operation should also be reflected in involvement in planning and decision-making.

- I realize that a politico-military framework for PIP operations will not materialize tomorrow or even the day after tomorrow. This has a bearing on difficult internal NATO questions: tasks related to territorial defence and collective defence guarantees which rest solely upon NATO member states. They must be kept separate. Sweden does not want to see the cohesion or effectiveness of NATO weakened. However, if we want to increase the capacity and preparedness to launch peace-support operations, we will have to create a common system/a mechanism for operations.

- When we talk about a politico-military framework for PIP operations, the question, at least from my perspective, is how to involve troop-contributing countries in NATO planning and the conducting of the operation. Or to be more specific, what kind of indication is needed from a partner country that wishes to be involved at the earliest possible stage? What should be required of a partner country if it is to have the right to be involved, consulted and, to the maximum extent possible, to participate in joint decision-making concerning the operation? (With the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council we have put a political structure in place for dealing with such questions.)

- The Swedish proposal for such an indication or trigger, presented in the EAPC, is linked to the Planning and Review Process. In the planning of a particular crisis management operation, partner countries may, on an individual basis, permit NATO to include troops and resources about which NATO has been notified within the framework of the PARP. I am fully aware that PARP should not be confused with operational planning or even defence planning. But resources notified within PARP are well known and approved by NATO planners. And is it so unlikely that in the future PARP will contain some generic planning? I believe that there is much still to be done both inside and outside NATO to improve the planning for peace-support operations. This will be a major task for both NATO and non-NATO countries.

3. How do we see the way ahead?

A realistic view, I think, would be that we aim to agree on a politico-military framework at the next summit in Washington in 1999. This requires that we move a step further at each EAPC ministerial meeting. Perhaps some questions are too difficult to discuss at this stage. Let us therefore concentrate on the easier ones.

The continuing operation in Bosnia will of course be of decisive importance for the discussions on a politico-military framework. One perhaps not so revolutionary observation from the IFOR/SFOR operation is that events on the ground have had paramount impact on the conceptual work - the impact of the CJTF concept is an example. I think that a similar relation exists between the politico-military framework and the Bosnia operation. It is inevitable that the process towards the increased involvement of partners in planning and decision-making and political review will continue as we proceed towards the post-SFOR operation.

As a contribution to the work done in NATO with partners, Sweden has invited all EAPC countries to a discussion/brainstorming meeting in May at the Swedish PIP Centre just outside Stockholm. The discussions should be based on a realistic scenario and should aim at increasing partners' knowledge of how NATO deals with an evolving crisis. It should also aim at identifying partner countries' needs and how NATO member states might best respond to these needs.

4. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) are created in order to improve NATO's ability to meet crises of a similar nature to that in Bosnia and to improve interoperability within the Alliance and, hopefully, between NATO and partner countries. The key concepts are adaptability and flexibility from a geographical, operational and political perspective.

In the future it is likely that CJTF commands and the CJTF-related planning cells will dominate the operational planning for crisis management and peace-support operations that affect NATO or other

multinational organizations in Europe and its immediate vicinity. US-dominated multinational operations will probably be of a CJTF nature, presumably under the NATO flag in the European sphere, with the UN or the OSCE as overall authorizing body.

Formally, CJTFs represent a new way of thinking within NATO and a new element in NATO's military arsenal. The development of CJTFs can also be seen as a consequence of the fact that individual nations do not have the capacity to take military action without the cooperation of allies/partners in the peace-support sector. Many of today's crises are internal and complex, and rarely are traditional military resources sufficient. The political reluctance to use military intervention, the need for a broad international base, as well as the cost aspect, also play a part. Today's warring factions are the same as before; the difference lies in the creation of new opportunities for military intervention, new principles for cooperation between forces and countries, and new planning and command structures for the operations. With relatively unsophisticated new acquisitions, a certain amount of restructuring and, above all, the reordering of priorities within structures and forces, a better and more flexible operational ability is created. In addition, rapid reaction capability has been developed in several countries.

5. Future missions

CJTFs are not created for a specific military mission. In spite of the fact that every CJTF must be tailor-made for each mission, and practised routines are inappropriate for the new mission, the innate flexibility of CJTFs will probably be exactly what is needed in a world in which crises cannot always be identified in advance. However, it is worth speculating about future missions. We know that SFOR and Operation Alba (in Albania) are regarded as models today in both the WEU and NATO, and a similar model could apply to Kosovo. (Scope, complexity and level of conflict (peace-keeping/peace-support) are variables.) From an American perspective, one could also turn to the Persian Gulf (Desert Storm scenario). The question is raised, however, which tools would be required for a peace-support operation in the Caucasus, an evacuation operation in Algeria, or crisis management in the north-eastern Mediterranean. The same reasoning applies here as to the NATO-Russian Council, the OSCE or the UN Security Council: that military intervention in areas where vital national interests prevail among the central actors is often more controversial.

There is a danger that we expect too much of NATO. CJTFs are by no means a formula for European crises, but CJTF commands, forward planning, and multinational, joint cooperation do at least create greater operational capacity.

What determines the dimension of a CJTF military operation is the leading NATO countries' willingness to commit themselves. Troop contributions, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, interoperability and national composition also help determine the operation's effectiveness. The national composition ought to be less of a problem since Europe has at its disposal an extensive arsenal of multinational units that are relatively well equipped and trained to work together (for example, Eurocorps, the ARRC - including the Multinational Division Centre -, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR).

6. The Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)

In 1997, after an international working group had spent a year and a half preparing a number of questions concerning the possibilities for setting up a rapid reaction brigade to be made available to the UN, their work resulted in a number of countries, of which Sweden was one, signing the necessary documents for setting up a permanent command known as PLANELM (planning element).

The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, opened the permanent headquarters in Copenhagen on 2 September last year, in the presence of the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries. The permanent headquarters is made up of officers from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada and Austria. Of the countries that signed the Letter of Intent, those next in line to send permanent staff members are Poland, the Netherlands, Argentina and the Czech Republic. It is not intended that units from the permanent members of the Security Council be included in the brigade.

SHIRBRIG is commanded by a Steering Committee whose members come from participating countries and whose task it is to ensure political control and steering.

The new command has been instructed to make practical preparations for the setting up of the force. The objective is that the brigade is to be operational from 1 July 1998. The brigade is to be made available to the UN, in accordance with chapter VI of the UN Charter, at 15-30 days' notice for a maximum of six months. It is intended that the force be thereafter replaced by regular UN forces. Sweden intends that our rapid reaction force will be included.

With the seven countries that have now decided to participate, it will not be possible to make a full brigade available to the UN. More countries need to make forces available. This particularly applies to special units such as medical, surveillance and maintenance units. Denmark has therefore, following a decision by the Steering Committee, sounded out a number of UN member states on their interest in joining SHIRBRIG. The criteria guiding the selection of these countries were that they had experience of peace-support operations and the ability to cover their own costs for training and participation in SHIRBRIG. Several countries have expressed an interest in participating.

In addition, the command has to plan how the units will participate in joint exercises. At present the intention is that units down to battalion level are trained by the commander of SHIRBRIG, and units

below that are trained nationally in accordance with directives from the command. The command is responsible for its own training.

Decisions on operations involving SHIRBRIG can only be made after the respective participating countries have made a national decision to put their units at the disposal of the brigade and the UN. This requires that procedures for decisions concerning operations are worked out, and this is currently one of the main tasks, together with the recruitment of more participant countries.

In addition to acting as a rapid reaction force at the disposal of the UN, there are other possible functions for SHIRBRIG, namely:

1. *PLANELM*, which plans peace-support operations full-time and as such can either fully or partially be used as Technical Fact Finding Teams to quickly gather information about a particular conflict area;

2. *SHIRBRIG's staff* could form the nucleus of *UNDMHQ* in a future operation; and

3. *PLANELM* could be used to train troops for peace-support operations. The command could provide training, for example within the framework of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), where a combined African unit could be led by an African command which was instructed by SHIRBRIG personnel.

On the whole it must be said that SHIRBRIG is a new and complicated concept, which has continually taught us new things during the establishment process and through its established staff can already constitute a resource for peace-support operations.

Last year I had the opportunity to serve, within the framework for the PIP and the major NATO staff exercise Cooperative Guard, as Chief of Staff for a CJTF command, with 400 officers from NATO and partner countries under my command.

My experience of the exercise was very positive. The fact that NATO countries and partners, working together in a CJTF, after a relatively brief but intensive training period were able to produce such a coordinated entity was surprising and gratifying. This should provide the foundation for the development of future multinational effective commands involving different countries.

В.К. ПОТЕМКИН,

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РЕФОРМА КОМАНДНОЙ СТРУКТУРЫ НАТО: ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЕ МНОГОНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ СИЛ

Уважаемые дамы и господа!

Два доклада, представленные членами Президиума второго заседания конференции, еще раз убедили меня в том, что на сегодняшний день нет единой точки зрения на роль и место различных структур в миротворческих операциях.

Мы услышали и увидели на слайдах капитана 1-го ранга г-на Шуллера хорошую рекламу возможной трансформации командных структур НАТО для миротворческих задач. Мы заслушали аргументированные соображения нашего шведского коллеги генерала Джохана Хедерстедта о практической деятельности по созданию миротворческих сил. Я вижу, что наши шведские коллеги, по сравнению с конференцией в Стокгольме укрепились в своих взглядах и продвинулись вперед. И в принципе их волнуют те же самые проблемы, которыми обеспокоены военные эксперты Министерства обороны и Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации.

Шпенгауэр как-то заметил: "Мы редко думаем о том, что имеем, но всегда думаем о том, чего нам не хватает". Дискуссия в рамках первого заседания напомнила, "чего нам не хватает":

— всеобщего понимания необходимости сохранения и расширения НАТО при всех ее заслугах в деле укрепления безопасности;

— понимания целей, задач, а главное — последствий ее трансформации для будущих миротворческих операций;

— понимания механизма взаимодействия НАТО со странами ЦВЕ и СНГ при создании региональных систем безопасности;

— понимания со стороны НАТО экономических трудностей России, препятствующих стратегии партнерства при реализации программы "Партнерство во имя мира", механизма консультаций и сотрудничества в рамках основополагающего Акта о взаимодействии России — НАТО;

— единства взглядов при уточнении доктринальных положений миротворчества, изложенных в Уставе ООН.

Нам непонятно, почему НАТО стремительно форсирует переход от политического сотрудничества по разрешению кризисов с государствами ЦВЕ, СНГ и странами других регионов мира к оперативной совместности группировок вооруженных сил. Нам непонятно, почему

учения программ ПРМ должны содержать сложные элементы боевого слаживания штабов и совершенствования высокотехнологичных систем оружия, объектов инфраструктуры европейских ТВД. Я сознательно, как и некоторые другие участники нашей дискуссии, привлекаю внимание к этим вопросам. Необходимо в ходе нашей конференции из многообразия мнений по этой проблеме сопоставить и конструктивно обсудить две точки зрения, два подхода к миротворчеству в XXI в., которые заявили о себе не только теоретически, но и практически.

Первый подход состоит в том, что для миротворческих операций не требуется создание и применение стратегических или оперативно-стратегических группировок вооруженных сил, применяющих современные системы вооружений. Второй, я думаю его разделяет большинство экспертов НАТО, состоит в том, чтобы через подготовку к выполнению миротворческих задач исследовать сохранение способности ОВС НАТО к воссозданию стратегических группировок для ведения широкомасштабных военных действий, в том числе и за пределами зоны ответственности НАТО.

Мировая практика разрешения конфликтов и парирования угроз, на примере конфликта в Боснии и Герцеговине, получила, наряду с политическими мерами, карт-бланш на применение военной силы. По нашему мнению, это нарушает системный подход в урегулировании межгосударственных противоречий, основывающихся на балансе сил, равновесии, сдерживании и равной безопасности всех членов мирового сообщества. Изменения во взаимоотношениях Запада и Востока, смещение акцентов в стратегии сдерживания к стратегии конкуренции и сотрудничества закладывают основу многополярного мира, где должно быть место не только супердержавам.

В случае нарушения принципов этой стратегии, возобладания приоритетов силовой политики со стороны единоличного лидера, и, как следствие, нарушение стабильности, мы можем получить в практике миротворчества образ врага с неопределенными агрессивными признаками суверенного государства третьего мира, предстающего перед миром в качестве источника опасности.

Будет ли он страшнее, чем конкретный образ времен "холодной войны"? На мой взгляд, да. Потому что попытки превратить миротворческие операции в способ пересмотра этнических и государственных границ, наведения экологического и экономического порядка в той или иной стране непременно приведет к расширению параметров ее применения, что вызовет перманентную эскалацию военных конфликтов. Следование второму подходу, с моей точки зрения, таит в себе опасность ревизии международных норм законности применения военной силы, определенных в Уставе ООН для операций по принуждению к миру.

Реформа командной структуры НАТО — это очередной закономерный шаг трансформации НАТО, которая началась с уточнения ее новых задач в области миротворчества. Политические предпосылки трансформации НАТО Вам известны. Стратегические предпосылки, по моему мнению, состоят в стремлении НАТО сохранить способность в кратчайшие сроки создавать такие группировки войск (сил), которые могли бы выполнять стратегические задачи коллективной обороны НАТО, а также участвовать в наведении порядка вне зоны ее ответственности.

Снижение глобальной угрозы позволило военно-политическому руководству НАТО в 1994 г. принять решение о создании совместной объединенной оперативно-тактической группы. Это решение, реализуемое в рамках программы ПРМ, стало ключевым моментом трансформации НАТО.

Реализация и проверка концепции СООТГ в миротворческой операции в бывшей Югославии потребовала уточнения командной структуры НАТО. Я оставлю без внимания политические аспекты, которые присутствовали во взаимоотношениях членов НАТО при принятии окончательного решения по реформированию системы управления ОВС НАТО в Европе. С нашей точки зрения, положительным моментом является то, что европейские члены НАТО получили возможность на основе вооруженных сил ЗЕС и разграничении ответственности членов с США укреплять и развивать собственный военный компонент в Европе. Положительным, с точки зрения России, является и то, что страны, не входившие в НАТО, также получили возможность участвовать в формировании многонациональных оперативных сил. Мне представляется, что трудности на пути адаптации командной структуры НАТО, кроются в нежелании отдельных ее членов способствовать военным интеграционным процессам в ЗЕС и в СНГ. Мне лично методы противодействия НАТО интеграции в СНГ напоминают бесплодные внешнеполитические усилия СССР по сдерживанию западноевропейской интеграции в 60-е и 70-е годы.

Что, на мой взгляд, можно сегодня предпринять для совершенствования механизма индивидуального партнерства НАТО с Россией и другими странами в системе ее новой командной структуры?

1. Мировое сообщество должно подтвердить незыблемость прав ООН и ОБСЕ принимать политические решения по урегулированию любых конфликтов. Решением этих организаций

должны быть определены полномочия региональных политических и военных структур на проведение всех типов миротворческих операций.

2. Необходимо четко определить содержание военных задач в рамках миротворчества в XXI в. Военные задачи не следует ставить на первое место. В учениях миротворческих сил приоритет должен принадлежать невоенным способам разрешения конфликтов.

3. ООН, ОБСЕ и другие организации должны изыскивать финансовые ресурсы для обеспечения участия стран, не входящих в состав НАТО в штабных элементах ее командной структуры. Сегодня Россия, к сожалению, не сможет воспользоваться предложением НАТО направить своих представителей в эти структуры.

4. Я думаю, что не решив проблему участия штабных офицеров ВС России в командных структурах НАТО, мы будем не в полной мере использовать возможности Совета Евроатлантического партнерства (СЕАП), созданного взамен Совета Североатлантического сотрудничества.

5. Наши подходы к вопросу дальнейшего совершенствования миротворчества в XXI в. состоят в следующем:

- укрепление структур Секретариата ООН, занимающихся проблемами поддержания мира и военными вопросами;
- создание "резервных сил ООН", предоставляемых правительствами государств — участников в каждом конкретном случае в распоряжение ООН для осуществления операций по поддержанию мира;
- включение в национальные программы подготовки военного и гражданского персонала вопросов, относящихся к проведению операций по поддержанию мира; совершенствование стандартизированных процедур в целях взаимодействия сил различных государств;
- тесная связь ОПМ с задачами содействия политическому процессу и мирному разрешению спора;
- четкая определенность мандата, длительности и условий прекращения операций;
- наличие адекватных ресурсов и финансирования;
- риск для миротворческого персонала должен быть заблаговременно всесторонне взвешен и признан минимальным;
- неотъемлемое право миротворческих сил на оборону;
- состав объединенной командной структуры миротворческих сил должен адекватно отражать численность и роль национальных контингентов, участвующих в данной ОПМ;
- возможность контроля со стороны национального и военного руководства.

Свободная дискуссия участников конференции по данной теме Discussion on the theme of the conference

Mark MALAN,
Institute for Security Studies, South Africa,
Senior Researcher Fellow

I do not really have questions, but I have to make a statement, because I was very impressed by the last speaker, general Potemkin, who made me understand why I, as an African, am here in Moscow and what the relevance of this conference is.

Because from the previous presentations, and of what the General said, I get the impression that this morning we accepted that the future of peacekeeping, or the trend is that the UN will scale up its involvement and will do specialised things and the work with big battalions will be delegated. You also talked about the ghettoization of peace-keeping in Africa or the trivialization of peacekeeping. And I think that the Russian perspective, and I try to simplify, because of my African mind, is also a contrast between exclusivity of the NATO Club and the universality of the United Nations. This is a problem I am struggling with in my own mind also the effectiveness of single nations endeavours or the peacekeeping military lines as a tool, when we stretch peacekeeping to include all sorts of things: military operations, involving a lot of forces, versus literacy of multinationality.

I think that this can go on and on and on, but the key point is still exclusivity versus universality. SHIRBRING for example. General said, that anybody is welcome to come on board to contribute to the SHIRBRING they are looking for new countries to contribute, but you must have had peace-keeping experience, and you must be able to feed the boat. SHIRBRING once again is exclusive, but also the utility of SHIRBRING is related to Chapter 6 operations. What we are talking about? I am certainly confused, and I am worried about the fact that we today haven't resolved for our-selves what we are talking about and resolve the issues of exclusivity versus universality.

В.К. ПОТЕМКИН,

начальник Центра военно-стратегических
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генерал-лейтенант

Я думаю, что языковой барьер и неточность в переводе послужили причиной того, что г-н Малан не понял высказанные мною позиции. Я прошу переводчиков очень четко переводить то, что я скажу. Моя позиция состоит как раз в том, что для миротворчества нет никакой необходимости привлекать большие контингенты вооруженных сил. Позиция НАТО в этом вопросе противоположная.

Второй подход, который я разделяю, его также изложил в своем выступлении представитель Индии генерал-лейтенант Намбиар, это уверенность в том, что в региональной системе безопасности тех стран, которые составляют основу этого региона, могут обойтись собственными силами, без НАТО. Хочу повторить, что мы в СНГ, проводя на протяжении нескольких лет миротворческие операции, не нуждаемся в натовских контингентах миротворческих сил. В крайнем случае, нам нужна была бы помощь ООН по финансовому обеспечению проводимых миротворческих операций.

И наконец, я сторонник того, чтобы миротворческие операции проводились небольшими контингентами сил, в том числе и в Южной Африке, где, по моему убеждению, должны формироваться собственные контингенты. Опыт показывает, что по основным принципам миротворчества успех операции обеспечивается там, где конфликтующие стороны больше доверяют миротворческому контингенту. К привлеченным иностранным войскам не может быть доверия, а только страх перед силой, демонстрирующей военную мощь и принуждающей к примирению.

В заключение хочу подчеркнуть, что роль и статус Южной Африки в миротворческом процессе мы ценим очень высоко.

Richard COHEN,

George Marshal Centre (Germany),
Professor

I hope this technical lack of communication is not a symbol of our lack of philosophical communication. But I am afraid that we in the West and you in Russia are looking at the same situation but from totally opposite perspectives.

It seems to me that the NATO from the Western perspective, is trying to do its very best: to adapt as Mr Shuller outlined to us the forces have been cut dramatically, the readiness levels have been reduced and really some are worried that NATO is no longer fully prepared for articulate collective defence operations as they were able to do it during the Cold War, far from it.

The vehicle of PFP and the EAPC and in fact the Permanent Joint Council between Russia and NATO - it seems to me to be an ideal vehicle for inclusion and not exclusion as Mark Mallan was referring to. And I think, as an outsider, not a member of NATO, it seems to me that NATO is making every effort to bring to Russia in particular to the kind of operations which we have been talking about.

I think that in the real world situation the NATO is the only practical feasible military organization. Certainly in Western Europe or in Central Europe they can conduct military operations, and as such it has been asked by the United Nations to conduct or lead operations in Bosnia. And I think you will agree, Bosnia could not have been undertaken with any kind of small peacekeeping forces, some of you just have been recommending. It needed a larger force to, at least, put the situation under control, and indeed some of the operations of the CIS required more than small brigades size multinational peace keeping forces operating under Chapter 6. So larger forces are required at times, and NATO is the only organization, which is capable of multinational large-scale peace support operations.

I think that NATO is very slow to conduct many peacekeeping operations, it takes a lot of persuasion to get 60 members to agree to do a particular operation, so besides anything, NATO is much more reluctant than many people would like, to get involved. And I think that in future, we will see that in Bosnia. NATO is going to be very reluctant to get involved in that kind of operations that we see in Bosnia today. So I don't really think that you have to worry much about that account. CTFJF is actually a pretty small scale operation when it comes to the old cold war collective defence kind of situations. We are talking of a COR level operation, a COR is not going be of no threat at Russia certainly and any other and major parts. So I don't see how NATO can be anything else than like peace support operation NATO led under CTFJF operations giving the kind of large-scale operations you perhaps are concerned about.

В. К. ПОТЕМКИН,

начальник Центра военно-стратегических
исследований Генерального Штаба ВС РФ,
генерал-лейтенант

Уважаемый г-н Козин!

Со многими характеристиками, которые Вы дали НАТО, я согласен. И в конечном итоге не дело России делать какие-то замечания НАТО в целом или отдельным членам этой организации о том, как им строить и совершенствовать свои вооруженные силы.

Но я с содроганием думаю о том, что если в каком-то районе мира, через какой-то промежуток времени натовские истребители вновь начнут пускать управляемые крылатые ракеты, на воздух будут взлетать не военные объекты, а объекты социальной структуры, жилые дома, под обломками уничтоженных зданий погибнут сотни мирных людей, среди которых окажется немало стариков и детей. В миротворческих операциях нет места таким способам действий. Есть другие методы урегулирования конфликтов. Для этого нужна воля мирового сообщества. В крайнем случае, нужна демонстрация силы с целью устрашения и принуждения сторон сесть за стол переговоров.

Johan HEDERSTEDT,

Military Advisor of the Ministry of
Defence, Sweden, Lt.General

It's completely clear for me that the need of different force structures for peace is a need for the future. We really support that NATO should develop that CTF structure and in the future we hopefully think that this partnership will come to that final structure in some way. But there is also a need for minor scale force headquarters, as I already have mentioned, this is the SHIRBRING. And the SHIRBRING is not - well, we will start with one nation at the beginning to confirm the structure for a concept of operations, a concept for a district, the rules of engagement, and when we are ready with that we will develop this concept of SHIRBRING. And may be, we will help other countries to build up due types of SHIRBRINGS.

Satish NAMBIAR,

United Service Institution of India,
Director, Lt.General

I quite agree with the opinions which have been expressed and the reservations made. But this is looking from a limited point of view. I think for the rest of the world it is also important to sort out some confusion Mark (Mallan) was speaking about. Because in 1992-93 there were three major so-called peacekeeping operations going around the world, I say "so-called", because these were related to the original concept, traditional concept, these were Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia. It was absolutely impossible for the United Nations to handle, from the technical point of view at least one of them, but they have tried to handle all the three. So it therefore was clear that the United Nations couldn't undertake operations of this sort of size and complexity. Which is why regional military organisations have been addressed, shall we say accepting a share of this sort of responsibility? However this share of responsibility has to be a conscious one.

