Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination

Challenges Project
Phase II Concluding Report 2003–2006

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Contents

Foreword

The international community needs to strengthen its total capacity for planning, conducting and evaluating peace operations. As a collegial endeavour, the international project *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century* was initiated in Stockholm in 1997. It is a manifestation of a broad multinational effort that seeks to improve the international community's response to these significant challenges, now and in the future. The findings of the first phase of the project were presented to the UN Secretary-General by my predecessor, the late Anna Lindh, on behalf of the Project Partners in April 2002.

As the international community continues to face daunting challenges of peace operations in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and elsewhere, the Partners decided to continue their cooperation and address in more depth some of the challenges identified in Phase I. The present report, *Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination*, is timely and relevant. It focuses on key challenges such as the regional dimensions of peace operations, rule of law, and education and training.

The challenges of contemporary, complex peace operations need to be tackled on many levels, by many actors, and in many and difficult circumstances. The project provides an important platform upon which a broad range of civilian, police and military expertise from six continents have been able to meet for deliberations on these important issues. The project also aims to foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership. The partnership, which has grown over time, now consists of partner organizations from 14 countries. Some organizations are closely connected to, or are part of, their respective governments, while others have a more independent position. This combination has proved to be a rich source of expertise and a format conducive to a fruitful, broadly representative, dialogue.

The present report does not necessarily represent official governmental positions, but is an important and independent contribution to the international dialogue on how to enhance the total international capability of multinational peace operations. This offers us as governments and members of the international community an opportunity to assess the analysis of the report, and to take action to ensure the effective implementation of its recommendations, when and where appropriate, in order to meet the challenges of peace operations of the 21st century.

Laila Freivalds
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

Acknowledgements

Given the nature of this broad and long-standing common undertaking, a process of cooperation and coordination itself, it would be impossible to list the many institutions and individuals that have contributed to the project effort. The Project Partners' deep gratitude and appreciation are extended to all. Nevertheless, in focusing on the institutional commitments and contributions that have been made, a number of groups and organizations stand out.

First and foremost, special thanks are extended to the speakers, seminar participants, and Partner members of the working groups who have made the deliberations and work of the project both possible and fruitful (see Annex 2–3, 5). Important contributions have also been made by representatives from Partner Countries who have reviewed the report and analyzed its contents.

Australia, Sweden and the new Partners in Phase II, Turkey, Nigeria, China, and the United Kingdom, hosted valuable seminars, each producing a separate Challenges Seminar Report on the topics discussed at their respective meeting (see www.challengesproject.net).

The Challenges Project and this report would not have been possible without the crucial support received from governmental organizations in Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Important contributions have also been made by a number of public and private sponsors (see Annex 6).

Representatives at the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of the Partner Countries and officials of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have played an important role in providing insights from the perspectives of the United Nations and its headquarters in New York.

The report, based essentially on the detailed work of the seminars, has been edited by the Project Coordinators and the Rapporteurs of working groups chosen by the Project Partners.

Challenges Project Concluding Report 2006
Executive Summary and Conclusions

1.   This report is the product of a number of seminars that took place between November 2002 and March 2005 aimed at developing joint recommendations for strengthening international peace operations. It follows in the footsteps of the Concluding Report of earlier work entitled "Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century" that was presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi A. Annan, in April 2002. In that report, the Project Partners concluded that an area of peace operations that demanded more attention and inspired initiative was that of multinational and multicultural cooperation and coordination, and this became the over-arching theme of the second phase of the Challenges Project.

2.   As before, the aim of the project has been to bring to bear the collective knowledge and views of participants on the challenges of peace operations, and to take matters further by setting out ways by which some of those challenges may be met through significantly improved cooperation and coordination.

3.   In the second phase, the circle of Project Partner Organizations was enlarged by the addition of new Partners from Turkey, Nigeria, China and the United Kingdom. The content and findings of this report were developed from inputs from experts and generalists (in the area of peace operations) at the seminars, and from teams in subsequent drafting sessions according to the specific areas of interest and expertise among the Partner Organizations. Given the ongoing project process over several years, some of the conclusions and recommendations arrived at have already been, or are in the process of being, implemented. Others still require attention by the International Community before agreement is reached, and implementation is possible. This document contains recommendations of both kinds. The chapters that follow and their respective recommendations have been reviewed by all the Project Partners, representing views from 14 countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. However, since some of the Partner Organizations are part of or closer to their governments than others, the recommendations contained herein do not necessarily represent the agreed policies of any government. That said, the success – or failure - of multilateral peace operations continue to depend very heavily on the extent to which support from Member States is forthcoming. It is in the interests of enhancing that support that this report is presented.

The Dynamic Nature of Peace Operations and the Challenges of Change: Cooperation and Coordination in a Turbulent Security Environment

4.   Modern peace operations face enduring and intimidating challenges in a rapidly changing international security environment. At the same time, the local security environments into which recent peace operations have been deployed are among the most difficult and least-governed of any that international operations have ever encountered. The pace of deployments has increased and while a majority are still undertaken with the consent of the major parties to the conflict, almost all peace operations launched in the present decade have been given, for good reason, Chapter VII 'peace enforcement' mandates. By the end of October 2005, the total military and police strength of the 18 active UN peacekeeping missions stood at over 69 000, added to which there were some 15 000 international and national civilian staff and UN Volunteers in the field, bringing the deployed total to 84 000 personnel. These numbers together with those operations with personnel not under UN command, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Solomon Islands, underline the extent to which such operations place high demands on the international community at large.

5.   Increasingly, operations have taken on a hybrid character, with two or more organizations responsible for different elements of the international response. Differences in circumstances have led to no standard form being adopted, and thus the UN has sometimes deployed troops alongside those of other organizations with or without formal coordination, or preceded or followed a multinational, regional or bilateral force, with responsibilities and relationships changing as the mission matures.

6.   Of the factors that have driven the changes in the nature of the security threat during the past few years and their implications for peace operations, two stand out as major challenges and risks – the consequences of weak/fragile or failed states, and the threat of terrorism. They differ in significance from country to country and from region to region. However, both sets of challenges constitute serious threats to life, property, social stability, public order and established governmental authority, and have impelled the international community to devise actions to address them, including robust multifunctional peace operations under Chapter VII mandates and specific countermeasures against terrorism.

7.   With respect to the conduct of peace operations in weak/fragile or failed states, such states not only fail their own peoples, but constitute power vacuums attractive to terrorist groups and organized crime alike – thus posing a threat to the wider international community as well. The peace operations deployed in these states have needed mandates covering a wide spectrum of tasks, often far beyond

the traditional training and duties of soldiers and police. These situations have in turn demanded unexpected dimensions of local administration, civil-military co-operation, institutional initiative, mission innovation, and at times much personal courage. It is Africa that has had to endure the most extensive experiences of humanitarian crises, breakdown of governance, conflict and wars, widespread lawlessness and criminality, and the movements of refugees and internally displaced persons. Not surprisingly, therefore, Africa has been the principal geographic focus of UN peace operations in recent years.

8.   The increase in terrorism has also had an impact on the conduct of peace operations. The environment in which UN military and civilian peacekeepers were earlier seen as impartial, neutral and serving a good cause to all, has been worsening for years, at least since the attacks on UN peacekeepers in Somalia and the taking of UN troops as hostages in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Now UN peacekeepers have to be regarded as being at much higher risk, and accordingly much greater caution has to be exercised in their deployment. Moreover, greater security arrangements involve greater costs, adjusted operational concepts and techniques, and the new situations argue for much better field intelligence, to anticipate and to thwart such attacks.

9.   Complex, multinational, multicultural and multi-dimensional peace operations normally take place in difficult political, security, economic and humanitarian environments and therefore require effective co-operation and coordination. Co-operation is as much an attitude as it is a physical act. It is a willingness to explore possibilities in partnership with other stakeholders and, if agreed, to pursue a course of action. Coordination implies cooperation, but extends further to the systematic use of policy and actions to achieve mandated aims in a cohesive and effective manner by leading, planning, managing, negotiating and implementing.

10.   In seeking to achieve the objective of sustainable peace, peacebuilding and development activities have increasingly been recognized as being just as important as providing physical security. However, the question of who should carry out such activities has resulted in overlapping of interests and responsibilities and at times institutional clashes between the different actors, raising questions with regard to policy aspirations versus operational capacities. Discussions between security and development actors on these issues should be more actively encouraged if the international community is serious about effectively and sufficiently addressing all such activities in immediate post-conflict environments.

11.   Separately, in most countries, there is no effective working linkage between field requirements, available personnel, financial resources, recruitment systems, training needs, training capabilities, deployment mechanisms, and evaluation systems. There is, for example, normally no stated national requirement for the pre-training of personnel, and due diligence with regard to the safety of nationals being

deployed to a conflict or post-conflict zone is often overlooked. Some countries include some training for police, but in general, official national training, for a variety of reasons, is often limited to those engaged in military-related duties. Often there is no clear national point of contact from which the UN or regional and international organizations can seek specific assistance. Cooperation and coordination under these circumstances are therefore a very real challenge.

12.   With respect to operations, the principal areas for cooperation and coordination in a mission include: operational concept development; detailed operational planning; conduct of operations, including specific operations related to security; governance; institution building; rule of law (ROL); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); human rights; gender; refugee return and humanitarian assistance; information sharing; operational priority setting; resolution of inter-cultural conflicts; education and training; and the evaluation of progress. At the international level, there is an emerging recognition that government departments and agencies, the armed forces, education and training institutions, national NGOs, representative offices from IOs and UN agencies, and the private sector all need to work together more closely with respect to national contributions to international peace operations.

13.   However, the efforts of external actors will be for naught if the people who must live with the consequences of success or failure, namely the people of the concerned country, are not fully engaged in and committed to the peace. While much time and energy are spent on attempting coordination between international actors, enhanced efforts should be devoted to improving the partnership with the local population and the national institutions. From the outset, it is important to also include the media and academia in early contacts, and to progressively engage like-minded groups in a process of reconciliation; groups such as veterans, business community, widows, youth and religious leaders, to name but a few.

14.   In seeking to meet these many and diverse challenges, the Project Partners focused attention on three particular areas: regional dimensions and capacity enhancement, implementing rule of law, and education and training. These areas are explored in greater depth in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the report.

15.   Chapter 1 concludes with a call for **action** in meeting the challenges of cooperation and coordination:

- Action by governments to think imaginatively and act cooperatively in providing resources, facilities and assistance.
- Action by secretariats, training centres, agencies and programmes to improve effectiveness by agreeing on common standards and adopting joint approaches to common problems.

Cooperation and Coordination: Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations

16.   To realize the vision of an "interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities", a number of measures could and should be taken by UN Member States, working in cooperation with the UN Secretariat as well as the secretariats of their respective regional organizations. This report therefore reviews major issues and obstacles to better UN-regional and regional-regional cooperation and coordination and makes recommendations with regard to ways in which those obstacles may be overcome, cooperation and coordination improved, and operations made more effective and thus less costly in the long run.

17.   Key functional elements of cooperation and coordination in the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements are identified and addressed: issues of consensus and complementarity; memoranda of understanding; early warning, liaison and information sharing; conflict prevention and peacebuilding; and procedures and guidelines for mission handover. To actively promote capacity-building and enhancement in regional organizations, recommendations are put forward to address shortages related to headquarters and planning structures; guidelines, doctrines, strategies; sustaining operations; financing operations and financial assistance.

Cooperation and Coordination between the UN and Regional Organizations – Recommendations

18.   The primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security, and the complementary nature of actions by the UN, Regional Arrangements and Member States, are now widely recognized. Throughout the Phase II Challenges Seminars many participants spoke of the magnitude and complexity of the challenges to hand, that also necessitate action by nations and regions, with the UN system not expected to carry full responsibility for such endeavours. It is necessary to ensure that actions that are taken at regional and international level are properly linked and optimized to maximum effect and that Member States provide the resources and political will to support such a complementary process. To support the idea of synergy and complementarity, a number of Project Partners suggested that the full contributions of military, police and civilians and other support by Member States to UN-authorized regional peace operations should be reflected in relevant statistics.

19.   In peace operation matters, the links established between the UN and regional organizations and arrangements are still limited. Challenges seminar participants have called for the establishment of joint consultative mechanisms and meetings to be held on a regular basis to promote more effective and coordinated inter-

national action and are pleased to note recent progress made. These agreements and others must now be transformed into practical formats for regular and operational co-operation. The UN Secretary-General should move towards implementation of decisions taken at the recent World Summit to institute memoranda of understanding between the UN and other organizations as appropriate. At the working level, the linking where practical of early warning arrangements through communication and computer systems would allow the exchange of unclassified background data and evolving information about a developing crisis. The UN, regional organizations and Member States should also establish a regular process for developing and exchanging measures of effectiveness for the civilian, police and military components after a mission is completed (or steady state achieved) or contributing forces and personnel have exited.

20.   The Project Partners have stressed the importance of improving liaison. The exchange of civilian, police and military staff and liaison officers between the UN and regional organizations, and between various regional organizations, is an important aspect of transparency, a practical way to implement cooperation, and should be encouraged at all levels and in a systematic manner. Such exchanges, and opportunities to attend "lessons learned" and best practices studies and seminars, can bring significant benefits and, in turn, need to be properly funded. This should be one of the priorities for the first in the series of foreseen regular meetings between the UN and regional organizations, and lessons should be drawn from recent models of liaison between secretariats as well as within actual operations.

21.   For cooperation and coordination in peacebuilding, the Partners welcome the decision at the 2005 World Summit to establish a UN Peacebuilding Commission. Regional organizations are urged to recognize the Peacebuilding Commission as the principal focal point for the coordination of peacebuilding activities, and those organizations should also be invited to participate, as relevant, in the development and work of the Commission.

22.   Another aspect of liaison and information-sharing arises when the lead responsibility and operational control are transferred from one authority to another. It is likely that there will be a continuing need for effective operational transitions between the peacekeeping forces of regional organizations and coalitions, and the United Nations. In transitions, national or coalition contingents from one organization will often transfer to the operational control of a new authority. Recent experiences with "re-hatting" of this nature, in UNAMSIL, UNMIL, UNOCI, ONUB and MINUSTAH, have demonstrated continuing gaps between equipment levels and logistic support practices of many regional organizations and the different, sometimes higher, standards provided and expected in UN missions. Member States should encourage the United Nations to facilitate the development of compatible guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for effective transitions between UN and

non-UN peace operations, in close consultation with states and organizations having experience with such transitions.

*Capacity-Building in Regional Organizations
– Recommendations*

23.   A major conclusion arising from reviews of peace operations over the last few years is that the ability of most regional and sub-regional organizations to respond rapidly to urgent demands for peace operations, and to conduct operations effectively once deployed, is quite limited. In particular, the capacity for such organizations other than NATO and the EU to plan, mount and sustain operations without a lead nation providing the core of the deployed resources, is limited. Furthermore, where regional organizations have deployed, they have often quickly (within a few months) sought significant support or replacement by the UN or other providers or donors. The Project Partners point to several areas where improvements might be made.

24.   One such area would be a permanent strategic headquarters or secretariat within a regional or sub-regional organization that could prepare peace operations policy, guidelines and procedures for future regional operations and would also plan, command and administer any deployed mission for the regional executive. Particular attention should be directed towards multifunctional missions, and the still relative weaknesses in the civilian dimensions of peace operations. To accelerate the development of effective headquarters staffs of developing regional organizations, the Project Partners encourage the United Nations and Member States to assist in training essential planning and other staff elements and assist in the creation of appropriate standby procedures to complement those being developed in the UN civilian, military and police standby arrangements.

25.   Another subject area addressed in the report is that of guidelines, doctrines and strategies. An institution's doctrine for peace operations derives from its strategic aims and is highly dependent on the range of tools at its disposal, which vary from organization to organization. To achieve confidence and consistency between contributors to peace operations, a set of guidelines could outline an approach to common activities, laying out the fundamental principles, practices and procedures normally to be followed in meeting the mandates of such operations. The Project Partners argue that the UN, in full cooperation with individual Member States, needs to further refine the guidelines, doctrine and policy for multifunctional peace operations, and then seek to distribute the products widely in the UN official languages. Regional organizations involved in peace operations should contribute to UN efforts and to review such guidance and, where appropriate, adjust and develop their own guidance so as to support the capacity for compatible operations with

the UN. To this end, regional organizations and arrangements should hold regular consultations and seminars on doctrine with the UN.

26.   Yet other areas to be improved include the different aspects of gender issues in peacekeeping and the problems related to the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. UN guidelines should be considered as the minimum standards applicable universally and should be incorporated in the doctrines of all regional organizations intending to carry out peace operations. Regional organizations should accelerate efforts to fully implement UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

27.   The greatest impediment to enhanced involvement in peace operations of many regional and sub-regional organizations, particularly in Africa, has been the lack of capacity to launch such operations, which involves more than just the technical training and equipping of individuals and light infantry forces for peacekeeping. Particular challenges are faced when conducting multifunctional missions, with one or more civilian components. Important complementary aspects are the provision of essential enabling capabilities, heavy unit equipment and the logistics to allow rapid and efficient deployment, as well as the maintenance of effective administrative and logistic support to contingents in the mission area. Developing regional organizations should consider their own personnel and equipment policies, with the UN standards and reference documents that have been developed from experience as a good basis.

28.   Once initiated, the further sustainment of logistic support to field operations is expensive and complicated to manage. The UN has increased its resource efficiency through standing systems contracts with commercial suppliers and by promoting cooperation between peacekeeping operations deployed in the same geographical region. Other systems of logistic support exist based upon military and civilian support experiences. The Project Partners suggest that the UN needs to discuss various logistic support options with regional organizations so as to optimize complementary and effective sustainment of responses. In this context, it has been suggested that Member States should agree to allow the UN to provide equipment support from UN owned resources to regional operations and encourages the early implementation of the UN making strategic deployment stocks available for operations conducted by regional/African organizations.

29.   Funding is another area in which more cooperation and coordination between regional organization, the UN and donors is needed. It has been suggested that UN Member States, working through the appropriate UN bodies, should seek agreement on mechanisms to allow regional organizations to draw on the UN assessed budget to carry out peace operations mandated by the Security Council, on a case by case basis. This option must, of necessity, entail a certain degree of condi-

tionality and external oversight on the use of the funds for those regional arrangements that will want to take advantage of it.

Cooperation and Coordination – Rule of Law

30.   The rule of law is the keystone in the creation of the virtuous circle that peace operations seek to achieve, promoting a secure environment that makes economic or political progress possible, which will in turn facilitate the deepening and sustainment of rule of law. In Phase II of the Challenges Project, participants addressed and highlighted rule of law issues relevant to: the legal framework of peace operations; law in a cultural context; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; the application of criminal law; policing; the conduct of military forces; human rights; accountability; and issues arising during transitional administration and assistance. Other issues considered included counter-terrorism and laws applicable thereto; how the military can contribute to a 'culture of protection' in peace operations; the use of international stability police units to establish and maintain public security; and issues relating to transitional justice.

31.   Particular attention is paid to recommendations on two of these issues: (1) the best means of operationalizing rule of law objectives and achieving rule of law outcomes, particularly in relation to the key aspects of policing, prisons, judicial capacity and law reform and (2) accountability. The development of better cooperation and coordination in peace operations among and between international actors and national and local stakeholders is of fundamental importance to ensure that the rule of law is institutionalized fully in the host nation in a manner that builds local capacity, ensures justice, and fills the rule of law vacuum, that so often exists in circumstances necessitating the deployment of the peace operation. International cooperation and coordination are also essential to address the fundamental importance of holding international actors involved in peace operations legally accountable for their actions and any failure to act.

32.   Rule of law as a central objective has been incorporated into a number of missions, including, for example, where the UN has been mandated to support existing structures and processes, and, on more rare occasions, undertake an executive transitional role. Key lessons of recent peace operations experience have further reinforced that it is necessary to develop local capacity not merely for policing, but also in relation to the judiciary and penal system, and to assist the legal system to meet internationally recognized standards. Perhaps above all, it is important that care must be taken to provide a proper mandate for rule of law issues in the first instance. This will ensure not only the legitimacy of rule of law initiatives, but serve as a rallying point for drawing the necessary funding and resource support.

33.   The complexity of rule of law challenges in peace operations affects the civilian, police and military components equally and depends to a large extent on the mission context. This can involve environments where there is a total absence of a functioning rule of law apparatus and culture, to one where there is merely a requirement to support or remedy particular points of weakness. To match these differing circumstances, there may be a Security Council mandate that provides full executive authority or there may only be a mandate to provide support to an existing government.

Managing Rule of Law Issues in Peace Operations
– Recommendations

34.   In managing rule of law issues in peace operations, Project Partners urge that the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process include a rule of law planning check list and should assess the context of a proposed operation for legal and cultural considerations, for the scope of deficiencies likely to be encountered and for key points of intervention that may be required. To that end, rule of law specialists, police and military planners should be jointly involved in pre-mission assessments to identify what law enforcement, judicial and penal functions the mission will initially need to perform, including the proper legal and logistic management of detainees.

35.   Partners welcome the establishment of a UN Standing Police Capacity, at present due to be launched by July 2006. Other areas, receiving less attention but of equal importance relate to prison and probation officers, the provision or rehabilitation of prison facilities, criminal investigation and intelligence, crowd control and the judiciary. As a complement to the UN's Standing Police Capacity, an effective standby arrangements system that contains rosters of individuals or functions (including the range of policing specialties as well as judges, magistrates, investigative judges, lawyers, administrative, prison and probation officers and personnel), who can be called upon for operations, together with effective police and rule of law training programmes for various personnel, should be developed by the UN and actively supported and contributed to by Member States.

36.   Effectively addressing the sources, not just the symptoms, of inter-group violence and obstruction of the peace process entails a number of cooperation and coordination challenges. To deal with the threat of violence directed against the peace process or the mission, integrated mission planners must enable an effective human intelligence plan based on building a sound relationship with the community, addressing its grievances and offering security from intimidation by would-be spoilers. Other key recommendations include a sound public media and education strategy, an ombudsman or other mechanism for the local community to air grievances, such as a mission dispute resolution or claims unit, and also mechanisms to address

war crimes and other atrocities, such as transitional criminal codes or codes of procedure, and traditional or customary processes.

37. Particular problems are related to the successful transfer of the responsibility for rule of law from the international mission to the indigenous authorities, when faced with an executive Security Council mandate. An international operation must develop a visibly holistic approach to managing rule of law objectives, in order to ensure the coordination of law enforcement, judicial reform, law reform and human rights, and coordination of the many partners engaged in addressing these issues. The need to take such an approach is generally recognized, but the international civilian capability frequently does not exist to put this concept effectively into practice at the inception of a mission. The transition process must be planned from the very beginning so that, for example, as police recruits are trained and demonstrate their competence, policing responsibilities can be transferred increasingly to indigenous personnel. The aim of any international support should not be to create replicas of their own home paradigms, but primarily to make themselves redundant and to support the development of a rule of law matrix that will be fully accepted by the assisted State.

38. The chapter underlines the need to institute performance safeguards to ensure that public security entities and overall judicial processes actually serve the public interest, respect minority rights, dispense justice equally, and maintain their autonomy from corrupting forces. The community must have channels for airing their grievances and mechanisms for pursuing effective remedies. Measures to ensure the independence of the judiciary must be instituted and good governance supervisory mechanisms introduced with appropriate dismissal and prosecution powers. Measures to ensure a free press will assist in the effort to ensure transparency and fidelity. These and other aspects must be reflected already in the planning phases of a mission.

39. The Project Partners identified two key opportunities for promoting rule of law in peace operations: the newly established UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO), and secondly, building regional peace operations capacity, including through paying particular attention to civilian components.

40. At the time of writing the report, details regarding membership, structure and institutional relationships within the UN of the Peacebuilding Commission were yet to be resolved. However, consensus is building that it should serve to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict, with a view to provide an effective UN transition support capability. There is strong support for it being mandated to provide recommendations and information to improve coordination of all relevant peacebuilding actors,

develop best practices and help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, extending the period of international engagement in the recovery effort.

41.   Key rule of law aspects that these mechanisms should address include: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; transitional and gender justice; legal reform, electoral support and good governance; doctrine and reference resources; assessment and plans; coordination and liaison; and human resources.

42.   The Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office, together with the international effort being mounted by the EU, G8 and others to develop regional peace operations and peacebuilding capacity, could play an important role in the development of regional rule of law organizational capacity. One example would be the creation of regional Rule of Law Centres of Excellence. Regional centres could bring to bear expert knowledge of the cultural and legal contexts of assisted states and ameliorate regional factors (e.g., facilitating the acceptance of assistance in neighboring States and cooperating in cross border aspects). These centres could play a strong preventative role as well in fostering good governance and reform options. They could be responsible for the training and mentoring of experts prepared to commit to standby arrangements for deployment or provide consultancy support. Project Partners recommend that Member States should consider supporting the development of regional Rule of Law Centres of Excellence.

Accountability within Peace Operations – Recommendations

43.   It is accepted that States, organizations and individuals involved in the creation, management and conduct of peace operations should be accountable for their actions, and on some occasions, their omissions. However, the exact boundaries of this accountability are much more controversial. Three central questions must be examined: to whom States, organizations and individuals are accountable; what accountability standards should be set for military, police and civilian peacekeepers, and who should set them; and what mechanisms are appropriate to hold the myriad of actors involved accountable.