This morning, Mr Cilliers was talking about some developments in Africa. Within the NATO forces we deployed in Africa, say, I have deployed in Africa - would it be a NATO position or would it be on their behalf. If it was on the behalf of the United Nations Security Council, the commanding control can be given to the NATO, then where is to be the headquarter, or who is to be the head of mission? This is the sort of questions which NATO thinks are irrelevant. And I share Prof. Cohen's remarks in that regard as far as to know of what kind should be the forces, but then we have to ask that the United Nations should take this commitment.

We asked the United Nations for four divisions and we got nothing. Then we asked the NATO and we got it and they were able to do it. Therefore one must understand that the UN Security Council is not able to give armed enforcement. We therefore need a political military organisation - it is physically the command structure which the UN had been used to. When you can bring together a bunch of people from all over the world, some 150 or 200, and extract them to work together it is clear that you need some structure. And this will be credible if you look into the NATO structure, I can give you a very example: within the NATO structure you have elements of other international actors on a regular basis then the NATO can be a strong nucleus for any national or regional operations. I would suggest that it would be better to have some regiments in various regions, but there is to be an international staffing to get the needed forces to them. So far the forces are concerned, shall I record the concept of a national or regional standby support. But for such a regional standby force there are many contradictory political commitments. Let me give you another example - the 17 countries that may decide on the short standby support do not want this.

But why there should be a reservation against the permanent standby military force, or a standby UN-force? Because we would need to put on limitations which are similar to the limitations existing with the hypothetical international peacekeeping organisations. But I am sure that some of the problems can be overcome. And the last point, - somebody was talking and used the word enemy - when speaking of peace operations we cannot use the concept of enemy - the United Nations, the international community as such cannot have an enemy, I would even go so far as to say that even in the Gulf War you could not call Iraq an enemy - the Iraqi people to be an enemy. I would like that the concept of enemy would not be used during our conference.

В.В. ЛЕБЕДЕВ,
советник аппарата
Совета обороны РФ

Я очень внимательно слушал выступающих и у меня сложилось впечатление, что очень часто в докладах с военной составляющей все выглядит красиво и четко. Но как практический политик, как историк я не всегда все понимаю. Я попробую сформулировать некоторые вопросы, которые у меня возникли в этой связи.

Мы сейчас очень много говорим о том военном компоненте миротворчества, который занимает очень важное место в средствах массовой информации, о котором много сообщается и которая видна наглядно. Но тем не менее, как правило, человек в военной форме сам по себе решить проблему миротворчества не может, и это тоже признано во всем мире. Мы много говорим о Югославии, других регионах, но не договариваем, что проблемы в этих регионах не решены. И с точки зрения военного миротворчества решить существующие там проблемы невозможно.

В тех выступлениях, которые предложили наши коллеги из НАТО, очень красиво расписано, что такое многонациональные оперативные силы. Да, это хороший инструмент, который может использоваться в той или иной конкретной ситуации. Но вновь встает вопрос о яйце и курице: "А где та политическая воля, политическое решение, экономическое и политическое сопровождение процесса миротворчества, которые, в конце концов, должны привести к урегулированию проблемы?". Сегодня, скажем, оперативные и военные меры осуществляются. Но где гарантия того, что последующие меры экономического и социально-политического сопровождения будут адекватны. И кстати, это одна из самых больших проблем миротворчества, которая существует.

Второй вопрос, который я хотел бы задать нашим коллегам из НАТО, это вопрос реальной заявки на конвертацию военной организации в организацию миротворческую. Предыдущий выступающий, наш гость из НАТО сказал, что НАТО — это политический альянс шестнадцати государств. Я почему-то всегда по наивности считал, что согласно Вашингтонскому Договору это оборонительный альянс, это союз в целях совместной обороны. Это не совсем одно и то же для меня. Но при этом я хочу сослаться на тот практический опыт, который у нас есть. Идут учения, в которых отрабатываются, как это объявляется, элементы миротворчества. Однако не надо закрывать глаза на то, что элементы миротворчества, как правило, занимают один или два дня учений. А дальше проходят обычные крупномасштабные учения сил НАТО, которые реализуются в тех рамках, которые существовали в межблоковом противостоянии.

Еще один наивный вопрос. Насколько оправдано существование сил и средств межблокового противостояния для решения задач миротворчества? На мой взгляд, тяжелое вооружение, которое используется в процессе миротворчества, та техника и подразделения не совсем соответствуют задачам миротворчества.

И последнее. Когда мы говорим о миротворчестве, то старательно обходим вопрос о том, сколько это стоит. Миротворчество — недешевый вид деятельности, но этот вопрос всегда почему-то находится в стороне. Насколько я помню, стоимость миротворца ООН в Намибии за один день составляла тысячу долларов.

А.В. ДЕДУРЕНКО,
преподаватель Российской академии
государственной службы при Президенте РФ,
профессор

Я хотел бы поделиться собственным опытом миротворчества в Югославии и возможно ответить на некоторые вопросы. Сразу о вопросах. Уважаемый коллега В.В. Лебедев, я Вас уверяю, что учения НАТО, проводимые по миротворческой тематике, действительно проводятся по миротворческой тематике. Я сам неоднократно участвовал в подобных учениях. Учебные места и учебные вопросы организованы именно для этих целей. Сосредоточение войск, если это вообще можно назвать войсками, отрабатывают маленькие подразделения: взвод, рота, максимум — батальон. А вопрос об отбытии к местам постоянной дислокации можно в принципе отнести к

обычным вопросам оперативной и боевой подготовки. Кроме того, я согласен с Вами относительно того, стоит ли привлекать тяжелое вооружение. Я долгое время был энтузиастом западной системы разделения миротворческой операции на пять или шесть типов. Я не буду их приводить, все мы знаем о них. Сейчас, после приобретенного опыта в СНГ и Боснии, я прихожу к выводу, что это большая ошибка. Практически необходимо давать настолько гибкий мандат военным миротворцам, чтобы они имели весь арсенал для миротворческих операций — от мирных средств, до принуждения.

Привожу пример. В Боснии, когда я был начальником штаба сектора, несмотря на то, что мы имели мандат ООН на поддержание мира, на нас была возложена задача также вести антитеррористическую борьбу, то есть правила говорили нам, что надо применять оружие только после нападения на нас. Причем, одновременно мы должны были вести борьбу со снайперами как сербскими, так и боснийскими.

В заключение хочу сказать, что мнение о том, что мы могли бы найти решения, которые удовлетворяли бы как Россию и страны СНГ, так и страны НАТО, ничто иное как иллюзия. Я предлагаю разработать пакет документов, которые бы в принципе удовлетворяли все стороны.

Johan HEDERSTEDT,
Military Advisor of the Ministry of
Defence, Sweden, Lt.General

Could I make a couple of comments, the first one, and a brief one, to General Potemkin? I suspect that it is up to Captain Schuller to say something more comprehensive than I, but he mentioned the large elements of army, we weren't speaking in these terms at all - we spoke about rapidly deployable mobile armed forces (DMAF). You don't need large elements of armed forces - excuse me, but you talked about large armed elements - which is not an absolute concept of forces, and perhaps I may ask Captain Schuller a couple of things about his presentation. First of all it seems to me that the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is not DMAF. But going on to perhaps a more important element - to the European part, the European Security Defence Identity which you didn't mention much in your presentation which is very much part of the Berlin Declaration of NATO of 1996 and the Madrid Summit held last summer.... We spoke very directly about the use of the Combined Joint Task Forces, the European Security Defence Identity and handing, if necessary the European operations to be led by the WEU - and I think that the WEU, which is what we call the Petersburg task, as from the Petersburg declaration of 1992. The term of Petersburg tasks is used for a lower type of scale of peace support operations.

From the WEU aspect it is a great involvement with the nations of Central Europe in that decision-making. But, what I would like to see is, if there is pre-ambivalence in the United States, a very important thing, is concept. In that it gave very positive support in the Conference Chair, in the Declarations, but is it pre-ambivalence? Or perhaps the Americans, and the Pentagon are suspicious about Europeans taking actions themselves and, I don't know, it might be sense of use to comment on it, but I rather would like to know, is there a degree of ambivalence evident and therefore why politically the statements we made support such a role and that certain elements have reservations about this. And, finally on the time-table aspect, you talked about a very detailed time-table, you spoke about 2000 and beyond, there is a command planned for WEU and NATO in year 2000 and presumably the Combined Joint Tasks concept is going after that. So what would happen if we had a situation, say, next year which is an ideal one to use the Combined Joint Tasks, for example something is going seriously wrong in some regions of Africa and it seems to be a very effective way of using the Combined Joint Task Forces in the concept of the Madrid Declaration? What would happen? Would NATO be prepared to accelerate the time table, could one use it or would we have to wait for all the stepping stones and therefore miss the opportunity, not only miss the opportunity, but have a significant failure to meet some of our obligations, because we haven't been able to speed up the time-table?

Floris SCHULLER,
Head of the International Military Staff,
NATO HQ (Belgium), Commander

Thank you for those important, rather important questions, particularly the last one. But let me take up number one:

First the reattribution core - yes, that would be an ideal element of decisional concepts, approved in its entirety, would be approvingly integrated into the CDTF as for instance a learned component command, taking care of the land forces, and as such would be easily integrated. It would not be the nucleus, it could

be a complementation module, but most likely would be the NATO learned in charge of the land component under the authority of the CFDT Headquarter and its commander. I am coming back to some elements later... Your second question was if the CBSE knows, as far as I know there is absolutely no ambivalence with the ISBI developments within NATO, as a fact of today and I did mention it briefly, but in the beginning, so may be it was relatively too short, but when the CDTF concept has been developed, as it has been developed, the elements will be made available to WEU, if the WEU is called on to act or if the Alliance decide that it is, in sum an operation which the Alliance should not take into its entirety, upon UN request but should be for instance given to the Europeans within the Alliance. That again would be a bluebird decision, and I am a military man working with a military staff and took largely part in "Bluebird" decisions.

We, again there is no ambivalence, we work regularly together with the WEU planning cell - NATO as you know as well as with representatives from the ministerial in Berlin and we joined last year the NATO estate to do operational planning for the WEU if necessary - so the WEU has provided NATO with illustrations of the Petersburg perspectives and we take that on our boards and we discuss this regularly with others. Again this will also be a reaction to what we have done earlier, we discuss everything always on all levels at this moment with partners with Russia and within the Berlin Council and there is a lot of co-ordination going in the area of Yugoslavia where as you know Russians and NATO are working shoulder to shoulder sharing the same political mission. What would happen next year - Yugoslavia is ongoing, it is an example of combined and joint operations and my neighbour to the left gave another example of combined and joint operations. That is in NATO terminology the same thing as the Combined Joint Task Force which as a concept is intended to give a structure to response to a political call at a short notice in an organized and prepared fashion, not to talk, not looking around how shall we do it now, but in a military efficient way. And so, if before there is a WEU-NATO joint exercise, and before we take further steps into an implementation plan as I highlighted and I gave in my presentation, we would look at what we have created today, we probably would look at what we have done in last November, we would after in the this week exercise look at what we have done wrong at all and use the same structure to response and - yes, the transfer to WEU - as a military man I think that when we are given a task, when the mission has been formulated we put our shoulders together and we make it work and this has been and is an experience within NATO in its 40 first years of existence. It is certainly in the NATO a current practice, as I know - with many other nationalities in various pools of operations as actually in Yugoslavia, and I am convinced that will give us experience for the near future and hopefully also the co-operation with Russian Forces which will be elaborated at home.

Could I use this moment when I have the microphone, Mr Chairman, to stipulate again something which has come out quite clear in previous discussions, could I underline again that the Alliance is a political Alliance of 16 sovereign nations, and 16 sovereign nations have unanimously to agree to undertake a mission. And as it has been clearly stated in the Founding Act and other various ministerial declarations, it will be the Council's decision and other nations will be involved and consulted in the various areas that are alive today. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has been mentioned, the Permanent Joint Council with Russia both these on ministerial level but also at military committee level. There are similar meetings in the EFBC with participants as for ongoing questions, which will continue, in the new future, and I should not forget the similar sort of relations with the Ukraine which NATO is building on. We are in a process, we are in a tremendous interesting time of change and it will be interesting to see where these developments are going to.

Johan HEDERSTEDT,
Military Advisor of the Ministry of
Defence, Sweden, Lt.General

Well I will give only some very small comments. For sure military men - they are excellent peace-workers. Of course it so that military component cannot work alone, there must be a lot of political workers, diplomats, there must be the humanitarian workers, there must be a civil implementation all these must work together with the military component. This is very important. Secondly I shall comment something about the costs A Swedish soldier in Bosnia costs 10 000 US \$ per month, per soldier, that's the roughly cost.

And, certainly I shall emphasise that the ASFOR force in Bosnia is a real neutral force.

Floris SCHULLER,
Head of the International Military Staff,
NATO HQ (Belgium), Commander

You asked where is the political intervention. It is a political decision to use neutral means in consonance with other political efforts. Especially in the former Yugoslavia an ongoing council on a regular basis does its regular work and they determine their political action, they approve the military advice on the rules of engagement, they set up the various reactions. But other speakers of this morning have already alluded to that

The Washington treaty is a collective defence treaty, that's true but it is under the hospices of the political will and the political agreement of the 16 sovereign nations to have a collective defence organisation of which of course the military component has an important part but it is under the authority of the political bosses, this means the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Ministers of Defence that form the North Atlantic Council, that is the Ambassadors, that are the Councillors in Permanent Session. And so, the 16 nations capitals are consulting each other, they look around and then decide what should be done. The military are not an authority by themselves.

For costs, I am not an authority and I have not researched it recently, but costs are boarded by the nations, so the best thing to do is just what my neighbour to the left said is to ask the various nations what their costs are in the operations. I am sure that they are willing to share the information. As for the collective costs for the Alliance, I have no insight in, but at this moment they are relatively small compared to the various nations' costs.

В.К. ПОТЕМКИН,
начальник Центра военно-стратегических
исследований Генерального Штаба ВС РФ,
генерал-лейтенант

Я удовлетворен дискуссией в рамках второго заседания и думаю, что в последующих наших рассуждениях, неформальном общении мы будем стремиться обсудить в первую очередь возможность рационального использования отдельных элементов командной структуры НАТО, других военных организаций. Я думаю, что мы еще вернемся к вопросу об объеме военных задач в ходе миротворческих операций.

Устав ООН принимался после окончания Второй мировой войны. Все стремились наказать агрессора, развязавшего эту войну. Прошло 50 лет. Мы говорим, что за это время не было больших войн. Было около трехсот конфликтов малого масштаба. Давайте подумаем о том, чтобы операции по принуждению к миру стали менее кровопролитными.

Тема: Проблемы и вовлеченность в реформирование национальных вооруженных сил. Тип и способность вооруженных сил, необходимых для проведения миротворческих операций, гражданское и военное взаимодействие

Theme: Problems of implications in the reforming of National Military Forces. Types and abilities of Military Forces required for peacekeeping operations – civil and military interactions.

Hassan ABAZA,
Royal Jordanian Air Forces,
Brig. General

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honored to be here today, and, being given this valuable opportunity to address such a distinguished audience, and to discuss a subject of great significance to the whole world, if I may say. The end of the Cold War has allowed the United Nations into a new era of international consensus. Today, it looks set to become an overarching force for peace and security throughout the world. As a military officer in the Jordanian armed forces, I believe we have an obligation to live up to these new challenges.

At the outset, I would like to start with the words of His Majesty King Hussein, The Supreme Commander, in his farewell speech to the first Battalion departing to Croatia, and I quote: "I am confident that you will always be as I used to know you, ambassadors of a country that never ceased to look forward to peace and stability and members of a family that never quit its grand dream of justice not injustice, security not horror, good not evil, equality not discrimination and progress not backwardness, to prevail and control the relations among the nation's of our human family." End of quote. This is our Doctrine — Participating in Peace-keeping operations

The ongoing Jordanian participation in peacekeeping operations started in the late eighties; the sum of participating Jordanian peacekeepers being 1343 officers and 14094 NCO's.

The good reputation that Jordanian armed forces enjoy, both locally and internationally strengthened by His Majesty King Hussein's efforts for promoting world peace, led the world to respect this army despite its size and limited capabilities. The result was the gaining, by our part, of an important role in the international arena, observed through our participation in peacekeeping missions in several hot areas around the world such as Angola, Cambodia, Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Georgia, Tajikistan and Liberia.

Allow me at this point to return to our core subject. As a third world army, we remain an efficient one in the area and if I may add a well equipped one as well, that is of course comparatively speaking. Attention has always been focused on training. For these reasons, participating in peacekeeping operations was not difficult, because Jordanian forces met basic requirements for training and equipment. As you are well aware, dispatching troops to act as peacekeepers requires special training and skills such as:

1. English language skills, which the armed forces concentrated on by providing extensive language programs for officers and NCO's.

2. Computer skills which have also been provided especially for officers dispatched as military observers.

3. Knowledge of UN organization, Charter and role.

4. Knowledge of the special UN reporting system and investigation techniques. All officers are given special training to be able to deal with reports, and to carry out investigations in the field.

5. Functions of other organizations and NGOs, such as the ICRC and their relation to the UN.

For these purposes and more, the armed forces established a peacekeeping training center to meet the requirements of participation in peacekeeping operations.

As you know, peacekeeping operations are most effective when conflicts are between legitimate governments, and are less effective when confronted with complex conflicts involving internal factions or movements.

The type and capability of the force required in peace support operations in the first case would depend on such conventional factors as, size of country, weather, terrain, etc. In the second case, and as a military officer, I advocate the use of perhaps minimum force in certain cases and under specific rules of engagement.

I am positive that many might not agree with me, as they would argue that peacekeeping operations are to adhere to their fundamental principles if they are to retain their character. However, when confronted with complex conflicts, peacekeeping operations invariably find themselves confronted with a situation

where they are outmanned or outgunned by the different factions and are therefore in need of some deterrent capability whatever form it takes. After all, a show of power is often sufficient to deter an opponent.

Of course, the mandate of an operation remains a deciding factor of its composition. In this connection, I wish to cite the example of our experience in former Yugoslavia, where the mandate of each battalion decided the type of force required:

In 1992, the UN headquarters officially requested Jordan to send a battalion to join UN forces operating in former Yugoslavia in Novoska, in the western part of Croatia. The battalion consisted of the following elements:

First, the logistic support team, which consisted of:

- a) *A medical platoon: 8 officers and 24 NCO's.*
- b) *A maintenance platoon: 2 officers and 30 NCO's.*
- c) *A ration platoon: 2 officers and 30 NCO's.*
- d) *A communication platoon: 2 officers and 30 NCO's.*
- e) *An engineering platoon: 2 officers and 30 NCO's.*
- f) *An air defense platoon: 2 officers and 20 NCO's.*

Second, 4 mobile teams consisting of 8 officers and 125 NCO's.

Third, a special team of 8 officers and 125 NCO's (reconnaissance group).

The battalion was mandated to perform the following tasks:

- 1. *Peacekeeping among parties to the conflict.*
- 2. *Humanitarian assistance.*
- 3. *The provision of security and stability for the local residence.*
- 4. *Helping re-construct destroyed sites.*
- 5. *Implementing the resolution and policies of the Security Council and Secretary General.*
- 6. *Providing peace and stability for returning residents.*

The following mandate given to battalion number four illustrates the composition of the battalion which is completely different than battalion number one.

The mandate of Battalion 4:

- 1. *Bring the region, demilitarized and secured, under the sovereign control of the government of Croatia.*
- 2. *Retain the multiethnic character of the region.*
- 3. *Promote an atmosphere of confidence among all local residents.*
- 4. *Promote respect for the highest standards of human rights.*
- 5. *Contribute to the redevelopment and reconstruction of the region.*
- 6. *Organize free and fair local elections no later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period.*

The organization structure of Battalion (4) was as follows:

- a) *Maintenance workshop consisting of 5 officers and 7 NCO's.*
- b) *Tank company of 9 officers and 70 NCO's.*
- c) *Logistic company of 15 officers and 138 NCO's.*
- d) *Mechanized infantry company of 9 officers and 108 NCO's.*
- e) *Support company consisting of 11 officers and 138 NCO's.*
- f) *Artillery company of 10 officers and 92 NCO's.*

Moreover, and in addition to the mandate, it remains imperative to combine peacekeeping efforts with those of peacemaking and eventually peacebuilding. Peacekeeping remains a temporary solution if not combined with a long lasting political settlement, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the rebuilding of national institutions to uphold this settlement. From here emerged the importance of integrated missions, a model that is now adopted for almost operations.

The Jordanian experience in this regard is illustrated by our participation in the rapid deployment force.

The Jordanian mission comprised personnel from the following institutions:

- 1) *The ministry of internal affairs with 35 employees specialized in the fields of planning, election observing and human rights.*
- 2) *The ministry of health with 39 physicians, 8 pharmacists, and 50 nurses and technicians.*
- 3) *38 personnel specialized in telecommunications.*
- 4) *The ministry of transportation providing airport facilities.*
- 5) *Public security with 5 officers and 45 NCO's.*

I myself have served with the UN in Tajikistan from October 1994 to December 1996. The mission was a relatively small one with a total of 96 persons, 45 of which were military observers from nine countries: Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine, Uruguay and Jordan.

Throughout this period I came up with a number of observations I would like to share with you:

Firstly, the success of any traditional peacekeeping operation depends on the consent of the conflicting parties. This condition remain a pivotal element in launching peacekeeping operations as long as operations retain their conventional form; in other words, their principle of non-use of force, except in self-defense.

Secondly, I have noticed that at times, leaders of contending parties would sign agreements that fail to reach the military and field commanders. We tried to overcome this problem by distributing copies of those agreements to both parties by our teams.

Thirdly, when you have more than two parties involved in a conflict as in Tajikistan, more effort and coordination is needed.

Fourthly, one important problem was that government forces were deployed by three different agencies; the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Security. We later found out that there was no coordination between them. As such, there was a serious communication problem on the field between those Forces.

Fifth, our mission was an integrated mission; i.e. It was civilian and military at all levels. We had a civil affairs officer at the team site along with the military observer to evaluate the political situation in the area, at the same time the military situation was being evaluated. This proved to be a very successful method to do the job. Of course, in such circumstances, there needs to be utmost coordination between the chief military observer and the head of mission.

Sixth, in this connection, I have to emphasize a very salient point concerning the directives given to the head of mission and the chief military observer by the UN headquarters in New York. These directives should be followed closely, if the mission is to be run smoothly and to be successful.

Despite the fact that Jordan's participation in peace support operations is fairly recent, the country's experience in this field has been rich and useful, and has been viewed with great interest at the local and international levels. It is logical to draw the conclusion that more involvement in such missions will further enhance the promising potential of Jordan's armed forces and will reflect positively on the image of the nation as a whole. The experience of Jordanian units in former Yugoslavia reveals the following considerations:

Clear and unambiguous mandate for peace support missions is essential, and new rules of engagement based on more balanced political, humanitarian and military considerations may be required to ensure protection, credibility and effectiveness of UN forces.

The Jordanian experience has shown that JAF's equipment is compatible with those used by the UN, though the following points need to be mentioned:

First of all, Jordanian units were equipped according to national capabilities rather than to UN standards which at times hampered the mission's potential. Jordanian Armed Forces will review the availability of engineering vehicles and equipment for better performance and task accomplishment.

Generally, the UN units are sufficiently equipped to provide standard support in an operational environment. However, on a number of occasions, the fulfillment of extra and urgent humanitarian needs requires more resources. JAF has to analyze the effects of such situations on the operations of the Jordanian units and re-equip them accordingly.

Secondly, extra medical services are required to meet the demands of local populations.

Thirdly, JAF may put more operational emphasis on improving the communication potential of its units in the mission area.

3. Logistic support

In few cases, Jordanian units had to depend on their headquarters in Amman for technical support and supply of spare parts. This was either due to their unavailability in the local market or because of prevailing war conditions which left equipment out of order for longer than usual. This underlines the need for developing the UN spare parts support system.

4. Human Resources

a) Language

Language barriers have created few problems for officers who were not as well conversant in foreign languages as required. As I mentioned before, JAF has already taken adequate and effective measures to address this problem.

b. Training of troops

JAF have recently established a UN specialized institution to handle the following aspects:

Training in technical aspects of peacekeeping operations, not included in basic military training.

Training in negotiation skills, communications, and other skills required for UN military observers in the Institute of Diplomacy.

Training in carrying out missions under severe weather conditions. Briefings and data base concerning political and geopolitical background of the conflict in the mission area.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The performance of the United Nations during the Cold War was often marred by conflicting interests of the World's great powers. Today the situation has cleared up with the end of the Cold War. To insure the maintenance of international peace and security, the strengthened Security Council can now invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter to bring about the cessation of hostilities where ever and whenever they erupt. What remains is the upgrading of our own national forces to befit the new challenges of our new world.

Алексей ШАХТАХТИНСКИЙ,
представитель НАТО по вопросам информации в Москве

РОЛЬ НАТО В МИРОТВОРЧЕСКИХ ОПЕРАЦИЯХ

Я хотел бы начать свое выступление с коротких замечаний, одновременно обещая не задавать вопросов. Во-первых, мы приносим извинения участникам международной конференции за то, что не приехал третий участник конференции из Штаб-квартиры НАТО. На мой взгляд у нас идет сегодня очень интересная дискуссия о роли ООН в миротворчестве, об эволюции НАТО. Я думаю, что мы говорили об этих проблемах по деловому.

С моей точки зрения, новая командная структура НАТО полностью отражает ее новую миссию. Главная миссия НАТО — это соответствие ее предназначению (ст. 5). И мы стараемся не отходить от положений этой статьи. НАТО — прежде всего политическая организация. Но она не полностью разоружена. Мы не ищем врагов, мы ищем союзников. Хочу подчеркнуть, что новые миссии за пределами статьи 5 становятся все более важными для НАТО. И Вы можете убедиться (я правда не захватил с собой этих документов) по тем сценариям, последним маневрам, проведенным НАТО в 1998 г. они становятся все более важными, потому что в них есть потребность. Как это было, например в Югославии, пару лет назад.

И здесь я хочу четко сказать, что я не согласен с теми выступающими, которые утверждали, что ООН или ОБСЕ могут всегда справляться с такого рода кризисами. Я сам дипломат, французский дипломат, но я хочу говорить не совсем дипломатично. Дипломатам платят за то, чтобы они повторяли во всем мире, давайте югославскую проблему решим мирным путем. Естественно, НАТО за решение всех проблем мирным путем. Но иногда, очевидно, та или иная сторона может иметь разные взгляды или беспокоиться о балансе сил. Давайте четко уясним, о чем идет речь. Нам нужно предотвратить войну или приостановить ее. Иногда это требует ограниченного применения военной силы. И определенно, иногда мы должны это сделать просто для того, чтобы предотвратить большие катастрофы или чтобы они не разразились снова. Например, как это было в июле 1995 г., когда удалось предотвратить крупномасштабные преступления против человечества в Хорватии, за которое никто не понес наказание.

Итак, пока я определенно считаю, что НАТО — это очень полезный инструмент поддержания мира, и мы хотим перейти к более традиционной, более широкой концепции поддержания мира. А это требует более действенного вовлечения в миротворческие акции, иногда и с применением силового метода. Но важно, чтобы все миротворческие операции мы могли проводить вместе с партнерами. И для этой цели создан ОБСЕ.

Я хочу подчеркнуть, что мы в НАТО прагматики. И мы знаем, что нам необходимо не только реформироваться и приспособлять нашу командную структуру, но и выдвигать новые концепции, типа миротворческих сил Европейского Союза. Вы знаете, что в НАТО нет наднациональных сил, у нас есть только национальные вооруженные силы. Это требует реформы таких вооруженных сил, нового планирования. Я не военный специалист и не буду углубляться в этот вопрос. Хотел бы только сказать, что мы проводим исследования, которые еще не согласованы с 16 государствами-участниками НАТО. Но здесь мы имеем уроки, которые извлекли из операций по поддержанию мира. Я думаю, что могу передать Вам завтра материалы исследований, если Вы заинтересованы в этом. Это первый момент. То есть, мы готовы поделиться своим опытом по планированию и ведению обороны. Вы знаете, что реформа обороны проходит сейчас в разных странах НАТО. Это проблема, как я понимаю, обсуждалась и в России. Но в НАТО есть свои специфические способы планирования оборонительных мер. Это долгосрочные планы, как правило, на 6 лет, я полагаю Вы знакомы с ними.

Во Франции, которая, как известно, не участвует в Вооруженных Силах НАТО, началась перестройка вооруженных сил, количественное сокращение. Но важно, что в процессе реформы количественное сокращение, — это способ достижения определенных целей, а именно, получить более мобильные, меньшие по размеру и большее профессиональные вооруженные силы. Еще раз подчеркиваю, мы готовы поделиться опытом в перестройке наших вооруженных сил.

Кроме того, мы уделяем много внимания отношениям между военными и гражданскими властями. Это один из уроков, который мы извлекли из миротворческих операций. Мы также приглашаем партнеров принять участие в миротворческих маневрах. Мы хотели, чтобы те страны, которые готовы сотрудничать с нами, участвовали бы в совместных запланированных оборонительных операциях НАТО по полному масштабу. Пока что это планирование проводится успешно. И мы стараемся делать это оперативно, в кооперации с партнерами. Я могу завтра раздать и эти документы желающим.

В заключение я хочу сказать, как мне кажется, очень важную вещь. Участие в миротворческих операциях, в планировании и маневрах, Россия пока не принимает. И мне неизвестно, собирается ли она принять участие в ближайшее время. Ну, скажем, не в 1998 г., а возможно в следующем, но мы будем приветствовать такой шаг России.

Pr. Richard COHEN,
George Marshall Centre (Germany).

As a former military officer, I find it very difficult to give any sort of brief information without using slides. I apologise in advance that they are only in English, but I will try to talk through, because there are very few words in Russian. I think that after the excellent presentations we have had today, a lot has been added to our knowledge, at least for me, who possessed some information about this particular subject of peace support operations and its legal aspects in particular. I hope that I can add a little bit of extra dimension to your own thoughts as well.

In fact when I listened to Admiral Tornberg this morning, I had a feeling that a lot of what I had to say was already mentioned by him. So, I hope that I will organise my points in a slightly different way, but I must say that we are thinking along in very similarly lines in this respect.

So, my aim is actually to discuss civil - military relations in the context of peace-support operations. I want to talk about this on three levels. First: civil-military co-operation at the command level - the highest level, second: civil-military co-operation in the field, and then finally, from the British and perhaps the American point of view, because these are the forces which are the most involved in this, the contribution of civilians who joined the Armed Forces as reservists for operations like the one that we see in Bosnia.

I am going to use largely examples from Bosnia, and I don't apologise for this because I believe that Bosnia provides us with perhaps an unique example in the field of peace support operations of things which are gone so far and not just talking about former Yugoslavia. It is broken down, so I think that Bosnia is actually presenting a very interesting case study.

At the senior levels, the challenges of the co-operation and co-ordination between the military and the civilians are firstly a lack of understanding, on the part of the military commanders, of exactly what role the civilians play in those operations. Secondly, the civilians and especially NGO's, but not only, are inherently basically suspicious of the military, they don't know anything about military and what they do know is not particularly positive, or what they think they know is not particularly positive. They are also very interested, especially the NGO's, as very many of us know, in preserving their own "niche". They are responsible for gathering their own funds, to keep themselves going. And if a military is seen as taking over their jobs, they of course are very reluctant to allow this to happen. Civilians and military come from very different backgrounds and they have very different experiences and this again is a part of the difficulty. They operate under different assumptions and of course quite obviously civilians and military organizations operate under very different operating procedures and we shall talk a little bit about it in a moment. Finally, it is very rare that there are clear lines of command and co-ordination between the civil organizations and agencies and the military which arrive on the scene of a peace-keeping operation.

So those are the challenges: what are the ways we can overcome - or at least move towards overcoming - them? One solution is to perhaps develop some kind of joint doctrine and training. This of course is being tried and actually in practice in many places, although may be not as wide-spread as we would like to see it at the moment - under the auspices of the United Nations, e.g. Pearson Peace-Keeping Centre in Canada and other places, that you know perhaps better than me. But another feature is joint planning. If we can plan early enough and integrate together our operations that is the civilian and military agencies, then of course the whole thing would become much easier in the execution. That is not always possible, as we know. Thirdly, once we are on the ground, we must have very early and frequent liaison between the military and the civilian organizations. And finally, we must establish some kind of civilian and military co-ordinating committees and I just want to talk about one or two of these as they operate, or have operated in Bosnia.

At the highest level in Bosnia, we have something called the Principle meeting, which is a civil military co-ordination meeting which happens ordinarily twice a week, normally in the office of the highest representative. It's aim is to achieve synchronizing in a common approach to the operations, and you can see there (slides) the principle members of this meeting, the high representative, the commander of SFOR, the special representative of the Secretary General, the Commander of the International Police Task Forces and, normally, the Senior Representative of the OSCE. And there were several others who attended these meetings. So this is an example at the highest level of an attempt to co-ordinate things. Now, we also have heard earlier this morning that we have something like 400 NGO's involved at this moment - and one way in which the activity of NGO's might be co-ordinated is something like a Military and NGO Co-ordination Meeting. The aim is, as you see, to co-ordinate the military support and co-operation with and for the non-government organizations. In this particular instance we have a deputy commander, a deputy military commander who is the chairman of the meeting, deputy commander ISFOR, we have a Senior Representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Senior World Bank Representative, very important as you know in Bosnia, the European Community Monitoring Mission Senior Representative, and then we have a whole row of Senior Representatives from the Non-Government Organizations: *Medicins Sans Frontières*, *USA-CARE* and so on. And what they do is to get together and elaborate plans to do some joint planning, they talk about protection, they talk about the logistic support and they talk about the other occasions of resources.

Now I would like to say a word or two about the way in which, the ideal way in which the military operations and civilian operations should be co-ordinated: the Dayton Peace Accord provides us good examples in many ways of a jointly planned operation. In some ways we see that agreements fell short. But I think that the important thing is that we must ensure that the overall objective is put first. The overall objective is very rarely a military objective, it's normally a some kind of civil objective or objectives. The military task within and the civilian tasks are fitted in together then to support this overall objective. So the military objective should not be the primary objective as several speakers alluded to this morning.

Dayton was quite good at this, it gave individual parties responsibilities. It was in a way an integrated plan, an integrated civil military plan. What it didn't do was to inject the civilian representatives into the chain of command, so that we had a good civil political control of the military; not in Brussels, but on the ground of the theatre. Now, perhaps this is a result of the bad experiences we talked about earlier with the DUK approach where we had the Secretary General's special representative and the military commander, especially when the NATO became involved not really being able to agree and all kind of difficulties which have flown from that. So in fact in Bosnia the military forces are in fact commanded from Brussels, by the North Atlantic Council. I think that in future operations, if we had the time and the right experience in history, we could probably ameliorate that and have a civilian on the ground with a military commander subordinated to him and the civilian getting his instructions either from the NATO or the North Atlantic Council or the WEU Council or from the Security Council in New York.

But the civilians actually implanted into the chain of command in the theatre are to be senior leaders. I think that is very important. This would lead us perhaps to organise a joint civil-military headquarters, an integrated civil-military headquarters. So that the civilian leader, unlike at the beginning of the Bosnian experience had more than just a telephone and may be an aid and a secretary to work with. He must have a whole established military headquarters to contact with who will give him the actual parts and ability to actually co-ordinate and command the operations.

This leads to the next point which I think Admiral Tornberg mentioned: that civilians who work in these headquarters must be able, must have the skills and the experience and the knowledge to do so. Otherwise, they will be a drive on this integrated recorder. And of course something we are all working on is to bringing civilians up to - I say up - to bring them to the same level of military expertise to run a joint staff that perhaps the military officers have achieved in years of experiences.

Finally, or secondly, the co-operation on the field level, there are some military skills which civilians do not possess, or some capacities: planning. The civilians, and particularly the NGO's are not particularly good in planning complex operations. The military are very good, I think that's essentially what they do for the whole of their careers. When they are not fighting, they are planning, or training according to plans. The military can also provide, of course, protection and indeed the scale of military involvement in one of these operations is inversely in proportion to the degree of stability and the security of the situation. A low security situation involves more force and more protection. And finally, logistics: a well known contribution of the military can be made out of transportation, helicopters, airlifts, certain medical facilities and infrastructure to help the civilians to complete their tasks. Now, certain civilian tasks which really the military are not really in a position to conduct themselves and that are things like supervision of elections, return of refugees, the police functions - and we can talk about that may be in the discussion period and that would perhaps allow to bring up some ideas to bring these up under the military function, de-mining operations etc. However the thing to remember about all these is that they do require generally military support, they cannot be done by civilians on their own. And the elections in Bosnia, the recent elections, are a very good example. The OCSE could not, were not able to conclude the elections without a very, very heavy SFOR support.

Finally I just wanted to say a word about the contribution of the preservers complay. They do certainly play a role in support of the US and British forces and perhaps others as well. We call up routinely civil affairs specialists who are in the reserve but who do not exist in the regular army. Very, very important people as you know who actually do the job in liaison with the local communities. Public information people running news-papers, radio stations, linguists, certain kind of logistics, that the military because perhaps of reductions of regular forces cannot any longer feed themselves in the regular forces, specialists medical people, civilians who are civilian doctors who work in civilian hospitals normally who are called upon to come to this operation, legal experts and finally even things like banking expertise. In Bosnia military and civilian in uniforms have been helping to recreate the banking system.

So in summary, a few points, I think it is wise to remember that there is no natural meeting of minds between civilians and military it has to be worked up and co-ordination is definitively a hard work on both sides. Both sides have different roles, different aims, different motives, and what we have to remember - different philosophies and these to be reconciled one with the other. Co-ordination at all levels is absolutely vital, that goes without saying. And finally the civilian and military tasks can and should complement each other and not run in opposition.

Thank you very much indeed.

The Civilian-Military Interface in Peace Support Operations



Outline

- *Civil-military cooperation at the Command level*
- *Civil-military cooperation in the field*
- *Contribution of Reservists*

Cooperation at Senior Command Levels

Challenges:

- **Lack of Military Awareness**
- **Civilian Suspicion**
- **Vastly Different Backgrounds and Experience**
- **Different Assumptions and Operating Procedures**
- **No Clear lines of Command or Coordination**

Cooperation at Senior Command Levels

Solutions:

- **Joint Doctrine and Training**
- **Joint Planning**
- **Early and Frequent Liaison**
- **Establishment of Civ/Mil Coordinating Committees**

"The Principals' Meeting"

- **Bosnia Civil-Military Coordination Meeting**
- **Twice a Week at Office of High Representative**
- **To achieve a "synchronized, common approach"**
- **Members:**
 - **HR**
 - **COMSFOR**
 - **SGSR**
 - **IPTF**
 - **OSCE**

Military-NGO Coordination Meeting

Aim: To coordinate military support and cooperation with NGOs

- **DCOMSFOR as Chairman**
 - **ICRC**
 - **World Bank**
 - **ECMM**
 - **MSF**
 - **USAID**
 - **CARE**
 - **etc.**
- **Planning, Protection, Logistic Support, Allocation of Resources**

Cooperation in the Field

- ***Military Skills***
 - Planning
 - Protection
 - Logistics
 - transportation
 - helicopter/airlift
 - medical
 - infrastructure

Cooperation in the Field

- ***Civilian Tasks***
 - Election Supervision
 - Return of Refugees
 - Police Functions
 - Demining
 - Arms Reduction and Control
- **All these require military support**

Civilian Support to the Military: Reserve Forces

- Civil Affairs Units
 - Public Information
 - Linguists
 - Logistics
 - Medical Services
 - Legal Matters
 - Banking Expertise
-

Summary

- *There is no natural “meeting of minds”*
 - *Coordination is hard work!*
 - *Different roles, aims, motives, philosophies must be reconciled*
 - *Coordination at all levels is vital*
 - *Civilian and Military tasks and skills can and should complement each other*
-

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ПРОБЛЕМЫ МИРОТВОРЧЕСТВА И ПУТИ ПОВЫШЕНИЯ ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ МЕЖГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА В МИРОТВОРЧЕСКИХ ОПЕРАЦИЯХ, ИСХОДЯ ИЗ ОПЫТА ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ РОССИИ

Уважаемые дамы, господа, коллеги!

В своем выступлении я хотел бы остановиться на некоторых проблемах миротворчества и путях повышения эффективности межгосударственного сотрудничества в миротворческих операциях, исходя из опыта ВС России.

В главе 6 Устава ООН содержится значительный перечень средств мирного разрешения споров, продолжение которых может угрожать миру. Однако, более чем полувековой опыт развития этой организации, к сожалению, не дает оснований для оптимизма в деле использования ее мирного потенциала. И с этим трудно не согласиться. По официальным данным ООН, в результате послевоенных конфликтов погибло более 20 млн. чел. и свыше 6 млн. чел. оказались калесами, но самое страшное, что главными жертвами всех конфликтов становятся мирные люди. Статистика показывает: из каждых 10 убитых 9 — мирные жители. И эти цифры продолжают расти. Что нужно сделать мировому сообществу, чтобы остановить их опасный рост? В этом вопросе, наверное, и заключена одна из целей нашей конференции и ее актуальность.

Окончание "холодной войны" резко снизило степень военного противостояния двух систем, дало возможность начать движение к многополюсной системе международных отношений и реальному избавлению от тяжелых последствий военных катаклизмов. Опыт проведения миротворческих операций в Боснии и Герцеговине показал, что миротворчество приобретает все большее значение в строительстве глобальной и региональной систем безопасности. Наступило время, когда нужны согласованная стратегия миротворческой деятельности на уровне ООН и региональных организаций (ОБСЕ, ОАГ и др.) и специальные органы в составе этих организаций, наделенные соответствующими полномочиями и отвечающие за проблемы миротворческих операций.

Опыт совместных операций также позволил выявить некоторые тенденции современного миротворческого процесса, которые в общих чертах можно сформулировать следующим образом.

1. В миротворческой деятельности происходит смещение акцентов *к операциям по принуждению к миру*.

2. Происходит передача полномочий по урегулированию региональных кризисов *от ООН к военно-политическому союзу или государству-лидеру*.

3. Создание *коалиционных группировок войск (сил)* для решения миротворческих задач.

4. Активизация участия *органов исполнительной власти* бывших конфликтующих сторон в постконфликтном устройстве миропорядка.

5. Миротворчество *начинает оказывать воздействие на трансформацию положений военных доктрин с целью уточнения задач ВС*, в том числе по их участию в проведении операций по поддержанию мира.

6. Миротворчество выступает катализатором развития сотрудничества государств в военной области.

Политические реалии современного мира свидетельствуют о том, что положительные тенденции в развитии мирового сообщества еще не стали необратимыми, не сделали его более безопасным для народов. Преодолев непосредственную угрозу глобальной войны, мировое сообщество столкнулось с опасностью возникновения и разрастания непредсказуемых по своим последствиям и трудно контролируемых вооруженных конфликтов на межэтнической и конфессиональной почве в различных регионах мира. Их предупреждение, локализация и прекращение становятся проблемой и наступающего XXI в.

Участие ВС России в международной миротворческой деятельности постоянно расширяется и становится одним из приоритетных направлений ее внешней политики. Юридической основой участия российских ВС в миротворческой деятельности является принятый Госдумой в мае 1995 г. Закон "О порядке предоставления Российской Федерацией военного и гражданского персонала для участия в деятельности по поддержанию или восстановлению международного мира и безопасности".

Опыт участия российских военнослужащих в составе контингента миротворческих сил показал, что задачи миротворчества должны выполнять профессиональные военнослужащие, прошедшие специальную подготовку к действиям в различных конфликтных ситуациях. В наших ВС личный состав для участия в миротворческих операциях подбирается из частей ВДВ. Однако,

по нашему мнению, лучше иметь постоянный контингент миротворческих сил, занимающийся в повседневной деятельности специфическими вопросами миротворчества. Сейчас, в условиях реформирования ВС РФ, ставится вопрос о создании постоянного контингента миротворческих сил.

Возможно, для кого-то это спорный вопрос. Поэтому мы считаем, что многие существующие проблемы миротворчества могут быть успешно решены в результате изучения уроков и выводов из совместных действий многонациональных сил в Боснии и Герцеговине. В этой связи российскими и американскими военными специалистами развернута совместная научно-исследовательская работа, которая позволит уточнить на будущее не только порядок подготовки и действий миротворческих сил, но и более четко определить роль, место и задачи ВС в миротворческих операциях XXI в.

Базируясь на совместных разработках, мы можем вынести на обсуждение некоторые проблемные вопросы, от решения которых во многом зависит повышение многонационального сотрудничества в миротворческих операциях:

- отсутствие постоянных органов, ответственных за миротворческие операции и наделенные соответствующими полномочиями, в структурах ООН, региональных организаций и стран;

- постоянный контингент миротворческих сил под эгидой ООН и региональных организаций со своими учебными центрами, программами учебно-боевой подготовки военнослужащих и системой их контроля, что позволит устранить ситуации, когда национальные воинские контингенты руководствуются интересами своих государств, а не коллективными интересами ООН;

- вопросы скоординированных действий при планировании, подготовке и ходе миротворческих операций;

- совместный анализ экспертами стран-участниц в составе многонациональных сил опыта подготовки и проведения миротворческих операций и другие вопросы.

Решение этих и других проблем миротворчества сегодня позволит операции многонациональных сил, проводимой в Боснии и Герцеговине, перерасти из прообраза в действительно миротворческую операцию следующего столетия, а также укрепиться и расширяться наметившейся тенденцией превращения ВС из инструмента предотвращения и отражения агрессии в инструмент предотвращения и урегулирования военных, политических, социальных и других конфликтов в будущем.

Свободная дискуссия участников конференции по данной теме Discussion on the theme of the conference

Б.Р. ТУЗМУХАМЕДОВ,
советник Управления
международного права
Конституционного суда РФ

У меня короткий комментарий, связанный с взаимодействием в миротворческих операциях между гражданскими и военными. По-моему, из всех выступающих, кто так или иначе эту тему затрагивал, только генерал Капралов упомянул вскользь вопрос о взаимодействии между персоналом, участвующим в операции, и местным населением, местными органами власти, что имеет важное значение. Персонал, который проводит операции, должен взаимодействовать с местным населением, органами государственной власти, за исключением тех случаев, когда эти органы полностью парализованы. Часто в ходе операций, как это было в отдельных районах бывшей Югославии, по крайней мере в том районе, где мне довелось работать вместе с британским подразделением, по мере развития операции местные органы власти стали восстанавливаться, после чего вели себя иной раз даже агрессивно, в том числе и по отношению к силам ООН. Вот это из нашего внимания выпало, и очень важно этот вопрос не упускать из вида.

Ю.И. БУЧИНСКИЙ,

старший преподаватель кафедры
оперативного искусства Военной академии
Генерального Штаба ВС РФ, генерал-майор

Что из себя представляет миротворчество? Это совокупность политических, дипломатических, экономических, а при необходимости и военных мер. Началась активная фаза конфликта. Вот здесь миротворческие силы проводят свои операции. Есть еще и постконфликтная деятельность, будут и другие вопросы, и потребность в миротворческих силах отпадет. Им нужно уйти своевременно. Именно на это я обращаю Ваше внимание. Профессор Козн говорил, что в конфликте участвуют военные, гражданские власти, воюющие стороны. Один из принципов миротворческих операций заключается именно в признании местного правительства, то есть мы, миротворческие силы или участники миротворческих операций, при ее проведении, наряду с другими принципами, должны признавать местные органы власти, а про них как раз и забывают, чего нельзя делать. Самый главный вопрос здесь — кто должен организовывать взаимодействие. Я считаю, что тот, кто организовал операцию, тот и должен организовать взаимодействие. Пока же все наоборот. Все отдается на откуп тому, кто возьмет больше власти в регионе.