44.   Depending on the circumstances of the deployment, States, organizations and individuals in peace operations are accountable to, amongst others: the UN and Member States of the UN; regional organizations and Member States of those organizations; other international organizations; host nations; troop contributing States to that particular peace operation; national organizations; non-governmental organizations; and the general population. Accountability can therefore become extremely diffused and confusing as military and civilian peacekeepers, humanitarian agents and contractors try to identify the myriad of relevant organizations and bodies to which they can, should or must report. This often leads to misunderstandings

as to responsibility, lack of transparency, and lack of appropriate redress of grievances.

45.   Two particular examples of accountability standard setting are addressed. First, attention is drawn to the Secretary-General's Bulletin concerning "Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse" in UN peace operations,[1] and the so called "Zeid Report" of 24 March 2005[2], calling Member States to take vigilant action. The Project Partners urge that the UN should continuously review its Standard Training Modules (STM) to ensure the issues and recommendations of the Zeid Report are adequately covered, and refine them if necessary. The model UN Stand-by Arrangements System MOU should be amended to include an undertaking to meet STM training standards for personnel conduct, thereby stressing the responsibilities of the personnel contributing states, and it was suggested by some that the UN Training and Evaluation Service should include an inspector-general who could monitor the adherence to STM standards and provide confidential recommendations to personnel-contributing countries in this regard.

46.   The second example concerns private contractors. Member States and international organizations should develop more effective and efficient measures to enhance the accountability of international contractors who provide services to peace operations. More specific recommendations to consider include developing general principles and guidelines for employing and managing contractors; a generic or model contract (including remedial measures for dealing with unsatisfactory conduct by personnel and with any damage or injury that may be caused by them) that may be used as a basis for employing and managing contractors; and a mission specific code of conduct for employing and managing contractors.

47.   The development of complex peace operations, the many actors involved in the planning, management and conduct of such operations, and the growing evidence of some of the adverse consequences that arise from the deployment of military and civilian peacekeepers suggest strongly that there is a need to develop more effective and efficient mechanisms of accountability. Among other suggestions, the Project Partners support that an Ombudsman should be instituted for each mission, that all peacekeeping forces should be properly supported by a welfare capability, and that Member States should ensure that the issue of accountability in peace operations is integrated into their doctrinal development as well as fully integrated into relevant curricula for pre-deployment training and education of military, police and civilian peacekeepers.

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[1]   Secretary-General's Bulletin, 'Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse', ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October 2003.
[2]   *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* UN Doc A/59/710, 24 March 2005.

Cooperation and Coordination – Education and Training

48.   The international community faces a major challenge in meeting the recent surge in demand for qualified peacekeepers. States are primarily responsible for supplying peace operations with properly trained personnel. Appropriate education and training of peace operations personnel—military, police, civilian—are critical, for reasons of both operational effectiveness and personal and collective safety and security in these challenging mission environments.

49.   The past three years have seen a number of positive developments in peace operations education and training, including advances in, and general acceptance of, the UN's structure, policies and resources, standards and guidelines for peace operations education and training, and new and enhanced institutions for the development and delivery of education and training.

50.   The Project Partners, in their consideration of areas of training that should be given priority, identified several areas of critical importance to the effectiveness and efficiency of complex peace operations: Rule of Law; Security Sector Reform; Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration; Discipline, Conduct and Professionalism; and Cooperation and Coordination. The common thread that consistently runs through these areas is an emphasis on the multidisciplinary nature of the peacekeepers involved – military, police and civilian – and therefore the need for training programmes that bring them together to understand each other's tasks and develop the necessary skills.

51.   To achieve this, the Project Partners made suggestions regarding multidisciplinary education and training, the use of modern technology, and the need for measures of assessment and evaluation. Soldiers, police, and civilian personnel serve together in complex peace operations, but rarely train together beforehand, and often have very little direct knowledge of the others' professional culture. Those involved in organizing multidisciplinary training and exercises need to understand from the outset that there is a significant need to facilitate civilian participation, beginning at a political level with the provision of the financial resources necessary to enable civilians and police to contribute to an exercise. Additional induction training, specialized safety training unique to the mission, and further sustainment training related to specialized aspects of a mission or new operational approaches, should also be considered at appropriate junctures during the mission.

52.   Proven computer-assisted exercise capability exists within various training institutions in a growing number of Member States. As technology advances and availability increases, it should be possible to do a considerable amount of learning on-line, with people coming together mainly to share experiences, to simulate a peace operations environment by problem-solving together, and for immediate pre-deployment and group development training. In addition, Advanced Distributed

Learning can complement existing or planned courses, problem-based learning and exercise pre-training. Many institutions, including in Partner Organizations States, have such a capability and are encouraged to advertise and actively cooperate in sharing the content with others. One way is for education and training institutions to more actively use the UN website in preparing courses and exercises, but also to contribute information on courses available, current lessons-learned reports, seminar results, project details, and planned peace operations activities.

53.   Assessment of the retained knowledge or skills following participation in a training activity is a particular challenge. Although testing and performance measurement is a growing focus of mainstream educational practice, this subject can be politically very sensitive for courses involving international participants. This is particularly the case for civilian personnel. In addition, the most difficult dimension that is not regularly accomplished is that of field assessment (an assessment by the employing organization or agency). To avoid proficiency-related problems in the field, Member States should work with the UN and its agencies, as well as with regional and international organizations, on a mission by mission basis, to identify significant problems that can be attributed to training and selection deficiencies, and work to rectify them. Member States should also work toward, and implement, evaluation standards for military units, police units and personnel, and civilian personnel, both pre- and post-deployment, ideally based on common performance benchmarks.

54.   Partners underline the importance of promoting civilian training and public understanding. Within the military profession, preparation for peace operations is facilitated by an organizational culture of training as part of their normal duty. The mainstreaming of peace operations training can be accommodated within the military training cycle. For police, peace operations training normally cannot be mainstreamed, as it is not always a professional requirement, although training for specific operations is not uncommon. For most of the diverse civilian professions involved in peace operations, training in peacekeeping basics rarely occurs, as serving in peace operations is not generally considered a requirement for advancement in most governments, or in the private sector. Many civilians, whether from government service or NGOs, continue to arrive in dangerous mission areas with a minimal understanding of the political, environmental, and personal safety issues, and are potential liabilities to mission effectiveness and the safety of themselves and their colleagues.

55.   In order to rectify the current international lack of civilian capacity, Member States that seek to contribute to peace operations in an effective and efficient manner should develop a comprehensive human resource generation plan for peace operations. Member States should also consider the possibility of UN-certified, civilian-focused, courses to be voluntarily delivered by Member States wishing to contribute mobile training teams through their national multi-disciplinary training

institutions. Further, should the currently proposed concept of UN Civilian Observers be adopted, the development of an appropriate training programme for their preparation will need to be given high priority.

56.   The need for senior managers to be given peace operation training before deployment has long been recognized, but the provision of such training has rarely been achieved. Being qualified professionally, having diplomatic experience, and/or having management experience in government or the private sector, are simply not enough to take on the challenges of management of a complex peace operation. The Project Partners urge Member States to pay more attention to this aspect, by designing appropriate foundation and safety training before deployment to a mission or an international organization that does not have its own senior management training arrangements.

57.   As for promoting wider public understanding of peace operations and their inherent challenges, experience continues to show that it is insufficient to leave this to the reports of the media. Project Partners suggest that Member States may wish to consider focused sessions with parliamentarians, public seminars and meetings, and carefully structured media strategies, where permissible, to raise understanding of and support for peacekeeping and particular operations.

58.   Regarding international capacity-building and enhancement, donors are recommended to intensify work with regional and sub-regional organizations to develop needed training concepts, supporting activities, and resources to increase the efficiency of international training programmes. Again, the need for civilian and multifunctional training is emphasized.

59.   Peace operation training is, however, of little value if the personnel trained are subsequently not deployed to situations in which that training can be put to good use. To that end, capacities could also be improved if Member States and relevant international and regional organizations had better information on trained capabilities – military, police and civilian, by unit and individuals. There is a clear need for better record-keeping in order to identify personnel who have formal peace operations education and training, both generic and specialized. Countries that host training programmes are encouraged to summarize and report training accomplishments to trainee contributing states and all should make better efforts to track their own military, police and civilian peace operations training graduates. All Member States should, in turn, create appropriate national data-bases of personnel trained for peace operations.

60.   Another aspect of capacity-building is the need to give appropriate training to personnel who have to provide special services or use specialized equipment. Areas include logistics, communications, intelligence and equipment support, all of

which have an interface between the providing state and the supported state or organization, and thus specialized training is required.

61.   The Project Partners note that working to build international capacity has produced some notable successes. Some progress has, for example, been made in turning former recipients of peace operations into contributors to peace operations elsewhere in the world. In the interests of furthering this progress, Member States should design all capacity-building programmes for peace operations with the goal of creating capacity that can be sustained by recipients, either on their own or within the resource constraints of known or projected assistance programmes.

62.   In conclusion, peace operations can be successful only if the international community works together in pursuit of peace and stability, but the current supply of well-trained personnel for peace operations falls well short of today's need. Peace operations are complex, multifaceted, multidisciplinary and difficult. Effective training must replicate real situations on the ground. Education and training needs to emphasize professionalism and the creation of a culture of cooperation and coordination, in a multidisciplinary and multinational setting.

Introduction

Background

1.   *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century* (also known as the Challenges Project) held its first seminar in 1997. From the outset, its overall purpose has been to contribute to the enhancement of the international community's capability to conduct current and future peace operations. It has aimed to achieve this by fostering and encouraging a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership to generate practical recommendations that will benefit the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations.

2.   The first phase of the project (1997-2002), featured ten international seminars held in nine countries. The seminars, each focusing on a specific aspect of peace operations, were attended by a wide range of highly experienced civilian and military peacekeepers and academics from some 230 organizations and 50 countries. The findings of the first phase, in the form of a concluding report: *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century,* were presented by the late Anna Lindh, Foreign Minister of Sweden, on behalf of the Project Partners to the Secretary-General of the United Nations at UN Headquarters, New York, on 25 April 2002. Covering 14 subject areas, the report contained 69 practical recommendations.

3.   Since that report, the project has evolved into an undertaking by Partner Organizations from 14 leading peace operations countries around the world (see Annex 5). The Partner Organizations embrace a cross-section of foreign or defence ministries, research institutes, academies and training centres. Contributions to the project have also been made by colleagues of international institutions and associations, including the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organizations, and international think tanks. Some 15 peacekeeping training centres have contributed with their perspectives on the issues, and some also by hosting parts of a seminar. The broad range of expertise and diversity of opinion have necessitated much cooperative effort to find common ground, but the combination has proved to be a rich source of political, military, police and civilian knowledge and advice.

4.   In 2002, the original ten Partners agreed to a second phase of the Challenges Project, to address some of the specific challenges identified in the Phase I Concluding Report. In Phase II of the project, joined by four additional Partners, six seminars have been hosted by Partners in Australia, China, Nigeria, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Sweden has acted as coordinator of the Project.

Promoting a Culture of Cooperation and Coordination

5.   An important conclusion of the Phase I report was that more attention and inspired initiative should be given to multinational and multicultural cooperation and coordination. The terms 'cooperation and coordination' may at first appear self-evident, requiring no explanation, and so obviously necessary as to need no persuasion. Yet the hard fact remains that all too often these pre-requisites for success are sadly lacking in the implementation of peace operations. Governments have different assessments of the situation, different political objectives and differing priorities. International organizations have differing capabilities, and their own and often cumbersome systems for achieving the tasks given to them. In the field, there are the differing skills and cultures of civilian, police, and military participants. Add to these aspects, the differences of circumstances and agendas that are present in countries emerging from conflict and chaos, and the outcome is a spectrum of very complex proportions.

6.   The present report, the concluding report of Phase II, addresses the challenges of multidisciplinary and multinational cooperation and coordination in peace operations. It focuses essentially on three main areas: the regional dimensions of peace operations, the rule of law, and education and training. Specifically, it examines issues such as: what are the optimal arrangements and relationships between the United Nations and regional organizations in peace operations? What kind of capacity-building requirements emanate from this? How can we ensure that the success of peace operations is not undermined by insufficient attention to key rule of law issues? How can the effectiveness of peace operations be improved through more effective education and training of peacekeepers - civilian, police and military?

7.   The objectives of the report are to inform on current developments in some of the principal issues in contemporary peace operations, and to make practical recommendations to enhance the international capability to conduct multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations.

8.   Peace operations cannot be successful without the commitment and support of, and cooperation among, Member States. Thus, the primary target audience of the report is Member States and it includes specific recommendations for action and follow-up by governments at regional, national and sub-national levels, and in multinational fora.

Current Challenges and their Implications for Peace Operations

9.   Important developments have taken place during the course of Phase II of the project. Actions by armed opposition groups, directed either indiscriminately

at civilian gatherings or deliberately targeted, as the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, have significantly increased the security challenges (and costs) of peace operations. At the level of the United Nations, and particularly important in the wake of the events of September 2001 in New York and Washington, and the military actions taken in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, was the issuance of the *Report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*[3] set up by the Secretary-General, and his subsequent response, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development Security and Human Rights for All*[4]. The terms of reference and remit of the High Level Panel were much wider than the work of the Challenges Project, with relatively little that directly addressed the complex issues of peace operations. In many respects, the Phase II report of the Challenges Project serves as a complement to that of the High Level Panel in that they both seek to grapple with the challenges and vicissitudes of the changing situation in these early years of the 21st century.

10.   Another significant and continuing development has been the reassessment by regional arrangements and organizations of the peace operation aspects of their roles. As a consequence, we have seen major initiatives, especially within the structures of the African Union, the European Union and NATO, to deploy their own resources out of area or assist in the capacity-building of others. The challenges of balancing the global and the regional dimensions of international peace and security will continue to present major tests and opportunities for cooperation and co-ordination in the years ahead.

11.   The work of the Challenges Project also took place in the light cast by the preparation for the 60th Anniversary of the UN and the High Level Summit of Heads of States and Government in New York on 14-16 September 2005. In re-affirming the wide-ranging goals of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted in 2000, the summit took important steps forward in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding[5]. The Member States endorsed "the creation of an initial operating capability for a standing police capacity to provide coherent, effective and responsive start-up capability for the policing component of United Nations peacekeeping missions …", supported "the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to develop capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements", and supported "the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building within the African Union".

12.   Separately, a major new initiative of the summit was the decision to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and advise on and propose inte-

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[3]   UN General Assembly document A/59/565 of 2 December 2004
[4]   UN General Assembly document A/59/2005 of 21 March 2005
[5]   UN General Assembly document A/60/L.1* of 20 September 2005, paragraphs 92-105.

grated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. The full impact of the establishment of this mechanism will take time to assess. The general proposals agreed at the World Summit were developed too late in the Phase II process for the full partnership of the Challenges Project to make a serious analysis of the implications for the conduct of peace operations and so, although addressed to a limited degree in this report, this issue will need to be examined more thoroughly in the future. Nevertheless, peacebuilding is now seen to be an integral part of complex peace operations and demanding a high level of cooperation and coordination by many actors.

Call for Action and Implementation

13.   The Challenges Project is an effort to harness the extensive experience of peace operations that the Partners and others gained over the years. The writing of the Phase II report has taken place in a fluid and evolving environment. Much of the strength of the project lies in the active involvement in the project work by many of the key actors involved in contemporary peace operations. Every Challenges seminar has been an opportunity to meet, address and elaborate on a particular issue of peace operations. A seminar report has been produced by each seminar host (see Annex 3). The present concluding report is the outcome of a broad consultation and healthy discussion process among the Partner Organizations, but it does not pretend to represent a consensus document agreed by all. Rather, the report is a demonstration of a belief in the value of a broad dialogue on the complex issues of peace operations, with the aim of promoting an enhanced international willingness and capacity to tackle current challenges.

14.   Above all, the Partner Organizations of the Challenges Project see a need for action. Governments, international and regional organizations, training centres and all involved in peace operations are invited to consider and implement those recommendations that they may find useful and appropriate. It is to that practical and pragmatic end that the Partners of the Challenges Project offer this report.

The Dynamic Nature of Peace Operations and the Challenges of Change: Cooperation and Coordination in a Turbulent Security Environment

"My basic message is a simple one: to be able to deal effectively with the main conflicts in the world today, there needs to be much greater coherence between us in the peacekeeping community, and our counterparts in the international financial institutions, the development and humanitarian agencies, and the bilateral actors. If we engage on our largely separate tracks, we will fail the people who need us most"

Remarks made on behalf of UN USG for Peacekeeping Operations,
Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Challenges Seminar on Cooperation and Coordination
Beijing, 3 November 2004

Introduction

1.   Peace operations face enduring and intimidating challenges in a rapidly changing international security environment. At the same time, the local security environments into which recent peace operations have been deployed are among the most difficult and least-governed of any that international operations have ever encountered. While a majority are still being undertaken with the consent of the major parties to a conflict, almost all UN peace operations in the present decade have been given 'Chapter VII' peace enforcement mandates, for good reason, and the pace of deployments has increased considerably since the publication of the first-phase Challenges Project report, *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century*[6] in April 2002. Five new UN peace operations have been established and a sixth significantly expanded by the UN Security Council. Six others were authorized by the Council, but led by coalitions or regional arrangements.[7] At the

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[6]   *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997–2002* (Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2002). The report is also available at www.challengesproject.net

[7]   See www.un.org/dpko Operations established by the Security Council since April 2002 include the UN Mission in East Timor (UNMISET), May 2002; UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), September 2003; UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), April 2004; UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), June 2004; UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), June 2004; UN Mission in Sudan, (UNMIS), March 2005. The principal mission expansions involved the UN Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, July 2003, October 2004). Missions authorized by the Council include the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), reauthorized May 2002; ECOWAS peacekeeping force for Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), February 2003; the EU Operation Artemis in Bunia, DRC, June 2003; ECOWAS forces in Liberia (ECOMIL), July 2003; a "multinational force" to maintain security and stability in Iraq, October 2003; and a multinational interim force for Haiti, February 2004. UN-authorized operations comprised another 15-18,000 troops, in addition to perhaps ten times that number in Iraq, authorized by the Security Council in October 2003.

end of April 2002, the approved strength of UN peacekeeping missions was about 47,000 troops, military observers and police. By October 2005, the total military and police strength of the 17 active UN peacekeeping missions stood at 69,000, added to which there were some 14,000 international and national civilian staff in the field.

2.   Africa has had to endure the most extensive experiences of humanitarian crisis, breakdown of governance, war and violent conflict, widespread lawlessness and criminality, and the movements of refugees and internally displaced persons. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Africa has been the principal geographic focus of UN peace operations in recent years.[8] Of the 17 current operations, eight are on that continent and these involve approximately three-quarters of the troops and police serving in UN missions.

3.   These numbers do not include troops not under UN command, such as in Kosovo, Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, and Iraq, nor the invaluable and extensive contributions made by humanitarian agencies and NGOs, nor UN operations which are more political in nature and have only small military or police components. It is clear, in other words, that the organization and implementation of peace operations continue to place high demands on the international community at large.

4.   The complementary nature of many of these responses is significant. There have been a growing number of instances in which the United Nations has deployed a peacekeeping mission in cooperation with a regional organization, or taken over from, or transferred responsibility to, a regional arrangement. Moreover, since the Phase I Challenges Report, regional organizations, particularly in Africa and Europe, have taken major steps toward improving their respective capacities for peace operations. The developments in the regional dimensions of peace operations are addressed in more depth in Chapter 2 of this report.

5.   In *integrated operations*, the full scope of the operation is managed within a single chain of command and control. Increasingly, however, operations have taken on a hybrid character, with two or more organizations responsible for different elements of the international response. These can be categorized in part by the relationship of those organizations in the field. In *coordinated operations*, the UN and other organizations operate side-by-side, under separate command structures, but closely coordinate their policies and actions. In *parallel operations*, the UN deploys alongside another organization's force without formal coordination. In *sequential operations*, the UN precedes or follows a multinational, regional or bilateral force. Responsibilities and relationships also change as the mission matures. These rela-

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[8]   See Abuja Challenges Seminar Report: *The Regional Dimension of Peace Operations Into the 21st Century – Arrangements, Relationships and the UN Responsibility for International Peace and Security,* National War College, Abuja, 2004, also available at www.challengesproject.net

tionships may support a range of different objectives, including short-term military support, civilian-military division of labour, linking of peacekeeping and observer operations, and hand-over of responsibility.[9] Very rarely, to date, have operations combined all functions within one single structure of command and control, that is, been fully integrated.

Table 1.1: Categories of Hybrid Peace Operations, with Examples[10]

Sponsoring Organizations' Relationship:	Integrated	Coordinated	Parallel	Sequential
Functional Distinctions:				
Short-Term Military Support			UK-UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)	EU Artemis-MONUC (DRC)
Civilian-Military Division of Labour	UNMIK (Kosovo)	UNMIK-KFOR (Kosovo) UNAMA-ISAF (Afghanistan)	UNAMA-Coalition (Afghanistan) UNAMI-Coalition (Iraq)	
Linked Peace-keeping-Observer Operations	MONUC (DRC)	UNOMIG-CIS (Georgia) UNMEE-AU (Ethiopia/Eritrea)		
Handover of Responsibility				ECOMOG-UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) INTERFET-UNTAET (East Timor)
Fully Integrated Functions	UNTAET (East Timor) UNMIL (Liberia)			

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9   Study on *Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses*, Dr Bruce Jones for the UN Best Practices Unit, 2003 (see http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/).
10   Derived from ibid.

6.   Table 1.1 maps a number of operations according to command relations and functions and reflects the fact that such mapping is itself a complex affair. For example, UNMIK in Kosovo appears in two cells of table 1.1 because, while it is fully integrated in non-military matters, it also coordinates closely with NATO-led KFOR, which has authority and responsibility for military security. Similarly, UNTAET in East Timor was a fully-integrated executive mission, but first involved a handover of responsibility from the coalition operation INTERFET. MONUC, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, began as an observer mission protected by peacekeepers, but has also benefited from the short-term security support provided by the French-led European Union Operation Artemis, while the UN's own Ituri Brigade was assembled and deployed. In Afghanistan, a civilian and political UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) benefits from some added security provided by the peacekeeping force led by NATO, and both function in parallel with an ongoing US-led military coalition operation. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), on the other hand, depends for its security almost wholly on the multinational force led by the United States. Like UNTAET, UNMIL in Liberia is a fully-integrated UN mission, with both military and extensive civilian components. In terms of manpower, it is nearly twice the size of UNTAET at its peak, but it lacks UNTAET's executive mandate. In any cell within table 1.1, in other words, the political authority granted a peace operation may vary a great deal. An operation may have an assistance mandate, which allows it to provide technical or political advice and support but little more, as is the case with UNAMA and UNAMI. It may function in partnership with national authorities (or another international operation that it is replacing) to support and strengthen efforts and policies within its tasking. Its mandate may assign it control over one or more aspects of governance within its area of operations, as was UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992–93. Or the mandate may give it rights of governorship, with full, if temporary, executive authority, as noted in a limited number of cases such as UNMIK, UNTAES and UNTAET.[11] The fact that peace operations now take many different structural forms increases considerably the challenges of cooperation and coordination, as examined later in this chapter.

7.   A particularly challenging aspect of recent complex peace operations has been a broadening of mandates, and including with regard to the use of force. This evolution has necessitated progressive shifts from 'classical peacekeeping' (traditionally associated with Chapter VI mandates and under UN 'Blue Helmet' command) through various phases to regional actions (for example, by ECOMOG and ECOWAS in West Africa in the 1990s), to the trend toward UN operations themselves being assigned Chapter VII mandates. In 2005, over three-quarters of the troops and police deployed in UN operations function under such mandates. This is a marked departure from the practice of past decades, where Chapter VII mandates for UN forces were relatively rare.

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[11]   Jarat Chopra, ed. *The Politics of Peace Maintenance* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

8.   In parallel, the UN Secretariat has implemented a wide range of recommendations from the Brahimi Report.[12] The improvements have included an expanded headquarters staff, primarily in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which is now better able to plan and implement large, complex operations. DPKO's military division is now double its pre-Brahimi size and the police division is also twice its former strength, although both are undersized by comparison to the UN's recent mission planning and support requirements. The reform process improved the structure and organization of logistic and field support. DPKO has devised an internal process for integrated mission planning, and greatly expanded the mission support capacity of the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. Moreover, its Best Practices Unit (BPU) has begun to generate the sort of timely, mission-analytic reporting that UN Headquarters, operations, and mission contributors have long needed. However, several of the proposals that depended on the approval and support of Member States – most prominently, the proposal that the UN set up a central strategic planning and analysis staff – were subject to extended discussion and political procrastination with results that were at best inconsistent and sometimes saw no progress at all. Recommendations that the UN institute a more systematic interdepartmental/interagency approach to mission planning, while endorsed by Member States, have not been fully implemented in the Secretariat. At the time of writing, generated by the World Summit and the reform process, the DPKO and the Secretariat is going through a further reorganization and enhancement process. Not least, the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peace Support Office as agreed by Member States at the World Summit, will change the way in which the Secretariat can address the challenges of cooperation and coordination of peace operations most effectively.[13]

Challenges of the Changing Security Environment

9.   Before considering the overarching issue providing the framework of this report, namely, the challenges of cooperation and coordination in peace operations, it is useful to highlight two of the major factors that have driven the changes in the nature of the security threat during the past few years and their implications for the conduct of peace operations.