Четкое юридическое определение существует только для случаев, когда государство соглашается по просьбе Совета Безопасности передать воинский контингент. Тогда ему высылаются рекомендации, где написано, что под операцией сил ООН по поддержанию мира следует понимать установление присутствия сил ООН в зоне конфликта. Есть силы, есть операция. А так ли это? Я считаю, что термины нужно четко определять. Один из вариантов определения термина ОПМ звучит так: это совокупность согласованных, взаимосвязанных по целям, задачам различных действий (сдерживание, блокирование, несение службы и т.д.) специально подготовленного воинского контингента по единому замыслу, плану в целях поддержания мира и т.д. Надо обязательно связать действия сил по единому замыслу и плану в интересах проведения операции, которая организуется в три этапа. Работают органы безопасности, недействующие структуры — военно-штабной комитет и департамент миротворческих операций. После выработки мандата, согласования даты ввода в действие, вручения мандата миротворческим силам, назначения командующего, объединенного штаба начинается разработка плана операции миротворческих сил, хотя миротворческая операция уже идет. Однако это уже не миротворческая операция, а операция миротворческих сил. Национальные контингенты желательно готовить по единой программе.

И последнее. Я не согласен с г-жой Спенс, когда она говорит что, Совет Безопасности чуть ли не на коленях просил НАТО, чтобы ее войска вошли в бывшую Югославию. Не так все было. Три года международные силы занимались охраной, сначала в Хорватии, Боснии, Герцеговине, Македонии едиными силами, а потом, с 31 марта 1991 г., все разделилось на две операции. В конце концов ситуация вышла из-под контроля. А кто отменил принцип миротворческой операции «согласие конфликтующих сторон». Миротворцы вошли с согласия конфликтующих сторон? Да. А теперь эти стороны стали отказываться от них. Кто их такого права лишил? Никто. Значит давайте принуждать. Нам так хочется. Планировалась операция вывода миротворческих сил, и НАТО предложило свои услуги, «помощь» в выводе. НАТО спланировало операцию по оказанию помощи в выводе миротворческих сил. Если выводить надо было около 20 тыс., то НАТО хотело ввести свои войска — около 35-40 тыс. солдат, чтобы вывести эти 20 тыс., на что не пошло мировое сообщество. Буквально через неделю Дейтонское соглашение и операция по оказанию помощи в выводе переросла практически в подготовленную операцию выполнения Дейтонского соглашения, рассчитанную на 12 месяцев. Кто мешал сразу думать, как операция будет развиваться. Практически в ходе операции сил ООН по установлению мира он был установлен? Но если он не был установлен, то зачем его поддерживать? Значит, по-видимому, мир был установлен.

А второй этап заключался в чем? В установлении мира. Но посчитали, нет там мира и эта операция плавно переросла в операцию по стабилизации. Уже 18 месяцев заканчивается через 3 месяца. И уже идут разговоры о том, что мы не сможем решить проблемы за 18 месяцев, итак, впереди еще 50 лет. В конечном итоге НАТО тоже неоднородная организация, но двойными стандартами наверное не стоит пользоваться.

Что касается большого количества миротворческих сил, то, по моему мнению, ружье, выражаясь словами классика, висящее в первом действии на стене, к концу спектакля должно выстрелить. Не кажется ли Вам, что тема миротворчества затмила все остальное. Можно создать такие миротворческие силы, что они сами себя поглотят. Раз они постоянные, то все у них будет, а конфликтов нет. Все должно быть разумным. Бутрос Гали говорил, что в мире много типов операций, много конфликтов. Есть конкретный конфликт. Мировое сообщество своевременно должно выявлять и для конкретной ситуации создавать конкретные мировые институты, в том числе и военные, для его разрешения.

Pr. Richard COHEN,
George Marshal Centre (Germany),

General, you are absolutely right. I didn't even touch on the subject of relations with the civil community. My aim was to talk about civil-military relation within the UN-Force and the organizations surrounding that, people who come from the outside and not really with the civil society. But you are right it is a big subject on its own and really requires a whole lecture devoted to its own. And I think that you certainly have brought up some very good points.

А. ШАХТАХТИНСКИЙ,
представитель НАТО по
вопросам информации в Москве

Мы не ради полемики собрались здесь, мы очень высоко оцениваем конструктивный подход с российской стороны, и тому есть прекрасные примеры. Касаясь операции в Югославии, я не могу не реагировать. Июль 1995 г. Мне не кажется, что можно сомневаться в том, что было. Я говорю о тех преступлениях, которые были совершены в зонах под защитой ООН, имея в виду не только Сараево, но и Сребреницу. Я тоже против двойных стандартов, мне безразлично, к какой вере принадлежит жертва. Мы прекрасно знаем, кто были жертвы, кто выступал в качестве великого преступника, правда были и другие преступники, их тоже разыскивают. Очень надеюсь, что их будут судить всех. Относительно акции, которую НАТО предприняло до Дейтонского соглашения, это было сделано в соответствии с резолюцией Совета Безопасности ООН по защите зон ответственности. Давайте лучше смотреть в будущее и работать вместе, а не полемизировать

Hassan ABAZA,
Royal Jordanian Air Forces, Brig.General

I just want to say one comment. I think, well in my opinion, if the conflicting parties don't believe in peace, especially the people in the top it doesn't matter what the United Nations is trying to do, or the NATO or anybody else. It comes from the people who all make the decisions and especially the conflicting parties. I can give you an example in the Middle-East, the UN took part in this part of the world for the last fifty years and up to now we don't have peace. So may be the same situation will happen in Yugoslavia unless the parties themselves will believe in peace and especially as I said, the people at the top it is not the people on the ground. From my own experience in Tadjikistan, honestly, most of the people don't want this civil war. But they are affected with it - in a way or another. And the people in the top they want war, they don't want peace. So this situation is going to continue forever, as Mr Kamel Abu-Jaber said at the beginning, we have to have peace inside us.

Larry Foster
Director of the Peace Keeping Institute
US Army, Colonel

I think one of the benefits of a gathering like this is in fact that we have different perspectives laid out and discussed. I would like just to emphasize, if I may, Mr Cohen's excellent presentation with respect to how the US Army approaches training for the civil-military, in fact, training for peace operations. We believe, and I think most armies do believe, you need to be trained to how you think to operate. So we recognize, the key connection between the civils and the military in this type of operations and we have to say that in most of these operations the military has just an enhancing role, a supporting role and in fact is subordinated to if you will a political dynamic in these operations. We tried to train to replicate that in terms of our forces. We believe that it takes a good soldier first to be a good peace-keeper and so try to lay upon standard soldiers skills in addition to sensitivity and approaches and understanding necessary to be a good peace-keeper. We also believe that if we have good soldiers who have a good professional military education system which prepares leaders at all levels in understanding of these operations then we can train just in time for particular operations. Our units have an annual training program which are based on what we call "Missions on Central Taskwork" what is a work-time mission, we find that we can adjust in time the training for a peace-operation and make that fairly effective. One another thing we are trying to do in our Peace-Keeping Institute is to include key civilian organizations in our training programs, so that soldiers understand the different minds and cultures - and we learn from each other. In fact it is not a one way learning process, but it's a both sides process, and we try to reform it, enhancing it, making it work that we all will recognize as operating in accordance with the international law, of course it is not as simple as that to make it work. But of course, only the military interfaces accords are simple, if we look at that to discuss to going to make these operations more successful in a short period of time, in other words to promote, if you will, these type of institutions which are made for a long term concrete resolutions. But I thank you for the very rich ideas which have been presented here, this afternoon.

Hassan ABAZA,
Royal Jordanian Air Forces, Brig.General

I just wanted to say one thing. Some people tried to show that there is a problem between the military and the civilians on the ground. And, from my one experience, I worked with three heads of missions. I did not face not one kind of problem with the civilians and we have integrated them into the missions. It depends on the personality. It is not a problem that there is no communication between the military and the civilians. The communication is there and sometimes the personality makes the difference. May be if the military people, or some people who don't want to talk, don't want even to work with others, this is a personal problems but in my opinion, it is not a big problem.

Claes-Goran HEDEN,
Swedish International Centre, Brig.General

As for me I would like to make a brief comment. There was a lot of information and in General Kapralov's statement, and in the intervention just earlier by the General across of me - A brief comments: of course, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia is participating. But some of the legitimacy is not all in my mind as far as for the multinationality which is involved in the UN Security Council Resolution. I would invite the two speakers to use the terms which now have been created at the proper level, because a lot of political information was also transmitted and there is the Permanent Joint Council and the NATO Headquarters, there is the Permanent Joint Military Council and Military Session where the concerns expressed could be presented and can be properly analysed and addressed. I think that to some extent, I would also refer to Prof. Cohen's presentation who eluded to the fact, that there is a quite extensive consultation going on between NATO and the United Nations at very various levels built in Bosnia and New York and occasionally in Brussels where information is exchanged, where concerns were expressed, where certain facts are being discussed, at the proper level, at the Ambassadorial level. Thank you.

В.К. ПОТЕМКИН,
начальник Центра военно-
стратегических исследований Генерального Штаба ВС РФ,
генерал-лейтенант

Чтобы не создалось привратное впечатление о незаконности пребывания российского миротворческого контингента в Боснии и Герцеговине, хотел бы сказать, что часть миротворческого контингента осталась по решению ООН и продолжала выполнять задачи после того, как были развернуты силы НАТО. В последующем российский парламент на основании Указа Президента РФ ратифицировал это положение, и на юридических основаниях наш контингент как страны ООН был представлен в составе миротворческого контингента. В последующем законодательство продолжалось, и сегодня есть Указ Президента РФ о формировании специального контингента миротворческих сил России. Этот Указ соответствует позиции России, в том числе и точке зрения военных, которую я сегодня представлял, что в составе миротворческих сил не обязательно иметь группировки вооруженных сил. У нас для миротворческих сил выделен специальный контингент, правда я должен сказать, что он базируется на структуре воздушно-десантных войск, специальных инженерных, медицинских, тыловых частей. В этом на сегодняшний день заключается отличие нашего подхода, а юридическая база для выделения и применения миротворческого контингента есть.

О.И. ВИШНЕВСКИЙ,
исполнительный директор Фонда
"Российский общественно-политический центр"

Призываю всех выступающих проявлять терпимость и внимание друг к другу. Вопросы, которые сегодня обсуждаются, волнуют всех. Мы говорим о проблемах вчерашних, позавчерашних, но, к сожалению, мало говорим о завтрашних, начала XXI в., о том, что мы можем сделать уже сегодня. На конференции в Стокгольме было представлено 11 государств. Здесь количество государств увеличилось до 21. Мы разрабатываем документы, делаем предложения на уровне государственных руководителей и т.д.

Хотелось бы внести свое предложение. Может быть, есть смысл создать небольшой координационный совет или группу с целью уточнения вопросов, которые целесообразно обсудить и, возможно, оговорить ряд технических проблем. Второе. Почему бы нам не подготовить обращение к главам государств и правительствам, к международным организациям, содержащие глубокий и проработанный анализ тех проблемных вопросов, о которых мы говорили в Стокгольме. Может быть, этот организационный комитет сможет подготовить такой документ и здесь, в Москве.

Тема: Роль национальных и международных миротворческих центров в миротворческих операциях

**Theme: National & International Peacekeeping Centers:
Opportunities of collaboration**

В.Г. АВАКУМОВ,
заместитель начальника Высших офицерских курсов "Выстрел",
генерал-лейтенант

**ПРИВЕТСТВИЕ УЧАСТНИКОВ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ ОТ РУКОВОДСТВА
ВЫСШИХ ОФИЦЕРСКИХ КУРСОВ "ВЫСТРЕЛ"**

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оборонительный характер военной доктрины России, основные направления проводимой военной реформы. В ходе учебного процесса главное внимание уделяется практической подготовке офицеров. 60—70% учебного времени уделяется полевым занятиям, работе с вооружением и техникой. Основной категорией обучаемых являются командиры полков (мсп, тп, пдп), командиры батальонов, дивизионов и их заместители. Из 600 час., отводимых на обучение, свыше 60% (360—380 час.) занимает тактическая и тактико-специальная подготовка; до 20% (80—110 час.) выделяется на изучение вопросов управления повседневной деятельностью части, подразделения; до 15% (80—90 час.) — на военно-техническую подготовку.

Подготовку офицеров в данный момент на курсах осуществляют свыше 80 преподавателей, из них 10 чел. имеют ученую степень, 12 — обладают опытом боевых действий. Все преподаватели до перехода на преподавательскую работу служили в полковом, дивизионном, армейском и окружном звеньях. В прошлом году курсы подготовили свыше 800 офицеров для российской армии по более чем 20 военным специальностям.

В деятельности курсов "Выстрел" значительное место занимает подготовка иностранных военнослужащих, которая ведется более 70 лет. За это время подготовлено около 10 тыс. военных специалистов по более чем 100 специальностям для 70 государств. Так, в 1993 г. у нас прошло обучение около 100 военнослужащих. В 1994—1997 гг. было организовано обучение уже более 300 военнослужащих из 22 государств, таких, как Кувейт, Мали, Корея, Кипр, Армения, Киргизия, Таджикистан, Казахстан и др. Диапазон подготовки иностранных военнослужащих довольно велик — от руководящего состава батальонов, полков, бригад до инструкторов и специалистов по боевому применению, эксплуатации и ремонту различных видов вооружения и техники.

Особым направлением нашей деятельности является подготовка военных наблюдателей ООН и офицеров штабов миротворческих сил, которая ведется с 1974 г., а с 1996 г. в созданном для этого на базе курсов "Выстрел" Российском центре подготовки офицеров-наблюдателей сил ООН. Здесь обучаются и иностранные специалисты. Сделано это по инициативе США, Канады, Швеции, Финляндии и других государств, чьи представители специально посетили курсы "Выстрел", изучили наши возможности. За эти два года, к примеру, прошли обучение военнослужащие из США, Канады, Великобритании, Германии, Норвегии, Дании, Швеции — около 40 чел., причем больше половины слушателей составили представители Великобритании и США. Пользуясь случаем, хочу пригласить и другие государства принять участие в обучении на курсах.

Повышение активности России в миротворческой деятельности потребовало от нас увеличения подготовки военных специалистов для миссий ООН. Так, в период с 1974 по 1990 г. было обучено около 200 российских военных наблюдателей ООН, а за последние годы в Российском центре прошли подготовку свыше 500 военных наблюдателей, военных полицейских и офицеров штабов сил ООН. Всего курсы "Выстрел" подготовили для миссий ООН около 600 военных специалистов.

Основное внимание при подготовке наблюдателей ООН обращается на:

- знание основных технических характеристик вооружения и техники, используемых сторонами, вовлеченными в конфликт в районах развертывания и функционирования миссий ООН;

- знание разведывательных характеристик техники и вооружения, встречающихся в районах миссий ООН;

- умение работать со средствами связи в соответствии с регламентом связи миссий ООН;

- умение водить автомобиль в сложных полевых и городских условиях;

- умение ориентироваться на местности и работать с топографическими картами.

Курсы активно участвуют в выполнении положений Договора по ограничению вооруженных сил и обычных вооружений в Европе. В 1990—1991 гг. нами подготовлено более 250 офицеров-инспекторов по контролю за сокращением вооруженных сил и обычных вооружений. Контроль со стороны соответствующих органов ООН показывает, что качество подготовки иностранных специалистов на курсах соответствует международным стандартам, и имеется возможность для обучения на существующей учебно-лабораторной базе не только военных наблюдателей ООН, но и других специалистов для службы в миротворческих операциях под флагом ООН, как, например:

- офицеров штабов Объединенного командования операций по поддержанию мира (ОПМ ООН);

- офицеров связи ОПМ ООН;

- офицеров тыловых и технических служб ООН;

- командиров подразделений миротворческих сил ООН;

- офицеров военной полиции ООН;

- офицеров гражданской полиции ООН;

- служащих гражданского персонала ОПМ ООН;

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генерал-лейтенант

**ПРИВЕТСТВИЕ УЧАСТНИКОВ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ ОТ РУКОВОДСТВА
ВЫСШИХ ОФИЦЕРСКИХ КУРСОВ "ВЫСТРЕЛ"**

Уважаемые дамы и господа!

Выражаю свою признательность в том, что Вы оказали нам честь и внимание своим посещением нашего учебного заведения. Некоторые из Вас уже бывали на Высших офицерских курсах "Выстрел". В своем выступлении я коротко остановлюсь на истории возникновения, становления, развития, основных вопросах организации и хода процесса подготовки офицеров российских вооруженных сил и иностранных военнослужащих на курсах за последние годы.

Высшие офицерские курсы "Выстрел" им. Маршала Б.М. Шапошникова являются одним из старейших учебных заведений Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Они начали свою историю 7 июня 1826 г. — во время формирования Образцового учебного батальона при Гвардейском корпусе русской армии. За это время курсы многократно реорганизовывались в зависимости от геополитической обстановки, развития военно-технической мысли и совершенствовании военного дела и превратились в многоплановое военно-учебное заведение, по праву называемое в войсках полковой академией. Во все времена курсы "Выстрел" осуществляли подготовку высококвалифицированных, преданных своему Отечеству офицеров.

Весной 1827 г. батальон преобразовывается в Образцовый пехотный полк. Осенью 1827 г. состоялся первый выпуск инструкторов в гвардию. С января 1858 г. курсы стали называться Стрелковая школа, а с 1859 г. — Стрелковая офицерская школа. В период с 1826 по 1882 г. Образцовый батальон и полк, а также учебный пехотный батальон подготовили для армии около 130 тыс. офицеров и унтер-офицеров. В 1863—1864 гг. в батальоне курс тактики вел видный теоретик и педагог генерал от инфантерии М.И. Драгомиров.

Наряду с подготовкой офицерского состава, наши курсы всегда уделяли внимание развитию стрелкового и автоматического оружия. Продолжая традиции, заложенные в 1892 г. ученым секретарем опытной комиссии школы, теоретиком и практиком стрелкового дела генерал-лейтенантом Н.М. Филятовым, под руководством которого при школе воспитывались отечественные конструкторы-оружейники, создававшие автоматическое оружие: В.Г. Федоров, В.А. Дегтярев, Ф.В. Токарев, Н.И. Колесников, В.П. Коновалов и др. Курсы и сегодня занимаются испытанием новых образцов вооружения, разработкой боевых уставов, инструкций и наставлений, участвуют в научно-исследовательских проектах.

Великая Отечественная война 1941—1945 гг. потребовала перестройки учебного процесса таким образом, чтобы удовлетворить потребности армии в командных кадрах и возросшие требования к ним. С этой сложной задачей курсы "Выстрел" успешно справились. За годы Великой Отечественной войны курсы подготовили более 20 тыс. командиров ротного, батальонного, полкового, а также армейского и фронтового звена, среди них 1700 командиров полков.

В настоящее время в качестве учебно-методического центра Сухопутных войск курсы выполняют большой и сложный комплекс задач профессиональной подготовки командных кадров полкового и батальонного уровня, офицеров штабных специальностей в звене полк — бригада — дивизия, преподавателей военных училищ, а также иностранных военнослужащих и специалистов для осуществления операций по поддержанию мира под эгидой ООН.

Военно-профессиональная подготовка офицерского состава для Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации проводится в сроки от 10 дней до 4 месяцев и осуществляется по более чем 20 учебным программам, в которых учтены особенности военно-политической обстановки в мире,

оборонительный характер военной доктрины России, основные направления проводимой военной реформы. В ходе учебного процесса главное внимание уделяется практической подготовке офицеров. 60—70% учебного времени уделяется полевым занятиям, работе с вооружением и техникой. Основной категорией обучаемых являются командиры полков (мсп, тп, псп), командиры батальонов, дивизионов и их заместители. Из 600 час., отводимых на обучение, свыше 60% (360—380 час.) занимает тактическая и тактико-специальная подготовка; до 20% (80—110 час.) выделяется на изучение вопросов управления повседневной деятельностью части, подразделения; до 15% (80—90 час.) — на военно-техническую подготовку.

Подготовку офицеров в данный момент на курсах осуществляют свыше 80 преподавателей, из них 10 чел. имеют ученую степень, 12 — обладают опытом боевых действий. Все преподаватели до перехода на преподавательскую работу служили в полковом, дивизионном, армейском и окружном звеньях. В прошлом году курсы подготовили свыше 800 офицеров для российской армии по более чем 20 военным специальностям.

В деятельности курсов "Выстрел" значительное место занимает подготовка иностранных военнослужащих, которая ведется более 70 лет. За это время подготовлено около 10 тыс. военных специалистов по более чем 100 специальностям для 70 государств. Так, в 1993 г. у нас прошло обучение около 100 военнослужащих. В 1994—1997 г.г. было организовано обучение уже более 300 военнослужащих из 22 государств, таких, как Кувейт, Мали, Корея, Кипр, Армения, Киргизия, Таджикистан, Казахстан и др. Диапазон подготовки иностранных военнослужащих довольно велик — от руководящего состава батальонов, полков, бригад до инструкторов и специалистов по боевому применению, эксплуатации и ремонту различных видов вооружения и техники.

Особым направлением нашей деятельности является подготовка военных наблюдателей ООН и офицеров штабов миротворческих сил, которая ведется с 1974 г., а с 1996 г. в созданном для этого на базе курсов "Выстрел" Российском центре подготовки офицеров-наблюдателей сил ООН. Здесь обучаются и иностранные специалисты. Сделано это по инициативе США, Канады, Швеции, Финляндии и других государств, чьи представители специально посетили курсы "Выстрел", изучили наши возможности. За эти два года, к примеру, прошли обучение военнослужащие из США, Канады, Великобритании, Германии, Норвегии, Дании, Швеции — около 40 чел., причем больше половины слушателей составили представители Великобритании и США. Пользуясь случаем, хочу пригласить и другие государства принять участие в обучении на курсах.

Повышение активности России в миротворческой деятельности потребовало от нас увеличения подготовки военных специалистов для миссий ООН. Так, в период с 1974 по 1990 г. было обучено около 200 российских военных наблюдателей ООН, а за последние годы в Российском центре прошли подготовку свыше 500 военных наблюдателей, военных полицейских и офицеров штабов сил ООН. Всего курсы "Выстрел" подготовили для миссий ООН около 600 военных специалистов.

Основное внимание при подготовке наблюдателей ООН обращается на:

- знание основных технических характеристик вооружения и техники, используемых сторонами, вовлеченными в конфликт в районах развертывания и функционирования миссий ООН;

- знание разведывательных характеристик техники и вооружения, встречающихся в районах миссий ООН;

- умение работать со средствами связи в соответствии с регламентом связи миссий ООН;

- умение водить автомобиль в сложных полевых и городских условиях;

- умение ориентироваться на местности и работать с топографическими картами.

Курсы активно участвуют в выполнении положений Договора по ограничению вооруженных сил и обычных вооружений в Европе. В 1990—1991 г.г. нами подготовлено более 250 офицеров-инспекторов по контролю за сокращением вооруженных сил и обычных вооружений. Контроль со стороны соответствующих органов ООН показывает, что качество подготовки иностранных специалистов на курсах соответствует международным стандартам, и имеется возможность для обучения на существующей учебно-лабораторной базе не только военных наблюдателей ООН, но и других специалистов для службы в миротворческих операциях под флагом ООН, как, например:

- офицеров штабов Объединенного командования операций по поддержанию мира (ОПМ ООН);

- офицеров связи ОПМ ООН;

- офицеров тыловых и технических служб ООН;

- командиров подразделений миротворческих сил ООН;

- офицеров военной полиции ООН;

- офицеров гражданской полиции ООН;

- служащих гражданского персонала ОПМ ООН;

— специалистов для выполнения миротворческих задач под эгидой НАТО, ОБСЕ и других организаций.

Для подготовки офицеров вооруженных сил России, армий СНГ и иностранных специалистов курсы "Выстрел" располагают продуманной организационно-штатной структурой, что доказывает преимущество курсовой подготовки как основного звена поэтапного обучения офицеров в системе непрерывного образования.

Курсы "Выстрел" включают:

- управление;
- 9 учебных циклов и 2 отдельных дисциплины;
- 5 учебных курсов и специальное отделение;
- отделы, службы и отделения обеспечения и обслуживания офицеров—слушателей и иностранных военнослужащих.

Практические занятия проводятся с использованием вооружения и техники полка обеспечения учебного процесса и автомобильной базы. Учебно-материальная база состоит из классно-лабораторной, прикурсовой, полевой и учебно-спортивной базы. Классно-лабораторная база расположена в 8 учебных корпусах, 7 павильонах, 1 гостинице и включает около 150 классов, 5 лекционных аудиторий, имеющих свыше 4 тыс. посадочных мест.

Основной полевой учебной базой является территория полигона (свыше 9300 га), находящаяся рядом с г. Солнечногорском, на объектах которого проводятся все виды полевых занятий: стрельба, вождение боевых машин и т.д. Полигон имеет учебно-тактическое поле для проведения РТУ с боевой стрельбой, учебно-артиллерийский комплекс с командным пунктом, учебные поля по подготовке офицеров родов войск (ПВО, РХБЗ, инженерных и разведки), директрису БМП, танковую директрису, автоматизированное войсковое стрельбище для выполнения упражнений из стрелкового оружия и гранатометов, три танкодрома, два вододома для обучения вождению на плаву и под водой, два автодрома.

На курсах применяется современная технология организации учебного процесса, прогрессивные методики обучения. Занятия проводятся как в поле, так и в стационарных условиях. Иностранные военнослужащие занимаются в современных корпусах с десятками специализированных классов и аудиторий, конференц-залом, библиотеками и лабораториями, спортзалами и стадионом, стрелковым тиром. Классы оснащены электронно-техническими средствами обучения, подключены к единой телевизионной системе курсов.

Слушатели размещаются в благоустроенных гостиницах, оборудованных спутниковым телевидением, питаются в столовой и кафе военного городка, в котором имеется Дом офицеров с комнатами отдыха, бильярдной, кинозалом, библиотекой, буфетом и т.д. В военном городке также есть свое почтовое отделение, сберегательный банк, междугородний переговорный пункт, банно-прачечный комбинат, магазины, кафетерий, парикмахерские и другие социально-бытовые заведения.

Сам городок расположен в экологически чистой зоне на берегу живописного оз. Сенеж, являющегося жемужиной Подмосковья, что дает возможность хорошо отдохнуть в свободное время, поплавать на яхтах и лодках, половить рыбу, а зимой походить на лыжах. В выходные дни для иностранных военнослужащих организуются поездки и экскурсии в театры, музеи, на выставки Москвы и исторические памятные места Подмосковья, в некоторых из них проводятся учебные занятия по истории и культуре народов страны пребывания.

Таким образом, Высшие офицерские курсы "Выстрел" вносят определенный вклад в миротворческую деятельность России, осуществляют подготовку специалистов для миротворческих сил ООН.

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ПРИВЕТСТВИЕ УЧАСТНИКОВ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ ОТ ШТАБА ПО КООРДИНАЦИИ ВОЕННОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА ГОСУДАРСТВ-УЧАСТНИКОВ СНГ

Уважаемые дамы и господа!

От имени руководства Штаба по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ приветствую представителей правительственных, дипломатических, научных, военных и общественных организаций различных стран мира, прибывших на вторую международную конференцию по проблемам миротворчества на рубеже XXI в.

Особую признательность позвольте выразить руководителям Фонда "Российский общественно-политический центр", Канадского международного миротворческого подготовительного центра Пирсона, Отдела прессы и информации НАТО, Шведского Национального Оборонного Колледжа, а также Иорданского Института дипломатии как организаторам настоящего форума. Конференция призвана изучить пути повышения эффективности многонационального сотрудничества в миротворческих операциях, определить роль и место в этих операциях национальных и международных миротворческих центров.

Штаб по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ, на территории которого Вы сейчас находитесь, создан в декабре 1993 г. Его важнейшей задачей является координация деятельности по обеспечению национальной и коллективной военной безопасности всех участников Содружества Независимых Государств. В решении этой задачи миротворческая деятельность занимает одно из ведущих мест. Содружество Независимых Государств — сравнительно молодая региональная организация, которая находится в стадии поисков наиболее эффективных и оптимальных путей становления и развития.

Большинством государств Содружества миротворческая деятельность признана приоритетным направлением внутренней и внешней политики по укреплению коллективной и национальной безопасности, сохранению территориальной целостности и независимости. Основным итогом миротворческой деятельности на территории государств—участников Содружества Независимых Государств, стало прекращение кровопролития в Абхазии, Приднестровье, Южной Осетии, обеспечение межджаджского диалога. За этими действиями стоят тысячи спасенных человеческих жизней.

В силу ряда причин основной формой миротворческой деятельности в Содружестве являются операции по поддержанию мира с использованием воинских контингентов. Практика показала, что такие операции — эффективное средство прекращения или локализации вооруженных конфликтов. Несмотря на предпринимаемые коллективные усилия по урегулированию кризисов мирным путем, к сожалению, в различных регионах СНГ сохраняются очаги потенциальных вооруженных конфликтов, представляющих главную угрозу безопасности и стабильности в Содружестве.

Говоря непосредственно о месте и роли Штаба по координации военного сотрудничества государств—участников СНГ, следует прежде всего отметить, что участие в миротворческой деятельности — одна из основных функций Штаба. Штаб сегодня является координирующим органом, который участвует в решении комплекса вопросов, связанных с поддержанием мира в Республике Таджикистан и зоне конфликта в Абхазии. Основные наши усилия сосредоточены на подготовке предложений по развитию операций по поддержанию мира, разработке правовой и теоретической базы миротворчества, оказании помощи командованию коллективных сил. Штабом разработаны проекты более 20 ключевых решений Совета Глав государств и Совета Министров обороны государств—участников СНГ по вопросам проведения операций по поддержанию мира, 6 основополагающих теоретических руководящих документов, в частности, "Концепция предотвращения и урегулирования конфликтов", "Положение о коллективных силах по поддержанию мира", "Соглашение о подготовке и обучении военного и гражданского персонала", "Наставление по подготовке и проведении операций по поддержанию мира", "Основные термины миротворческой деятельности". 17 генералов и офицеров Штаба принимали участие в операциях по поддержанию мира в составе Объединенного командования коллективных миротворческих сил в Республике Таджикистан. Представители Штаба неоднократно выезжали в районы проведения операций для уточнения и согласования подходов конфликтующих сторон, привлекались к решению наиболее важных проблем по урегулированию конфликтов, оказанию практической помощи командованию миротворческих сил, к изучению реальной военно-политической обстановки и настроений местного населения. По результатам этой работы готовились предложения для принятия решения Советом Глав государств и Советом Министров обороны Содружества. За истекшие годы мы провели 6 научно-практических конференций по проблемам миротворчества, приняли у себя в Штабе делегации более 40 различных стран. Генералы и офицеры аппарата Штаба выезжали в Великобританию, Норвегию, Швецию и другие страны.

Приведенные данные наглядно свидетельствуют о том, что Штаб принимает активное участие в миротворческой деятельности, решении вопросов поддержания мира в СНГ, что является приоритетным направлением его деятельности.

На сегодняшнем заседании конференции хотелось бы сконцентрировать внимание участников на ряде проблем миротворческой деятельности, которые на наш взгляд, требуют своего разрешения.

Во-первых, проблемой можно назвать так называемый "принцип согласия". Он предусматривает согласие не только со стороны органа, учреждающего миротворческую операцию, но и согласие самих конфликтующих сторон на разрешение конфликта мирными

политическими средствами. Иначе говоря, разрешение конфликта это прежде всего дело конфликтующих сторон.

Во-вторых, по нашему мнению миротворчество должно стать прерогативой международных региональных организаций. В этой связи было бы оправдано, если бы Совет безопасности ООН делегировал часть своих полномочий этим организациям в соответствии со статьей 52 главы 8 Устава ООН.

В-третьих, принимая во внимание, что миротворческие операции требуют привлечения значительных материальных и финансовых средств и людских ресурсов, правомерно поставить вопрос о направлении основных усилий мирового сообщества на реализацию принципов и механизмов раннего предупреждения конфликтов путем разрешения споров и противоречий на стадии их зарождения. В этой связи представляется целесообразным участникам конференции проработать вопрос о создании международного механизма предотвращения конфликтов или, по крайней мере, поставить эту проблему.

В-четвертых, значительного совершенствования требует система управления миротворческими операциями. Для ведения миротворческих операций привлекаются воинские контингенты, военные наблюдатели, специальные миссии. Руководство ими сосредоточено исключительно в аппарате Генерального секретаря ООН. Это затрудняет проведение операций на качественном профессиональном уровне. Целесообразно было бы возродить Военно-штабной комитет Совета Безопасности ООН как орган военного управления силами, участвующими в операциях. В действительности Военно-штабной комитет Совета Безопасности ООН от осуществления этой функции отстранен.

Таков наш взгляд на некоторые поставленные проблемы.

В работе конференции принимают участие представители разных государств мира. Многие участники являются крупными специалистами в области миротворчества и хорошо известны не только в Содружестве Независимых Государств, но и во всем мире. Прозвучавшие на конференции идеи, предложения, представляют научный и практический интерес. Этот потенциал несомненно будет обобщен, а наиболее ценные предложения помогут совершенствовать и развивать миротворческую деятельность.

Штаб по координации военного сотрудничества стран-участников СНГ приветствует решение о проведении третьей международной конференции по миротворчеству осенью нынешнего года в Иордании и готов принять участие в ее работе. Позвольте от имени руководства Штаба по координации военного сотрудничества государств-участников СНГ еще раз поприветствовать Вас и пожелать успешной работы международной конференции.

Claes-Goran HEDEN,
Swedish International Centre,
Brig.General

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have the honour to make a brief and quick presentation about the Swedish Armed Forces International Command, abbreviated SwedIn. I took the command when the International Command was organized on the first of July last year and some of you might met me at my command, last year, when you visited the Stockholm Conference

I am subordinated to the Supreme Commander, the Head Quarters in Stockholm - and I am responsible as a Division Commander, as you can say in the Army terminology, I am a Division Commander, but my responsibility is also all Swedish individuals and units abroad. So, my responsibility is all Swedish national matters concerning all the Swedish participants in United Nations or other international operations. We have some, in fact, two units or individuals directly subordinated to the Headquarters in Stockholm and that is the non-NATO Unit for Co-ordination in Sarajevo and also the Swedish - Scandinavian Intelligence Cell in Sarajevo. Those two are directly subordinated to the Supreme Headquarters in Stockholm. All the rest are under my responsibility.

Our main tasks are, in fact, five:

- We have to recruit and train all Swedish men and women who are going to serve in international missions. They are also employed by me. I employ them before the deployment into the mission area. And that concerns all the Swedish civil policemen, they are subordinated to me and they are employed by me during their mission time.

I have, as I showed you on the first slide, the national commander control concerning all national matters. We are also responsible for all support, the logistics down to the battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fifth task is one of the main tasks, that we put a lot of efforts into today. That is a deep briefing program. Every man and woman coming back from a mission abroad goes through a three-day debriefing period. As we heard before lunch, my Russian colleagues are building up their competence

centre, and this is what I am responsible for in Sweden as the Armed Forces Competence Centre in International Matters.

We do evaluate the ongoing missions, lessons learnt. We prepare regulations and directives and especially we have a working group within the Nordic countries, we work together with the Finns, Danes, and Norwegians in regulations and directives. We do develop tactics, techniques and training methods for peacekeeping. And we also participate in the development of new equipment, for different types of peacekeeping units. I am going to show you an example of that. The International Command consists today of about 130 officers and civilians and we are situated just south-west of Stockholm. I am an artillery officer my-self, I belong to the Swedish Navy, so you can see that this command is a joint command. My deputy commander is a Colonel from the Army, I have a staff personnel (information, plans, logistics, communications, finance...) I also have a controller, a civilian, he is an expert in economics, because I am responsible for about 1 hundred million dollars a year. I have to know what I do with every single dollar, in front of my government. And that's why I have to lean on my expert.

Our training centre - that's the place where our collaborators from different countries come, when they come to Sweden, they are meeting my officers at the training centre. And we have also organized a regional Partnership for Peace Training Centre. And I am coming back to talking about the Education and Training.

I have a Support unit under my command, I have the new Swedish Repatriation Unit, and I am coming back to that too. We have units undergoing training and just now this week, the tenth Swedish battalion for Bosnia is ending their final exercises, and they are starting their rotation next week, down to Bosnia. Of course, we are involved with the PFT matters, exercises, seminars a.s.o We have a battalion, a Swedish battalion inside Bosnia today, we have a platoon in the former Republic of Macedonia, our military observers, monitors, civilian policemen. The officers in the Nordic Pole have regained their places in the Headquarters in the BOI. And we also have, as we call it an "Officer's Pool": it is about 10 officers from a Brig. Gal down to Major who are trained and ready to go out, when our Supreme Commander decides to quote the Swedish soldiers to somewhere on the earth where we are needed.

The Command was organized the first of July last year. And from that time we have got 3 new tasks: Firstly to organise a rapid reaction unit, secondly, as I have told you, to organise the regional PFP training Centre and the third task is focusing on CI-MiC affairs, (civilian-military cooperation) - as we have been talking about during the Conference, especially yesterday.

Gal Hedderstedt mentioned yesterday, when he was talking about SHIRBRING - he mentioned that Sweden is organising a Rapid Reaction Unit, that is the Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit, consisting of about 450 men. And the main components are a mechanized infantry company and a special unit. And, it is the government who has decided what that special unit should be. For the first period that means for the first year, that special unit is an engineer company - the unit also consists of some liaison and logistic elements as of course a very small staff and thus you can see this is not a battalion it's a unit that we plan to put into a multinational bigger unit. For example the SHIRBRING.

The regional PFP Training Centre: there we have responsibility for education and training according to the overall purposes of the PFP: courses, seminars, symposiums, language courses. We also have the capability and readiness to contribute to PFP exercises and exercises in the spirit of it PFP. We also take part in the planning and for example we are going to execute in the spirit of PFP big exercise in Sept-Oct this year in Sweden. We also have the responsibility to strengthen partner nations if they ask our help, as Sweden has taken part in 14 different PFP exercises during 1998. This training consists of four parts: we train of course Swedish units, we also train international units in international training courses, we arrange seminars and we also support other countries with peace-keeping competence. Some of our training activities or above-mentioned seminars were involved in the United Nations projects - for example for the Baltic States, preparing national personnel.

So mentioned, we do have unit training and courses. And the unit training is shown on this slide, the battalion - for the Nordic Polish Brigade in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Swedish platoon in Macedonia... We also have the responsibility for the training of the national support element in Hungary, in Southern Hungary, supporting the troops in Bosnia. We also do train the Swedish Rapid Reaction Unit. The Rapid Reaction Unit shall be operative from the first of July this year. The courses that we arrange at the Training Centre are mainly for Governmental Organizations and NGO 's, we do have basic training for females, some have made their proofs in the Swedish Units abroad. We are open for females, and those females who haven't done their basic training, they have to go through a short 3 weeks course. We have courses for the military observers, policemen, United Nations Police Officers, PFP Staff Officers courses. We train monitors and delegates, as I mentioned, we have English language courses. We have a United Nations Staff Officers Course, United Nations Juniors Officers Course. That Course is mainly for young officers, captains and majors, platoon leaders and company commanders. And we also help Admiral Dunbary with some of our experts from our international command to the National Defence College.

The training steps for a normal Swedish officer for international missions or a Swedish unit is based on three bones:

- the preparatory training, as we call it, UN staff officer's course or the Junior Officers course, or the police officers course. These are the basic courses. Logistic officers course.

Then we try to have a fact-finding period down to the mission area. That's the second step.

And just before the rotation down to the mission area, we have the mission training. The battalion mission training, for the whole battalion is a 3 weeks period. Some of the soldiers and officers have been in for training for some 5 weeks. In the bottom of this slide, you have the ordinary soldier's training, their basic training. They are all volunteers.

For the future, at the regional PFP training Centre, we are building up a computerized training system, so that we can arrange combined post exercises in a computerized environment - so, that every officer working in his staff should, or must, recognize himself in his special mission area. We take back information from the mission area, put them into the computers and then let the officers train at the command before they are employed, or deployed into a mission area.

The last picture of my 15 minutes which are running out is just to show where you find Swedish peacekeepers today: We are involved in 16 different missions from Guatemala in the West to Korea in the East. The latest mission is in the Sahara, where we have, just before Christmas deployed 10 civilian policemen and perhaps the Swedish Government is going to take the decision, this week to deploy a Swedish demining unit to the Western Sahara to help the preparations for the elections later on this year. That ends my thoughts briefing Thank you very much.



Larry FORSTER,
US Army Peacekeeping
Institute Director, Colonel

U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE

I very much appreciate the opportunity to be able to speak about the US Army Peacekeeping Institute and following the example of my Swedish colleague, I shall try to compress a little bit of information about our particular organization in a short period of time.

I think you will see that our goals and our purposes are slightly different from that of other peacekeeping training centres. In our case we have a particular Institute which was created in 1993. We also recognise that there are things distinctly different about peace-support operations, to that which we have an experience within the US military. So this was an issue of concerns for those who decided to create an Institute that permitted the study, the discussion, and the exploration of the unique issues related to the peace-support operations on world-wide level. That is the US Army War College in Pennsylvania.

BACKGROUND	THE US ARMY IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS
• Created in July 1993 • Purpose: • Engage in the debate on peace operations • Study strategic/operational implications • Represent the Army/military in appropriate forums • Educate senior leaders • Instruct Army War College students • Support the combatant commanders • Integrate strategic lessons learned • Convey the message:	TASKS • PROMOTE STRATEGIC & OPERATIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, AND APPLICATION • ESTABLISH AFFILIATION WITH INSTITUTIONS AND "THINK TANKS" • INSTRUCT ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS • SUPPORT COMBATANT COMMANDERS • PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOCTRINE • SERVE AS AN INFORMATION INTEGRATION AGENCY FOR SENIOR ARMY LEADERS



NETWORK with: • Office of the Secretary of Defense • US Senior Service Colleges • US Commanders-in-Chief • US Department of State (Foreign Service Institute) • UN Operational Agencies: Secretariat Triad (Security/Humanitarian/Political) • Academic Centers • International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers • Foreign Military Organizations	OPERATE • Provide Pre-deployment Training • Fill Key Positions on Joint Task Force Staffs • Study/Participate in Military Support to Civilian Operations: • International Emergency Structures • Democratic Governance Support • International Police Operations
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EDUCATE • Conduct the Chairman's Peace Operations Seminar • Co-sponsor Interagency Training for Complex Emergencies • Provide Negotiations Training • Teach Electives at the Army War College (3) • Co-instruct the International Conflict Resolution Skills Course with the US Institute of Peace • Support Regional Command Training Exercises	INTEGRATE • Coordinate Strategic Level After Action Reviews • Review/Produce Peace Operations Doctrine • Input into Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook • Produce Appropriate Publications • Facilitate Military and Civilian Contingency Architecture Harmonization
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PROJECTS • Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR) • CJCS Seminar and Game on Peace Operations • Interagency Training For Complex Contingencies • International Conflict Resolution Skills Training Seminar (ICREST) • Revision of FM 100-23, Peace Operations • Civilian-Military Handbook • Complex Emergency Assessment Tool • Seminar and Exercise Support	ISSUES • Establishing Sustainable Security • Comprehensive Campaign Planning • Military Support to Civilian Operations • Familiarization with Contingency Response Architecture • Support for Democratic Governance • Total Asset Protection
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"VALUE ADDED" • ARMY BETTER PREPARED FOR PEACE OPERATIONS IN TODAY'S COMPLEX CONTINGENCY ENVIRONMENT THROUGH: * CURRENT OPERATIONS EXPERTISE * CONTINUOUS DIALOGUE WITH PK/HA COMMUNITY * LEADER DEVELOPMENT * DOCTRINE * EDUCATION AND TRAINING * LITERATURE
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We have become a Forum within any US Military to discuss, to train to educate on any peace-support operation and also a point of interface between the US Army and other services between the US Military and other departments of Government, between the US Military and the United Nations and other Centres, as appropriate to explore the key issues and the concerns and the kinds of questions that occur in the spraid dynamic environment of peace-support operations. And I might just add that as a part of this process we have in addition a responsibility of teaching our Work Army College Students, educating them about peace-support operations and we have become a place of where senior officers, or general officers, admirals can come and also explore some of the issues related to peace-support operations. The creation of the US Peacekeeping Institute was meant to send the message that the US Military is committed to this type of operations and we would be prepared to conduct our share, our portion in these operations in a professional and competent manner.

The task that has evolved for the US Army Peacekeeping Institute are as they are shown here: Besides a commanding debate centre we also made a place of which there can be support for regional commanders and chiefs in their plans and aims and exercises on peace support operations and to be a place from where data come for expertise on peace support operations should that be required. And the last point mentioned here is, - I think it worth noting, - we have become an information and inauguration agency for the US military; we are responsible for taking the lessons learnt - at a strategic operational level and make sure that these are inaugurated within our professional military education system and also to produce the documents, the doctrines and the documents that would support the training education in common practice in peace-support operations within the US military.

This allows our organisation to accomplish these tasks, it is very small organisation, and I would make appear in green our serving army office positions, in blue our civilians and altogether we are 13 - that counts, also the secretarial staff, so, we are a rather small organization. But we organized around the three main areas of peace-support operations, of course the political, the military, humanitarian and those supporting skills required to fully understand and to be able to articulate what is the essence of this type of missions. We also have individual, regional expertise as well as functional expertise, we try to combine them in such ways that we can provide the kind of supports that might be required in wide operations, in respect to United States interests in different parts of the world.

To graphically display who our clients are... our clients are everybody, in a sense. We are a part of the Army, to explain it in a transparent way, and in an honest way. What we are intending to do is to engage with others an honest dialogue and discussion, so that we may learn from you as well as convey to you what we are doing and therefore benefit from a mutual exchange phocus. So, our clients have really been, more outside the Army, than in the Army, in the sense that we have done some work for and we continue to do work for our Officer Secretary Defence, for the Joint Staff, and are very involved with other departments of Government, such as the Department of State, as they need to understand how the military looks like and works within the peace-support operations. And, of course we have been a point of interface for Academic Institutions jointed to the US Military - just thinking about this types of missions, and we were a kind of interface between the US military and the - I think this has been reflected in the very outstanding working relationships we have with other peace-support centres, training centres, places of study and expertise on peace-keeping operations. So to do this we have really four focus points, or vectors in our work: we attempt to report, to operate and this makes something unique in the US Military in a sense that we know about the Academic Institutions. We also have an operational role, so we try to combine the academic expertise with practical experience and then employ that in the education process. And as a result of our three efforts to be able to integrate the insights, the understandings gain from different processes to be appropriate for use of our military forces.