10.   One set of security threats includes the proliferation of small arms, the spread of crime and corruption, and the debilitating impact of all three on governments. Warlords, organized crime syndicates and the weapons, drugs, gems, oil, timber or human beings that they smuggle and sell both undermine the rule of law and sustain predatory warfare, with horrific results for whole populations. Another

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[12]   United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi Report")*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
[13]   For a survey of the implementation of the Brahimi Report, see W. J. Durch, V.K, Holt, et al., *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

key concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the spread of terrorism, and the risk of WMD falling into terrorist hand. The major challenges and risks, including the consequences of weak or failed states and the threat of terrorism[14], differ in significance from country to country and from region to region.

11.   Both sets of challenges however, constitute serious threats to life, property, social stability, public order and established governmental authority, and have impelled the international community to devise actions to address them, including the authorization of robust multinational and multifunctional peace operations under Chapter VII mandates, as well as counter-terrorism measures adopted by the UN and the Security Council.

Weak or Failed States and Implications for Peace Operations

12.   Most peace operations are conducted in weak/fragile or failed states. This has implications both for the security environment and for the mandates of the missions. Such states not only fail their own peoples, but constitute power vacuums attractive to terrorist groups and organized crime alike - thus posing a threat to the wider international community as well. Bad governance, poverty, widespread corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality in income distribution, trafficking of human beings, organized crime including drugs, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons can become so extensive and pervasive in such states that they lead to the destabilization of society and even entire regions, with heavy consequences. The complexity of these problems, which must be faced simultaneously, requires a very comprehensive set of tools in peace operations, whose overall task is one of contributing to national political, security, social, economic and institutional (re)construction. These tools have to be co-ordinated.

13.   During recent years, a greater emphasis has been placed on the idea of human security, focusing on human life and dignity, rather than narrower and more 'traditional' security concerns. Evolving concepts outlined in a number of reports[15] have recognized that the traditional concept of sovereignty is changing, and that there is a wider acceptance of the need for the international community and regional entities to act early, not only to address problems in states of concern and to prevent humanitarian disasters, but also to assist failed or weak states to recover. The peace operations deployed in these states have needed mandates covering a wide spectrum of tasks, often far beyond the traditional training and duties of sol-

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14   See Krusenberg Challenges Seminar Report: *Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism* (Folke Bernadotte Academy/Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2003), also available at www.challengesproject.net
15   The 1994 Human Development Report set out new dimensions of human security. See also, for example, *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century- Concluding Report,* The Changing Concepts of Security, pp.35-48, April 2002; *The Responsibility to Protect,* Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001; and United Nations, *the Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,* December 2004.

diers and police. These situations have in turn demanded unexpected dimensions of local administration, civil-military cooperation, institutional initiative, mission innovation, and at times, much personal courage. Along the way, there have been successes and constructive advances in the science of peace operations, but there have also been misunderstandings, misinterpretations of intent and miscalculations of capability, from which many useful lessons have been drawn.[16]

Terrorism and Implications for Peace Operations

14.   Terrorism, and the need to counter it through international cooperation and coordination, has come to the fore as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Terrorism is a strategy and method, not an ideology or an actor. As such, it does not particularly lend itself to resolution by dictates from the UN Security Council, for which terrorists hold no respect. Indeed, it is in part because the UN Security Council reflects the authority and legitimacy of the international community that the UN itself and its staff in the field have become targets for terrorist actions. In various ways, the increase in terrorism has also had an impact on the conduct of peace operations.

15.   With the bombing of the UN offices in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, and the deaths of 22 UN staff, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and 9 Iraqi national staff, the extent to which the UN mission was unprepared for such an attack, as identified in subsequent and highly critical investigative reports,[17] became evident. The tragedy has significantly sharpened the attention of the Secretary-General and his senior leadership to the risks of further terrorist attacks on the staff of UN peace operations serving in high-risk areas and has increased the emphasis on mission protection in new mission plans.[18] The report of the Secretary-General's *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change*, in December 2004, stressed that, "Al-Qaida and associated entities pose a universal threat to the membership of the United Nations and the United Nations itself. In public statements, Al-Qaida has singled out the United Nations as a major obstacle to its goals and defined it as one of its enemies".[19]

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[16]   See, for example, *Lessons Learned From United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences In Sierra Leone*, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO, September 2003, available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu

[17]   *Report of the United Nations Security Coordinator to the Secretary-General,* 2 September 2003; Report of an International Investigation of a Team of UN Personnel to the Deputy Secretary-General, 5 September 2003; *Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq,* 20 October 2003 (known thereafter as the Ahtissari Report); *Report of the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel* (known thereafter as the Walzer Report).

[18]   Nearly half of the 10,000 troops planned for the UN Mission in Sudan, for example, are assigned to the "force protection component." United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan,* s/2005/57, 31 January 2005, para. 52.

[19]   United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,* report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York: United Nations, 2004. The report defined terrorism as 'any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm

16.   The environment in which UN military and civilian peacekeepers were earlier seen as impartial, neutral and serving a good cause to all, has been diminishing for years, in particular since the taking of UN troops as hostages in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. But now UN peacekeepers have to be regarded as being at much higher risk, and accordingly much greater caution has to be exercised in their deployment. This is particularly the case for civilians, whether serving in UN peace operations or as members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with limited means of self-defence.[20] Much greater attention has now to be paid to security and safety training. Greater costs are inevitably incurred by having to provide security equipment, armoured vehicles, additional guards and personal security details where appropriate. Finally, the new situation argues for much better field intelligence, to anticipate and to thwart such attacks. In most places where peacekeepers deploy this means human intelligence, which requires both good local knowledge upon deployment and a growing network of contacts with the local population.

Challenges of Cooperation and Coordination in the Implementation of Peace Operations

17.   If large, independent organizations like governments or international organizations naturally cooperated to achieve objectives of common interest and easily coordinated their actions to such ends, this report would not be necessary. In reality, however, they do not. Several generic challenges inhibit cooperation and coordination between international and national organizations and local actors in a conflict area.

Definitions

18.   Cooperation can be considered to be 'working together for a common purpose'. It is as much an attitude as it is a physical act. It is a willingness to explore possibilities in partnership with other stakeholders and, if agreed, to pursue a course of action. The fundamental pre-requisite for cooperation is communication. Cooperation emerges out of sustained communication, personal connection and shared analysis.[21] Without effective communication, the personal and professional relationships that underpin cooperation cannot develop. Moreover, communication is essential not only to develop relationships in the first instance, but also to share relevant information, to jointly develop plans, policies and procedures, and

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to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act', p. 52.
20   Such as the killing of humanitarian workers of Médecins Sans Frontières and the kidnapping of UNDP electoral workers in Afghanistan in 2004, and the murder of the head of the Iraq CARE in October 2004.
21   See Dr Andrea Bartoli, 'An International Policy Approach', *The Challenges of Change: the Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and Continuing Need for Reform,* Centre for Strategic Research, Ankara, 2004. Also available at www.challengesproject.net

to be able to work together on common objectives in support of a peace operation's mandate.

19.   Coordination implies cooperation, but extends further to the systematic use of policy and actions to achieve mandated aims in a cohesive and effective manner by leading, planning, managing, negotiating and implementing. The aim is to achieve effective and efficient results by harmonizing, prioritizing and sequencing of separate component and actor activities. Coordination needs to involve all disciplines with a part to play in achieving a specific objective – political, security, humanitarian and developmental, peacebuilding and sustainability. To be palatable, coordination needs to be as non-threatening as possible to participating actors and agencies. Coordination is difficult in peace operations, because such operations are complex, multinational, multicultural, multi-dimensional, and all normally take place in a difficult political, security, economic and humanitarian environment. The many actors are often in competition for influence and effect.

Generic Obstacles

20.   The diverse obstacles that may limit or impede effective cooperation and coordination include:

- **National interests.** These will differ among the major powers paying attention to a crisis or peace accord and are likely to differ among troop contributors and donors of reconstruction assistance, colouring their attitudes toward mandates, costs and priorities.

- **Institutional mandates.** Institutions may share general goals, but be constitutionally unable to coordinate their work with intergovernmental peace operations (the International Committee of the Red Cross), while others (such as Médecins Sans Frontières) may be doctrinally opposed to so doing. Vague or overlapping mandates may invite coordination, but such coordination may result in a loss of field-level influence, access, or further funding.

- **Institutional resource gaps and overlaps.** Some countries and organizations have the ability to work cooperatively on certain tasks or objectives at high levels of intensity for long periods of time; others do not, or they may lack funds or personnel in several key areas.

- **Levels of authority, independence and accountability mechanisms.** Different management structures delegate different levels of authority to mid-level managers. Mismatched decision making or resource-producing authority at nominally equivalent levels of management, make coordination awkward and time-consuming.

- **Communications resource gaps.** Language can be a serious barrier to coordination between an international operation and local officials and population. Technical barriers to communications arise if different organizations bring communications equipment to an operation that is not interoperable with mission Headquarters equipment or between the various organizations themselves.

- **Professional cultures.** Differences in professional and organizational style can generate misunderstandings, confusion and a general inability to work effectively together. The gulf may be especially large between hierarchical, command-driven organizations like the military and loose, networked, consensus-driven entities like some NGOs. Police culture is quite different from military culture and also significantly different from other civilian groups.

- **Personalities.** Especially at more senior levels, personality differences can make or break operations, as there are very few ways to avoid direct interaction so close to the top of an administrative or command hierarchy.

- **Impact of the Media.** The political dimension derives support from individual nation states and funders, and the media is the conduit that shapes the information that is presented and works to influence the international community and the actors on the ground and their willingness and ability to cooperate and coordinate.

21.   To date it has proven difficult to understand and to manage these challenges as they apply to peace operations, in a structured, coordinated and coherent manner. At the root of the problem are the complex and occasionally contradictory relationships amongst the many organizational contributors to peace operations and the often inadequate levels of communication, consultation and coordination amongst them. The resulting inefficiencies and lack of effectiveness have, in many situations, been used to considerable advantage by those wishing to undermine peace processes and to prevent the achievement of mission objectives.

Strategic and Operational Challenges

22.   In order to be able to deal effectively with the main conflicts in the world of today, there is a requirement for greater coherence between all actors; the peace-keeping community and the international financial institutions, the development and humanitarian agencies, as well as the range of bilateral actors, including national military forces and aid agencies. Such coherence needs to be pursued in a range of areas at the strategic level in relation to peace operations: political issues; policy development; strategic planning; a basic division of responsibilities; elabora-

tion of mandates; development of broad operational concepts; financial and operational burden sharing; establishment of priorities; and, education and training.

23.   The principal areas for cooperation and coordination in a mission at the operational level include: operational concept development; detailed operational planning; conduct of operations, including specific operations related to security; governance; institution building; rule of law (ROL); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); human rights; refugee return and humanitarian assistance; information sharing; operational priority setting; resolution of inter-cultural conflicts; education and training; and the evaluation of progress.

24.   The challenges also differ considerably across the types of activity undertaken in the course of a peace operation. These activities (prevention, intervention, regeneration and sustainment)[22] may not be sequential and may, depending upon circumstances, shift back and forth. In mission transitions there are no clear lines of delineation where responsibility might automatically be expected to shift from one organization to another, or from one type of operation to another. Mission transition, its characteristics and the roles of all of the players, are crucially dependent upon the formal and informal relationships among the many international contributors and the various professional cultures, as well as between the international community and local authorities, civil society and the private sector. Achieving effective transitions to the satisfaction of all players is a major challenge.

25.   In seeking to achieve the objective of sustainable peace, peacebuilding and development activities are recognized as being just as important as those providing physical security. However, the question of who should carry out such activities – that is, which actors have the capacity, expertise, will, and human, financial and logistical resources to execute civilian post-conflict activities – has resulted in a debate that has generated a new dynamic in recent years. Actors such as the World Bank and UNDP have in the past five years increasingly identified reconstruction and post-conflict economic and social recovery as areas in which they can and should make significant contributions. At the same time, DPKO has found itself more and more involved in tasks that can have long-term or development-oriented implications, such as policing, rule of law, support to electoral assistance undertaken by DPA and to reintegration of former combatants, primarily dealt with by actors such as UNDP and the World Bank. The overlapping of interests and responsibilities has resulted in some institutional clashes between the different actors. It has also raised questions with regard to policy aspirations versus operational capacities. Greater cooperation and coordination is needed to delineate and agree upon the relative capacities and core responsibilities of the different actors involved.

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[22]   See *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, JWP 3-50, UK MOD, 2004, 2nd ed. para 235.

26.   The complex relationship between security and development actors can also be seen in the United Nations rules and regulations on funding. Certain security activities are traditionally covered by assessed financial contributions while reconstruction or development activities must rely on voluntary contributions – contributions that may arrive late, or be much smaller than required. Yet, the success of a peace process depends on both. For example, in the complex area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), peacekeeping budgets today will largely cover the disarmament and demobilization costs of former combatants, but not activities designed to reintegrate them, or the large numbers of women and children associated with the fighting forces, back into society. Ongoing discussions between security and development actors should be actively encouraged and pursued, if the international community is serious about effectively and sufficiently addressing all such activities in immediate post-conflict environments. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peace Support Office will be important platforms for addressing these challenges.

27.   In most countries, there is no effective working linkage between field requirements, available personnel, financial resources, recruitment systems, training needs, training capabilities, deployment mechanisms, and evaluation systems. There is, for example, normally no stated national requirement for the pre-training of personnel, and due diligence with regard to the safety of nationals being deployed to a conflict or post-conflict zone is often overlooked. Other countries include some training for police, but in general, official national training, for a variety of reasons, is often limited to those engaged in military-related duties. Often there is no clear national point of contact from which the UN or regional and international organizations can seek specific assistance. As noted by the UN's High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, and concerning primarily development work, bilateral donors call for better United Nations coordination, but show little enthusiasm for similar efforts on their own account.[23]

28.   A certain level of security is a prerequisite for contributors to a peace operation to be able to begin their work. Cooperation on achieving this level is therefore necessary, which implies that resources and efforts need to be channelled initially to this end. To the extent that parallel life-saving humanitarian efforts need to complement the physical security efforts, these need to be carefully coordinated. The focus of the military and police on security requires close cooperation between these two disciplines, a cooperation that can begin within a Member State and be practiced at home and in national and multinational exercises.

29.   The security environment varies from mission to mission, and is partly translated into, and depending on, its mandate, authorisation and tasks. One of the most difficult of operational environments is that in Afghanistan, and the operational issues related to security, the efforts to provide it, and the concerns they provoke, can

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[23]   Ibid, High-Level Panel Report, para 55.

be seen in the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or Provincial Stability Teams (PSTs) as some refer to them. These are civil-military teams that include diplomatic and reconstruction officials on the civilian side, together with national military contingents working with Afghan army units. A PRT's primary purposes are to facilitate the development of a secure environment through establishing relationships with local authorities; to support security sector reform within its means and capabilities; to facilitate reconstruction efforts; and to focus on DDR of combatants. In some cases, they have favoured assistance-type activities such as drilling wells and rebuilding schools and clinics.

30.   PRTs are essentially the operational manifestation of cooperation and coordination between troop contributors and local authorities in pursuit of security, governance and local reconstruction objectives in an intense security environment. The degree to which reconstruction efforts are pursued, as well as the degree of cooperation with national and local authorities and their priorities, varies depending upon the lead nation within the particular PRT. To address these complexities and uncertainties, the participants in Afghanistan have created a PRT Steering Committee, comprised of the UN mission (UNAMA), the various IOs and UN Agencies involved, an NGO coordination group, and the NATO-led peacekeeping force (ISAF). Most of the contributors are still adapting to the concept, knowing that "no one size fits all". The fact that at least three very different approaches by contributors and their governments existed in early 2005 shows the complexity and the challenges that participants are struggling to deal with.[24]

31.   From another perspective, the PRTs also exemplify, to humanitarian actors, the trend toward what has come to be called the 'invasion of humanitarian space'. The importance of civil-military coordination has been recognized for well over a decade. The military components of peace operations have gone to major lengths to understand civilian concerns and find ways of working with them, for example, by establishing Civil-Military Operation Centres. However, as an offshoot of working more closely together in certain circumstances, a large part of the humanitarian community has become increasingly uneasy at what it regards as a loss of distinction between the military and non-military domains. Many members of the humanitarian community would prefer to see PRTs' energies re-directed from humanitarian assistance action to the rebuilding of police stations, custom houses and local administrative offices. This would provide the infrastructure for greater public security, thereby improving the conditions for the distribution of aid by the aid community and more clearly delineating the roles of the military and the humanitarians. Humanitarian assistance actions by some militaries have given rise to concerns in the humanitarian community regarding the primary motives of the

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[24]   The US, German and UK approaches are quite different with respect to responsibilities, lead authority and methods of coordination.

military and what many humanitarians believe to be a distortion of humanitarian principles and policies.[25]

32.   These considerations have resulted in a difficult conundrum for the humanitarian community. On one hand, humanitarians wish to preserve the area in which they carry out their work as being separate and apart from that of the military – and sometimes apart from the entire UN mission – in order to act and be perceived to act in accordance with humanitarian principles and motives and so that they can avoid to the maximum extent possible being drawn into the sphere of politico-military affairs. On the other hand, they do not want to be perceived as jealously guarding 'turf' and denying themselves and the needy the valuable access to security and support that the military is able to provide. Military organizations generally understand and respect the potential benefits arising from establishing a "humanitarian space" and encourage their commanders to manage in-theatre relationships and operations accordingly. However, recent experiences (e.g. in Afghanistan) have indicated that, for humanitarians, their neutrality and independence from military forces may not provide an adequate basis for their security. It may be necessary for them to arrange additional support including, for example, from commercial security providers, and to engage in a degree of mutual information-sharing with the military. The uneasiness that surrounds this topic illustrates the need for extended dialogue, at a minimum.[26]

Addressing the Challenges of Change

"...... the cause of larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among States. Such cooperation is possible if every country's policies take into account not only the needs of its own citizens but also the needs of others. This kind of cooperation not only advances everyone's interests but also recognizes our common humanity."[27]

Improving Cooperation and Coordination

33.   In his report "*In Larger Freedom*", the UN Secretary-General urged the world to evolve a broader vision of collective security. As he put it; "Collective Security today depends on accepting that the threats each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all. These are not theoretical issues, but ones of deadly urgency". He called for a holistic appreciation of threats to

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[25]   For the humanitarian principles, see Dr Manuel Bessler, UNOCHA, 'State and Non-State Actors in Peace Operations – Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies', Abuja Challenges Seminar, May 2004.
[26]   IASC Reference Paper *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies,* The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group on 16-17 June 2004, issued on 28 June 2004. It complements the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* of March 2003. Available at http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines
[27]   Ibid, *In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all,* Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005 of 21 March 2005, para.18 (available at www.un.org/largerfreedom)

peace and security, not limited to just war and conflict, but also extended to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, civil violence, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and poverty. He recommended a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy, substantial progress on disarmament, and non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the creation of an inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission and a Peace Support Office within the UN Secretariat, and the adoption of a Security Council resolution setting out the principles that will guide decisions on the use of force. Progress was made on most of these issues during the World Summit, while some aspects remain to be addressed.

34.   If peacebuilding and other related objectives set out in the SGs' report are to be achieved, cooperation and coordination will need to be effectively practiced by and within Member States.[28] At the national level, there is an emerging recognition that government departments and agencies, the armed forces, education and training institutions, national NGOs, representative offices from IOs and UN agencies, and the private sector all need to work together more closely with respect to national contributions to international peace operations. Examples of programmes of national cooperation in particular countries include efforts to create a common peacebuilding fund, as well as the creation of teams of civilian experts for rapid deployment;[29] a system of linking training, recruitment and evaluation;[30] an action plan for a human resource development programme;[31] a national cooperation system, which involves the meeting of all agencies involved in peace operations on a regular basis to exchange information and to pursue other practical forms of cooperation;[32] systems for linking available resources and international requirements;[33] and offices to co-ordinate government-wide civilian capacity to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in post-conflict transition.[34]

35.   Establishing fundamental communications is the essential first step in the cooperation process. There is no place in today's complex missions for 'stovepipe-style' operations, isolationism and the promotion of narrow goals. Experience has demonstrated that within operations there are a number of formal ways to facilitate such communication: agreed exchanges of information and reports, regular meetings, establishment of liaison offices, memoranda of understanding, joint reconnaissance, common boundaries, task forces/groups, and joint civil-military facilities (HOCs, HICs, HACs, CMOCs, CMICs).[35] In a less formal sense, irregular

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[28]   Ibid, *High Level Panel*, para 55.
[29]   UK Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit.
[30]   Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, Germany.
[31]   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.
[32]   Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden.
[33]   NORDEM and CANADEM in Norway and Canada respectively.
[34]   US Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department, and the UK Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit.
[35]   Humanitarian Operation Centres (HOCs); Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs); Humanitarian Assistance Centres (HACs); Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOCs); and Civil-Military Information Centres (CMICs).

or issue-specific meetings can assist in the process of exchanging information, as can use of the web and, even, taking every opportunity for casual interaction. Even with formal relationships established in formal ways of communicating, it is critical to establish informal ways of exchanging information. Trust, credibility and reliability from participants act as catalysts for effective coordination.

36.   Examining the issue from the perspective of the need to engage with local authorities, the efforts of even the most well-meaning external actors will be for naught, if the people who must live with the consequences of success or failure, namely the people in the area of conflict, are not fully engaged in and committed to the peace. There is a big difference between the stake of external actors, no matter how much money and time they spend, and that of the local population. For peace to take root, it must be "owned" by the local people and the role of an international presence is to support national and local processes. The challenge is to balance international responsibilities with demands for self-rule. This will depend on the extent of convergence of interests between local and international parties, so essential in post-conflict situations.

37.   While much time and energy are spent on attempting coordination between international actors, regrettably little time is devoted to ways to improve this partnership with the local population. From the outset it is important to include the media and academia in early contacts, and to progressively engage groups in a process of reconciliation; groups such as veterans, business community, widows, youth and religious leaders, to name but a few. Careful consideration must go into determining how to interact with the media. Within the many local actors, it is also too easy to focus on just the leadership. It is important that the international community acknowledge the opposition leaders in a fledgling democracy, lest the impression be given that the international community is supporting only the existing leadership. In other instances, millions of dollars have been spent to ship in bottled water for international staff rather than investing in water treatment plants and training local staff to run them. Hasty elections have taken the place of finding legitimate interlocutors. In general, "only lip service is paid to the idea of the local population being in the driver's seat, and too often they are, literally and figuratively, just the chauffeurs for international actors, who dictate the route, destination and speed."[36]

38.   The concepts "partnership" and "ownership" become critical to a sustainable peace process. National and local authorities and the public must be treated as partners and become owners of the process, supported by the international community. There is no place for international military rhetoric that talks about "enemy forces", or for civilian organizations, including NGOs, who forge ahead with their

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[36]   Remarks made on behalf of UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr Kieran Prendergast, 'Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations – Political Aspects of Peace Operations', Beijing Challenges Seminar, 3 November 2004. See also www.challengesproject.net

own operational concepts and priorities without consultation with local authorities. This issue needs to be systematically included in the education and training programme of those deploying on a peace operation as one of the fundamental learning objectives, and the local community needs to be carefully incorporated into national and international exercises designed to practice as a multinational and multi-disciplinary team.

39.   At the same time, any such programme must take into consideration the possibility that some former fighting factions or their leaders may not be seriously committed to peace and may have profited handsomely from war (e.g., the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone). Such parties and persons may try to manipulate the peace operations mission and international community in pursuit of their own interests, which lie with the status quo and not with positive post-war changes. They pursue their goals at the expense of mission progress and credibility. War may have destroyed the institutions and infrastructure of government and scattered those with the skills needed to run those institutions. The mandate of each peace operation, and the training of its leadership, must therefore be closely calibrated to the politics and security situation in the proposed area of operation.

Regional Dimensions and Enhancing Capacity

40.   Over the past number of years, based on experience in Africa, Europe and Asia in particular, there has been recognition and acceptance of that the UN and regional organizations can be vital partners in promoting peace and security.[37] Such cooperation is essential not only for reasons of efficiency, but also operational necessity. Indications of progress in strategic level relationships include the 2003 agreement on cooperation in crisis management between the UN and EU, frequent and regular crisis management discussions between officials at NATO and the OSCE, and developments in the African Union (AU) and its relations with the UN, EU, NATO and sub-regional entities such as ECOWAS and SADC.

41.   The major obstacles to better UN-regional and regional-regional cooperation and coordination need to be addressed in order to make operations everywhere more effective and less costly, both in human lives and material resources. There are measures that could and should be taken by UN Member States, working in cooperation with the UN Secretariat as well as the secretariats of their respective regional organizations, to enhance the total international capacity to conduct peace operations. Issues of particular relevance and addressed by this report, include: principles of Consensus and Complementarity; Memorandums of Understanding; Early Warning, Liaison and Information Sharing; Conflict Prevention and Peace-building; Procedures and Guidelines for Mission Handoff/Sequencing. Concerning organizational capacity building in the regional dimensions, the topics of: Head-

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[37]   Ibid, the *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, December 2004.

quarters and Planning Structures; Guidelines, Doctrines, and Strategies; Initiating Operations; Sustaining Operations; and Financing Operations and Financial Assistance, are examined.

Implementing Rule of Law

42.   One major challenge to the conduct of effective peace operations that has become more apparent in the past three years has been the need to more effectively support reform of the rule of law sector, the implementation of which is the foundation of successful peacebuilding. The two dimensions of this problem are, first, institution and capacity-building in the assisted State, and second, the interim capability that the international community may be asked to assist with.