Just to give you an idea of with whom we are working. This has been a very interesting process, because it is a constant process of expanding, those with whom we have contacts, and whom we learn from, and hopefully can influence them in a some way. But because of the close working process within the US military and within the US Government, we are very involved in many different initiatives which had some very profound effects. And I shall explain it in just a minute, but there is one example: we have been involved behind the scene in the attempt by the US Government to better integrate its efforts collectively as Government in peace-support operations and this was manifested in a Presidential decision directive, signed by President Clinton in May 97, entitled "Management of complex contingencies" - Our Institute was very involved behind the scenes in creating the process, the political military planning structure and then named by names specifically in the Presidential decision directive the three organisations to train our inner agencies, it is a Deputy Secretary duty and above, how to use this new procedure and how to inaugurate this new specific organisational efforts without our national Security Council and Governmental Halll. So we have got involved in a number of different areas, because of this network of process that has turned out to be something of official.

We have sent out officers to specific organizations to gain insight into how those organisations relate to the military and the military to those organizations, such as to supporting the OSCE election mandatory in Bosnia in 1996 during the national elections.

In Bosnia we worked with officers and high representatives and we have worked on various projects, such as the understanding of interface between the military and police in peace-support operations, working with the UN pool, the International Police cast in Bosnia and various other projects related to that.

I mentioned that we educate as a result of this. And I would highlight a couple of points very quickly: we are responsible for putting on the seminars on peace-support operations annually. And this is where we bring together our officers, commanders in chief from various services and we invite the equivalent level of representatives from the other governmental agencies and other international organisations, so that we can work on current and critical issues that are involved in peace support operations as a way of mutual understanding, sharing ideas and perspectives between these various communities and cultures which are characteristic for peace support operations. Of course a better understanding helps in terms how we plan, how we conceptualise, how we conduct this type of operations.

We are responsible for all the Army's teaching after action reviews. History of our peace-support operations begins in Rwanda, Tahiti, Somalia, others, and we are involved in ongoing process in stages or phases doing thatfore our involvement in the first IFOR and now SFOR in Bosnia. And of course we have some publications that may be of interest to the members of this group, and I would be happy if you would sign your name on the list to take your names and that of your organizations to send you some samples, such as the book we published on military-humanitarian operations by case-studies which might be of use. We have several other products that, - well we very soon will have a web page, and you can then come down to access as you would like.

So, to conclude the current issues of things we are focused on right now, and find of interest, I think there is one thing I would like to point out at this conference: the whole issues of establishing sensitive security in peace-support operations. We also are very involved in comprehensive campaign planning, we try to look out the ways in which the major participants in peace-support operations can work together initially to develop a plan to work together in a way which is synergistic, that add to the collective effort rather than at times as it seems in the past, in cross purposes, because of ignorance, or just not understanding what the others are doing. And we will have a copy of that plan, if anybody likes to have an understanding of what we produce by Prof. Gene Dowy we are happy to convey that to you also. And we also are trying to look at and understand better the whole continuous response architecture that is built up and understand how the US military and our partners in a particular operation can better inaugurate our-selves into that and be good partners in the operation, as we are all trying to do the right thing for the people we are trying to assist.

With that I will conclude by saying that if I could be of assistance to any member or organization represented here, or if your projects, or things you are concerned about - we will be happy to do what we can to support you just as partners. And again, we do have some publications, if you let me know your address we shall try to send it to you, hoping it will be of interest to you.

Mark MALAN,

Institute for Security Studies, South Africa,
Senior Researcher Fellow

TRAINING FOR PEACE IN SOUTH AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

With the spectre of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 still fresh in African minds, the United Nations admitted last year that: *"The Organisation still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations. Troops for peacekeeping missions are in some cases not made available by Member States or made available under conditions which constrain effective response. Peacemaking and human rights operations, as well as peacekeeping operations, also lack a secure financial footing, which has a serious impact on the viability of such operations"*¹

While the Rwandan tragedy symbolises African conscience, the death of 150 peacekeepers during the failed international intervention in Somalia (1992-1995) underlies the fact that public opinion in most Western countries is unwilling to accept further troop casualties in Africa. African leaders have thus come to realise that they have no option but to take the first concrete steps towards creating the capacity to prevent or manage conflicts, and to alleviate the human suffering caused by such conflicts on the continent. One of the most practical steps which can be taken in this regard, is to enhance African capabilities through the training of personnel for effective participation in peace operations.

Although South Africa does not yet have a "Peacekeeping Centre", considerable progress has been made in the presentation of peacekeeping training and education since 1995. This has occurred within a fairly complex framework which includes a variety of actors within a specific continental and regional setting. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of progress and prospects for the development of South(ern) African capabilities for the conduct of peace operations, with particular reference to the role played by the Institute for Security Studies. It is hoped that this will provide a clear perspective for discussion on "opportunities for co-operation and co-ordination", which is the broad theme of today's activities.

THE CONTINENTAL CONTEXT

A significant number of African countries have their own dedicated peacekeeping training programmes at the national level. A June 1996 Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), called for a working group of military experts to "come out with practical and realistic recommendations on the technical issues raised" on the concept and conduct of African peace operations. A study was subsequently commissioned to provide the OAU with a comprehensive overview of the training efforts of select countries which had either participated in peace operations, or which appeared to be imminent potential participants; and to provide the OAU with recommendations for the enhancement and co-ordination of such efforts. The survey sample consisted of the following countries: Botswana; Cote d'Ivoire; Egypt; Ghana; Kenya; Nigeria; Senegal; South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The primary recommendation of this survey was concerned with addressing the urgent need to develop a common concept, guidelines and doctrine for participation in peace operations by OAU member states. The other recommendations dealt with the provision of guidance and support from the OAU for the ongoing efforts of Member States to train and prepare for participation in peace operations; and the harmonisation of sub-regional and continental efforts to manage conflict and maintain peace and security. Interim measures to assist Member States in their efforts to manage conflict and prepare for peace operations were also suggested, such as: an Intra-African seminar on training for peace operations; and the development of a framework for the harmonisation and standardisation of logistical systems and procedures for supporting African peace operations.

The idea of an Intra-African seminar was realised when a group of military experts and observers from 45 African nations met in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 21-23 October 1997 to draft peacekeeping proposals for consideration by the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (24-25 October 1997). The meetings in Harare confirmed the validity of the findings of the 1996 survey, and produced some very significant results. No fewer than fifty substantive and specific recommendations were approved for consideration and adoption by the political organs of the OAU.

For example, agreement was reached on the need for African efforts to strengthen United Nations capacity for peace operations by providing the bulk of a ready force package for utilisation by the UN, and for the OAU to be more assertive in placing African crises on the UN agenda. As a principle, it was recommended that the OAU take the first initiative in approaching the UN to endorse and authorise a peace operation in response to an emergency on the continent. If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU should be prepared to take preliminary action whilst continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body. It was decided that the OAU concept for peace operations should be firmly linked to the operationalisation of its Early Warning System within the Conflict Management Division, which will include a network linking in the early warning cells of the various sub-regional organisations in Africa, as well as research institutes, academics and civil society. The proposed concept for the conduct of OAU peace operations includes the use of sub-regional organisations, as a possible first line of reaction where the OAU is unable to act. However, the OAU should endorse all peace operations conducted by sub-regional organisations in Africa.

The Chiefs of Defence Staff also recommended a brigade-sized contribution from each of the five African sub-regions as a starting point for a standby arrangements system, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards according to evolving circumstances. The Southern African region is widely regarded as an essential building block and success-demonstrator in this regard.

PEACEKEEPING TRAINING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The view that regional groupings such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC)² should take a leading role in conflict resolution, has been a persistent theme of recent academic and policy discussions on peace and security. Southern Africa, under the auspices of SADC, has established a mechanism to deal with conflicts that arise in the region - the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. The objectives of this Organ include a commitment for SADC Member States to:

- co-operate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention management and resolution;
- promote peace making and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;

- develop a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact for responding to external threats; and
- develop a regional peacekeeping capacity with national armies, that could be called upon with the region or elsewhere.

The Southern African leaders believe that SADC's initiatives in building conflict resolution capacities must be complementary to that of the OAU and the UN. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Defence Sub-Committee of SADC's Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)³ had also decided in October 1997 to establish a brigade-sized regional peacekeeping standby capacity. Whilst each SADC country will prepare and train its respective forces in the specialised techniques required for peacekeeping and peace support operations, there is a strong emphasis on regional co-operation and co-ordination.

The task of co-ordinating regional peacekeeping training efforts was bestowed on Zimbabwe as a result of two inter-related factors: the identification of the Zimbabwe Staff College by the United Nations as a possible regional centre of excellence for peacekeeping training and education; and a request during 1996 by the Inter State Defence and Security Committee that Zimbabwe take the lead in coordinating peacekeeping training and education in the SADC region.

The Zimbabwe Staff College runs an annual two-week peacekeeping course at the senior command and staff level, drawing participants and instructors from SADC defence forces and observers from all over the world. On the 1997 course, for example, the Directing Staff were drawn from South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. By drawing the Directing Staff from various countries of the region, the College is able to draw on a variety of operational experience. Plans are now underway to renovate the College, in order to provide separate facilities for peacekeeping training in a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, and perhaps to increase course intakes within the foreseeable future. There are plans for the Centre to conduct the first UN Military Observers course to be presented in the region during 1998.

To maintain continuity, however, member states are encouraged to conduct their own peacekeeping training in their national training institutions. The importance of co-ordinating such training endeavours, in order to make optimal use of scarce resources, cannot be over-emphasised. In this regard, a regional clearing-house for peacekeeping training will also be established within the Peacekeeping Training Centre during 1998. Beyond the efforts of the Zimbabwe Staff College, SADC countries have shown a significant degree of enthusiasm in training together through their participation in a variety of workshops, seminars and map exercises. This co-operation has now been extended to include multinational field training exercises.

For example, a regional battalion-level peacekeeping exercise was presented by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces in conjunction with the British Army during April 1997. Exercise *Blue Hungwe* involved a combined total of some 1 400 members of the armed forces of ten of the (then) twelve SADC countries, as well as civilian police observers and international humanitarian NGOs and agencies. The troop contributions varied from 400 Zimbabweans and 300 South Africans to one or two observers from Botswana and Zambia. Mozambique, which recently emerged from civil war with the assistance of a UN peacekeeping mission, contributed a company of 130 troops from their new national army.

The aim of the exercise, among others, was to enhance regional liaison, cooperation, military skills and inter-operability by means of a multinational joint field training exercise in the tactics and techniques of international peacekeeping. The lessons learnt from the exercise indicated that there is much room for improvement. Importantly, the diversity of contingents that took part in the exercise created such realism that the problems which were encountered were very practical ones, not merely theoretical speculation. For example, difficulties were experienced in working with contingents which had been trained to different doctrine and standards, and it became apparent that there is a need to develop Standard Operating Procedures for use on regional level. There is also a need to conduct standardised pre-deployment training, in view of the diverse cultures and training doctrines of the various SADC Trooping Contributing Countries. The need to enhance the compatibility of communications equipment and procedures, for effective command and control, was revealed early in the exercise.

Many other lessons are highlighted in detail in the Exercise report, which has been distributed to all SADC member states. These will be addressed in a follow-on exercise to be hosted in South Africa, as explained below.

PEACEKEEPING TRAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA

For obvious historic reasons, South Africa has not yet provided troop contributions for peace operations under the auspices of the UN or the OAU. However, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has provided select logistic, airlift and specialist support for such missions since 1990. The SANDF provided electoral assistance in the form of air transport for UNAVEM II in Angola and ONUMOZ in Mozambique. The SANDF also provided logistic support for the UNAVEM III operation in Angola, in the form of tentage and equipment for four of the assembly areas set up by the UN in that country. Moreover, the SANDF has provided humanitarian assistance to Burundi in the form of medical assistance and the provision of essential humanitarian supplies, and has assisted the Government of Angola with the training of de-mining teams.

The SANDF believes that when it does undertake third-party peacekeeping, its contingents must be well-equipped and trained to the highest standards. Personnel development is an important part of this equation, including the attendance by select personnel of peacekeeping-related courses in foreign countries. Since the middle of 1995, SANDF officers have attended a wide variety of peacekeeping courses in the region and abroad. The aim is to establish a pool of knowledge and expertise among career officers and soldiers, which can be utilised to enrich the quality of existing and planned training programmes for peace operations.

In addition to the general courses attended by select personnel in other countries, the SANDF has introduced a civic education programme for all members of the armed forces. The aim of civic education is to ensure that all South African soldiers, of all ranks, are aware of and respect the rights and duties of citizenship in the democratic state, including human rights. Civic consciousness will form an essential element of the leadership philosophy of the integrated National Defence Force. One chapter of the existing civic education curriculum is devoted to the Law of Armed Conflict, and the ICRC will facilitate the teaching thereof within the SANDF. A human rights programme has also been approved for teaching in the SANDF. In time, both the civic education and human rights programme will ensure that all SANDF personnel will embark on dedicated peace operations training with an appropriate attitudinal foundation for peacekeeping duties.

As with many other countries, the development of peace operations training and capacity is centred around the South African Army. The Army has already produced a draft *Joint Warfare Manual: Peace Support Operations*, which will be revised according to new trends in peacekeeping, and according to experience gained by the Army over time. The army has also planned for the implementation of four phases of peace operations training.

Phase 1 - force preparation, or background training for peace operations - will be presented to all members of the army, and has been mandated for all new intakes of SA Army volunteers, beginning with the January 1997 intake. In addition to the above, Phase 1 training for personnel and units which are earmarked for participation in future peace operations will include training in the specific operational skills for peace operations, according to UN standards. Two infantry battalions have been identified for such training, and their command cadre and instructors have already completed the entire Phase 1 training package.

Phase 2 (pre-deployment, or mission oriented) training will commence when a unit or units have been placed on standby for participation in a specific peace support operation. It will also be the responsibility of the unit commander to train specialist personnel and sub-units which have not yet undergone Phase 1 training, after marrying-up has been completed. It is envisaged that Phase 3 (in-theatre) training will be conducted with the assistance of UN personnel. Phase 4 (post-deployment) training will be conducted at the unit level upon conclusion of or rotation out of a specific peace operation. It will consist of a re-training programme to be conducted by the unit's training staff, and will be aimed at psychological 'unloading' and switching the mind-set of personnel back to that which is required for their primary role and functions.

SA Army background training for peace operations is conducted at three levels:

- At the technical level, all troops receive Phase 1 background training as part of their basic and corps training.
- At the tactical level, young career NCOs and officers study selected subjects related to UN peace operations, while a two-week peace operations package, followed by a tactical exercise, is presented to officers on Junior Command and Staff Course.
- At the operational level, the Senior Command and Staff Course includes a peace support operations package and a map exercise which was developed with the assistance of the UK Staff College, Camberley. The latter training is conducted by the SA Army College in Pretoria. The mission of the SA Army College is to: "With competent staff ... develop selected SA Army officers to become internationally accredited commanders and staff officers." This means that the College strives to present command and staff training which is of such a high calibre that the competence of its graduates will be recognised by professional armies the world over. As such, the College also attracts an appropriate number of students from other countries.

The SANDF also plays a key role in the ISDSC Sub-Committee on Defence, including the latter's efforts to co-ordinate peacekeeping training activities in the Southern African region. For example, the SANDF will be hosting a larger scale follow-on to the *Blue Hungwe* exercise this year. During November, the second regional peacekeeping field exercise will be held at the South African Army Battle School in Lohatla. The aim of Exercise *Blue Crane* will be "to enhance the capacity of SADC military forces for peace support operations". It is envisaged that there will be a brigade HQ with three battalions under command (an estimated total of some 4 000 troops). The SANDF will have to provide vehicles for all contingents except Zimbabwe, Namibia and Lesotho. Aircraft will also be scarce, with limited contributions from Zimbabwe. The SANDF will have to provide the rest (light aircraft, transport and helicopters), tailored according to the exercise scenario.

With respect to co-operation and co-ordination of peacekeeping training activities, it must be noted that South (and Southern) Africans have become increasingly sensitive to the issue of foreign domination. The SANDF seems determined to prevent external powers from dictating the size and shape of Exercise *Blue Crane*, although they will welcome outside support according to needs identified by the regional exercise planning committee. However, they have welcomed the input of local non-government actors, such as the Institute for Security Studies, in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping training.

THE ROLE OF THE ISS

Although it receives no funding from the South African government, the ISS is not, in essence, a 'non-governmental organisation' - we are an independently funded applied research institute. Since the convening of an international conference and the publication of two books on peacekeeping in Africa during 1995, peace operations has been one of the Institute's major areas of enquiry and analysis.

During 1996, the ISS, in conjunction with the African centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), presented a series of peacekeeping training seminars for senior diplomats, military and police officers, and representatives of NGOs in a number of SADC countries (Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). In South Africa, ISS conducted a seminar on *Contemporary Issues in UN Peacekeeping* on 18 March 1996. The seminar was attended by representatives from the South African military, foreign affairs, and NGOs. The Institute was also involved in the planning, presentation, and funding of a five-day seminar, over the period 9 to 13 September 1996, which was part of the SA National Defence Force's Exercise *MORNING STAR* (the largest mapex and seminar on peacekeeping held in Africa to that date). On 19 September 1996, ISS presented a seminar on *Humanitarian Support Operations in Practice*, predominantly for the SA Medical Services.

The ISS continues to actively support peace operations training at the senior officer level in the SANDF. During 1997, for example, the Institute was requested to render the following support to SANDF peace operations training and education:

- The design and presentation a one-day workshop on 'Contemporary Issues on the Southern African Peacekeeping Agenda' for the SA Army College. This workshop was specifically tailored to the needs of some fifteen former nonstatutory force officers of senior age and rank who were engaged in an abridged senior command and staff course.[^]
- Presentation to SA Medical Services Academy (Senior Command and Staff Course) of lectures on the 'Concept and Conduct of Peace Operations in Africa'.
- Presentation to SA Air Force College (Senior Command and Staff Course) of lectures on 'An Agenda for Peace and Peacekeeping in Africa'.
- Presentation a one-day workshop on 'Contemporary Issues on the Southern African Peacekeeping Agenda' to under-graduate and graduate students at the SA Military Academy.
- Assistance to the SA Army College with finalising the seminar programme for Exercise *Pegasus* (a two week peace operations seminar and map exercise presented in conjunction with the US Naval Justice School), and the presentation of select seminar papers.
- Presentation to SA Defence College (Joint Staff Course) of lectures on 'The Privatisation of Security and Peacekeeping in Africa'.
- Presentation to SA Army College (Junior Command and Staff Course) of lectures on 'Peacekeeping in Africa: The Role of the OAU and SADC'.

From 4 to 6 November 1997, the Institute presented a conference on '*Multinational Peace Operations: The Evolution of Policy and Practice in Southern Africa*', which was jointly hosted with the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC). The seminar was attended by international experts and military and civilian government officials from 10 of the SADC countries. The expert speakers were used by ISS to present a public conference in Pretoria with the theme 'Contemporary Peace Support Operations', on 5 November 1997. The latter was attended by some 150 participants, including academics, the media, the military, and foreign affairs officials.

ISS has also provided support and advice to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Defence in the formulation of an appropriate South African policy on peace operations. The Institute has made a major contribution the Draft White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions (dated 21 January 1997), which should be submitted by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Peace Support Operations for political approval by the end of April 1998. ISS was also part of the inter-departmental workshop which recommended, on 27 November 1997, the formalisation of a Standing Committee which should be mandated to manage all issues relating to peace missions for the South African government.[^] At the regional and continental policy level, the ISS led the OAU-commissioned peacekeeping project mentioned above. The findings of the study were originally presented in English and French, as a report for the Secretary-General of the OAU, and were subsequently published as an ISS monograph.[^] An ISS researcher was also seconded to the OAU Secretariat as a facilitator and rapporteur for the Military Experts Meeting and Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the OAU Central Organ from 19 to 25 October 1997. The Institute continues to provide the OAU with consultancy services on peace operations and conflict management issues.

Dedicated work in the field of peace support operations is presently conducted at ISS under the auspices of the 'Training for Peace' project, which has the overarching purpose of enhancing the capacity of Southern African states for participation in UN peace support operations. More specifically, the Training for Peace project has aimed to:

- enhance institutional capacity within Southern Africa for training and policy making in peacekeeping;
- provide training in peacekeeping and thereby assist in the establishment of a resource pool of trained persons that can be deployed in peacekeeping operations;
- encourage the development of a common peacekeeping doctrine within the region; and
- produce publications documenting local concepts, trends and techniques in peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

During 1998, the Training for Peace project, which is conducted in partnership with ACCORD and NUPI, will lend its support to the planning and conduct of Exercise Blue Crane, in addition to conducting a number of regional peacekeeping training seminars. For example, from 25-27 February this year, the Project presented the first regional seminar on "The Role of Civilian Police in UN Peace Operations". This was attended by senior police commissioners and diplomats from 11 SADC countries, and has laid a firm foundation for further regional co-operation in civilian police training.

The ISS remains extremely active in research and writing. Our publication record on issues related to conflict management, regional security, and peace operations is unparalleled on the African continent - and we are increasingly regarded as a regional and continental resource, rather than a South African institute.

CONCLUSION

There has been remarkable progress over the past few years in building African capabilities for the conduct of peace operations - as evidenced by developments at the level of the OAU and in the conduct of major regional peacekeeping exercises. Likewise, the Southern African region has made significant progress towards the development of a sub-regional capacity for keeping the peace, within the framework of and in collaboration with the UN and the OAU. As the dominant regional power, South African support for such efforts is an essential prerequisite for success.

It is apparent that South Africa has followed a fairly cautious and pragmatic route with regard to peace operations. Involvement will be within the framework of SADC guidelines, OAU resolutions, and UN principles and practice. South African troop commitment will be contingent upon clear objectives and mandates, as well as a conviction that SANDF are superbly trained and equipped for the job. However, the last few years have seen a gradual shift in SANDF attitudes towards multinational peace operations - from extreme reluctance to cautious enthusiasm. We have reached the stage where such enthusiasm should be converted into a leadership role, where South Africa plays an active role in international peacekeeping in support of the UN, the OAU and SADC.

The ISS will continue to advocate and support such a role, and we are extremely grateful for the opportunity provided by the Russian Public Policy Center to seek new alliances as we prepare to meet the challenges of peace support into the 21st Century.

ENDNOTES

¹ UN Report on Reform, released 16 July 1997, <http://www.un.org/reform/track2/part2.htm>.

² Until recently, SADC had 12 member states: Angola; Botswana; Lesotho; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; South Africa; Swaziland; Tanzania; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. In October 1997, Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles were admitted as new member states by the SADC Heads of State and Government, but both countries have yet to accede to the SADC Treaty and to pay their membership fees.

³ The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee is to be incorporated as an integral part of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. See, for example, Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, *SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development*, ISS Papers, No. 19, March 1997 and Mark Malan, *SADC and Sub-Regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 19, February 1998.

⁴ For details of the integration of statutory and non-statutory forces, and the transformation of the SANDF, see Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt (Eds.), *About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence*, Institute for Defence Policy, Johannesburg, 1996.

⁵ An edited version of the proceedings of this seminar have been published under the title of "Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa", ISS Monograph Series, No. 21, February 1998.

⁶ This proposal should also be submitted for political approval before the end of April 1998.

⁷ See Mark Malan, William Nhara, and Pol Bergevin, *African Capabilities for Training for Peace Operations*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 17, November 1997,

<http://www.iss.co.za/iss/WWW%20PUBS/MONOGRAPHS/No%2017/contents%20html>

Dr. Ken EYRE,
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (Canada),
Director of Research & Development Studies

We have seen and heard about very various peacekeeping training centres today and if you bear with me for some other fifteen minutes, I will give you another variant of the theme and I will discuss the Canadian approach.

Lester Pearson for those of you who are interested is a former Prime Minister of Canada and our Centre is named in honour of him. We are feeling particularly boastful as Canadians, sometimes we say that Mr Pearson invented peacekeeping, because we were instrumental in the creation of UNEF - United Nations Emergency Force in 1956 in the time of the Suez crisis and in a matter of fact he was awarded the Nobel prize for peace in the following year. Canada is involved in peacekeeping for about some 50 years - we go back to the beginning. It has been one of our cardinal anchors in our foreign policy. And it's very interesting that for the entire first generation of peacekeeping - up until the end of the Cold War it was the position, the doctrine of the Canadian military that no specific training for peacekeeping was required. The announce was that peacekeeping essentially was unidimensional, it was fairly simple to do - it was done in a stable environment, in a sense that it was with the consent of political factions, and it was always some sort of truth for cease-fire in the positions: the UN was the only significant Agency, the only significant player and there was modest media interest in it. And the Canadian position was that a well-trained general purpose come-back soldier would be a fine peace-keeper. And this experience, is the experience that we have known.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the nature of peacekeeping changed dramatically, we moved to, for lack of a better terms, to the second generation of peacekeeping. Initially, Canada maintained its position that nothing, no specific training was required and we suffered serious reverses in our deployments in Yugoslavia, in Somalia and these led to the conclusion that we had to re-think our entire approach. In Canada, we now see peacekeeping, and I use it as a very broad term as a complex multi-dimensional activity. And let me describe these dimensions, because this informs about the ways we have approached our training. We see peacekeeping as a cultural task, taking in a very wide spectre of activities, from initiatives to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place, to mitigate the severe healing of the conflict if it does occur, to help political factions to terminate the conflict. So, prevention, mitigation, termination and recovering, all are included by our concept of peacekeeping. We also see peacekeeping now and that is the key to our approach as a multi-disciplinary activity. The military is no longer the sole player and in many instances in the spectrum that I spoke about, the military employ would be a minor, a secondary or a support player. Peacekeeping is of course also a multi-organizational, in a sense that now no longer the UN has a monopoly. We can find regional organizations involved, you will find sometimes national organizations involved on a bilateral basis... For example, in Haiti, which was a UN mission, there was also an organization of American States Mission and from time to time there were American bilateral operations going on. Needless to say that the co-ordination of these activities is extremely complex.

When we talk about the multi-disciplines of peacekeeping, we have identified generally about eight: these certainly include the military, but increasingly civilian police have a role to play, humanitarian agencies, human rights organizations, democratization agencies which are either working with governments on electoral reforms, development agencies and certainly the political and politicians and diplomats are also part of the collection of the peacekeeping disciplines. And we refer to that in our literature, as to the "new peacekeeping partnership" In 1994, - the government of Canada decided to create a peacekeeping centre. They had the option to put it under the heading of the Department of Defence, or the Department of Foreign Affairs, - and it was to do just nothing, and they took the approach of creating an organization which would be purely neutral. And they created a non-governmental organization. We are a governmentally organized non government organization or a GONGO. We are amended to conduct training, education and research, and we certainly lead various seminars, conferences and we do some field research, but our main activity is our educational activity and we run a series of fifteen courses over a period of a year. Let me say something about these courses, because this would give you an idea about how we approach them.

A typical course is two weeks long and has 30 students. And the students are representative of (as much as we can make it) of the entire group of the new peacekeeping partnership. For those of you who are military, let me give you an analogy - if you are going to study some complex military operation, for example a salt water crossing - you would not want a group of just infantry men to discuss that, you will want engineers, artillery, intelligence, logistics, air - and other obvious elements. So, it follows that if we are going to try to understand complex peacekeeping operations in the real sense, then we should have representatives not just from the military, but we should have politicians, diplomats, civilian police, humanitarian, human rights developers that entire set of people. And that is how we try to structure our courses. As I said our typical course is either two weeks or 18 hours long. For those who are interested in the option of taking academic credit at the University Under-graduate or Graduate Level is available. A

typical course loan would consist of approx. ten Canadian military personnel, in addition to that the Canadian department of the National Defence provides ten scholarships: military officers, international military officers for each of our courses, and this is available through the Canadian Military Attaches in all countries. The other ten participants in our typical courses would be representatives of the various other peacekeeping disciplines... that I already have mentioned. Let me say a little bit about these courses: we have the name of a training centre, but in essence, we are doing education. We have typical student parties from the militaries who are to be majors, to field colonels and the equivalent from other peacekeeping disciplines. We do not do technical military training. Our foundation course is called "Interdisciplinary co-operation" and what it aims to do is to familiarise the student party with the capabilities, the limitations, the role of all the other partners in a typical peacekeeping operation. Another course we offer is on negotiation and mediation: this is what we call "contact skills" - as supposed to come-back skills and this is, in our analysis required for modern peacekeeping. We have a legal course, and this is not for lawyers, this is for field-commanders and their staffs to give them a background of how to operate and what the legal environment of international peacekeeping operations is. We have a logistics course: how to employ to the UN system, we have a course on peacekeeping engineering and technology. We have another course which is the "personal dimension" - We have to look after our peacekeepers, we have to look after their health, their physical health, their mental health, their domestic health, their financial health, we have to look for them before they go, we have to maintain them while they are on the mission and we have to continue to do this after they return from the mission.. We also teach how to use the mechanics and the principles of disarmament in mobilisation and re-integration. Peacekeeping, of course, is mainly done by soldiers, and there is maritime element in peacekeeping, it's not the blue water, but it's the ports, the rivers, the coastal operations, so that we have a course on the maritime dimension of the peacekeeping operations. We will teach Human Rights within a course, we teach purely military operations, our doctrine is that in peacekeeping it is inappropriate to speak of enemies: the enemy is the violence itself and the role of the military in a peacekeeping mission is to control and to de-escalate the violence. So we teach the technical skills which go along with that. We also have a course on civil-military operations a Ci-MiC course which is exclusive for the Canadian Forces. Our last portion is a six weeks course, only six weeks course, and it is a major overview where we include a week-long visit to the UN Headquarters in NY and our course is going out on the theatre, visit a peacekeeping mission on the ground.

Enclosing just two other aspects of our operations: we started, and we provide the secretarial service for the International Association for Peacekeeping Training Centres, and, Mr Chairman, this might be a possible venue or vehicle to support some decisions of co-ordination that you have mentioned. And we also have the "peacekeeping" press where we publish various articles on the nature of modern peacekeeping. I hope that in these few minutes I have given you an idea of how, we, in Canada have decided to approach peacekeeping and again, the key notion is peacekeeping.

В.Н. БЕЛОКОПЫТОВ,

представитель Главного Управления
международного военного сотрудничества
Министерства обороны РФ, полковник

СИСТЕМА ПОДГОТОВКИ ОФИЦЕРОВ-НАБЛЮДАТЕЛЕЙ ООН НА ВЫСШИХ ОФИЦЕРСКИХ КУРСАХ "ВЫСТРЕЛ"

Сегодня Вы имели возможность познакомиться с организацией подготовки военных наблюдателей ООН на Высших офицерских курсах "Выстрел". Я хотел бы кратко рассказать, как у нас организуется отбор и подготовка офицеров, которых мы в последующем направляем в миротворческие миссии ООН в качестве военных наблюдателей и штабных офицеров.

В Министерстве обороны РФ есть два Главных управления, которые занимаются в первую очередь отбором кандидатов для участия в миротворческих миссиях ООН, их подготовкой и направлением. Это Главное управление кадров МО РФ, которое осуществляет отбор кандидатов для обучения на курсах как военных наблюдателей ООН, так и офицеров штабов сил ООН, а также Главное управление международного военного сотрудничества МО РФ, которое занимается общей организацией подготовки наших миротворцев, координацией действий всех Главных управлений, а также видов вооруженных сил и родов войск при подготовке контингентов для участия в миротворческой деятельности. В наши обязанности входит и сотрудничество с секретариатом ООН по предоставлению воинских контингентов и офицеров — наблюдателей и штабов наших миротворческих сил.

Учебный центр, организованный на базе курсов "Выстрел", является основным центром, в котором готовят военных наблюдателей и штабных офицеров. В этом центре осуществляется по необходимости и подготовка военных полицейских для миротворческих миссий ООН. В настоящее время мы изучаем вопрос возможности обучения полицейских наблюдателей для миссий ООН. Хорошо было бы готовить и офицеров для воинских контингентов, которые участвуют в миротворческих миссиях как ООН, так и совместных миротворческих операциях, в частности, в Боснии и Герцеговине. В настоящее время этот вопрос пока в стадии проработки, так как данный учебный центр не располагает всеми необходимыми возможностями.

Что касается подготовки военных наблюдателей ООН нами приобретен достаточный опыт. Наша система обучения отличается от существующей в Пирсонском миротворческом центре, однако она тоже заслуживает внимания и может быть применена для подготовки миротворцев из других стран. У нас успешно прошли подготовку военные наблюдатели из Великобритании, США, ФРГ, Дании, Канады, Финляндии, Швеции и других стран. В апреле этого года будет осуществлен очередной набор на курсы военных наблюдателей из целого ряда стран, есть заявки из стран СНГ, которые также планируют готовить на базе этого центра своих военных наблюдателей.

Качество подготовки военных наблюдателей можно оценить по тем высоким отзывам, которые даются руководителями многочисленных миротворческих миссий ООН нашим офицерам—наблюдателям. Брака Центр пока не допускал.

Подготовка воинских контингентов для участия в миротворческих операциях организуется непосредственно направляющими их родами войск в своих учебных центрах. Эти учебные центры недостаточно укомплектованы соответствующими специалистами, имеющими необходимый опыт участия в миротворческих операциях. В Главном управлении разработано "Руководство по действиям подразделений ВС РФ в составе войск ООН". При его составлении мы пользовались аналогичными учебными пособиями, разработанными в скандинавских странах, которые имеют большой опыт участия в миротворческих операциях и подготовке контингентов войск для этих операций, а также рекомендациями, которые нам предоставил Секретариат ООН.

В чем заключаются наши трудности. В ходе проведения миротворческих операций возникают определенные проблемы, многих из которых можно было бы избежать при более тесной кооперации между миротворческими учебными центрами различных стран и регионов. Разница в требованиях, предъявляемых к подготовке личного состава, вооружения и военной техники в различных странах сказывается на выполнении задач многонациональными формированиями миротворцев. Важное значение имеет внедрение системы подготовки миротворческих контингентов, обеспечивающих их эффективное взаимодействие в операциях по поддержанию мира. Решение этой проблемы заключается, в частности, в выработке единых стандартов базовой специальной подготовки военнослужащих, а также подразделений по возможности сориентированных на стандартные процедуры и учебные программы ООН, в уточнении национальных наставлений и уставов в части, касающейся проведения миротворческих операций, согласовании их с требованиями ООН, в проведение совместных штабных тренировок и компьютерных игр по миротворческой тематике.

В этих мероприятиях мы активно участвуем, успешно сотрудничая с миротворцами из Великобритании, Германии, Чехии, Польши. Особенно я хочу отметить Канаду, в особенности Пирсонский миротворческий центр, где прошли обучение десятки миротворцев из России. Кроме того, было бы полезно, на мой взгляд, создать региональные учебные центры для подготовки миротворческих сил. В частности, тот центр, который Вы видели сегодня, мог бы играть роль регионального центра по подготовке миротворцев для стран Евразийского континента. Другие центры могут быть организованы для других континентов, других регионов, но наш центр, чтобы играть роль регионального, требует в первую очередь укрепления материальной базы. Кроме того, сотрудничество с международными центрами по подготовке миротворцев у нас на протяжении нескольких лет проходит достаточно успешно. У нас хорошие связи, в первую очередь, со скандинавскими странами.

Я хотел бы призвать всех участников конференции и далее крепить сотрудничество и расширять практику обмена опытом между миротворческими центрами, представляющими различные регионы мира. Как мне представляется, финансирование таких мероприятий могли бы взять на себя соответствующие региональные организации, такие, как ОБСЕ, Евросоюз, ОАЕ и др. при координирующей роли ООН.

Свободная дискуссия участников конференции по данной теме
Discussion on the theme of the conference

Hassan ABAZA,
 Royal Jordanian Air Forces,
 Brig.General

I have two general questions for General Maltzev.

From your presentation I could understand that you consider the CIS as a peacekeeping force. On what basis do you consider the CIS a peacekeeping force since they are not under the UN hospices or they are not authorized by the United Nations?

The second question: I was in Tadjikistan as a chief military observer and I know that a mandate was signed between the CIS and the Government of Tadjikistan without taking into consideration the other parties of the conflict, and their position. How can you consider this as a peacekeeping force, since you deal only with one party of the conflict in the area?

Л.С. МАЛЬЦЕВ,
 первый заместитель начальника Штаба по
 координации военного сотрудничества
 государств-участников СНГ, генерал-лейтенант

Мы рассматриваем операции, которые проводятся в рамках СНГ, именно как миротворческих потому, что СНГ является региональной организацией, и это зарегистрировано в ООН. Операции проводятся в соответствии с мандатами, которые принимаются на Совете глав государств—участников СНГ. Таким образом, если это региональная организация, и высший орган этой организации принимает соответствующие мандаты по согласованию со всеми конфликтующими сторонами, то проблемы легитимности не возникает. Вопрос о том, чтобы все мероприятия проводились под эгидой и по мандату ООН неоднократно ставился, никто этого не отрицал.

В Таджикистане при выработке соответствующих мандатов учитывались позиции всех сторон. Мы видим, что главная цель операции — прекращение огня — достигнута. С другой стороны, после военной фазы должна следовать политическая часть, и этот процесс в Таджикистане идет. Тем не менее мы в СНГ считаем, что сам механизм проведения операций именно в региональных организациях должен совершенствоваться, в том числе и в отношении принятия решений и их легитимности, чтобы ни в коем случае не было никаких подозрений в том, что только от одной стороны получено согласие. С моей точки зрения, проблему не следует понимать упрощенно, существует целая система принятия решений, которая должна совершенствоваться. Мы эти проблемы видим и работаем над ними.

Li ZHIHONG,
 Chine Institute for International
 Strategic Studies, Senior Researcher Fellow

I have heard a lot of new ideas and different views. But today we have got much closer to understandings. I think that we hopefully came here to learn from each other, to seek the common ground and keep our differences in peacekeeping operations. The first one is about the principles. People always think that in China, we are always talking about principles, because - well, I think principles form the basis, form the guidance for operations. China is a developing country and as a permanent member of the Security Council we should take our responsibility for the world peace and international security. We try our best to make contributions to the cause of peace. I mean since the restoration of our legal position in the UN. China practises an independent policy, independent peace policy in foreign affairs which is based on five principles of peaceful coexistence. Everybody knows that, there is no need to express those ideas in details. So we always take a positive and co-operative attitude towards the UN peacekeeping operations since the 80-ties. And we also participate, according to our capabilities or resources. We study it case by case. Shall I remind that we have several major principles? The first one is that we should act in operations according to the UN Charter and International Laws which I think is very important to everyone of us, although maybe some of us are working their regional practice, but still it must be a part of the international community. The most important thing is that we also are states, whether big or small countries. So, the mutual respect of the non-intervention principle is a very important thing. All the operations should consider this first - then shall we find no excuse to intervene in other sovereignties and territories. Although I remember yesterday our friends from NATO said that all the 16 sovereign states will have to make a decision to do something. So I think that sovereignty is very important.

So when you say that any military operation - peacekeeping operation can be undertaken only on the wills and must get the consent from the parties concerned, then you could find a bare co-operation with the locals, that is the success of the traditional peacekeeping operations.

The second point: if we practise an operation, we better should consider to settle disputes in a peaceful settlement, by peaceful meanings, or in peaceful ways, not to use force. Now we came to talk about internal conflicts - between parties of different types, or different ethics, you should better consider that as given. If you give any humanitarian assistance to certain regions, to certain countries, you should better keep neutral, that's a question of impartiality. You should not involve any country into an internal conflict, you all cannot support just one side, or support one side against another, that is what happened in Somalia and some other places.

The third principle: all the mandates should be issued by the Security Council. I think this is very important to show that it is under command and control and is the hand of the Security Council. Of course it heeds people to do this job.

Main history events and successful experience proved such ideas, such principles.

As for the Chinese, we participated in the UN peacekeeping operations just according to the policy, that was the policy of independence joint policy of peace, that was also according to our capability and resources in each area.

My second part is to tell you about the contribution of China in short: we have begun to join the peacekeeping operations in the late 80-ties. So far we have sent military observers, about 500 (accumulating)- we have sent engineering jurists over to Cambodia, over 800 persons. Of course we have good co-operation with all the armies and staff officers and even get the support from the service unit, so the Chinese would say their gratitude for that international co-operation.

So we have important jobs for the next 21st century, because I think that all these old principles are still working, especially in the developing countries. That we heard from our friends from India or Jordan and some from Africa. So the way of thinking, the approach to understanding, may be different from the European regions and other parts of the world but so we have better choices, so is our international community: we have different cultural backgrounds and histories and ways of thinking and so the history is very important: so why should we not have our approaches in differentiation of colours? Not one colour is the best, not one way of thinking is the best. Thank you.

Question from Mr. Vishnevski: Are there any peacekeeping centres in China, such as we heard about from our colleagues, or is anything planned for this purpose?

Li Zhihong: We in China have started to study the case of peacekeeping operations in the Middle-East. On the invitation of his High Excellency the Secretary General of the UN, who urged us, persuaded us to send some political officers and military observers and start thinking. But what can you do appropriate with international community? In 1986 we sent a group and I was a member of this team and we had good contacts with different people, I think from both sides, even people from the United States, from the UK and from Russia. Also the Nordic countries became very good friends as they are all peacekeepers as the Canadians. Then we had a visit to Finland and some other countries, and have even asked for views from the Canadians and the Swedes about their experiences. So, we have our training at our Military Academy. And also we got, may be, some other schools, so we divided our training. So far we haven't concentrated, like you, judging by the place we visited in Moscow. I think it is a very successful one. All the military, and military observers are taken from different parts of China, that means from different military regions. We have the main army, we also have Navy officers and the Air-Force officers.

В.Н. ТЕРЕНТЬЕВ,

начальник направления Штаба
по координации военного сотрудничества
государств-участников СНГ, генерал-майор

У меня вопрос к бригадному генералу Хелену. Вы упомянули о курсах, на которых работаете с сотрудниками неправительственных организаций. Насколько успешным было Ваше сотрудничество, с готовностью ли они откликнулись на ваше предложение, и как вы оцениваете результаты работы с неправительственными организациями? Можете ли Вы использовать Ваш опыт для дальнейшей работы с неправительственными организациями?

Claes-Goran HEDEN,
Swedish International Centre,
Brig.General

We do have some NGO's coming in to our courses, just to have the multi-functionality, as Mr Eyrie spoke about the multi-dimensional questions. We do arrange some special courses for NGO's before they enter an international mission area, we are training them in security questions, i.e. how to act in an area where you have a lot of mines and so on. That's what we are doing today. But we are trying to create something as we call a civil staff of secource CIVISOC - and we plan to run that parallel either with the UN staff or Civil Staff of Secource and the Police of Secource and the Civilian Aid of Secource. But we haven't arranged such a course yet, but we are hopeful that we shall have a positive response in that way. We are running some courses today, but it's mainly during a week or a couple of days, to prepare the civil organisations before they enter into a mission area. Have I answered your question?

Gal Terentiev: Well, partly - for me it's obvious that you have to develop this team further in the sense that it doesn't really address the question that was raised during the Prof. Cohen's presentation yesterday and which many of us in the mission areas have been subjected to, to the fact that the NGO's and the military do not have that degree of understanding and cohesion when they work together in one prospective.

Gal Heden: It is not as developed as we want - but we are very hopeful and positive.

В.В. ГОРЯННОВ
старший офицер-оператор по
миротворчеству Министерства обороны РФ
подполковник

Здесь обсуждались перспективы миротворческих операций. Хотелось бы знать, как армия США обеспечивает обучение гражданских и военных участников миротворческих операций. Отношения между военными и гражданскими властями должны быть также частью этого военного курса. При этом очевидно, что военные должны занимать подчиненную роль по отношению к гражданским руководителям.

Мы считаем, что чтобы быть хорошим миротворцем, нужно быть хорошим солдатом, поэтому надо сначала пройти стандартную военную подготовку, а затем уже обучать - быть осторожным, чувствительным и т.д. Если Вы профессиональный военный, который готовит военных руководителей для операции, то нельзя забывать о политическом аспекте операции. Надо, чтобы обе стороны учились друг у друга.

Здесь не обсуждался вопрос о поддержании безопасности в зоне, откуда выведены миротворческие силы. Если мы работаем в соответствии с международными законами, то необходимо учитывать, что безопасность гражданских лиц должна обеспечиваться в течение длительного времени. Иначе говоря, было бы целесообразно иметь такие организации на своей территории, которые способны выполнить эти задачи.

Terry JHONSON,
Naval Postgraduate School
(US, Monterey), Professor

I enjoyed all the presentations this afternoon, I think they were all extremely good. I have got two questions, one for Dr. Mallan: you talked about the efforts to co-ordinate peacekeeping training and others in Africa, now, a lot of us are aware that there are certain political difficulties. And difficulties, perhaps, of culture and backgrounds and so on that Mr Lee spoke about. Could you tell us a little bit of some of the difficulties you have in co-ordination of peace-support activities. Because I think it's probably not an entirely problem-free area. I think it might be interesting to hear about that.

And a question for Larry Foster: You talked about a concept of sustainable security, I am very interested, if you just could tell us a little bit about what that concept means and how you are developing it.

Mark MALAN,
Institute for Security Studies, South Africa,
Senior Researcher Fellow

Professor, I will try to address your question as briefly as possible, but the problems of co-ordination perhaps have something to do with the politisation of the peacekeeping game. And, I do not want to detract from the role of this conference, calling peacekeeping a game. But even the debates in the Northern hemisphere, and the European debates, are highly politicised and this is also happening in Africa. Apart from the objectives and problems of co-ordinating and putting together multi-national forces that can actually do something which is useful and I speak now about the sub-Saharan African regions, - I mean they are real practical problems. We have won equipment from different suppliers during previous time, but there is no money for standardisation or inter-operability and all this kind of things. These are real problems. The political problem, I think comes with well-meaning of a system which is conditioned upon certain countries doing certain things. For example, it's no secret that Nigeria is very upset about being excluded from ACRI because of its system of government. At a smaller level, African countries are getting a kind of confused, because they are getting conflicted in messages about what peacekeeping is or is not. Should they work with and or through the UN system, or do we need a unique African thing, because of the problems of the Continent— talking about African crisis and response because we don't have European crisis response... Africa is regarded as one big basket case. But there are differences: I think there has been a lot of improvements in internal co-ordination, in speaking one to the other, as I was speaking yesterday, we have the African Peace-Support Group, the British and the US were seen to be supporting the big French exercises within a few weeks back in Senegal. The French have sent a battalion of paratroops and some other things and God knows what other kinds of peacekeeping armament and they were teaching. But these are the problems, they are real problems of co-ordination and these are political problems, it's always a question a little bit of competition, of jealousy- for example, I mention the regional centre for peacekeeping training which is just doing the co-ordination. You can imagine how the feelings are in Zambia for example - and even South Africa is a little bit jealous of the status... so, I think that I have given my answer, Mr. Chair, there are real problems and problems that could be addressed much better in a dialogue.

Larry FOSTER,
US Army Peacekeeping
Institute, Director, Colonel

I appreciate your question on the sustainable security, I think it is a concept that on the route among the militaries involved in most of the operations. Using the absence of rule of war and security for the people of an international community involved in the operation have resulted in the military action to help or provide security, and given the rules of engagement in a distant degree perhaps providing some sustainable security for the people of the country in question. The idea of sustainable security is an attempt to assist the country in accordance with the treaty or a document which is based on a mandate for involvement in the operation. We must get to the point where they are able to maintain their own security, their own sovereign responsibility for security and the will of law in accordance with internationally accepted standards of policing. By that I don't mean only the policing but the general criminal justice system, courts, prisons, etc...