43.   Peace operations in recent years have had to be carried out in circumstances where law and order has broken down to varying degrees. Police and prison control is often either very weak or non-existent and the judicial system has collapsed or been destroyed. In cases where there have been massive human rights crises, the indigenous police, prisons and judiciary are part of the problem that the international community has mobilized to address. Action to put in place security sector reform has to be given high priority in order to bring under control violence against or within the local population and the reconstruction and relief actors. For a society embarking upon the long and arduous path of transition, the introduction of democratic processes and institutions needs to be carefully planned and capable of being absorbed in the particular cultural context.

44.   In the absence of law and order, reconstruction and relief actors often find themselves unable to access areas of the country where aid and development are much needed. The absence of aid leads to yet further instability and provides opportunities for peace spoilers to gain the upper hand with the result that the security situation worsens. On the other hand, efforts to distribute aid when law and order are absent can sometimes attract instability in the form of large-scale robbery and intimidation. Peace spoilers or bad actors in internal ethnic conflicts might see aid or the denial of it as a weapon in their war.

45.   Overcoming this challenge requires a mix of capabilities and the marshalling and careful coordination of international resources and effort. This includes ensuring rule of law factors are part of the initial integrated mission planning process. It is then essential that there is support for clear transition plans formulated by or in cooperation with a host government. In high threat environments, particularly in missions undertaken by coalitions, it is essential that there be a judicious use of military force, effective policing support, political acumen and civil persuasion. The combination and priority of these can be expected to be different in every instance, according to the variations between lawless gangs at one end of the spectrum and

more sophisticated and coordinated actions by heavily armed and organized groups at the other.

46.   In many instances, the situation may be far beyond the capacities of the police to assert law and order. A more robust use of military force may, therefore, be needed, including the use of effective military assets and technology, particularly in areas, such as intelligence. UN missions need to be allowed by their mandates to apply proportional force when warranted, and forces provided by troop contributing countries must have the capability and political willingness so to do. They should also be sufficiently flexible in their use of tactics and techniques to apply force as appropriate to the circumstances. The presence of a military and police capability can create an expectation of protection among the civilian population. In the early stages of a mission there will be pressure on the military to use the initiative and opportunities of this period to provide a firm platform for rule of law peacebuilding. In sum, peace operations now need to be more capable of dealing with rule of law objectives and to have mandates adequate to that task when circumstances so require. There also needs to be a strategic institutional mechanism, such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to marshal the international response to the rule of law challenge.

Education and Training

47.   A major cross-cutting conclusion of the Concluding Report of Phase I of the Challenges Project was:

> "70. ……… The strong message that came time and again from the Challenges seminars is that much more attention and priority needs to be given to training and education as an investment in more effective peace operations. Personnel need to be trained in their skills and in what will be expected of them, and they also need to be trained together as far as practicable, so that they may develop teamwork and a cooperative spirit."

48.   The past few years have seen progress in the area of education and training. However, progress is not the same as achieving the aim. Education and training are areas that can always be improved and require consistent attention and updating. They also require senior management commitment to provide the resources and make personnel available from their day-to-day duties. In addition, with a constant stream of new people becoming involved in peace operations and taking on assignments for the first time, education and training are never-ending tasks and agreement on common standards and content is important.

49.   Challenges of training and education remain significant. Current priority areas include: rule of law (ROL); security sector reform (SSR); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and professionalism, discipline, and codes of conduct. There is also a need for more multidisciplinary training, better use of training technology, and better assessments of training effectiveness. Other areas

that need attention are the importance of education and training for civilians, including an increased understanding of these endeavours amongst parliamentarians and publics in the sending and supporting countries. The challenge of effectively enhancing the total international capacity for peace operations is compelling and addressed in the final chapter.

Conclusions

50.　This chapter has defined cooperation and coordination and argued why it is necessary, at many levels, to significantly improve cooperation and coordination, if the objectives of today's complex peace operations are to be achieved. It has also highlighted the growing importance of regional organizations and arrangements in peace operations. Whether working in parallel and mutual partnership with the United Nations or in separate operations, they are strengthening their capacities to conduct peace operations. Regional organizations, their capabilities, constraints, needs, and their relationship to the United Nations, are the focuses of Chapter 2 of this report.

51.　A major challenge to the conduct of effective peace operations is the need to assist in establishing and institutionalising the rule of law as a post-conflict principle of governance. It is the substantive core of what peace operations hope to achieve. This issue has many facets, and Chapter 3 addresses some of their core aspects in greater detail.

52.　Many of the goals and objectives of peace operations can only be achieved if participants in such operations, at all levels, and in a systematic manner, receive appropriate education and training to develop not only individual knowledge, but improved skills in cooperation and coordination, and a greater appreciation for their critical role in peace operations. The challenges of effectively preparing future contributors to peace operations through education and training, are thus the subject of Chapter 4 of this report.

53.　Efforts to cooperate usually produce much better results than solitary-planned and implemented endeavours. It is, however, primarily at the level of Member States and institutions that the Challenges Partners seek to address their comments and recommendations. The chapters that follow contain a call for action in meeting the challenges of cooperation and coordination.

- Action by governments to think imaginatively and act cooperatively in providing resources, facilities and assistance.
- Action by secretariats, training centres, agencies and programmes to improve effectiveness by agreeing on common standards and adopting joint approaches to common problems.

Much is already being done but, as all who have served in peace operations in the field will attest, much more remains to be done.

Cooperation and Coordination – Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations

"The UN, over the past year, has continued to develop its cooperation with a number of regional organizations in support of UN peacekeeping. The focus of that cooperation has been, on the one hand, seeking direct support by getting regional organizations to deploy before, alongside or after a UN operation, and, on the other hand, strengthening the long-term capacity for peacekeeping of regional and sub-regional organizations"

Remarks made on behalf of Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Abuja Challenges Seminar, 1 June 2004

Introduction

1.   Inter-action between the United Nations and regional organizations has become a common feature of peace operations. This inter-action has led to various forms of ad hoc co-operation under the pressure of circumstances. It is only in the past few years, largely via the dynamics of the field, that the need for a more co-ordinated approach throughout the conflict cycle has been revealed. The UN Secretary-General formulated this requirement in his report to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) in December 2004, urging Member States to "further define how the United Nations and other organizations should work together, and how peacekeeping demands should be shared", indicating that the aim "must be to develop a system of international capacities that is complementary, flexible and nimble".[38] The plea was repeated in his *In Larger Freedom* report stating that "the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnership".[39]

2.   In March 2005, the C34 reinforced that prompting, urging "the UN to strengthen its operational linkages and partnership with regional arrangements" as this "would have a positive impact on the optimal use of limited resources".[40] This is coherent with the terms of the UN Charter, which recognizes the role of "regional arrangements or agencies" in conflict prevention (article 52) and peace enforcement (article 53). It is now time to rise to the challenge set out by the Secretary-General

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[38]   Report of the Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, para 8, and 71, 15 December 2004, A/59/608.
[39]   Report of the Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All,* para 112, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005.
[40]   *Report of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, para 112, March 2005, A/59/19.

and to define the practical means to make full use of the potential created by the Charter, while bearing in mind both the broad range of interests and concerns of the wider membership of the organization, and the primary responsibility of the Security Counil in maintaining international peace and security. There will be no single formula applicable to all situations; "the right combination will vary depending upon circumstances, including political will of the Member States, as well as the capacities and mandates of the organizations concerned."[41] The World Summit in September 2005 paved the way for even further developments in this dimension of peace operations. Taking into account the diversity of the regional dynamics will be essential in assessing what each organization or arrangement can bring to the global capacity to prevent and resolve conflict, and in defining its optimal mode of relationship with the UN.

3. Considering the complexity of modern peace operations as discussed in Chapter 1, it is evident that the constructions required will not be simple bilateral relationships between the UN and regional arrangements. Increasingly, situations such as that of Kosovo, where the UN provides the political framework, whilst the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) guarantees military security, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) supports democratic institution-building, and the European Union (EU) has responsibility for reconstruction, will be the rule rather than the exception. In Africa, situations in which the efforts of the UN, the African Union (AU), an African Regional Economic Commission (REC) or Region, and other organizations external to the region, are combined, may well arise more frequently. Examples can already be witnessed in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. Organizing a degree of predictability in those complex arrangements, whilst preserving the needed political autonomy of each organization and the responsibilities of the Security Council, will be a major challenge in the years to come.

4. During the Challenges Seminars, presenters underlined the need for both global and regional efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and the importance of partnerships in this process. They noted the changing nature of conflicts and peace operations and the significant gaps in the capacity of most regional organizations to conduct peace operations, in the communications and information sharing within and between regions and the United Nations, and in the compatibility of various organizations' operating procedures, guidelines and processes.

5. Chapter 1 noted the turbulent nature of the peace operations environment and the impact this has on the planning, conduct and evaluation of peace operations. The aim of this chapter is to identify a number of measures that could and should be taken by UN Member States, working in cooperation with the UN Secre-

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[41] Report of the Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,* para 8, 15 December 2004, A/59/608.

tariat as well as the secretariats of their respective regional organizations, to realise the vision of an "interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities". The chapter will review major issues and obstacles to better UN-regional and regional-regional co-operation and coordination and make recommendations with regards to ways in which those obstacles may be overcome, cooperation and coordination improved, and operations made more effective and thus less costly in the long run. Recommendations, however, are best based on empirical observations. For this reason, the chapter first offers an overview of recent developments of the regional dimensions of peace operations, and of the partnerships in progress between and amongst the UN and regional arrangements.

Recent Developments in the Regional Dimensions

6.   A review of recent developments in the regional dimensions of peace operations demonstrates the diversity of mandates, intents, experiences, and assets of different regional organizations, arrangements, and 'groupings'. In very broad terms, three distinctions stand out and condition the inter-action of regional arrangements with the UN and with other regional groupings.

7.   The first distinction is whether the regional or sub-regional arrangement or organization's mandate includes a role in conflict management within and among its Member States. The Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU), the Arab League and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have all endorsed or confirmed the right of their Member States to take action in areas normally reserved for domestic jurisdiction, under specific conditions. These range from situations of gross violations of human rights, to events jeopardizing the democratic order, to war crimes and genocide.[42] These four regions, therefore, have an in-built internal conflict prevention and resolution mechanism.

8.   The second distinction is whether a regional organization or arrangement possesses, or intends to endow itself with, a peace-keeping capability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Arab League and the AU and several of the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), are relevant here. Consequently, in circumstances when a possible peacekeeping operation is called for, the UN might look for support from those organizations that have such a capacity, as noted by the Secretary-General's reference to the Af-

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[42]   The OSCE Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in 1991 (http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1991/10/13995_en.pdf); the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001 (http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm); the AU Constitutive Act of 1990 (Art 4 h) http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm; and the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999 (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf).

rican Standby Force and the European Union's Battle groups in his report for the Millennium Review Summit, and from his calling upon NATO, in February 2005, for help in Darfur.[43]

9.   The third distinction concerns the geographic scope of a regional arrangement's mandate and activities. Consistent with their internal conflict prevention and conflict resolution aim, the Arab League, ASEAN, AU, OAS, and OSCE, have to date no ambition to become active outside the perimeter of their membership. The EU has developed its conflict and crisis management capacity over the last decade and has supported or deployed peace operations in areas far beyond its own borders. NATO deployments in the Balkans, Afghanistan and now its support in Africa (Sudan), have taken NATO forces well beyond the Alliance's original geographic area of operation.

10.   The nature of the relationship and cooperation between the UN and a regional organization or arrangement will to a large extent be determined by the possibilities and limitations of a particular organization or arrangement as illustrated by the categories above. The overall objective – to address conflict and crisis as they occur – is a common one; the ways and means to do it however, require complementary approaches and effective cooperation.

Figure 2.1 summarizes these three distinctions amongst the main regional organizations, arrangements, and groupings addressed in the remainder of this chapter.

Figure 2.1: Comparing Regional Groupings

		Provision for regional peacekeeping forces	
		NO	YES
Provision for intervention within the grouping, under defined circumstances	NO	ASEAN	*EU* *NATO*
	YES	OAS OSCE	Arab League AU ECOWAS

Note: *Italics* indicate groupings that operate beyond the membership's borders.

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[43]   Report of the Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All*, para 112, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005; Speech of the UN Secretary-General to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php

Africa

11.   Africa remains the locus of most of the United Nations' major peace operations (with 54,300 personnel of the 69,000 total UN peacekeeping deployments in October 2005). The largest UN peace operations are currently deployed in Africa. For example, the breadth of UNMIL's mandate, includes implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme; support for humanitarian and human rights assistance; support for the reform of security-related institutions; and assistance to the transitional government in implementation of the peace process.

12.   Another notable development in peacekeeping in the region has been that of hybrid operations, sometimes involving the 'rehatting' of contingents. In Liberia, the deployment of UNMIL, which was the planned successor to an emergency stop-gap ECOWAS operation deployed in July 2003, was accelerated by logistical support and troop transfers from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), as well as substantial acquisitions of materials from the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. In Cote d'Ivoire, the UN operation was established in 2004, again as a successor to an ECOWAS operation, and involved rehatting of many of the West African troops. Another form of co-operation includes the structure of cross-support that has been fashioned for MONUC and ONUB, as MONUC goes through its third round of force expansion in as many years.

13.   The proximity of UNMIL to UNAMSIL and ONUCI, within the Mano River Basin, creates both the opportunity and the necessity to cooperate and coordinate, from sharing information about smuggler networks and militia movements, to mutually reinforcing border patrols, to shared acquisition and logistics. There appear to be, however, no initiatives as yet towards implementing fully integrated, region-wide operations or decision-making. Although the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) who serve as heads of mission and the missions' Force Commanders do meet periodically to review regional developments, cooperation and coordination between the missions are not yet formalized and remain at the discretion of respective heads of mission. An SRSG has been appointed to head the UN Office for West Africa, but that office deals largely with non-peacekeeping issues in the region.

14.   Alongside the UN operations, the development of the regional dimensions of peace operations in Africa has been substantial over the past decade. Groups of African governments, working at the continental or sub-regional level, have long been involved in "peacemaking", i.e. the mitigation of crises via diplomatic activity. Africa in the past three years has seen continued changes, advancing the efforts of governments to find common ways to address the conflicts and crises of the continent. The African Union, created in 2001 as successor to the Organisation for African Unity, acknowledges that the UN has global responsibility for the maintenance

of international peace and security, but also contends that it is well positioned to bring a continental perspective to bear on efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa.[44] In July 2002, the AU agreed to establish a Peace and Security Council (PSC) to serve as a collective security and early warning arrangement that would facilitate timely and efficient regional response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The Council was launched in May 2004 and is now empowered to execute its mandate in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution, though the PSC has yet to endow itself with a full professional cadre of staff to support its action.

15.   The AU has been active in peace resolution and with observer or peacekeeping operations in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Burundi and the Sudan. In early 2005, it wrested a change of internal dynamics in Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, forcing the conflicting parties to return to the negotiating table in the former case, and new elections on the country's leadership in the latter. It has also recognized that there is at present within Africa very limited capacity to respond to developing crises. It has therefore initiated policy, through its Peace and Security Council, for the phased creation of an African Standby Force (ASF), to comprise civilian, police and military capacity, to be developed on both a continental, but primarily sub-regional basis. The plan for an ASF, the "Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee (MSC)", was approved by the African Ministers for Defence in July 2003, and further developed in March 2005. It recommends establishing a strategic headquarters and brigades of about 4,500 troops in each of the five African regions by 2010. It also set out six progressively demanding scenarios of engagement[45] that would be developed in a phased approach and, accordingly, spelled out the degree of preparedness required for each scenario. It is expected that by 30 June 2006, up to 15,000 troops earmarked for the force will be in training and at the same time ready to work with United Nations peacekeepers in field operations under UN command, as well as in AU-led missions. The ASF is intended to be able to be deployed alone in peacekeeping operations by 2010, under its own command.

16.   Reality, however, seldom proceeds according to plans. On the one hand, implementation of the plan has slipped; on the other, with Darfur in particular, the AU has taken on an almost scenario 6 type of operation much earlier than envisaged. The initial impact of Darfur was to slow down capacity-building, as the totality of the embryonic AU capacity for crisis management had to be mobilized to ensure the success of the operation. However, Darfur has also had a catalytic impact and provided valuable lessons in refining the AU's plan and accelerating its timetable for

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[44]   Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 2002, http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm
[45]   From military advice (scenario 1) and military observation (African force deployed together with the UN in scenario 2, and freestanding African observer missions in scenario 3) to "simple" peacekeeping (scenario 4), "complex" peacekeeping (scenario 5) and "intervention" (scenario 6).

capacity-building. Thus, in March 2005, the AU and the RECs/Regions agreed on a "Roadmap" for the operationalization of the ASF. The Roadmap takes stock of the developments in each REC/Region and at AU level, and spells out the requirements for progress. For the first time, a sense of priorities emerges and an attempt is made to bring clarity to the somewhat entangled relationship between the AU and the RECs.

17.   The Roadmap sets out the "hierarchy of political authority" governing African peace operations. It clarifies the point, left somewhat ambiguous in earlier documents, that the AU will seek UN Security Council authorisation for its enforcement actions, but it also makes clear that the RECs/Regions should seek AU authorisation of their interventions.[46] Second, it states the requirements for the establishment of the ASF including: 1) strategic level management capabilities[47]; 2) operational management capabilities[48]; 3) the development of an ASF standby system; 4) training and doctrine requirements; 4) logistic support of missions across the six scenarios; 5) Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C^3I) requirements; 6) funding needs and sources. Throughout, the document insists on transparency between regional process and the continental level, and mandates a number of practical measures to ensure that regional and continental developments are kept in step, including via the finalization of an MOU between the AU and the REC/Regions, stating relevant rights and responsibilities.

18.   Just like the decision to intervene in Darfur, the Roadmap is an ambitious plan. Work is taken forward in each key area via a series of decentralized workshops involving the participation of the RECs as well as international donors. Indeed, the Roadmap lays great stress on "collaboration and cooperation" with bilateral and international partners, specifying that assistance will be necessary for the establishment of the planning elements (PLANELMs), the AU logistical depots and the provision of other logistic support, the ASF training and exercise programme and, last but not least, the financing of operations.

19.   In essence, the plan for the establishment of the ASF is bold and timely. Unfortunately, and despite the promising developments stated above, there have been delays in implementing the actions necessary. Despite several subsequent meetings and agreements between the AU and the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), action on the road map that identifies the practical measures to operationalize Phase I of the ASF, and to establish a continental early warning system

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[46]   "Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force", para 10, EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4(I), March 2005.
[47]   A planning element (PLANELM) at the AU, and a PLANELM for each of the five regional brigades at regionl level.
[48]   One brigade HQ for each regional brigade and an expanded PLANELM at AU level for directly mandated AU operation (e.g. Darfur).

(CEWS), has been slow.[49] Moreover, there is a need to continuously review the plan and to accord higher priority to policy development and implementation. For instance, under the ASF plan, the AU is to take responsibility for sustainment of peace missions after the initial 30 days of deployment by the sub-regional brigades. At present, however, neither the AU nor the sub-regional organizations have central logistical sustainment facilities or the requisite financial capabilities, thus leaving the burden of self-sustainment of ASF to coalitions of the able and the willing. In response to this challenge, several options have been suggested including the establishment by the AU of two logistics bases to support its operations, one each on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; the continued use of private military companies as ECOMOG and UNMIL have done with PAE[50]; or use of the UN Logistics Base, Brindisi, as a base depot, with a forward regional base in Africa. However, each of these options would require the full support and cooperation of the UN, regional arrangements and donor communities in order to be implemented.

20.   Besides the AU's initiatives, however, experience has shown the need for sub-regional groupings to also develop their own peace and security mechanisms, each with its own structure, priorities and capabilities. Thus, in West Africa a peace-keeping capacity was formalized through the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security. Since the late 1990s, attempts to prevent or mediate conflicts have multiplied.[51] ECOWAS has mounted operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire. It has also approved a Military Vision and Strategy, a Force Structure, a Logistics Depot Concept and a Concept of Development, and its Member States have pledged units and personnel for a Task Force, an HQ Staff, and a Main Brigade of 6,500 men. Its Mission Planning and Management Cell has been established and personnel have been recruited. Finally, the basis of an ECOWAS Early Warning system has been set via the establishment of four decentralised offices. ECOWAS cooperates with the UN and the AU on various of the above peace initiatives.

21.   In East Africa, member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC) have traditionally cautioned against the establishment of a similar sub-regional peacekeeping force in the absence of a single country in that sub-region with sufficient power to take the lead. The frictions between some countries in the sub-region have mitigated against the creation of such a force. However, this has not prevented IGAD from under-

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49   At a meeting in Addis Ababa on 22-23 March 2005, the AU and the RECs again adopted a series of resolutions to advance progress on the ASF, the CEWS and a MOU between the AU and RECs. (AU Communiqué EXP/AU-RECS/ASF/Comm (I) of 23 March 2005). The G8 meeting in Gleneagles did commit further support by G8 to the African Action Plan.
50   Pacific Architects & Engineers.
51   For details, see International Peace Academy, *Operationalising the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security,* August 2002, http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/OPER_ECOWAS.pdf

taking a range of peace initiatives in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia and the Sudan. The latter effort helped to create a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed on 9 January 2005, to end the long-running war in southern Sudan. Further, IGAD has approved a policy framework, a legal framework, a budget, and the location and staffing requirements of its PLANELM and of the HQ of the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). Subsequently, the IGAD Chiefs of Defence proposed the deployment of a 10,000-strong peacekeeping force to support a new transitional government in Somalia. The IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) was to be of nine months' duration and be followed by a deployment of an AU force. Demonstrating the continued volatility of Somali politics, several Somali warlords threatened to attack the new force and especially contingents drawn from neighboring states.[52] Finally, progress has been made in defining the role of the East African Community (EAC) in peace and security and in working out the appropriate arrangements to manage EAC's relations with EASBRIG, as the membership of the two organizations do not match.

22.   In Southern Africa, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) sponsored several peace operations field exercises in the 1990s but, with the exception of the brief operation in Lesotho (1998 – 1999), its members have been contributing forces to peacekeeping through the United Nations or the African Union. These include MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the African Mission in Burundi, which merged into the UN Operation in Burundi, ONUB, in June 2004. Despite this limited experience, the SADC is working towards establishing its component brigade for the ASF. In central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) has a modest experience of peacekeeping in the Central African Republic (350 troops in 2002-2003).

23.   In spite of these developments, peacekeeping capacity in Africa is continually hampered by several factors. For example, there is no AU doctrine or guidelines to assist the regional organizations and units. Thus contingents arriving in mission areas often operate in accordance with their national military doctrines, or with no doctrine at all. Peacekeeping operations on the continent have also been hampered by delays and shortfalls in funding. The AU's appropriation of six per cent of its regular budget (about $1.8m) is grossly inadequate for the tasks at hand, while external funding, which forms a larger portion of contributions, comes in slowly and often with conditions. Given such funding limitations, the AU and the RECs should be encouraged to continually consider which initiatives are to receive highest priority amongst the many possibilities: a continental and regional Conflict Early Warning System; a strategic planning and command capability; standby mission components of civilian experts, police and military; a logistic and communications

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[52]   "IGAD defence chiefs propose deployment of 10,000 troops in Somalia," Xinhua News Agency, 15 March 2005; "Uganda delays sending Somalia peacekeeping force," Reuters Foundation, 4 May 2005. Available online at www.reliefweb.int.

infrastructure able to support missions; and clear policy guidance on areas such as training, doctrine and funding.

24.   In these and other initiatives designed to enable Africa to field effective peace operations, Member States of the African Union will continue to need the technical and financial assistance of partners inside and outside Africa. Long-term capacity-building must be paired with more short-term operational support and co-operation. To date, the United Nations, other international organizations, extra-regional organizations such as the Group of Eight (G8), and regional actors such as the European Union, have assisted African states and organizations to some extent to establish these capabilities through direct deployment support to combined or bilateral development programmes.[53] Bilateral efforts have provided field training and classroom instruction in peacekeeping, and have helped develop regional training centres. The French sponsored Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), US-sponsored African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA), British Military Advisory & Training Team (BMATT) and Peace Support Teams (BPST) programmes, and programmes from Norway, Canada and Denmark provided additional training and equipment assistance, while other countries have helped to enhance skills, further doctrinal standardization and improve logistical capacity. The US-sponsored programme Operation Focus Relief trained seven African battalions for deployment to UNAMSIL.

25.   However much these Western initiatives provide in tangible benefits, Africans remain concerned that they do not address the most crucial needs of regional peace support, namely, logistical sustainment and adequate operational funding. A considerable portion of external initiatives have tended to widen already existing disparities in African regional capacities for peace operations. The international community needs to consider whether, through its programming, it wishes to broaden peacekeeping capacity within the region or just to deepen the capacities of selected countries; and how, once this capacity has been built, it can best be maintained when at home, and supported when in the field. Despite positive developments, there is still an ongoing challenge for African governments to clarify and prioritize their own needs. There are also persistent gaps in communication and co-operation between African and donor countries in developing effective programmes that would really support the benefiting states in order to attain their objectives for peace operations.

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53   See the 2004 UN Report A/58/19 of 26 April 2004: In noting these developments the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations remarked "The Special Committee welcomes the new partnerships that are being established in building Africa's capacity for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building between the United Nations, the African Union, other regional organizations and bodies, and individual Member States. It welcomes developments in relation to the European Union's peace facility for Africa and encourages the development of similar mechanisms. The Committee calls for coordination of bilateral and multilateral efforts to ensure that their effectiveness is maximized".

Europe

26.   Europe has three major regional arrangements able to contribute to peace operations, either in support of the United Nations or independently. These are the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In addition, there is potential for regional action by several groupings of countries in East Europe and Central Asia.

27.   The EU has made significant progress in the past few years in endowing itself with a strategic vision (European Security Strategy), political structure for crisis management (Political and Security Committee), and several administrative and military underpinnings (Situation Centre, EU Military Committee and Military Staff, European Defence Agency). It has also established a capacity for civilian crisis management including the ability to send police, civilian administrators and judicial personnel to peace missions. A new Political-Military Cell will constitute a capability to plan the civilian and military components of EU operations jointly, and Battlegroups intended, inter alia, to support UN operations through a rapid reaction capacity.[54]

28.   Congruent with this institutional progress, the EU has begun to conduct its own police, military, and rule of law operations. It is currently running three police missions (EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina; PROXIMA, in Macedonia; and EUPOL in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)), and launched a first rule of law operation in Georgia in July 2004 (EUJUST THEMIS), followed by a second one in Iraq in early 2005 (EUJUST-LEX). Security Sector Reform (SSR) is also on the EU's agenda, with a first mission being deployed in the DRC. The Artemis military operation in the DRC, in summer 2003, illustrated the benefits that an EU rapid reaction capability could bring to the UN, and generated the accelerated efforts to stand up the Battlegroups.[55] Also significant in the development of a EU capacity to handle large scale peace operations was the December 2004 handover from NATO to the EU of responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA), involving some 5-7,000 troops. Operation ALTHEA complements and supports EUPM and the work of the EU Commission and the EU Monitoring Mission already acting in the region.

29.   Early years of experience in EU crisis management have highlighted a number of lessons, both in the process of EU capacity-building and in the EU's re-

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[54]   The concept is to provide highly trained, battalion-sized formations of some 1,500 soldiers each, with all combat and service support, available at 15 days notice and sustainable for up to 120 days, by rotation. By prompt deployment and able to conduct combat operations in a hostile environment, they could establish and assert control in a crisis situation until the arrival of a larger UN force.
[55]   *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/608, 15 January 2005, para 72; *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,* Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para 112.

lationship with the UN. In the capacity-building area, the main challenge on the military side is to ensure that the countries fulfil their pledges to create the planned Battlegroups, with the first two intended to be single-state forces and the others to be multinational in nature. Two Battlegroups are planned to be on stand-by at any given time by 2007, with a total of 13 eventually available. Under the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement, the EU has access to NATO planning and support staffs, as well as support assets.

30.   On the civilian side, the priority is to take forward the 'Civilian Headline Goals' by working out the detail of the types of civilian missions the EU could undertake, identifying the necessary capacity requirements, and mobilizing Member States commitments for crisis management. Internal coordination requires further work. Authority and responsibility for civilian crisis management are, to a degree, divided between the European Council and the European Commission.[56] The Commission has certain responsibilities under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and disburses most of the budget. The Council, however, has primary responsibility for policies and activities under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and all 25 members must agree to the launch of an ESDP-related operation, unless they recuse themselves from the decision and from participation in the operation. Most of the costs of field operations are borne by the individual state-participants, who continue to pay the salaries of their seconded personnel, much as UN Member States do for police officers seconded to UN operations. The planned development of an EU Generic Strategic Planning Concept will be an important instrument to ensure the effective coordination and planning of the organization's work and undertakings.

31.   The EU's Operation Artemis also highlighted a number of lessons as regards UN-EU co-ordination and handover. These include the need for UN liaison officers to be attached to the EU operational level HQ from the early planning stage of the mission, and also at EU strategic level HQs during the mission; the need to build some time flexibility into the deployment and drawdown schedules of the EU force; and the need to seriously consider the option of leaving behind some EU enabling assets in order to ensure a smooth transition to (or back to) UN responsibility.[57]

32.   The EU-UN Joint Declaration on co-operation in crisis management of September 2003 provides the framework for co-operation in planning, training, communication and best practices both on the military and civilian sides of crisis management.[58] Both civilian and military implementation documents have since been

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[56]   The European Council is the highest decision-making body of EU member states) and the European Commission is made up of the 25 Commissioners, who represent the 'Community' as a whole.
[57]   *Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force,* UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, October 2004, http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPU/Document.aspx?docid=572
[58]   Full text at http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2768_en.htm

approved by the EU Council, incorporating options such as the EU functioning as a clearing house for Member States' contributions to UN-led missions, as well as different models for EU-led operations in support of, or as components of, a broader mission (e.g., police or SSR). The exchange of military liaison officers between the EU Military Staff and DPKO is aimed at enhancing coordination between the UN and the EU; the organizations have now participated in several joint missions to support the African Union. Systematic coordination at the operational but also the strategic level between organizations would facilitate the development of an EU DDR, SSR and rule of law capacity fully co-ordinated with UN efforts.

33.   NATO has crossed several bridges in the past 15 years, which have changed its role from defensive alliance to collective security instrument. In practice, NATO operations today focus on the establishment and provision of security in intense security environments, including peace enforcement when necessary. It has however also contributed to, for example, peacebuilding (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq), peacemaking (Balkans and Afghanistan) and classic peacekeeping tasks (Balkans). Its Partnership for Peace Programme has provided the framework for regional co-operation and capacity-building between the allies of NATO and most of the countries participating in the OSCE. NATO has also performed a major task of transforming the armed forces of the Central and Eastern European countries – some of which have become members. In the process, NATO has developed experience in security sector reform through military training and restructuring that is now being applied to the transformation of the armed forces of countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq.

34.   Relations between NATO and the UN have at times been uneasy, with the lowest point being perhaps the early 1999 NATO decision to intervene in Kosovo against the will of a number of Security Council members. However, co-operation has been the rule rather than the exception. NATO and the UN had an uncomfortable experimental cooperation arrangement during the period 1992-95 in Bosnia, but then worked hand in hand for nine years in trying to stabilize Bosnia after the Dayton agreement (1995) – until the EU took over from NATO there. NATO, as noted earlier, also provides military security for the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and, in Afghanistan, worked closely with UNAMA to ensure the success of the 2004 and 2005 elections. This co-operation, assisted by the presence of a NATO military liaison officer at the UN, could develop further. One new area of collaboration is Iraq, in the likely hypothesis that the roles of both organizations there will grow. In 2005, the UN Secretary-General called on NATO to consider what it could do to put an end to the situation in Darfur[59] and, as a result, NATO is now cooperating with the UN, the EU and the AU in providing transportation, logistical and training support. Moreover, in late 2004, NATO

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[59]   Kofi Annan, Speech to the Munich Security Policy Conference, 13 February 2005, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen

began a concerted dialogue with a number of key NGOs to explain its policies, operational concepts and other operational modalities, and in turn, to listen to NGOs concerns about and expectations from working with NATO military elements.

35.   The OSCE, comprising 55 Member States, has played an active role in peacemaking, elections, police training, and democracy-building in its geographic area. It has deployed small, long-term missions aimed at promoting peaceful dispute settlement in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and has field activities in a dozen other capitals in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In many ways, its activities are similar to those of UN political missions and, in several cases, it has worked in tandem with the UN, the EU and NATO. For example, it took responsibility for institution-building and democratization in Kosovo as a "pillar" of the UN Interim Administration Mission.[60]

36.   One of the key contributions of the OSCE to the conduct of peace operations, most relevant to this report, is the training of police. OSCE is a principal contributor to security sector reform and the rule of law. Nevertheless, its Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) has about a dozen staff, and operates on less than 700,000 Euros per annum, including assessment missions. Field staff are recruited through OSCE's Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) system, but the SPMU has been constrained to reject three-quarters of the police candidates put forward by Member States, despite the posting of detailed job descriptions. All candidates are seconded by governments; none can be hired directly by the SPMU. This rejection rate is comparable to that suffered by the United Nations in its efforts to recruit police for recent missions, indicating that the shortage of qualified police recruits is in fact a global problem.

37.   For reasons that include certain disagreements among its members, the future role of the OSCE as a peace and security actor is somewhat unclear. Most usefully from the perspective of the UN would be if the OSCE could continue to act as a force to contain conflicts and build democratic institutions in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

38.   Also uncertain is the potential contribution of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), collectively or in sub-groups, to manage conflicts and carry out peace operations. Both the CIS and its offspring, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),[61] are mandated by their founding documents to conduct peace operations across a broad spectrum of engagements, with priority accorded their own regional perimeter, but also potentially beyond its borders under a UN mandate. Whether this potential becomes reality, however, will largely

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[60]   For further details, see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Field Activities," online at http://www.osce.org/field_activities/.
[61]   The CSTO brings together Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.

depend on how Russia redefines the role of its military forces in the CIS area and how this is perceived by the broader international community, in particular by the other members of the Security Council.

Asia and the Americas

39.   In the Asia Pacific, there are at present no institutionalized regional collective security mechanisms, but there are noteworthy and still-evolving developments in regional approaches to security threats. In North East and South Asia, rivalries between well-armed neighbours preclude effective sub-regional cooperation at present, although significant dialogue and bilateral cooperation and negotiation, assisted by external actors, have made some important inroads toward reducing tensions. States from these regions have also contributed substantial numbers of well trained military and police contingents to a number of United Nations peace operations.[62] The recent progressive emergence of China as a contributor of troops, police and civilian staff in UN peace operations is an important development given that country's position on the Security Council and its resource potential.

40.   In South East Asia, the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), which at present is neither a security nor a defence organization, has discussed an Indonesian proposal to create regional peacekeeping cooperation under its auspices. While some of its members suggest that this proposal is "too early", individual ASEAN countries, including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore plus Japan and South Korea have all contributed contingents to either the UN-authorized or the UN-led peace operation in East Timor. Additionally, discussions on peace and security issues have continued to develop in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF is the main forum for security dialogue in Asia-Pacific. Created in 1994, it draws together 24 countries which have a bearing on the security of the Asia-Pacific zone.[63] In an area with little history of security cooperation, and enduring rivalries between well-armed neighbours, the ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues which underpin the region's security architecture. The ARF is premised on the idea – drawn from the ASEAN experience – that a process of dialogue can produce qualitative improvements in political relationships. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security. The ARF's 1995 Concept Paper set out a three-stage, evolutionary approach to the grouping's development, moving from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy

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[62]   India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal consistently support UN peacekeeping with large contributions of up to brigade strength. Recently China, South Korea and Japan have all contributed contingents to UN and other coalition operations.
[63]   The ASEAN Regional Forum includes the ten ASEAN Member States (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus Russia, Mongolia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, India, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand , the USA, Canada and the EU.

and, in the long term, a conflict resolution capability. The ARF is characterised by consensus decision-making and minimal institutionalization.

41.   In the South West Pacific, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) has adopted a pragmatic approach to regional security, preferring to develop a sense of shared responsibility for problem solving that concentrates on conflict prevention through improved governance. Where appropriate, the collective support of neighbours in the region is encouraged to address security concerns and to provide a framework to address threatened state failure. Successful examples include the regional Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in Bougainville and the PIF-endorsed Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which was an example of the region acting collectively to address a regional problem. Neighbours assisted a nation to restore stability, and promote good governance and economic development.

42.   RAMSI has given the impetus to an Australian initiative to develop a police standby force to assist in regional peace operations. In a way, PIF is creating its own model of peacekeeping, in which missions are led by the police, with the military coming in support. This seems to be the optimal format for a region in which the main security disturbances are threats to the internal order, and capabilities in the region in general are stronger on the police than on the military side (only three countries in the region have militaries).

43.   Within the Americas, the principal regional arrangements are the Organization of American States (OAS), and the sub regional organizations of the Caribbean Community Common Market (CARICOM) and the South Common Market (MERCOSUR). The OAS is mainly concerned with preventive diplomacy and has no collective mechanism to undertake peace operations. The OAS and CARICOM have nevertheless been promoting political reconciliation in Venezuela, monitoring the national and Presidential elections alongside other international observers. Additionally, the OAS has established a mission to support the peace process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA), and has sponsored discussions between Belize and Guatemala to help them resolve their territorial differences. The OAS 1991 Santiago Commitment on Democracy and Development raised the Haiti situation to the attention of the international community, and paved the way for a sustained OAS engagement on Haiti since the early 1990's. This involvement included ad hoc meetings of Foreign Ministers, observer missions to monitor parliamentary elections, and an international presence during 2000-2004, when the UN was thinner on the ground. CARICOM and Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) also played a part in peace support and mediation efforts on the island.

44.	After the short war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, members of the 1947 Rio Pact[64] deployed a group of military observers (the Military Observer Misssion – Ecuador-Peru) while the peace making process was being conducted, thus preventing conflict to escalate. The mission continued for four years, while the two countries negotiated, signed, and implemented a peace accord. It was withdrawn in 1999.

45.	In the past, the regional dimensions of peace operations in South America have been manifested by various countries having contributed individually to several UN Missions, including to UNPROFOR, UNTAET, UNIKOM, MONUC, and UNFICYP. In some cases these contingents have been multinational. As a first attempt at regional deployment, the Argentinean Task Force in UNFICYP encompasses platoon–level contingents from Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and officers and non commissioned officers from Brazil and Uruguay. The regional dynamics are now evident also in Haiti, where Member States of MERCOSUR have coordinated their troop contributions to support the UN Stabilization Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH).[65] While there is no standing organization in Latin America that prepares for collective participation in peace operations, there appear to be aspirations to develop such a capacity. Member States of the OAS and other sub regional groupings could consider further exploring this option and the establishment of regional standby forces for peacekeeping.

46.	The Conference of the Armies of the Americas (which includes most of the Armies of the Western Hemisphere) has been a forum for consideration of collective security issues. For example, the XXVI Conference in 2004-2005 was specifically devoted to "UN Peacekeeping Operations under Chapter VI", in order to seek a common ground to strengthen cooperation and coordination for future deployments. [66]

47.	As in Asia, despite the lack of strong regional organizations for peace and security, Latin American countries are major troop contributors to UN operations, suggesting complementary approaches in the regional dimensions of, and contributions to, peace operations.

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[64]	The Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty ("Rio Pact") was signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947 by the United States and 19 Latin American countries. The Treaty provided for collective defence of the Western Hemisphere from outside attack and thus served as a model for the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO.
[65]	The MERCOSUR members had at the time of writing more than 2,000 soldiers deployed in the missions (from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay).
[66]	Two Member States (Argentina and USA) of the Conference of the American Armies (CAA) translated the full Challenges Project Phase I report into Spanish. It was made requested reading at the CAA June 2004 conference. It should be noted that the focus on Chapter VI Operations still show a certain sensitivity in the continent towards the new tendency of deploying under Chapter VII.

Cooperation and Coordination between the UN and Regional Organizations

48.	This part of the chapter reviews key functional elements of cooperation and coordination in the relationship between the United Nations and the regional organizations and arrangements discussed in the previous section. These include: issues of consensus and complementarity; memoranda of understanding; early warning, liaison and information sharing; conflict prevention and peacebuilding; and procedures and guidelines for mission handover.

Consensus and complementarity

49.	The discussions on the appropriate role of the United Nations have emphasized the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security and the complementary nature of actions by the UN, Regional Arrangements and Member States. This concept was endorsed by speakers throughout the various Phase II Challenges Seminars, who recognised that the magnitude and complexity of the challenges to hand also necessitate action by nations and regions, with the UN system not expected to carry full responsibility for such endeavours. They emphasized the importance of promoting clarity and agreement on who should lead both the political management of a particular crisis and the international response. The guiding principles adopted by Member States in the Millennium Declaration and the World Summit, their commitment to the rule of law and the responsibility to protect, reinforces the requirement to ensure that actions that are taken at regional and international level are properly linked and optimised to maximum effect and that Member States provide the resources and political will to support such a complementary process. In many cases, regional organizations will be able to act more quickly and possibly more effectively than the UN, in accordance with the intention of Article 52 of the UN Charter.

50.	To support the idea of synergy and complementarity of efforts by the UN and regional organizations, a number of Project Partners have therefore noted that the full contribution by Member States, military, police and civilian, to UN-mandated regional peace operations should be clearly identified. For example, some military and police peace operations conducted by organizations other than, but in support of, the UN, assume the burden of 'heavy lifting' (operations in hostile and complex environments) at the expense of the contributing states themselves. An unfortunate consequence of this burden-sharing effort is that publicized UN statistics on troop contributing countries overlooks these efforts. It was argued such contributions should be recognized and effectively publicised in any general compilation of Member States' contributions to peacekeeping forces. In order to develop a more valid picture of actual contributions, civilian and financial resources committed by Member States should also be summarized.

Memoranda of Understanding

51.   At the time of writing, the links established between regional arrangements and the UN are limited, primarily consisting of periodic high level meetings and minimal informal staff connections. The High-level Panel and others have suggested that consultation and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations should be expanded and formalized, and the Secretary-General has indicated that he intends to introduce memoranda of understanding (MOU) between the UN and individual regional and sub-regional organizations as appropriate.[67] Firm links are necessary to enhance the potential for a more effective and coordinated international response to crises. This would also, as a minimum, allow each respective organization to better understand the strengths and limitations of the capabilities of its partners. To ensure such a complementary relationship between the UN and regional organizations, regional organizations and their Member States should establish joint consultative mechanisms and memoranda of understanding with the UN and meet formally with the UN on a regular basis.[68]

Early Warning, Liaison and Information Sharing

52.   In addition to MOUs and meetings at the higher level, there is a need to increase information sharing and transparency at the working level between the UN and the various regional arrangements. This is enhanced by the linking, where practical, of early warning systems through communication and computer systems that would allow the exchange of unclassified background data and evolving information about a developing crisis in a responsive manner. Exchange of information is always a sensitive issue, even in a routine, non-crisis mode. However, there is case to be made for exchanging information provided by early warning systems where they exist. Currently such exchanges are rather limited but the interest in, and potential for, an operational system is prevalent. For example, with the AU and the African RECs being increasingly active in conflict prevention via mediation and diplomatic action, the usefulness of exchanging information with the UN will increase. A good example has been set by ECOWAS, which recently concluded an MOU to share early warning analysis with the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the civil society West Africa Network for Peacebuilding. Regional organizations should work with the UN to identify the conditions and the ways in which they could exchange information with the UN.

53.   The exchange of civilian, police and military staff and liaison officers between the UN and regional organizations, and between various regional organizations, is an important aspect of transparency, a practical way to implement coop-

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[67]   In Larger Freedom, 21 March 2005, paragraph 213.
[68]   Similar to that agreed between the EU and the UN in the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management on 23 September 2003.

eration, and should be encouraged at all levels, and in a systematic manner to the extent that such exchanges are practical. Exchanges of liaison staff can go a long way in fostering a deeper understanding of the inner works of a partner organisation, making for a better targeting of counterparts, and fostering a "co-operation reflex". In each case, details are important. Is liaison for peacekeeping purposes best carried out by a civilian or a military representation? Should it be organized in New York or closer to the field? Should liaison be for the simple purpose of managing the technical implementation of political-military decisions that have already been made, or should it have an exploratory purpose, such as identifying new areas of co-operation? The principal difficulty in implementing this mechanism is that the various organizations' budgets seldom provide for them and political approvals for such funds are difficult to agree. Were this to be done on the scale suggested and required, the UN alone would need to dispatch dozens of personnel as liaison teams. Nevertheless, improvement on the current situation is necessary – better inter-action in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, doctrine, exercises, and training would be much facilitated by the exchange of liaison staff. The United Nations and regional organizations that deploy personnel to peace operations should petition their member states for adequate budget resources to set up and to staff inter-organizational liaison offices with experienced personnel.

54.   An additional liaison challenge arises in Africa where the division of labour between the AU and the RECs is not entirely defined and the relationship of the RECs and the ASF brigades requires refinement in some regions. Further, meaningful liaison is difficult in West Africa, due to the lack of geographic co-location of the seat of ECOWAS (Abuja) and that of the UN regional office (Dakar).

55.   Regional arrangements should consider such exchanges not only with the UN, but between themselves, if they anticipate the development of their co-operation. All regional arrangements should examine the benefits of exchanging liaison staff with other regional organizations, as appropriate.

56.   The UN and regional organizations can and should learn from one another's experiences. Joint participation in "lessons learned" and best practices studies and seminars can be a cost-effective way of doing so. These activities should be seen as opportunities to assist other states or organizations, both in developing a common understanding of the complexities as well as to encourage the views of all contributors be brought to the attention of others. Hosts and organizers of such events, especially when initiated on a national basis, are encouraged to consider both the external and internal benefits arising from such activities and to provide funded spaces for deserving external contributors.

57.   One example of an important purpose for an enhanced and regular process of information exchange between the UN, regional organizations and Member States would be to establish a regular process for developing and exchanging

benchmarks as measures of effectiveness[69] for the civilian, police and military components after a mission is completed (or steady state achieved) or contributing forces and personnel have exited. Measures of effectiveness will contribute to any of the corrective/amending actions necessary to achieve the desired end state and to a refinement of the campaign/mission plan during the assessment activity. The insights gained can lead to recommendations for mitigating actions or even changes in the end state of a mission. The process would also lead to an increased understanding of the civilian, police and military actors' respective aims, expected end-states, capacities, constraints, achievements, and problems during each mission.

Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

58.   Many regional organizations are focussing on conflict prevention and peacebuilding actions, particularly with respect to failing or weak/fragile states. Often regional partners can assist resolution more effectively due to their closer understanding of regional diplomacy, local factors and neighbouring national interests. The links discussed above through MOUs, early warning systems and close liaison can and should be used to support coordinated action in such situations by Secretary-Generals, special envoys, heads of missions and agency teams deployed into the relevant areas.

59.   Importantly, the processes of peacebuilding also need to be coordinated and operational linkages strengthened to ensure that post-conflict strategies of different actors and agencies reinforce rather than duplicate or contradict one another. Recent experiences with election support and monitoring, mine action, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration planning, and the recognition of the importance of security sector reform actions, highlight areas where common practices and integrated standards need to be followed at international and regional level and how actions at international and regional level drawing on a range of instruments can effectively complement each other. As stressed by the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping, a strong partnership between the UN and regional arrangements will have a positive impact on the optimal use of limited resources.

60.   Co-operation and co-ordination for peacebuilding should take place in the context of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The PBC should include all relevant actors, including regional arrangements. The PBC will be of particular significance for Africa, being able to engage in post-conflict reconstruction and development in an integrated and holistic manner, and to mobilize the breadth and depth of resources required. The PBC should carry out the task of coordinating

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[69]   Measures of effectiveness is one of five major activities of the core Effects Based Approach process. It is evidence based and is a qualitative and quantitative process largely relying on surveys, statistics and other related indicators, and evolves over time (it will also be aggregated over time). The use of trends with defined thresholds for success will be the most common method of the analysis.

UN's, Africa's and the wider international efforts in post-conflict peacebuilding. Regular consultations between the regional arrangements and the PBC will be essential. The involvement of regional arrangements would benefit from their establishing close staff-to-staff links with the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office. Regional arrangements should recognize the PBC as the principal focal point for coordination of peacebuilding activities and should be invited to participate, as relevant, in the development and work of the PBC.

Procedures and Guidelines for Mission Handoff / Sequencing

61.   There will very likely be a continuing need for effective operational transitions between the peacekeeping forces of regional organizations and coalitions, and the United Nations. In transitions, national or coalition contingents from one organization will often transfer to the operational control of a new authority. Recent experiences with "rehatting" of this sort, in UNAMSIL, UNMIL, UNOCI, ONUB and MINUSTAH, have demonstrated continuing gaps between equipment levels and logistic support practices of many regional organizations and the different, sometimes higher, standards provided and expected in UN missions. The use of SHIRBRIG to start-up the mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan and to some degree Liberia, pointed to the need for common SOPs for military forces, compatible logistics concepts, and a thorough understanding of each others equipment, procedures and conditions of engagement. Experiences have also highlighted the risk inherent in insufficiently prepared transitions (Sierra Leone in 1999-2000).[70] Occasionally, as in Ituri, DRC, a regional operation will not rehat, but instead leave the mission area. In such cases, the operational differences are visible but less drastic, and highlight the need for compatible handover guidelines and procedures, the importance of common expectations as to interoperability issues, and the importance of minimizing those issues before handoff occurs. Member States should encourage the United Nations and regional organizations to facilitate the development of guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for effective transitions between UN and non-UN peace operations, in close consultation with states and organizations that have experience in such transitions and building on lessons learned and best practices.

Capacity-Building in Regional Organizations

62.   A major conclusion arising from reviews of peace operations over the last few years is that the ability of most regional and sub-regional organizations to respond rapidly to urgent demands for peace operations, and to effectively conduct operations once deployed, is a challenge indeed. In particular, the capacities for

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[70]   UNDPKO Best Practices Unit, Lessons Learned from the United Nations Peacekeeping Experience in Sierra Leone, September 2003, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/SL-LL%20Report.pdf

such organizations, other than NATO and the EU, to plan, mount and sustain operations without a lead nation providing the core of the deployed resources is still limited. Furthermore, where regional organizations have deployed, they have often quickly (within a few months) sought significant support or replacement by the UN or other providers.

63. The process of preparing for, and conducting, peace operations requires a capacity to coordinate all of those agreements and activities that make forces and other resources ready to act, and that result in action being taken to address a peace and security situation. It also requires an ability to launch, sustain and conclude peace operations. To undertake such action, regional organizations and other actors need: headquarters to plan and to authorize peace operations; guidelines, doctrine and strategies on unity of effort within those operations; the recruitment, education, and training of field personnel, military, police and civilian; effective logistic and communications structures to support the operation; and the necessary budgetary processes to finance the action. Recommendations related to education and training are dealt with separately, in Chapter 4. The remaining process elements are considered here.