So in essence, the fact is that the military go into these operations as enablers, as assistants to the key elements which are to provide humanitarian relief, to provide necessary support, may be infra-structure building, democratization efforts, conflict resolutions, human rights in particular concerns. And there is no more gap between the what the state can provide in security, and the military security, because security forces may be the very initial part of the problem which all started with and we have built or altered in some way to keep up the standards at the requested level. So looking at the role of the military interfacing with say the international civil police, simple, or may be perhaps - gendarme force - or whatever it is in the meantime to help to survive the security gap, until the institutions for security in any particular state can be built up to an institutional level when they can secure the sustainable security within their functions. It's a complex process which varies from situation to situation.

Б.Р. ТУЗМУХАМЕДОВ,
советник Управления международного
права Конституционного суда РФ

У меня есть дополнительный аргумент к тому, что сказал генерал-лейтенант Л.С. Мальцев, отвечая на вопрос иорданского коллеги в отношении санкции ООН для операции, которая проводится силами СНГ и в регионе СНГ. Все-таки эти операции пока остаются в пределах статьи 52 Устава ООН, а принудительные меры (статья 53) уже потребуют санкций Совета Безопасности. Пока эти операции не являются принудительной мерой, поэтому санкций ООН

здесь не требуется. Другое дело, что документированное внимание ООН к этой операции придало бы ей авторитет, определенная финансовая поддержка была бы очень кстати. Вчера мы много говорили о концепции главы 6,5 Устава ООН, концепции Д.Хаммаршельда. Я предлагаю концепцию Тузмухамедова — 52,5 статья. Может быть, такая статья будет распространяться на подобные операции.

Вопрос у меня, может быть, даже ко всем представителям учебных центров. Правильно ли я понял, что подготовка и образование, которое получают Ваши слушатели, универсальны, то есть выпускники не знают, в какие условия они попадут, или есть курсы для слушателей, знающих, в какую миссию они будут направлены? Проводится ли такая подготовка, которая бы ориентировала выпускников на работу в условиях какой-то конкретной страны? Обращается ли внимание на изучение конкретных обычаев, конкретной правовой системы той или иной страны? Я уже рассказывал некоторым коллегам об эпизоде с командиром батальона, с которым мне пришлось работать в Боснии, когда местная администрация, пережив самый тяжелый период войны, начала как-то становиться на ноги и предприняла попытку выжить батальон с той территории, на которой находилась его основная база. Командир батальона прежде, чем стал кавалерийским офицером, получил юридическую степень в Оксфорде. Два юриста, командир батальона и Ваш покорный слуга, соединив лучшие достижения двух юридических школ, изучили законодательство бывшей Югославии, законодательство Боснии и Герцеговины, просмотрели судебные решения, и в очень спокойной атмосфере наметили местной администрации, что есть правовая база, обуславливающая незаконность их посягательства на ту территорию, которую занимал батальон. Проводится ли страноведческая подготовка в учебных центрах?

Dr. Ken EYRE,

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (Canada),
Director of Research & Development Studies

What we do at our Pearson Centre, you are correct, is that we do general education for pre-deployment for specific organisations going to specific theatres with separate packages, for example the Canadian Mounting Police is doing its training, there the Canadian Forces have their own pre-deployment training package and that focuses on language, culture, history and the specific backgrounds and is specifically geared for particular missions. So, the answer to your question is yes, it is done, but for the various government agencies or the various non-governmental organizations.

Claes-Goran HEDEN,

Swedish International Centre,
Brig.General

Yes, my answer is identical to Pearson Institute. As I showed you on this picture - this third step - is a mission related training. So you have the basic two steps, and then you have a mission training. And that depends on what mission is like. For example, Bosnia Herzegovina, - for the battalion, the Brigade Staff officers in Dubai in another Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, all the observers, military observers and that depends on where they are going to be mission related. So that it's the answer, we have a mission related last step in the training.

Larry FOSTER,

US Army Peacekeeping
Institute, Director, Colonel

For the US military it is something similar: we provide general training and professional military education for officers and non-commissioned officers, which provide a general legal and doctrinal background for this kind of operations. And then within respect to specific operations there is a period of pre-deployment training that focuses on a particular cultural, historic and other aspects of an operation, and looks into the international legal implications of such an operation and prepares the commanders and the soldiers for that particular mission. And also I have to add, that we have specialised courses taught in various US military schools, they go into depths to prepare specialists in aspects to these operations, including international law.

Claes TORNBERG,
Swedish National Defence College,
Commandant, Admiral

It's the same type of question really. I think it's very essential to have a clear role split between training and education. And in Sweden we have done what Brigadier Heden was talking about that is oriented training and what we are doing at the National Defence College that is education understanding backed with research capacities and that means also with the question towards the NGO's - that it is easier for them to get acquainted and have a closer relationship with the people than to us, a Defence College. And as for the other NGO's who want to have training and also will be more tied up with field operation, I think that Dr Eyre was very clear in his presentation.

Ю.И. БУЧИНСКИЙ,
старший преподаватель
кафедры оперативного искусства
Военной Академии Генерального
штаба ВС РФ, генерал-майор

В ходе дискуссии хотелось бы уточнить свою позицию. Я считаю, что учебный центр миротворческой направленности унифицированным быть не может. Непосредственная подготовка участников миротворческих операций возлагается на национальный контингент. Скандинавские страны решили этот вопрос следующим образом: различные войсковые подразделения готовят соответствующих специалистов (саперные подразделения — саперов и т.д.). У нас в течение 4-х лет велись дискуссии о том, должны ли миротворческие силы входить в состав вооруженных сил или нет. В конечном счете решили, что должны. Каждый военнослужащий, поступив на службу либо по контракту, либо по призыву, определенное время проходит обучение, но не по миротворческой тематике. Для специальной подготовки миротворческих сил Главным управлением боевой подготовки разработаны программы, специфические для каждого рода войск. Специфика программ связана с тем, что штатные подразделения целиком в миротворческих операциях не участвуют.

А.М. САЛМИН,
президент Фонда
"Российский общественно-
политический центр",
доктор исторических наук, профессор

ЗАКЛЮЧИТЕЛЬНОЕ СЛОВО ПО ПОДВЕДЕНИЮ ИТОГОВ РАБОТЫ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

Момент несколько волнующий: конференция подошла к своему естественному завершению. Подошла совсем неплохо, нам удалось рассмотреть все темы, ни одна из тех, что были в программе, не осталась без внимания. Думаю, что не ошибусь и выражу мнение всех присутствующих, если скажу, что цель, которую мы ставили перед собой, в основном достигнута.

В течение двух дней у нас происходил конкретный и в то же время теоретически насыщенный разговор о важнейших проблемах миротворчества на рубеже двух веков: XX и XXI. Мы передавали друг другу опыт, не всегда, конечно, соглашаясь друг с другом. Как бы то ни было, в конце конференции никак нельзя сказать, что мы достигли согласия о несогласии.

В первый день, на утренней сессии, начало нашей дискуссии положил г-н Юдин, первый заместитель директора Департамента международных организаций МИД России, и он высказал в общих чертах российскую точку зрения на миротворчество. Я думаю участникам конференции, особенно зарубежным, было интересно услышать официальную точку зрения российского МИДа именно здесь, в Москве. Г-н Юдин передал также привет, пожелания успеха и извинения от г-на Грановского, руководителя Департамента, который не смог прибыть на нашу конференцию. Были переданы поздравления и пожелания успеха и от секретаря Совета безопасности РФ г-на Кокошина.

В тот же день адмирал Торнберг и профессор Хульд нарисовали, на мой взгляд, очень широкую и конкретную картину проблем, стоящих сегодня перед миротворцами — проблем юридических, организационных, политических. Эти два выступления задали тон конференции и дали некий первоначальный материал для обсуждения, который спровоцировал последующую дискуссию.

В этот же день утром выступила г-жа Хильдинг. Я должен отметить, что она является близким другом "Российского общественно-политического центра". В течение нескольких месяцев она была настоящим энергетическим началом нашей конференции в период ее подготовки, за что мы ей очень благодарны и надеемся, что будем сотрудничать и дальше. Но г-жа Хильдинг внесла и другой, к сожалению не всеми замеченный, вклад в конференцию. Она опубликовала очень хорошую, на мой взгляд, статью в журнале "РОПЦ" "Полития" о проблемах миротворчества, благодаря которой в России получили достаточно развернутое конкретное представление о некоторых подходах к этой проблеме на Западе. Могу только пожалеть, что не все участники конференции владеют русским языком, но в нашем журнале уже опубликовано краткое изложение статьи на английском языке.

Вчера г-н Тузмухамедов, д-р Малан, профессор Бринг, г-жа Спенс остановились на проблеме, которая вызвала больше всего споров, продолжавшихся до глубокой ночи. Это проблема международно-правовой базы действия многонациональных миротворческих сил. Обратная ее сторона — вопрос стандартизации принципов организации операций по поддержанию мира. На мой взгляд, вопрос этот в значительной степени остался открытым, о чем свидетельствует то, что неоднократные призывы генерала Вишневого высказываться по этому поводу часто оставались без ответа. Это значит, что объективно мы пока еще не готовы предложить некую концепцию перехода к такой стандартизации и унификации международно-правовой базы, сближения нашего понимания различных международно-правовых и национальных правовых актов. Тем не менее, поскольку эта идея не была отвергнута никем из участников, проблема остается, а это значит, что нас ждет впереди достаточно большая работа.

Стараниями д-ра Силверса, капитана 1 ранга Шушера, генерала Хедерстедта мы поставили проблему многонациональных оперативных сил. Участники конференции могли увидеть различные подходы, и масла в огонь дискуссии подлило интересное выступление генерала Потемкина, вызвавшее в итоге в сочетании с предыдущими концептуальными выступлениями довольно любопытную полемику, которая не прекратилась даже после перерыва.

Обсуждался вопрос о гражданском и военном взаимодействии. Здесь выступления генерала Абазы, профессора Козина, генерала Капралова, генерала Вишневого продемонстрировали нам рамки проблемы, в то же время показав, что при различном понимании типов взаимодействия между гражданскими и военными, сам вопрос о взаимодействии выглядит вполне решаемым. Должен отметить, что вопрос был интересным настолько, что включившиеся в дискуссию г-н Шахтактинский и генерал Бучинский своими небольшими, как было объявлено, репликами сделали по сути полноценные сообщения.

Сегодня мы обсуждаем специфику миротворческих центров и миротворческих технологий, если можно так выразиться. Сессия началась поездкой на Высшие офицерские курсы "Выстрел", где располагается один из таких центров. Я думаю, что все участники конференции, в том числе и российские, которые не бывали там, получили в высшей степени интересную информацию. Я искренне благодарен руководству курсов "Выстрел" за предоставленную возможность посетить центр.

Думаю, что для нас очень важен и опыт знакомства со Штабом по координации военного сотрудничества государств СНГ, в котором мы находимся сейчас и гостеприимством которого пользуемся.

В сегодняшних выступлениях генерала Хедена, полковника Фостера, д-ра Малана, д-ра Эйри, полковника Белокопытова нашли отражение различные стороны деятельности миротворческих сил. Как говорят участники Стокгольмской конференции, в которой сам я, к большому сожалению, не смог принять участия, это шаг вперед в понимании специфики работы центров, их возможной взаимодополняемости, а также в распространении их опыта и их технологий.

В нашей конференции, как в капле воды были видны почти все проблемы сегодняшнего миротворчества, миротворчества на рубеже XXI в. "Блаженны миротворцы", как сказано в одном очень известном тексте, но, к сожалению, сегодня мы видим, что многие проблемы миротворчества еще не разрешены. Я думаю, это особенно актуально для российских участников. Зарубежные гости заметили, насколько мы были откровенны и самокритичны в своих выступлениях. Для России на сегодняшний день существует целый ряд нерешенных проблем: вопрос о статусе миротворчества в СНГ, проблема подготовки специальных контингентов миротворческих сил, не входящих в состав вооруженных сил. Я думаю, что все почувствовали остроту этих проблем для нашей страны. Очень актуальна для России проблема финансового обеспечения миротворчества. Речь идет о поддержании центра по миротворческой деятельности, центра, где готовятся наблюдатели ООН, на его базе можно было бы создать региональный центр миротворчества. Многие проблемы в России решаемы в том случае, если и в финансовом, и в административном, и в политическом отношении они не будут проблемой какого-то одного департамента, одного министерства.

Есть и другие проблемы, более универсальные, чем сегодняшние российские, отзвук которых мы также услышали на конференции. Сегодня миротворчеству, по сути, бросаются вызовы, их несколько. Потенциально растет стоимость миротворческих операций, они становятся все более и более дорогими. Если прогнозы, которые делаются в отношении XXI в., оправдаются, то эта проблема станет достаточно серьезной. Разрастаются и умножаются силы и структуры, которые участвуют в миротворческой деятельности. Это становится самостоятельным серьезным вызовом. Чем крупнее система, тем сложнее ею управлять, тем в большей степени она способна выходить из-под контроля. Растет опасность применения силы в миротворческих операциях. Мы видим такие примеры и, может быть, еще увидим, к сожалению. Где кончается миротворчество и начинается нечто, не имеющее к нему отношения? И последнее — отсутствие общих стандартов, общих правил проведения операций. Это еще одна проблема, еще один вызов, которым мы много занимались на этой конференции.

В свое время, лет двадцать назад, в России была популярна одна шутка. Некто приходит к пророку и спрашивает у него: будет ли в XXI в. мировая война. Нет, отвечает пророк, мировой войны не будет, будет такая борьба за мир, что после нее камня на камне не останется. Надеюсь, что это пророчество не сбудется, однако превращение миротворчества в некую глобальную, трудно управляемую, все более дорогую систему — потенциально может стать головной болью XXI в. В XX в. с головной болью похожего рода в целом удалось справиться. Я говорю об ООН, которая является сейчас главной структурой, благословляющей миротворчество. Была опасность превращения этой организации в нечто мегаломаническое, бесформенное, финансово провальное. Не все проблемы решены и сегодня, но мы с ними как-то справляемся, и я надеюсь, что в XXI в. миротворчество не превратится в такую проблему, а если превратится, то, к сожалению, может породить и еще одну угрозу, другого рода.

В свое время, в самом начале Карабахского конфликта, мне приходилось довольно много общаться с его участниками с той и другой стороны. И однажды в разговоре я услышал аргумент, который меня сначала поразил, потом показался по-своему логичным, и, наконец, как выяснилось, оказался не случайной фразой, а частью целой идеологии. Аргумент этот был такой: нам не нужно миротворчество потому, что на благо народа не только победы, но и поражения. Причем, этот аргумент я слышал не от победителей, а от тех, кто в тот момент скорее походил на побежденных. Такая философия, как мы все прекрасно знаем, существовала всегда, у нее всегда находились сторонники. Но эта философия становится действительно определяющей, доминирующей только при действии неких дополнительных условий. Я боюсь, что тупики и неудачи миротворчества будут работать на укрепление такой философии, и это может быть последним принципиальным вызовом миротворчеству в XXI в.

В России много проблем, связанных с армией вообще, переходящих на миротворческие подразделения, на подходы к проблемам миротворчества. Это, в частности, проблема отношения гражданских и военных — то, что называется гражданско-военной кооперацией или сотрудничеством. В последние годы эта проблема постепенно решается. Есть проблема гражданского контроля, проблема прав человека в вооруженных силах, проблема управляемости вооруженных сил, экономические проблемы и др. Сегодня в России очень важно пройти между Сциллой и Харибдой, не допустить растворения миротворчества в других проблемах, в то же время не допуская ее чрезмерного выпячивания в ущерб другим проблемам вооруженных сил и внешней политики. Если нам удастся сохранить взвешенный подход к миротворчеству, то, я надеюсь, мы войдем в XXI в. с некоторой надеждой.

И последнее. Мы намерены опубликовать материалы нашей конференции по-русски. Это будет бесполезно не только для всех участников конференции, но и для лиц, принимающих политические, административные и, что особенно важно, экономические решения.

Надеюсь, что окончание нашей конференции не станет окончанием проекта. Рассчитываю, что мы встретимся в Иордании, встретимся с лучшим пониманием тех проблем, о которых мы здесь говорили.

Я благодарю от имени "Российского общественно-политического центра" всех участников за то, что они приехали к нам, за то, что они так напряженно работали. Я благодарю всех выступавших, особенно тех, кто сдал свои доклады в письменном виде. Спасибо всем. До следующих встреч.

Dr. Kamel ABU-JABER,
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy,
President

THE FORTHCOMING THIRD CONFERENCE ON PEACE-KEEPING IN JORDAN

Good evening Ladies and Gentlemen, Professor Salmin and General Maltzev, Yesterday and today I have been listening, like all of us, but for me, I have been listening with much attention and fascination to the discussion that has taken place. I was wondering throughout that may be 15 years ago none of us would have dreamt that the Russians, the Americans, the Canadians, people from Sweden and all the other countries would be sitting around one table, discussing peace in the 21st century. I think this is really a blessed and beautiful development. And I would like to make my input into it and to say that we supported all heartily. And I also hope that you will forgive me my inability to communicate with you in military terms, as you have been doing for the past two days, at least, the most of the attendance.

I would like to outline some ideas that might provide a certain framework for what we are talking about as well as ending with a few preliminary remarks about our next Conference in Amman. I am honoured to be allowed to participate in this concluding session, that has been for me a new intellectual experience. Indeed, regarding a very timely topic that touches up the life of everybody in the entire humankind, it is my belief that the world has always been in a period of transition, from one mood to another, so I think that the present and the coming historical moment may witness some of the greatest aspects of transition and human history. And that is not only "ethnological terms", but also in the changing mood that I see in the beginnings of this Conference. This is not only because of the terrors of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological or chemical, but more important because of the keeping and though slow keeping realisation of the common destiny. The shrinking distances, the increasing influence and the power of mass communication on everyone's life, everywhere. Slowly, but surely we are beginning to believe and to appreciate the need for living and letting live. Peaceful co-existence is in accepting the differences of each other, and in attempting to resolve these differences in a peaceful manner while respecting each other at the same time. This is indeed a rare historical moment. Never before, in human history as far as I know, have the great powers tried, as they are trying to do now, and as you see, sitting around this table, the representatives of these powers, to accommodate and to understand each other. Sure, there still linger doubts, suspicions and sometimes, even tensions which may remain in the very foreseeable future, but this historical moment should be grasped and should not be allowed to slip away for any reason at all. It is perhaps curious, though at the same time logical and heartening to see the kind of civil dialogue among the military of so many nations from NATO, non-NATO and other countries beyond.

I cannot discuss the technological particularities, though I witness a changing mood, a mood directed towards the search for non-violence solutions. For, in discussing challenges of peace support in the 21st century, you are participating in the constructing of a new culture of peace. A culture of peace based on reason, based on legality, based on reasonableness through co-operation, not conflict. Yesterday I passed by the building of the Russian State Duma - the name Duma which has been revived with the advent of the second Great Russian Revolution, in this century, the noun comes from the Russian verb *dumat'* means "to think": to think is to reason, to be rational. Introducing a sense of rationality rather than the passion of ideology whether this ideology is religious or secular - in addition to the emphasis on legality as discussed in this Conference and around this table is exactly what is needed in this tense historical moment. Only thus can the culture of peace be introduced and eventually flourish. Historically speaking, societies were either well prepared or preparing for military goals and military means. The time has come for peace preparedness. Technology, especially military technology has far out stripped advances in the social and the human sciences and design to ease relations between states and they all join to the conflicts. It is in this context that these workshops in Stockholm and in Amman and Pretoria should be viewed so that the cultures and civilisations must divert their attention from just holding their weapons for clash to holding them for co-operation. To give one example, we do live in a small world - and you all know, it is a unique world in this universe in which we live, this is the only planet, as far as I know, and as far as science and technology has known that has this fantastic variety of life on it. That's not only the life of human beings, but Life in general. Which is really a beautiful expression of the magnificence of God's Glory of His Creation, and we are, as you all know, through our competitive attitude drowning it, for us now, and our children, and our grand-children. And I was very much impressed to see today at the "Vystiril" which we visited, that there were some courses on the environment and how it can be improved.

General Potemkin yesterday emphasised the need for diplomatic non-violent means to resolve disputes. Along with that we need to rethink our premises regarding the concept of security so that they can transcend that of the military dimension to other dimensions too: socio-economic and cultural as well. I say this, because we in Jordan, - and we are a small country and we are in no place to give you lessons, - all I am trying to do is to share some humble ideas. You are a great nation of ideas that has produced some of the greatest literatures in the entire history of men, from Gogol to Turgenev to Dostoevski to Tolstoi etc I say this again, because we, in Jordan, have always attempted to introduce in our region, at any rate, the measure of reason and a measure of firmness to our very troubled area. Law, legality and firmness are very important. These are not intellectual logic for us, but these are our defence, our protection, our very survivals. No country should cling to itself. In Jordan, we live in a very difficult lifehood- with our ideology on one side, and oil on the other. Which have been the causes why conflicts in the region have been described as protected frustrated and even frustrating. This is partly because the people on both sides of the conflict are traumatised. We know that there is the "Sanda" trauma - we are too traumatised, but for different reasons. And partly also because the input from the outside has been less than positive. Our participation in the international peace-keeping operations in Jordan, and we participated, or I think, have participated or are participating now in 17 countries, is yet another way in which we are trying to emphasise the need for order, based on legality. This proves that even small countries, like ours can co-operate with the great ones, like Russia, the United States, like Canada, - like many European countries, like China to establish order and civility. But then I hope, I may be allowed to remind you that order is some more than the sum total of negatives, or negative prohibitions. Order is justice, and order is fairness. So far neither we, in the Middle East nor you elsewhere in the world have enjoyed either peace or security. Neither internal social peace, nor peace among nations can be enjoyed, - unless our mode of thinking changes in the proper direction. We have a popular saying that goes: "Necessity is the mother of invention" - if you open yourself to idealist ideas -religions, systems of ethics, or political philosophy these could not but bring about the needs to resolve by peaceful means and solving the differences, and they perhaps are increasing the legalisation of the world where we are forced to live close to each other. A man is only 3 and 20 minutes from Moscow - it's fantastic... when you think of the smallness of this world.

It is with this frame of my idea that I hope that we approach this and subsequent conferences of this kind. We have to expand the peace culture. In our modest way, in this and in subsequent meetings, in Amman and other places, I hope we can contribute to the scheme.

I shall conclude by a few remarks concerning the Amman conference which, I hope, will focus on issues of civil-military relations, with the goal of improving peace-keeping operations. Jordan's involvement in peace-keeping will also be discussed in as much as Jordan has quite an extensive experience in this area. It is here where the effort of the Jordan Diplomatic Institute will also be explained. An officer, a peace-keeper, we think, is more than a military man...or a policeman. He is that as well as a conciliator, mediator, and a provider of a human touch, sometimes he is also a confessor. I doubt that with some of our people who have been down in Bosnia or in Cambodia, or in Angola. And they sometimes illustrate this act in this capacity. We hope to focus in our meeting on the Palestinian dimension as a case study of peace-keeping. Some people today or yesterday mentioned that the very concept of peace-keeping was born some 50 years ago. My dear, I would like to tell you that the Swedish Count Bernadotte was the first peace-keeper and he perished in the pursuit of his duty. We hope to have the perspectives from the Swedes, the Canadians, the Austrians, the Russians, the Americans and others on this matter. Two additional dimensions will also be included in that conference. The first, is the very changing concept of security- like I say, they should transcend that of military matters, and the second, is my idea of having a round-table discussion at the end of our meeting, exploring some of the features that have been discussed by some of the participants of the Conference. I also must add, that our Conference will include a cultural dimension, this is to invite you all to come to Amman, I do hope that you all will come. Since we cannot repeat the magnificence of the Bolshoi Opera performance, we will have excursions into some of the rarest historical monuments and antiques anywhere in the world. And finally, if you have any ideas regarding the Amman Conference, I would be more than happy to hear them.

Please allow me to thank our Russian hosts for their hospitality and their willingness to share their ideas and their wisdom with us. In particular, I would like to salute the Russian Public Policy Centre, its President, and General Vishniewski, Mr Makhelai who has been a very active man and all the staff and especially the interpreters and thank you Ladies and Gentlemen.