Headquarters and Planning Structures

64. A permanent strategic headquarters or secretariat within a regional or subregional organization that can prepare peace operations policy, guidelines and procedures for future regional operations would also plan, command and administer any deployed mission for the regional executive. Existing models of permanent planning and support secretariats range from the hundreds of staff associated with NATO or UN secretariats, the thousands associated with wartime American Regional Combatant Commands, to roughly one dozen members of the planning element of SHIRBRIG.[71] The appropriate headquarters staff size and expertise for any given organization will depend critically on how that organization expects to use its peacekeepers. Referring to the AU's six scenarios for operations, a much larger and multidisciplinary staff would be needed to plan and support scenario five or six operations than would be the case for scenarios one or two. To accelerate the development of effective headquarters staffs of developing regional organizations, the United Nations and others should assist in training essential planning and other staff elements and assist in the creation of appropriate regional standby procedures to complement those being developed in the UN civilian, military and police standby arrangements.

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[71] Mike Denning, "Creating an Effective African Standby Force," *Parameters* (Winter 2004-05), 102-117.

Guidelines, Doctrines, and Strategies

65.   An institution's doctrine for peace operations derives from its strategic aims and is highly dependent on the range of tools at its disposal. For example, the UN and EU need a comprehensive doctrine, given their aims to act along the entire spectrum of conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis management, and post-conflict peacebuilding. The AU and the African RECs have a comprehensive agenda but, in practice in the coming years, their action is more likely to focus on conflict prevention, mediation, and the military aspects of peacekeeping. As implied by the African Roadmap, rule of law missions and the broader aspects of peacebuilding will continue to have to be handled by other actors for the foreseeable future. Finally, an organization like NATO will normally concentrate on the military aspects of stabilization, including longer term engagement in the field of SSR, and security support for peacebuilding efforts.

66.   Given such diversity, it would be difficult to recommend the immediate unification of doctrine. However, a gradation should be considered. To achieve confidence and consistency between contributors to peace operations, a set of guidelines could outline an approach to common activities, laying out the fundamental principles, practices and procedures normally to be followed in meeting the mandates of such operations. Many nations and some regional organizations have already established guidelines, which may be referred to as policies, doctrine or even standard agreements or operating procedures, applicable to peace operations. Such commonality of approach is important when various contributors and multinational and multi-dimensional organizations are operating together in difficult circumstances. It is particularly crucial that potential troop contributors to UN and regional operations thoroughly understand one another's approaches to (and possible national restrictions on) the use of force, cross-support to third country forces, fire support, and other manoeuvre-related issues.

67.   To date, the UN has issued very limited formal guidance on the conduct of peace operations, although a body of documents has been issued and various practices have become the norm. Further guidance is in the process of development and recently the UN has distributed more information on what it expects of Member States in their preparation for and conduct of peace operations. These include the Handbook on Multi-dimensional Peace Operations, sample Rules of Engagement, outline structures for field headquarters, force Standard Operating Procedures, and various other logistic and administrative writings, including the Standard Training Modules. UN, in full cooperation with Member States, needs to build on this momentum and further refine the guidelines, doctrine and policy for peace operations, and then seek to distribute this widely in the various official UN languages. Regional organizations involved in peace operations also need to contribute to these UN efforts, to review such guidance and, where appropriate, adjust and develop their own guidance so as to support the capacity for compatible operations with the UN.

In this regard it will be important for regional organizations and arrangements to hold regular consultations on doctrine with the UN. This could be organized via the exchange of documents, possibly regulated by MOUs, and joint seminars at relevant staff levels.

68.   The importance and utility of the UN and regional organizations engaging in a systematic dialogue on doctrinal development can be exemplified by two different, but practical examples. First, given that African operations will often precede/complement UN missions, the UN and other regional arrangements should attempt to draw maximum benefit from UN guidelines, inasmuch as the AU/RECs Roadmap indicates that ASF doctrine should be "consistent with that of the UN" whilst "complemented by African specificity". Second, UN guidelines on gender issues in peacekeeping, as well as issues related to the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (see discussion in Chapter 4) should be considered as the minimum standards to be applied universally and be incorporated in the doctrine of all regional organizations intending to carry out peace operations.

Initiating Operations

69.   The greatest impediment to enhanced involvement in peace operations of many regional and sub-regional organizations, particularly in Africa, has been the lack of capacity to launch such operations, which involves more than just the technical training and equipping of individuals and light infantry forces for peacekeeping. Important complementary aspects are the provision of essential enabling capabilities, heavy unit equipment and the logistics to allow rapid and efficient deployment, as well as the maintenance of effective administrative and logistic support to contingents in the mission area.

70.   Regional organizations need to develop strategies with their member states and other actors to ensure a capacity to launch missions, including the opening of entry and supply ports in the area of operations, and availability of those critical (and scarce) capabilities necessary to start up a mission, such as movement and air traffic control, strategic and operational transport, basic communications facilities, portable housing and accommodation (including transit and marrying up areas), plus initial medical and welfare cover.

71.   Similarly the appropriate standard and level of equipping military contingents for UN peace operations must be addressed. Based upon experience from many UN peace operations, the United Nations has developed a set of reference documents that outline the appropriate staff and equipment tables for units and individuals that are considered necessary for effective peace operations. For developing member states these standards are often higher than exist (or can be afforded) in their national forces, while for developed countries these standards may not meet

what they consider to be minimum standards. Nevertheless, these UN standards have been endorsed by Member States in the various UN committees, and are used in UN missions; they provide a good basis for regional organizations to develop their own personnel and equipment policies. These documents also provide guidance on the reimbursement costs that might be paid to contributors and the levels of equipment maintenance that are expected to be met by national contingents. At a minimum level, regional organizations should consider basing their equipment requirements on agreed UN documents and consider how to address issues of deficiencies that may arise in accepting these standards in UN missions. It would be a mistake to believe that African peacekeeping can be built "on the cheap". Regional or bilateral providers of assistance should keep this in mind and UN DPKO should provide relevant technical advice.

72.   As a further advance in initiating operations, in late 2004 the UN Secretary-General proposed that Member States consider the establishment of a Strategic Reserve for peace operations. This would take the international community a step beyond reliance on Brindisi for equipment, and a step beyond the existing UN Stand-by Arrangements System in terms of enhancing overall readiness. The Reserve, as proposed, would consist of several "task forces of some 1,250 troops each. Each task force would be a combined-arms force with enabling units, capable of sustained operations."[72] Each task force would be pre-cleared by its own government for rapid deployment to support a "predetermined mission." In principle, such a reserve force could be drawn from regional formations that could be dual-hatted to support either a regional operation or a UN operation. Such formations might include either the continental or regional elements of the African Standby Force, one or more EU Battlegroups, or elements of the NATO Response Force. Close cooperation and advance planning between DPKO, the troop contributing nations and the relevant regional authorities would of course be required.

Sustaining Operations

73.   Sustained logistic support to field operations is expensive and complicated to manage. UN DPKO has increased resource efficiency through standing systems contracts with commercial suppliers and by initiating cooperation between peacekeeping operations deployed in the same region.[73] Although regional-level strategic direction remains beyond reach at present, the UN's operations in West Africa, by sharing logistics resources, equipment and administrative support, have produced a cost-effective model that could be applied elsewhere, by UN and other organizations as appropriate. Alternatively, other systems of logistic support for field operations exist based upon military and civilian support experiences. The UN needs to

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[72]   *Report of the Secretary General* (A/59/608, dated 15 Dec 2004), para.15-18.
[73]   *Ibid*, para 65-68.

discuss various logistic support options with regional organizations so as to optimize complementary and effective sustainment of responses.

74.   Some regional organizations have suggested that the UN's logistic base at Brindisi (or a forward-deployed element of it) could also support regional deployments. The UN High-Level Panel recommended that Member States agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment support from UN owned resources to regional operations, as needed. However, the suggestion did not receive full support at the World Summit. An alternative is for regional organizations to establish their own regional logistic support bases, or to rely on a lead nation or other actor support to assume this responsibility. The establishment and management of the UN's SDS in Brindisi should provide valuable lessons learned about the management and sustainment of stocks to support peace operations which could be applied to the establishment of regional logistic depots and stocks if this concept is adopted. If a regional equipment stock is to contain military-pattern vehicles and equipment, however, there would arise the question of which pattern, the cost of training would-be peacekeepers to use it, and the cost of maintaining their proficiency if the equipment storage is in a different country. One approach is to link such equipment stocks to ongoing bilateral funding and training programs such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).[74]

Financing Operations and Financial Assistance

75.   The actual funding of peace operations is an area where more cooperation and coordination between regional organizations, the UN and donors must occur. Peace operations are expensive and to be initiated in a timely manner and to remain effective over time, they require a sound financial basis. Regional organizations that intend to establish and manage peace operations should therefore establish realistic budgets to maintain such capabilities and fund their deployments, including effective mechanisms to ensure that future financial commitments are able to be met. To this end, the Member States of the organization must be encouraged to support the establishment of these capabilities with regular financial contributions.

76.   The current development of African capacities will not only enhance capabilities for peace operations in Africa, but also for African States continuing valuable contributions to wider UN peace operations efforts. It should not be seen as an excuse to accelerate non-African disengagement from UN peacekeeping. There is a risk that "first class" and "second class" peacekeeping standards would arise, as the resources at the disposal of Western nations are incomparably larger than those of the rest of the world. As one example, it is estimated that NATO and the UN spent an average of $3.5 billion per year on Bosnia-Herzegovina alone between

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[74]   *G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capacity for Peace Support Operations,* issued 10 June 2004, available at www.g8usa.gov/documents.htm.

1995 and 2003. In comparison, only \$2.38 billion was made available for all seven UN missions in Africa in 2004.[75] Member States and the international community in general may wish to reflect further upon such apparent imbalances.

77.   Even when the AU reaches its goal in setting up its five ASF brigades, the total number of troops it will be able to mobilize will not exceed 25,000, perhaps 30,000. This is only a fraction of the total number needed to keep and restore the peace in Africa. Seen in budgetary terms, the discrepancy is even wider: with a planned budget of US\$ 1009,8 million, the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) dwarfs the US\$ 75 million budgeted by the AU for peace and security in 2005.[76] An increased African capacity therefore does not mean an end to the need for a broad UN presence on the continent. Experience so far has been of short term stop-gap African missions later replaced by larger, more comprehensive UN operations. Although the AU/REC Roadmap puts great stress on the sustainability of operations, it indicates that costing requirements will be made for missions of "an average… timeframe of between one and two years", whereas many peacekeeping operations last for five years at a minimum. The Roadmap notes, however, that one or two years "is long enough a period for the follow-on deployment of a UN mission or operation…". It also contemplates "more limited operations in support of peace processes of between six months and one year only".[77]

78.   Fully aware of both the imperative to develop the regional dimensions and the risks involved in taking this too far, the High Level Panel (and supported by the UN Secretary General's *In Larger Freedom* report) has made practical recommendations aiming to reconcile the principle of universality with the regional dimensions. Where regional operations are authorized by the UN Security Council, an option should be made available, under the rules of the United Nations peacekeeping budget, on a case-by-case basis to finance these operations with assessed contributions. This proposal may not have been ripe at the time of the World Summit, however, in the long term, UN Member States, working through the appropriate UN bodies, may need to elaborate on the challenges and possibilities on mechanisms to allow regional organizations to draw on a UN assessed budget to carry out peace operations mandated by the Security Council, on a case by case basis. This option must, of necessity, entail a certain degree of conditionality and external oversight on the use of the funds for those regional arrangements that will want to take advantage of it.

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[75]   Cyrus Samii, "Peace Operations in Africa: Capacity, Operations and Implications", Report from the 34th annual Vienna Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Seminar, Vienna, July 2004
[76]   Jakkie Cilliers, "UN Reform and funding peacekeeping in Africa", *African Security Review,* 14(2), Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, May 2005.
[77]   ASF Road Map, para 28.

79.   Finally, support has come in the form of the European Union's Peace Facility for Africa, which has pledged 250 million euros for institution-building and logistical capacity building related to peace operations. At their Evian Summit in June 2003, G8 leaders endorsed a Joint G8/African Union plan to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace operations and in particular to support development of the AU's African Standby Force. At their Sea Island conference one year later, G8 members agreed to tackle the most severe shortcomings in troop, logistic support and transportation capacity for global peacekeeping, endorsing the US-proposed "Global Peace Operations Initiative," which is intended to train and equip approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010, with a sustained focus on Africa, in particular.[78] Moreover, the G8 Summit in Gleneagle in 2005 made a priority of mobilizing support for the African initiative to further enhance its peacekeeping capabilities. These and other contributions need to be properly coordinated and made complementary in close dialogue between the receiving Member States, regional organizations, the donors and the UN.

Observations, Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations

80.   This chapter generally deals with matters at the strategic and operational levels, where policies are made, decisions are taken, and operations are implemented by collective mechanisms such as the UN system and regional organizations. However, this report is aimed at securing the support of Member States for enhancing such organizations' capacities to conduct more effective and efficient peace operations. Each of the recommendations in this chapter, while often presented as a challenge to collective bodies, should also be seen in the light of a challenge to Member States to promote these recommendations within the UN system and within the respective regional organizations. In particular, Member States need to work at political levels with the leadership of the organizations, at a working level with their respective secretariats, and in a national representational context within working committees of these organizations, to pursue improvements in the areas discussed in this chapter and summarized below. This chapter has highlighted, in particular, the need for enhanced communication, consultation, liaison and sharing of information. The UN and regional organizations require, to the extent possible and practicable, to promote common strategic approaches and doctrine in peace operations. This should lead to a greater harmonization of operational concepts and procedures amongst all of the principal contributors to peace operations, in particular with respect to mission handover. International efforts could be further strengthened if there was a coherent and coordinated international financial and logistic support to regional organizations seeking to strengthen their involvement in peace operations, in particular the African Union.

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[78]   *G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capacity for Peace Support Operations*, issued 10 June 2004, available at www.g8usa.gov/documents.htm.

81.   Member States are encouraged to provide political, materiel and financial support, as appropriate, in pursuit of the following recommendations developed in this chapter:

Cooperation and Coordination between the UN and Regional Organizations

1. The full contribution by Member States, military, police, civilian, and financial, to UN-authorised regional peace operations should be clearly identified. These contributions should be recognized and effectively credited in any general compilation of Member States' contributions to peace operations.

2. To ensure an effective and complementary relationship between the UN and regional organizations, regional organizations and their Member States should establish joint consultative mechanisms and memoranda of understanding with the UN and meet formally with the UN on a regular basis.

3. The United Nations and regional organizations that deploy personnel to peace operations should petition their Member States for adequate budget resources to set up and to staff liaison offices with experienced personnel. UN-regional liaison needs and plans should be the subject of appropriate inter-organisational memoranda of understanding.

4. All regional arrangements should examine the benefits of exchanging liaison staff with other regional organizations, as appropriate.

5. Hosts and organizers of lessons learned and best practices seminars, especially when initiated on a national basis, are encouraged to consider both the external and internal benefits arising from such activities and to provide funded spaces for deserving external contributors.

6. The UN, regional organizations and Member States should establish a regular process for developing and exchanging benchmarks as measures of effectiveness for the civilian, police and military components after a mission is completed (or steady state achieved) or contributing forces and personnel have exited.

7. Regional arrangements should recognize the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as the principal focal point for coordination of peacebuilding activities and should be invited to participate, as relevant, in the work of the PBC.

8. Member States should encourage the UN and regional organizations to facilitate the development of compatible guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for effective transitions between UN and non-UN peace operations, in close consultation with states and organizations that have experience in such transitions and building on lessons learned and best practices.

Capacity-Building in Regional Organizations

9. To accelerate the development of effective headquarters staffs of developing regional organizations, the United Nations and others should assist in training essential planning and other staff elements and assist in the creation of appropriate regional standby procedures to complement those being developed in the UN civilian, military and police standby arrangements.

10. The United Nations, as a logical focal point for coordinated guidelines, doctrine and policy for peace operations, is encouraged to accelerate the development of these materials, in close consultation with its troop, police and civilian contributors, and to distribute them widely. Regional organizations are encouraged to develop guidance and doctrine in turn that facilitate operations with the UN and to hold regular consultations on doctrine with the UN.

11. The UN and other regional arrangements providing support to the AU should attempt to draw maximum benefit from UN guidelines, inasmuch as the AU/RECs Roadmap indicates that ASF doctrine should be "consistent with that of the UN" whilst "complemented by African specificity".

12. UN guidelines on gender issues in peacekeeping and the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse should be considered as the minimum standards applicable universally and be incorporated in the doctrine of all regional organizations intending to carry out peace operations.

13. Regional organizations should consider basing their equipment requirements on agreed UN documents and consider how to address issues of deficiencies that may arise in accepting these standards in UN missions.

14. The competent bodies of the UN (GA, ACABQ, Fifth Committee) should seriously investigate the possibility of making strategic deployment stocks (SDS) available for African operations.

15. Regional organizations that intend to establish and manage peace operations should establish realistic budgets to maintain such capabilities and fund their deployments, including effective mechanisms to ensure that future financial commitments are able to be met.

16. The UN Member States, working through the appropriate UN bodies, should seek agreement on mechanisms to allow regional organizations to draw on the UN assessed budget to carry out peace operations mandated by the Security Council, on a case by case basis.

Cooperation and Coordination — Rule of Law

"This country has many laws and many judges, but it does not have the rule of law. Every citizen in this country knows that our laws are too often flouted or ignored, and that when prosecution occurs, justice is rarely served"

Authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Report to the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board 2002[79]

Introduction

1. The rule of law is the keystone in the creation of the virtuous circle that peace operations seek to achieve, promoting a secure environment that makes economic or political progress possible, which will in turn facilitate the deepening and sustainment of rule of law. States, the United Nations, regional organizations, and international organizations recognize the important role that the rule of law plays both in establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of peace operations and in successfully completing their mandates.[80]

2. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report on rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies defined rule of law as a concept which refers:

> to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.[81]

3. Various aspects of the rule of law were addressed during Phase I of the Challenges Project.[82] Building on this discussion during Phase II of the project, seminar

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[79] Cited by Mehmet Kemal Bozay, Ankara Challenges Seminar, November 2003.
[80] The UN SC has authorized UN peace operations with rule of law mandates. See, eg, Kosovo (S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999); East Timor (S/RES/1272, 25 October 1999); Liberia (S/RES/1509, 19 September 2003); Côte d'Ivoire (S/RES/1528, 27 February 2004); Haiti (S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004); Burundi (S/RES/1545, 21 May 2004).
[81] Report of the Secretary-General, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, S/2004/616, 3 August 2004, para 6.
[82] *See Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century — Concluding Report 1997–2002 (2002)* pp. 61–73. It focused primarily on dealing with legal ambiguities, domestic regulation, the use of force, interim justice, doctrinal challenges and the role of the police in the service of peace. See also individual seminar reports, for example, the Tokyo Challenges Seminar Report (2001), the legal regime of providing protection and security of peacekeepers and associated personnel was discussed and generated input to deliberations in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Chapter V in the Report of the Secretary-General, 1 June 2001.

participants have addressed and highlighted rule of law issues relevant to: the legal framework of peace operations; law in a cultural context; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; the application of criminal law; policing; the conduct of military forces; human rights; accountability; and issues arising during transitional administration and assistance. Also considered were the issues of counter-terrorism and laws applicable thereto; how the military can contribute to a 'culture of protection' in peace operations; the use of international stability police units to establish and maintain public security; and issues relating to transitional justice.[83] Challenges Partner Organizations have also taken practical initiatives to further strengthen the application of the rule of law to peace operations such as establishing a networked database.[84]

4.   While recognizing that many of the above-noted rule of law issues affect the creation, management and ultimate success of peace operations, this chapter will focus on primarily two of these areas: (1) the best means of operationalizing rule of law objectives and achieving rule of law outcomes, particularly in relation to the key aspects of policing, prisons, judicial capacity and law reform and (2) accountability. The chapter recognizes the fundamental importance of developing better cooperation and coordination in peace operations among and between international actors and local stakeholders to ensure that the rule of law is institutionalized in the host nation in a manner that builds local capacity, ensures justice, and fills the rule of law vacuum. The report also recognizes the need for international cooperation and coordination to address the fundamental importance of holding international actors involved in peace operations legally accountable for their actions and their failure to act.

5.   In order do address the foregoing areas of focus, with an emphasis on cooperation and coordination, this chapter examines, first, recent developments in the rule of law field; second, some key rule of law factors relevant to cooperation and coordination in peace operations, and to managing rule of law issues in the field; and third, the role of accountability in the success of peace operations. The final section summarizes recommendations that are made in this chapter.

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83   See Annex 3 for Challenges Seminar Presentations relevant for Chapters 1-4. See also Bruce Oswald, 'The Rule of Law on Peace Operations: A Cornerstone of Effective Peace Operations', primarily based on the Melbourne Challenges Seminar, in Langholtz, Kondoch and Wells (eds) (2004) *International Peace Keeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*.
84   Under the leadership of the United States Institute of Peace and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada in cooperation with Challenges Project Partners, the UN, OSCE, and the EU, the 'International Network to Promote the Rule of Law' (INPROL) was established in 2005. The aim of the Network is to facilitate exchange among rule of law practitioners serving in field missions, their counterparts who have previously served, and prominent experts, to encourage the sharing of best practices and application of lessons learned. It has also been suggested that a legislative database proposal that was made in the Phase I Report, be integrated into INPROL.

Recent Developments in Rule of Law and Peace Operations

Responsibility to Protect

6.   The World Summit celebrating the 60th Anniversary of the United Nations provided an opportunity for the international community to recognize and endorse the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect'. As argued by the 'High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change', every State has a responsibility to protect its citizens from gross violations of human rights and 'when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community'.[85] The doctrine of the responsibility to protect should be further developed through the use of treaties, legislation, State endorsements, commentaries, agreements and arrangements.

7.   It has been argued that the consent of the host nation authorities should not be considered an absolute and definitive feature of peace operations, and that the requirement for peacekeepers to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger stems from the perspective of maintaining the legitimacy of the peace operation through results, rather than the 'consent of the parties'. This would recognize that international responsibility to the local population is in some situations higher than accountability to the warring factions in the host nation, which has much to commend it both from a doctrinal and a humanitarian perspective. In a number of peace operations, there has been an absence of a functional State apparatus and therefore no question of achieving consent of "host nation authorities". Member States, the Security Council and appropriate regional organizations should recognize their accountability to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter by ensuring that peacekeepers are given suitable mandates and adequate resources so as to enable them to better protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger.

Legal Frameworks

8.   At the institutional level, for a number of years, the UN has focused on the application of legal principles to the planning, management and conduct of peace operations. This focus is reflected in a number of standards, policies and statements such as the Secretary General's Report on the Rule of Law; his follow on response to the High Level Panel Report on UN reform; his 'Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law'; the 'Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets'; the UN's policy towards third party liability against the UN resulting or arising from peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN; the application of the 'Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel' of 1994; and the inclusion in the mandates of peace operations of

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[85]   Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (2004) pp 66–7.

special protection and assistance provisions for groups requiring particular attention, including women and children.[86] It should also be noted that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is developing packages for training military peacekeepers in the application of the rule of law, specifically human rights law, to peace operations. The Directives on prohibiting sexual harassment, and those dealing with disciplinary measures,[87] are welcome additions to DPKO's efforts to ensure that civilian and military peacekeepers are held accountable for their behaviour on peace operations and were recently complemented by 'A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', henceforth referred to as the 'Zeid Report', and its policy recommendations.[88]

9.   The follow-on to the 'Zeid Report' has included the establishment of a 'Group of Experts' pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 59/300 of 22 June 2005, to examine more carefully the means of ensuring accountability including whether an international convention in this respect would be feasible. In addition, at the time of writing, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is working with DPKO on new protocols for investigations and a proposal for 'National Investigations Officers' to be provided by Troop Contributing Countries to support OIOS investigations. The object would be to ensure both the close cooperation from the States and contingents involved and success in any resulting prosecutions.

Institutional Developments

10.   At the time of writing, the concept for the UN Standing Police Capacity involves a pilot proposal for a small team of 25 personnel, to be launched by July 2006, that would focus on planning and starting up a police component of new UN policing operations and also assist existing operations with police reform and host state capacity building. It would work to ensure an integrated approach to the policing, judiciary and corrections dimensions of operations. If the pilot programme proves successful, the UN may seek approval for a larger team of 100-150 personnel, comparable to what was recommended in the report of the High Level Panel.[89]

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[86]   Ibid.; UN SG *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All*, 21 March 2005, UN Doc A/59/2005; Secretary-General's Bulletin, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999,'Third-Party Liability: Temporal and Financial /limitations', A/RES/52/247, 17 July 1998; and the Secretary-General's reports A/51/389, 20 September 1996, and A/51/903, 21 May 1997; See also S/RES/1502, 26 August 2003; S/RES/1265, 17 September 1999, para 13, S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000, S/RES/1460, 30 January 2003.
[87]   UN DPKO, DPKO/MD/03/00995; DPKO/CPD/DSHCPO/2003/002. DPKO, DPKO/MD/03/0093; and DPKO/CPD.DDCPO/2003/001, DPKO.MD.03/00994
[88]   UN Doc A/59/710, 24 March 2005.
[89]   Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (2004) para 223, pp. 70-71.

11.   As the challenges of rule of law issues in peace operations have become more apparent, also regional efforts are under way to develop capacities in this area. Some examples of regional developments include the EU Action Plan for the Civilian Aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy, endorsed by the European Council in June 2004, and which was followed up with a Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2004. The conference assessed the progress in achieving goals for mobilizing civil capabilities in the areas of policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection and noted that the committed personnel numbers were at 12,000. However, the key question of deployability, readiness or suitability of these personnel is yet unclear.[90]

12.   Driven by the experience of the slowness of mobilizing the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations within the US State Department was set up in 2004, and in May 2005, a plan to develop deployable civilian expertise was launched. Further, to ensure better military support for stabilization operations, the Civil Affairs and Military Police elements were to be enhanced. Similar institutional efforts are occurring in the UK with the formation of the Justice and Rule of Law Team within the Conflict Issues Group of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) within the Department for International Development.[91] Another initiative is the Multinational Interagency Group project (MNIG), which is an international effort to enhance mission planning incorporating NGO, government agencies and the military, including key rule of law issues.[92]

13.   Further, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a multi-lateral, five year programme launched by the USA and later endorsed by the G8.[93] Most of the GPOI funding is intended for Africa related initiatives, although activities have been expanded to include the Asia Pacific region. GPOI focuses on training and to a lesser degree necessary equipment. The training is founded on UN guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures. The concept targets police and "gendarmerie" in addition to military capabilities. To this end GPOI has already been used to support the establishment of the Police training facility at Vicenza in Italy.

Developments in the Field

14.   The rule of law as a central objective has been incorporated into a number of missions, where the UN mission has been mandated to support existing struc-

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[90]   European Security Review, Number 25, March 2005.
[91]   PCRU are producing a series of guidance modules on rule of law issues, which will include issues of Police, Prisons, Courts, Security Sector Reform and Customs.
[92]   Participants include Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, NATO, the UK and the US. The preliminary objective of the project is to design a model Concept of Operations to guide MNIG planning. See US Joint Forces Command Fact Sheet January 2005 for a summary of MNIG at http://www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/601/MNIG%20Fact%20Sheet%2007Jan05%20_2_.pdf
[93]   G8 leaders endorsed the concept at their 2004 Summit. The programme amounts to some US$660 million.

tures and processes, and, in more rare occasions, undertake an executive role. On any given mission there will be specific issues and grievances that need immediate rule of law targeting to achieve the short term security that will enable the remainder of the mission objectives to be met. One example of grievance and tension in peace operations has been disputes over property title on a large scale, due to dislocation, transmigration or confiscation. Dispute resolution mechanisms to address this dimension are vital to removing sources of grievance and tension that can undermine communal support to building a rule of law culture. Perhaps overarching all these considerations and suggested by them is the care that must be taken to provide a proper mandate for rule of law issues in the first instance. This will ensure not only the legitimacy of rule of law initiatives, but serve as a rallying point for drawing the necessary funding and resource support.

15.   The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone is focused on its human rights monitoring, training and capacity-building activities for security agencies and civil society.[94] Similarly, the UN mission in Liberia established a 'Rule of Law Implementation Committee' to coordinate the reform of police, the judiciary and correctional institutions.[95] The 'Rule of Law Task Force Tracking Coordination' in the Office of the High Representative, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is another example where a mechanism for cooperation and coordination in relation to the rule of law has been set up within a mission. This Task Force coordinates its members work and deals with issues including judicial reform, law enforcement, law reform and human rights. Such mechanisms are essential for ensuring that rule of law objectives are adequately addressed. Consideration should be given as to how to further the development of holistic mechanisms for managing rule of law objectives in peace operations.

Key Factors of Rule of Law

Type of Mandate – Executive or in Support

16.   The complexity of the rule of law challenge in peace operations affects the civilian and military components equally and depends to a large extent on the mission context. This can involve environments where there is a total absence of a functioning rule of law apparatus and culture, to one where there is merely a requirement to support or remedy particular points of weakness. To match these differing circumstances there may be a Security Council mandate that provides full executive authority or there may only be a mandate to provide support to an existing government. Where the mandate is limited to the provision of support, it will be essential to agree upon a proper framework specifying relationships, authorities and undertakings. An example of how this may be achieved is the regional peace

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[94]   Secretary-General's Report S/2004/536, 6 July 2004, paras 31–40.
[95]   Secretary-General's Report S/2004/430, 26 May 2004, para 25.

operation to assist the Solomon Islands known as RAMSI.[96] There, a Memorandum of Understanding was executed with the host government defining the rule of law support and authority for the deployed police and military. This was reinforced by the introduction of legislation by the host government.

17.   The spectrum of conflict to post-conflict circumstances and the status of the deployed force will also determine the nature of the legal framework within which the mission operates. Where the mission is one to which the full array of International Humanitarian Law applies, there will be a range of obligations, authorities, limitations and considerations. Other critical legal framework factors will include International Human Rights Law, Security Council Resolutions, the national laws governing troop contributing countries and the national law of the area of operations.[97]

Cooperation and Coordination between Organizations

18.   Legal planning factors also include those arising from the framework for consultation between the UN and other organization(s) conducting the peace operation; arrangements for the provision of diplomatic and operational support to such operations; arrangements for the conduct of combined, joint and integrated operations[98] by and co-deployment of United Nations and other such forces; standards for training and planning of operations; and mechanisms for accountability for organizations and personnel of Member States, the host nation and other international and national institutions. These are all areas where relevant principles of the rule of law should be taken into account. For example, UN-authorized actions taken by regional organizations or non-UN commanded coalition forces dealing with threats to international peace and security need to be in accord with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

19.   Finally, as the UN Secretary-General has highlighted, it has been demonstrated that the diverse nature of the application of the rule of law in peace operations requires that:

> donors, peace missions and the United Nations system commit themselves
> to working jointly with each other in a collective effort led by key actors
> of the civil society and Government concerned. Mere information sharing

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[96]   Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. The RAMSI mission was designed to bolster rule of law capacity in the Solomon Islands and to defuse a spiralling internal conflict. It was comprised of personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, Vanuatu and Nauru who were deployed on 24 July 2003 at the invitation of the Government of the Solomon Islands. It is police led with military support, but is also supported by components working to strengthen the prisons, judiciary, legislation and good governance aspects.

[97]   Report of the Secretary-General, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, S/2004/616, 3 August 2004, para 9.

[98]   Combined operations are those involving multinational forces; joint operations refer to land, air and maritime coordination, while a mission with mixed military and civilian organizations, personnel, and assets constitutes integrated operations. Each of these pose their own unique legal considerations.

is not enough. Rather, all partners should work through a common national assessment of needs, capacities and aspirations and a common national programme of transitional justice, justice reform and rule of law development.[99]

Managing Rule of Law Issues in Peace Operations

"Our analysis has identified a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. That this was not included in the Charter of the United Nations is no surprise since the work of the United Nations in largely internal conflicts is fairly recent. But today, in an era when dozens of States are under stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly."

Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,* December 2004[100]

20.   International efforts to promote the rule of law will be obstructed and flawed where there is a fusion of criminal and political interests. Dispelling large scale corruption, impunity and extremist domination of the rule of law institutions and entrenching the independence of organs such as the judiciary will lay the foundation for a self-sustaining local capacity. There will be various aspects to breaking this spoiler nexus including the use of specialized units, such as the MSU. Missions should address the source of grievances that are exploited by bad actors or spoilers to mobilize sectors or elements of the community. It may also be necessary to use international personnel to provide trial capabilities that are immune to intimidation.

21.   Effectively addressing the sources, not just the symptoms, of inter-group violence and obstruction of the peace process entails a number of cooperation and coordination challenges. To deal with the threat of violence directed against the peace process or the mission, integrated mission planners must enable an effective human intelligence plan based on building a sound relationship with the community, addressing its grievances and offering security from intimidation by would-be spoilers. Above all, perhaps, the local community and its leaders need to understand what it is that the international operation is attempting to do. Thus a public media and education strategy will be a critical component of the international effort to build support for rule of law initiatives and to promote the creation of a rule of law culture. In addition, the local community should have access to mechanisms such as an ombudsman, inspector general, or conduct officer, that will allow them to air grievances against the international operation itself in a secure and confiden-

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[99]   Report of the Secretary-Genera, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,* S/20004/616, 3 August 2004.
[100]   Para 261, p. 83.

tial setting. The need for such a mechanism has been amply demonstrated by the sexual abuse scandals erupting in peace operations, most recently with MONUC, which continued in part, because witnesses were reluctant to come forward. The existence and responsiveness of such mechanisms could build public confidence in an operation and in the rule of law that it is trying to promote. Whatever capabilities are introduced by the mission, great care should always be taken to determine the impact on host state institutions and that international and host capabilities are properly dovetailed.

The Interim International Response Capability

22.   Where there are deficiencies in the rule of law in an assisted State and there is a Security Council mandate or obligation to remedy these deficiencies, there may be a need for the international community to provide an interim law enforcement capability. Rule of law specialists, police and military planners should be jointly involved in pre-mission assessments to identify what law enforcement, judicial and penal functions, the civilian, police and military elements will need to perform respectively and when, including the proper legal and logistic management of detainees. The UN Integrated Mission Planning Process should include a rule of law planning check list and should assess the context of a proposed operation for legal and cultural considerations, for the scope of deficiencies likely to be encountered and for key points of intervention that may be required. Peace operations planners need a broad operational concept to help them identify, for any given strength and breadth of mandate, those that can be performed by host state authorities with international monitoring as appropriate, those that will be shared with host state authorities and, when faced with an executive Security Council mandate, those rule of law functions that will be the responsibility of the international community on an interim basis.

Challenges in the Public Security Dimensions: Police, Judicial, and Correctional

23.   The main roles that police components are required to perform include supervision of local police forces, monitoring their human rights adherence, mentoring and training. However, key lessons of recent peace operations experience have further reinforced that it is necessary to develop local capacity not merely for policing, but also in relation to the judiciary and penal system, and to assist the legal system to meet internationally recognized standards. This includes the importance of clearly defining the undertakings, authorities and framework for rule of law cooperation in such situations.

24.   Further, the difficulties of being unarmed and having no executive authority with regard to law enforcement, supervision or reform, was demonstrated in

the experience of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia. As a consequence, the subsequent UN Mission in Kosovo Civilian Police component (UNMIK CIVPOL) was given law enforcement authority and the mission in general was authorized to legislate, reform and control appointment and removal of officials under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

25.   Increasingly, the policing aspect has attracted significant attention and much effort has been made to deploy effective police components. One difficulty with this area of capability has been raising sufficient numbers as police are generally fully engaged at home and there is no "spare" or deployable capacity. Elements that may be contributed are sometimes of a non-communal policing type such as border police, and they may lack the type of policing skills required. Further, assembling police from diverse legal traditions and frameworks into another context is fraught with difficulties from the perspective of achieving successful prosecutions in accordance with the law of the assisted State.

26.   The development of a UN Standing Police Capacity will ease some of this problem, and other initiatives include the establishment of international police training centres in Hungary and Italy and a UN Prison and Probation Officers Course. Another example is the establishment of a police training facility focusing on operations in a regional context and suggesting a possible model for regional capacity building.[101] However, much remains to be done.

27.   Once in the field, the training of police to assume executive policing roles and to cope with the specific operational setting is critical and should be sustained throughout a deployment with a rolling programme of training during the mission.

28.   Member States are encouraged to support and contribute to both the UN's Standing Police Capacity project and an effective stand-by arrangements system that contains rosters of individuals (including the range of policing specialties as well as judges, magistrates, investigative judges, lawyers, administrative and corrections personnel) who can be called upon for operations, together with an effective police/rule of law training programme.

29.   With regard to crowd control there is a need to develop a rapidly deployable international capacity for specialist units with this capability, as this requires particular skills and equipment which are often needed in the early phases of an operation.[102] If the peace operation requires substitution for absent or inadequate local policing in a high threat environment, then the burden for restoring and main-

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[101]   International Deployment Group (IDG) is an Australian initiative and was launched in February 2004.
[102]   An example is the situation of the unarmed IPTF component in Bosnia described earlier. The attempts to exploit this situation by organized riotous mobs was eventually managed by the use of a Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) trained and equipped for non-lethal crowd control. This lesson was carried over to KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo and an MSU capability was incorporated in the mission.

taining public order will generally be shared with the military component. Consideration should be given to the inclusion of police into military observer activities and patrols to facilitate the securing of probative evidence. This requires careful coordination and clear provision for the legal standards and framework that will be applied. Where peacekeepers have responsibility for supervising local law enforcement, their mandate should provide adequate authority to enforce the law where local authorities are unable or unwilling to do so.

30.   Judicial support may include a monitoring, mentoring or training role. It may involve sitting in ad hoc tribunals to deal with the major cases, sitting as part of a mixed panel with local judges or, in the worst case scenario as was faced in East Timor, providing the entire trial capability. Mobilizing judges capable of performing these functions in the context of the operation can be extremely difficult. To be better prepared to do this effectively would ideally require the prior identification of volunteer judges, magistrates, investigative judges or lawyers who could perform these roles.

31.   Other areas receiving less attention relate to prison and probation officers, and the provision or rehabilitation of prison facilities. With regard to local prison administration, the difficulty is a human rights record and standards that are commonly poor. In the worst case, the detention system may even have been the main instrument in a systematic human rights abuse. This implies that international intervention may have to come prepared to provide the personnel to monitor/supervise/operate places of incarceration. It has regularly been demonstrated that trained and deployable prison and probation officers will be as important as their police and judicial counterparts. A disproportionate prisoner to prison officer ratio can generate a particularly hostile environment and difficult situations.

32.   Quite often the facilities available for incarceration are below the minimum international requirement either through conflict damage or because they were never intended to meet those standards. This has often suggested a need for an engineering capacity to rebuild or improve facilities. Another possible option is to provide portable facilities for interim incarceration.[103] Peace operations have often included a mandate to exercise some degree of detention authority. What has often been lacking, however, is a proper assessment and provision of the logistic and personnel impact of such a mandate. If the local prison capacity is insufficient or unsuitable to support this operational task, the international response will need to include not only the means to address the physical challenge, but the requirement to provide medical and sustenance support for detainees. Coordination with agencies such as the ICRC will be critical in this respect.

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[103]   This could be in the form of pre-prepared shipping containers, tentage or equivalent rapid erection materials with the required security/defence/support stores such as wire, floodlighting, generators, bath units, non-lethal control equipment.

33.   There have been recent developments in the preparation of international guidelines for prison officers on peace operations by the UN and a proposal for a UN Prison and Probation Officers Course (UNPriPOC) was launched.[104] Another initiative aims at establishing a national pool of rapidly deployable prison and probation officers.[105] Member States should develop and make available rapidly deployable capacities in all fields of expertise relevant to the successful conduct and outcome of a peace operation including the rapid deployment of prison and probation officers.

Local Capacity-Building for the Rule of Law

34.   Institutionalizing the rule of law in an assisted State may involve: helping to establish mechanisms for addressing war crimes and other atrocities; developing the capacity of the national legal system as a whole, depriving spoilers of their accustomed impunity; erecting "good governance" safeguards against corruption and malpractice; and building a rule of law culture. The transition to local ownership for rule of law should be linked primarily, but not exclusively, to the development of local skills.

Transitional justice

35.   Transitional justice has often been discussed in the context of dealing with the crimes of the past, rather than future capacity-building, but the two issues are inseparable. Dealing with the crimes of the past will set the tone and lay the foundation for the development of the rule of law and if handled well can be a vital tool for, and component in, developing or improving local capacity. Unfortunately, attempts to deal with past crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda focused only on that task and, while significant resources were channeled into it, local capacity floundered and drew proportionally little support.

36.   Mechanisms to address war crimes and other atrocities are important both to fight impunity, and to create an opportunity for healing the victims and the society at large. Among the principal mechanisms that can be used for this purpose are international tribunals (such as the International Criminal Court, and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), hybrid international-domestic tribunals (such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone), local/national (in terms of the judicial panel) ad hoc tribunals, which are internationally supported (such as the Iraqi Special Tribunal) and "truth" or "truth and reconciliation" commissions, of which there are many examples throughout the world. Traditional or customary processes as the basis for an expedited and streamlined

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[104]   UNPriPOC course proposal launched at Shrivenham Challenges Seminar, March 2005, Lars Nylen, Swedish National Prison and Probation System, see www.challengesproject.net
[105]   Swedish National Prison and Probation System, discussed at Shrivenham Challenges Seminar, March 2005.

accountability mechanism – such as the Gacaca process now underway in Rwanda, the Adat process in East Timor, the Urf system in Iraq and the Dia system in Somalia – merit further examination and possible support in the context of future peace operations. The concept of transitional criminal codes and codes of procedure is addressed later in this chapter. What will be appropriate for particular situations in the future will depend on such issues as capacity, political will, and the level of international attention paid to the violations that occur.

A Holistic Approach

37.   An international operation must develop a visibly holistic approach to managing rule of law objectives, in order to ensure the coordination of law enforcement, judicial reform, law reform and human rights, and coordination of the many partners engaged in addressing these issues, as part of an effective mission transition strategy from international to host state responsibility for promoting, institutionalizing and sustaining the rule of law. The need to take such an approach is generally recognized, but the international civilian capability frequently does not exist to put this concept effectively into practice at the inception of a mission. In a mission involving an executive mandate this may, by default, mean that the military component is responsible for establishing public order, providing detention facilities, and even facilitating a rudimentary judicial process. Where no executive mandate exists, there will be a requirement to coordinate effectively with the host government and provide frameworks for the basis of the cooperation. This would include setting out clearly the commitments of the host government. The overriding international imperative, however, is to provide for the worst case scenario and develop the capacity to field the personnel required to begin standing up or rehabilitating law enforcement, the judicial system, and the prisons as swiftly as possible. Capacities developed for the worst case can easily be adapted for lesser levels of support, but the reverse is far more fraught. The key to both scenarios is successful transition to local capacity. The transition process must be planned from the very beginning so that, for example, as police recruits are trained and demonstrate their competence, policing responsibilities can be transferred increasingly to local personnel. The aim of any international support should not be to create replicas of its own home paradigm, but primarily to make itself redundant and to leave a rule of law matrix that will be fully accepted by the assisted State.

38.   There should, therefore, be a mandate and matching capability to enable varying degrees of international intervention and supervision in relation to cases, which are vulnerable to communal or political sensitivities. Similarly, there may be a need for the mission to take responsibility for cases involving violent offences

committed against international personnel of the mission or to establish local ad hoc tribunal to meet these needs with mission support.[106]

39.   Detention issues have proven particularly difficult to manage and have generated a number of instances of unacceptable practices or behaviour. There has been a tendency in all missions to underestimate the logistic and management requirements of this line of operation. In operations where this is an issue, there will be a need, first of all, to lay a proper legal foundation for detention. This will include properly defined policies, the rationales for detention, standards of confinement, relationship to local law, command and control fixing appropriate responsibilities, establishing suitable monitoring mechanisms and providing for the key relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This process will also entail reconciling needs to acquire intelligence with the requirements of human rights standards and criminal processes. A proper estimate in the planning phase of the personnel and logistic requirements is essential. Many breaches of humanitarian and human rights standards stem from a failure in this respect. Operations should consider alternatives to incarceration, such as forms of community service for crimes of less serious threat to security. This could have the added benefit of assisting with the early demands of post-conflict reconstruction. Transparency and accountability are of key importance to ensuring this aspect of operations does not erode the legitimacy of the mission, but fosters the growth of a rule of law culture.

40.   Lawlessness and public disorder are common phenomena of all post-conflict environments. Oftentimes so is inadequate or objectionable criminal legislation that shows the accumulated signs of neglect and political distortion, contains discriminatory elements and/or fails to reflect the requirements of international human rights and criminal law standards.[107] The competent local legislative authority faces a double task of bringing criminal legislation in line with international human rights and criminal law standards, while crafting laws against newer crimes that may be thwarting the transition from conflict to peace. It will be crucial to find ways and means to truly assist and engage with the local community. International missions with executive mandates may have the authority to make such changes themselves, but close relations and partnerships with local actors are still needed, including a necessity to ensure a sustainable development once the mission departs.

41.   When an international mission does have such authority, as in Kosovo (1999-present) and East Timor (2000-2002), an early and fundamental issue involves applicable criminal law. Short of military occupation, which is addressed by the Geneva Conventions, finding and applying the law may be a difficult challenge. Thus, the UN organization governing refugee camps on the Cambodian-Thailand

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[106]   The Central Criminal Court of Iraq created by the Coalition Provisional Authority is one example that led to a permanent capability that was important in the context of the federalizing solution to the rehabilitation of Iraq.
[107]   Report of the Secretary-General, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies* S/2004/616, 3 August 2004, para 27.

border in the late 1980s, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-93), as well as the missions in East Timor, Kosovo, and Iraq, needed to create a workable criminal code or revise at least some elements of the state's existing code in order to carry out their mandates. The process of legal reform in such circumstances has been done to date on an ad hoc basis, as a reaction to immediate crime problems faced by the authorities. Interim criminal law reform can be a lengthy process however, that continues while crime goes unchecked.

42.   Consistent with recommendations made in the Brahimi Report,[108] an informal collaborative effort has been undertaken to generate a useable tool for peace operations with executive mandates, and to create a compendium to which countries—post-conflict or not—interested in bringing domestic law in line with international standards might refer for guidance.[109] Such a tool, even if not applied in its entirety, can serve as a reference for amendments or temporary modifications to the local law. Member States should consider supporting the concept of transitional criminal codes and codes of procedure to be applied ad interim in the mission area if, when and where, appropriate.

43.   Building enduring local capacity may require the coordination of development agencies, donor States, and non-governmental organizations to disperse and share the burden. This will mean creating a coordination mechanism, which includes the host government or, where there is no host government, local good faith actors. Where the military has been required to provide specific rule of law capabilities, it will be important to carefully design the phases of the transition of responsibilities to international civilians, and ultimately to local capacity, including meaningful sign posts and criteria.

Instituting Performance Safeguards

44.   To ensure that public security entities and overall judicial processes actually serve the public interest, respect minority rights, dispense justice equally, and maintain their autonomy from corrupting political forces, effective safeguards must be developed to promote transparency and accountability. The community must have channels for airing their grievances and mechanisms for pursuing effective remedies, measures to ensure the independence of the judiciary must be instituted and good governance supervisory mechanisms introduced with appropriate dismissal and prosecution powers. Measures to ensure a free press will assist in the effort to ensure transparency and fidelity.

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[108]   United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, paras. 76-83.
[109]   The project is a joint effort by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the National University of Ireland, and the United States Institute of Peace. Its aim is to develop a model transitional criminal code and transitional code of criminal procedure, which has been vetted by a large number of international legal scholars around the globe.

45.   It should be recognized that often success in establishing the rule of law in the post-conflict or transitional society context is not just about shaping institutions, but also about promoting a rule of law culture. This should be addressed through public media and dissemination as well as addressing deficiencies in the education system. It should also be accompanied by peace "dividends" that provide incentives and reinforcement to attaining rule of law objectives. Where a peace operation requires cooperation with a host government, there will need to be incentives to encourage its investment in evolving a rule of law culture. This might include linking aid delivery to the attainment of progressive goals. While such a culture is being built, it is essential that effective safeguards with respect to vetting and monitoring are in place to prevent the seeds of distortion taking root and to build local confidence.

46.   In some cases, there may be a need to provide international mechanisms to fill a gap in monitoring and vetting, while the local capacity takes root. As local capacity grows and strengthens, the international mechanism can phase out. This is the difference between providing training programmes and *institutionalizing* the rule of law. The types of measures necessary could include establishing specific review bodies, such as for the judiciary, to root out corrupt and human rights violating officials and ensure suitable appointees. It could also include setting up mechanisms led by an inspector-general or similar authority within government instrumentalities working with an overarching and independent auditing office. To empower the community at large and obtain its enlistment in the effort, an Ombudsman mechanism may be desirable. Through an executive mandate or by negotiation with a host government, such bodies and mechanisms can begin as totally international, be mixed or made up of capable local or expatriate personnel.

47.   When an international operation has a mandate to monitor and vet institutions responsible for the rule of law, it should negotiate with a host government as to how this will occur, or be prepared to implement such arrangements, where there is no host government. In either case, it will be necessary to balance the role and authority of an SRSG against the need to build local governing capacity and to transfer full authority to the national government as soon as possible.

Coordination of the Rule of Law Response

48.   Noting the key issues both of providing interim international capabilities and local capacity building, the question is how can the international community best coordinate and address these issues? Clearly the dimensions the rule of law challenge calls for comprehensive responses. Critical in this respect is the issue of funding. It is vital that in establishing a mission, the rule of law assessment include funding analysis, which should then be addressed either by assessed contributions as part of the operation or by mobilization of development funding specifically for

a rule of law package. It would seem that the only option is to find a means of spreading the burden. Another factor to consider is the cultural and legal diversity of the potential contexts of rule of law crises. With these dynamics in mind, two opportunities in particular seem to be worth exploring at the present time; the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO), and second, building regional peace operations capacity.[110]

Possible Roles of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office

49.   A benefit of the PBC is that it brings together relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. At the time of writing, its membership, structure and institutional relationships within the UN have yet to be resolved, however, consensus has developed that it should serve to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict. There is strong support for it being mandated to provide recommendations and information to improve coordination of all relevant peacebuilding actors, develop best practices and help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, extending the period of international engagement in the recovery effort.[111]

50.   The PSO, residing within the UN Secretariat and formed within existing resources as a small peacebuilding support office, should be staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the PBC. The PBC and PSO could play an important planning and marshalling role with regard to a wide range of international expertise relevant to peacebuilding, could coordinate with the development community, help generate and promote UN-endorsed strategies and best practices for the civilian elements of complex peace operations, and coordinate the scoping and assessment function with regard to those elements for a new peace operation, in cooperation with other relevant actors (such as the World Bank). It could provide integrated peacebuilding input, subsequently, into the UN's Integrated Mission Planning Process. The PBC and PSO could also foster the development of complimentary regional rule of law response capacities. The key rule of law aspects the PBC/PSO mechanism could address include:

- **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration** Bring expertise to bear and mobilize programme support keyed to the social dynamics of the assisted State or States in its regional context.

- **Security Sector Reform** Identify deficiencies in the policing, prisons, gendarmerie, and military structures of the assisted state and mobilize, in coordination

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[110]   High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, December 2004, and the Report of the Secretary General, *In Larger Freedom*, March 2005.
[111]   General Assembly Resolution 60/1 – A/RES/60/1 of 24 October 2005 *World Summit Outcome*.

with the Police Division and Standing Police Capacity in DPKO, and other potential partners and programmes for the gendarmerie and military sectors, such as the EU, NATO and GPOI, the expertise needed to address them. This could include sharing the vetting function with the Police Division, taking responsibility for non-police ROL personnel; and fostering the development of proper responses to detention operation needs and challenges.

- **Transitional Justice** Design concepts for proposal to the assisted state; promote and advise on judicial reform, including vetting and training. This might include the marshalling of international judicial personnel and analysing deficiencies in criminal codes and procedures.

- **Legal, Electoral and Good Governance** Provide or recruit legislative drafting expertise, electoral expertise, develop anti-corruption and accountability "best practice" standards and develop institutional options for mission accountability.

- **Doctrine and Reference** Develop operational guidelines, to serve as a repository for peacebuilding precedents, models of legislation, peace agreements, mandate language options, and other archives.

- **Assessment and Plans** Develop peacebuilding lessons learned in coordination with the DPKO Best Practices Unit, perhaps with field teams, who would bring back 'ground truth' information in cooperation with the international mission and the assisted State; create peacebuilding strategies and plans for new operations, including funding requirements, in coordination with other UN offices, for submission to the Integrated Mission Planning Process.

- **Coordination and Liaison** Facilitate donor and development aid meetings, partly by sharing with donors the products developed by the Doctrine and Reference, and Assessment and Plans roles, especially for peacebuilding efforts not directly associated with mandated peace operations; and facilitate the 'contracting out' of research and operational functions.

- **Human Resources** Develop data bases of experts prepared to commit to short notice stand-by arrangements for field assignments, with supporting tools that might include training and education packages developed in partnership with the UN DPKO Integrated Training Section, Police Division, Standing Police Capacity, and the independent UN Institute for Training and Research.

51.   Member States are encouraged to support the successful development of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office, to further the objectives of rule of law and peacebuilding within multinational peace operations.

Regional Response – Regional Centres of Excellence

52.   The PBC and PSO, together with the international effort being mounted by the EU, AU, G8 and others to develop regional peace operations and peacebuilding capacity, could play an important role in the development of regional rule of law organizational capacity. One example would be the creation of regional Rule of Law Centres of Excellence. Regional centres could bring to bear expert knowledge of the cultural and legal contexts of assisted states and ameliorate regional factors (e.g., facilitating the acceptance of assistance in neighbouring States and cooperating in cross border aspects). These centres could play a strong preventative role as well in fostering good governance and reform options. They could be responsible for the training and mentoring of experts prepared to commit to stand-by arrangements for deployment or provide consultancy support. Member States should consider supporting the development of regional Rule of Law Centres of Excellence.

Accountability within Peace Operations

> "Over the past year, the number of allegations of sexual misconduct against United Nations peacekeeping personnel increased significantly…all measures will be taken to ensure that those responsible are held fully accountable."
>
> UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan
> Report of the Secretary-General on the
> Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on PKO
> 15 December 2004[112]

53.   It is accepted that States, organizations and individuals involved in the creation, management and conduct of peace operations should be accountable for their actions, and on some occasions, their omissions. However, the exact boundaries of this accountability are much more controversial. Consequently, this section seeks to examine these questions, first, to whom States, organizations and individuals are accountable; second, what accountability standards should be set for military, police and civilian peacekeepers, and who should set them; and third, what mechanisms are appropriate to hold the myriad of actors involved accountable.

54.   A definition of accountability states that:
> "Being accountable means explaining one's actions and inactions and being responsible for them. Individuals, organisations and states have to account for their actions. Accountability also means that individuals, organisations and states may safely and legitimately report concerns and complaints and receive redress where appropriate."[113]

55.   Accountability depends on identifying the stakeholders one is responsible to; that stakeholders are entitled to know the standards, which are to be applied to the actions and omissions of States, organizations and individuals; and that stakeholders should know the mechanisms that are in place in order to report concerns and seek appropriate redress for any grievance.

56.   Accountability is fundamentally important if States, organizations and individuals involved in the planning, management and conduct of peace operations wish to maintain their legitimacy and credibility during peace operations. Furthermore, accountability is essential for ensuring that the military and civilian components undertaking peace operations do not break the law and maintain appropriate standards; and that they are held liable for any violations that they commit.

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[112]   *Report of the SG on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation*, (A/59/608) 15 December 2004, p. 18, para. 81.
[113]   Humanitarian Accountability Project, 'Humanitarian Accountability: Key Elements and Operational Framework', 11 October 2001, HAP Index ACC/01/09/2001, as quoted in Jon Cina, Rapporteur Report 'Accountability' in Jessica Howard and Bruce Oswald (eds), *The Rule of Law on Peace Operations: A 'Challenges of Peace Operations' Project Conference* (2003) p. 251.

Accountability Stakeholders

57.   When identifying the legal issues surrounding cooperation and coordination, it is important to understand that depending on the circumstances of the deployment, States, organizations and individuals on peace operations are accountable to, amongst others: the UN and Member States of the UN; regional organizations and Member States of those organizations; other international organizations; host nations; troop contributing States to that particular peace operation; national organizations; non-governmental organizations; and the general population. Accountability in such circumstances can therefore become extremely diffused and confusing as military and civilian peacekeepers, humanitarian agents and contractors try to identify the many relevant organizations and bodies that they can, should or must report to. This often leads to misunderstandings as to responsibility, lack of transparency, and lack of appropriate redress of grievances.

58.   Further, the relative reliability of organizations and individuals serving on the operation for the damages caused to the host nation and its inhabitants is an issue of concern. The UN has, for example, recognized that it is internationally responsible for the activities of UN forces, but has sought to limit that responsibility by stipulating that it is not responsible for damages arising from 'operational necessity' and, in other cases, limiting its liabilities by placing temporal and financial restrictions on third party liability against it. The unfortunate fact is that many organizations involved in the planning, management and conduct of peace operations have not stated their own policies regarding their accountability for damage arising from operational necessity and for third party damage. Even where such policies have been developed, they are rarely disseminated or explained to the local population who are often most likely to seek redress from such organizations for the actions or omissions of military and civilian peacekeepers.

Accountability Standards

59.   The Secretary-General's Bulletin concerning 'Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse' is one example of the UN Secretariat setting a standard for the 'purpose of preventing and addressing sexual exploitation and sexual abuse' on UN peace operations.[114] The most significant development in this respect, however, has been the 'Zeid Report' of 24 March 2005.[115] In this comprehensive document four key issues are highlighted, the UN's system of rules, investigation methods, organizational accountability and individual accountability. The main recommendations are that; the General Assembly authorize the establishment of a professional investigative capacity; TCCs participate in investigations in-

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[114]   Secretary-General's Bulletin, 'Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse', ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October 2003.
[115]   *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* UN Doc A/59/710, 24 March 2005.

volving their troops; TCCs should provide an expert in military law; courts martial be held in-country; curfews and off-limits areas be instituted for mission personnel; uncooperative contingent commanders be repatriated; commitments should be spelled out in the model UN Stand-by Arrangements System Memoranda of Understanding (UNSAS MOU) concerning disciplinary action against suspect contingent members.

60.   In addition to the measures proposed by the Zeid Report, the Partners welcome the review by the UN of its Standard Training Modules (STM) to ensure these issues are adequately covered, and refine them if necessary, and urge that the UNSAS MOU should be amended to include an undertaking to meet STM training standards for personnel conduct. It was suggested that UNTES should include an inspector general who could monitor the adherence to STM standards and provide confidential recommendations to TCCs in this regard.

61.   Member States and international organizations should develop more effective and efficient measures to enhance the accountability of international contractors who provide services, such as logistics, engineering support, technical support and transport to peace operations. The current framework to hold international contractors on peace operations accountable is inadequate because it relies almost solely on the application of the host nation's domestic laws or the contractor fulfilling their contractual obligations. While the UN has standards of conduct for contractors generally, it does not have specific standards for peace operations. In general, there are no clear and effective accountability procedures for contractors. Accepting that this current framework for holding contractors accountable for their behaviour on peace operations is inadequate, Member States, the UN and regional organizations should consider developing general principles and guidelines for employing and managing contractors; a generic or model contract that may be used as a basis for employing and managing contractors, which should include remedial measures for dealing with unsatisfactory conduct by personnel and with any damage or injury that may be caused by them; and a mission specific code of conduct for employing and managing contractors.

62.   When developing measures to hold contractors more accountable, Member States, the UN and regional organizations will need to consider, amongst other things, the extent to which they should 'police' the activities of contractors; the appropriate balance between the 'privileges and immunities' required by contractors to enable them to effectively and efficiently provide services and the requirement for them to observe the laws of the host country; the responsibility of Member States of which contractors are nationals, to ensure they are able to exercise jurisdiction over the acts, and in some cases omissions, of such contractors;[116] and the extent to which the organization employing the contractor should be vicariously responsible

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[116]   The question here is whether States have the legislative basis for dealing with citizens overseas, which varies.

for the acts or omissions of the contractor. Such measures will assist in better governance of contractors by ensuring that rules, principles, standards and norms that are developed are transparent; and that individuals and organizations are provided with effective mechanisms to make complaints and report their concerns regarding the behaviour of contractors, and where appropriate receive redress. Developing and implementing these measures requires effective and efficient cooperation and coordination between Member States, international organizations, professional organizations and contracting firms.

Mechanisms to ensure Accountability

63.   Traditionally the mechanisms used to encourage Member States, organizations and individuals to meet desired standards have included memoranda of understanding,[117] suggested principles and guidelines,[118] Security Council resolutions,[119] and international and municipal courts and tribunals. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms is limited by such issues as the good faith of the parties to the agreements, certainty and clarity, transparency, accessibility, and universal applicability to actors involved on the peace operation.

64.   The development of complex peace operations, the many actors involved in the planning, management and conduct of such operations, and the growing evidence of some of the adverse consequences that arise from the deployment of military and civilian peacekeepers strongly suggest that there is a need to develop more effective and efficient mechanisms of accountability. With regard to accountability of deployed personnel, contingents, agencies and organizations, there should be set in place effective and transparent reporting and monitoring procedures, together with standards, principles and rules against which these mission components may be held accountable.[120] The system of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs or Special Commissions of Inquiry should be extended to cover all peace operations; a standard fact-finding process should be incorporated into all missions to respond to alleged violations; the existing ombudsman and complaints authorities should be enhanced and standardized and an Ombudsman should be instituted for each mission.

65.   The Ombudsman would have the ability to receive and investigate complaints from the local population with regard to non-duty related behaviour and

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[117]   See, eg, *Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations*, dated 5 November 1999.
[118]   See for example, *Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggest Principles and Mechanisms* dated March 1999.
[119]   See, eg, Security Council Resolution 1264 , 15 September 1999, para 12.
[120]   See, eg, S/RES/1353, 13 June 2001, which deals with strengthening cooperation with troop contributing states. See also Report by Prince Zeid of Jordan commissioned by the UN Secretary-General, *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* UN Doc A/59/710 of 24 March 2005, paras 31-36, 68-71 and 78-93.

to pursue independent enquiries into allegations of operational violations such as detainee abuse and culpable misuse of force. This would be accompanied by appropriate safeguards for the identity and rights of members involved and could be reinforced by an inclusion in the UNSAS MOU of a requirement to cooperate with and facilitate the investigations of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman would be authorized to make recommendations concerning the release of persons unjustifiably detained by contingents, the need for further disciplinary investigation, action to be taken to rectify, mitigate or change unacceptable conduct or its consequences, reasons be given for the conduct, any practice relating to the conduct be changed, compensation be paid to any person, or any other appropriate actions be taken. Where the Ombudsman was of the opinion that a member is or may be guilty of misconduct in the course of performing his or her functions to such an extent as may warrant dismissal, removal or punishment, the Ombudsman should be authorized to report the opinion to the Contingent Commander, the Commander of the peacekeeping force and the SRSG, giving reasons for the opinion. Member States should support OIOS proposals to ensure that National Investigations Officers are provided to support and facilitate OIOS investigations.

66.   Each formed contingent to a peacekeeping operation, at battalion size or greater, should establish a dispute resolution or claims unit. Such units could provide a forum for local complaints of damage caused by the contingent, evaluate such claims and if proven, could explore remedial action. This need not be in the form of cash compensation, but could include restoration or clean up work performed by the contingent. The SRSG should also establish a mission complaints unit that could either take claims direct from the community and negotiate for a resolution with the TCC concerned, seek donor aid assistance or to receive referred complaints from a contingent's unit where they do not have the resources to satisfy the complainant. The establishment of a contingency fund to support a mission cell in this respect would also be beneficial.

67.   The causes of behavioural problems should also be addressed. Some of these causes include venting frustration from the tension of the operating environment or lack of productive engagement, economic hardship, and inadequate welfare management. As discussed in the Zeid Report, all peacekeeping forces should be properly supported by a welfare capability to address issues such as psychological counselling, recreation activities, family contact and general welfare counselling. Where it becomes apparent that TCC are not providing financial support to deployed members this must also be addressed to prevent criminal action to supplement or provide income.[121]

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[121]   An example is the experience of one contingent in a peacekeeping force, whose members were forced to resort to an illegal alcohol selling operation as their government had not paid them for a number of months. Other contingents faced with similar problems have engaged in black market trading, extortion and/or fraud.

68.   Other options that should be explored include international licensing regimes for non-governmental actors operating in an area of operations as contractors,[122] and the creation of a permanent international body to accept, examine and/or report on complaints made against international actors serving on peace operations. Finally, Member States should ensure that the issue of accountability in peace operations is integrated into their doctrinal development as well as is fully integrated into relevant curricula for pre-deployment training and education of military, police and civilian peacekeepers. Member States carry a heavy responsibility to uphold international law, and this includes diligently exercising disciplinary responsibilities in peace operations.

Observations, Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations

69.   The rule of law is a crucial element in peace operations. As the mandate for a new mission is developed, it is critical that the correct foundation for rule of law support be laid. Member States, working within the framework of the mission's mandate and in conjunction with all the relevant rule of law actors, need to develop a coordinated capacity to respond to both the absence of rule of law and to a lack of capability or willingness on the part of host state authorities to uphold the law during a peace operation. At a minimum, rule of law issues should be thoroughly integrated into the mission planning process and into canvassing for donor and development support. The extent of executive authority vested in the mandate should be made clear, as should the obligations on the host nation government and the mission's relationship to it. The rule of law must be upheld, ultimately, by capable local authorities. Member States should, through the UN and/or an appropriate regional organization, contribute meaningfully to institutionalising the rule of law in failed or weakened states through the coordinated contribution of training programmes, ROL experts, financial assistance, equipment and the joint development of laws, an ROL structure, and regional ROL centres of excellence. In promoting and building or rebuilding the rule of law within an affected state, and in the conduct of peace operations in general, the international community should be fully accountable for its actions. Within the framework of the UN and/or regional organizations, Member States remain accountable at three levels: to the peacekeepers in the provision of achievable mandates and tasks; to the overall success of the mission through the provision of adequately prepared, equipped and resourced capabilities; and to the people of the mission locality in relation to the conduct of deployed personnel.

70.   Consolidating peace and stability requires a coordinated effort and procedures. Member States should actively support the rapid development of the Peace-

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[122]   As suggested by the United Kingdom: to 'assist in distinguishing between reputable and disreputable private sector operators.' Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), Press Release, 12 February 2002.

building Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office, and similar concepts at the regional level that can focus on DDR, SSR, transitional justice, governance issues and the coordination of international funding for such efforts.

1. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect should be further developed through the use of treaties, legislation, State endorsements, commentaries, agreements and arrangements.

2. Member States, the Security Council and appropriate regional organizations should recognize their accountability to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter by ensuring that peacekeepers are given suitable mandates and adequate resources so as to enable them to better protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger.

Managing Rule of Law Issues in Peace Operations

3. A public media and education strategy will be a critical component of the international effort to build support for rule of law initiatives and to promote the creation of a rule of law culture.

4. The local community should have access to mechanisms such as an ombudsman, inspector general, or conduct officer, that will allow them to air grievances against the international operation itself in a secure and confidential setting.

5. Rule of law specialists, police and military planners should be jointly involved in pre-mission assessments to identify what law enforcement, judicial and penal functions, the civilian, police and military elements will need to perform respectively and when, including the proper legal and logistic management of detainees.

6. The UN Integrated Mission Planning Process should include a rule of law planning check list and should assess the context of a proposed operation for legal and cultural considerations, for the scope of deficiencies likely to be encountered and for key points of intervention that may be required.

7. Peace operations planners need a broad operational concept to help them identify, for any given strength and breadth of mandate, those rule of law functions that will be the responsibility of the international community on an interim basis; those that will be shared with host state authorities; and those that can be performed by host state authorities, with international monitoring as appropriate.

8. The training of CIVPOL to assume executive policing roles and to cope with the specific operational setting is critical and should be sustained throughout a deployment with a rolling programme of training during the mission.

9. Member States are encouraged to support both the UN's Standing Police Capacity project and an effective standby arrangements system that contains rosters of individuals (including the range of policing specialties as well as judges, magistrates, investigative judges, lawyers, administrative and corrections personnel) who can be

called upon for operations, together with an effective police/rule of law training programme.

10. Where peacekeepers have responsibility for supervising local law enforcement, their mandate should provide adequate authority to enforce the law where local authorities are unable or unwilling to do so.

11. Member States should consider developing and making available rapidly deployable capacities in all fields of expertise relevant to the successful conduct and outcome of a peace operation, including the rapid deployment of prison and probation officers.

12. Traditional or customary processes as the basis for an expedited and streamlined accountability mechanism merit further examination and possible support in the context of future peace operations.

13. An international operation must develop a visibly holistic approach to managing rule of law objectives, in order to ensure the coordination of law enforcement, judicial reform, law reform and human rights, and coordination of the many partners engaged in addressing these issues, as part of an effective mission transition strategy from international to host state responsibility for promoting, institutionalising, and sustaining the rule of law.

14. Member States should consider supporting the concept of transitional criminal codes and codes of procedure to be applied ad interim in the mission area if, when and where appropriate.

15. To ensure that public security entities and overall judicial processes actually serve the public interest, respect minority rights, dispense justice equally, and maintain their autonomy from corrupting political forces, effective safeguards must be developed to promote transparency and accountability.

16. It is vital that in establishing a mission, the rule of law assessment include funding analysis, which should then be addressed either by assessed contributions as part of the operation or by mobilization of development funding specifically for a rule of law package.

17. The key rule of law aspects the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office mechanisms could address are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; Security Sector Reform; Transitional Justice; Legal, Electoral and Good Governance; Doctrine and Reference; Assessment and Plans; Coordination and Liaison; and Human Resources.

18. Member States are encouraged to support the successful development of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office, to further the objectives of rule of law and peacebuilding within multinational peace operations.

19. Member States should consider supporting the development of regional Rule of Law Centres of Excellence.

Accountability within Peace Operations

20. In addition to the measures proposed by the Zeid Report, the Partners welcome the review by the UN of its Standard Training Modules (STM) to ensure that the relevant issues are adequately covered, and refine them if necessary, and urge that the UNSAS MOU should be amended to include an undertaking to meet STM training standards for personnel conduct. It was suggested that UNTES should include an inspector general who could monitor the adherence to STM standards and provide confidential recommendations to TCCs in this regard.

21. Member States and international organizations should develop more effective and efficient measures to enhance the accountability of international contractors who provide services to peace operations, and should consider developing general principles and guidelines for employing and managing contractors; a generic or model contract that may be used as a basis for employing and managing contractors which should include remedial measures for dealing with unsatisfactory conduct by personnel and with any damage or injury that may be caused by them; and a mission specific code of conduct for employing and managing contractors.

22. The system of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs or Special Commissions of Inquiry should be extended to cover all peace operations; a standard fact-finding process should be incorporated into all missions to respond to alleged violations; the existing ombudsman and complaints authorities should be enhanced and standardised and an Ombudsman should be instituted for each mission.

23. Member States should support the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) proposals to ensure that National Investigations Officers are provided to support and facilitate OIOS investigations.

24. Each formed contingent to a peacekeeping operation, at battalion size or greater, should establish a dispute resolution or claims cell.

25. The SRSG should also establish a mission complaints unit that could either take claims direct from the community and negotiate for a resolution with the TCC concerned, seek donor aid assistance or receive referred complaints from a contingent's unit where they do not have the resources to satisfy the complainant

26. Member States should support the addition to the mission budgets of all peacekeeping forces, proper welfare resources and capabilities, to make available psychological counselling, recreation activities, family contact, and general welfare counselling.

27. Member States should ensure that the issue of accountability in peace operations is integrated into their doctrinal development as well as is fully integrated into relevant curricula for pre-deployment training and education of military, police and civilian peacekeepers

Cooperation and Coordination
– Education and Training

"…imagine if we are able to deploy, within 72 hours, 20 highly skilled police specialists, geographically and gender balanced, who have trained and worked together before, to plan and kick start United Nations police mandates…They could probably make more of an impact than ten times their numbers of generalists, trickling in piecemeal, over the course of several months"

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN USG for Peacekeeping Operations
Opening of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations
31 January 2005

Introduction

1.   Education and Training was a principal topic during Phase I of the Challenges Project and all of the Partners in the project are either directly involved in the development and delivery of education and training products or are engaged in the management and oversight of education and training activities. The Concluding Report of Phase I argued that "more attention and priority needs to be given to education and training as an investment in more effective peace operations".

2.   As noted in earlier chapters of this report, over the past three years demands on peacekeeping and related field operations have grown and changed dramatically, reaching an unprecedented scale and degree of complexity, in often violent and desperate conditions.[123] The international community faces a major challenge in meeting the recent surge in demand for qualified peacekeepers. States are, in the last analysis, responsible for supplying peace operations with properly trained personnel. Appropriate education and training of peace operations personnel—military, police, civilian—is critical, for reasons of both operational effectiveness and personal and collective safety and security in these challenging mission environments. Training is the provision of the technical and procedural knowledge and skills required in the performance of assigned duties; it generates a predictable response to a predictable situation.[124] Education is the provision of a base of knowledge and intellectual skills with which information may be interpreted reasonably and sound

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[123]   *'Report of the UN Secretary General on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations'*, A/59/608, 15 December 2004, para 2. See also Opening Remarks of USG for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean Marie-Guéhenno, to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 31 January 2005.
[124]   *'Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century'*, (Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 2002), p. 231.

judgment exercised; it facilitates a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation.[125]

3.   There are no short cuts to being sufficiently prepared. Foundation-, specialist- and pre-mission training,[126] or equivalent experience, should be regarded as minimum requirements for deployment to a mission. To provide the men and women serving in peace operations with the necessary basic skills is a professional obligation and an investment in operational success and, for Member States, an obligation in the interests of due diligence.

4.   This chapter first reviews recent developments in peace operations education and training, then turns to current challenges and possibilities for training in the priority areas of rule of law (ROL); security sector reform (SSR); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); professionalism, discipline, and codes of conduct; and cooperation and coordination. The chapter also addresses the need for more multidisciplinary training, better use of training technology, and better assessments of training effectiveness. The chapter stresses the importance of education and training for civilian mission members, as well as the importance of promoting understanding of these endeavours amongst parliamentarians and publics in the sending and supporting countries. The final section discusses international capacity-building for peace operations.

Recent Developments in Education and Training

5.   Over the past three years, there have been a number of positive developments in peace operations education and training, including advances in, and general acceptance of, the UN's structure, policies and resources, standards and guidelines for peace operations education and training, and new and enhanced institutions for the development and delivery of education and training.

Policy

6.   Particular progress within the UN system includes the rejuvenation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit (BPU) and its work to develop a coherent body of peace operations policies and guidelines for the UN system; the development of BPU's comprehensive and interactive web site; and the

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[125] Ibid.
[126] Foundation training provides basic information about today's complex peace operations environment, including mandates, contributors, challenges, and teaches safety and other skills; specialist training focuses on specific functional areas in peace operations such as DDR, SSR and ROL; pre-mission training offers refresher training on some of the foundation topics but also addresses the specific mission mandate, local cultures, specific mission challenges and key mission contributors.

publication of the 2004 Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. The BPU not only provides a repository for lessons-learned but also facilitates their incorporation in education and training through clear analytical reports promulgated via the BPU web-site. The Challenges Phase I report highlighted the need for better training of civilians and the UN is now better placed as an institution to seriously address the problem, as the following sections illustrate. At the time of writing, the DPKO has entered into a process of reorganization and further refinement, out of which and amongst other developments, a much needed Integrated Training Services section has emerged.

Standards and Guidelines

7.   The DPKO Training and Evaluation Service (TES) took a significant step towards more effective preparation of peace operations personnel by developing and promulgating several levels of Standardized Training Modules (STMs). The availability and application of common training standards for all personnel involved in peace operations will contribute to improved interoperability and operational effectiveness, as well as individual and collective security. The UN's STMs have been developed in cooperation and close consultation with a large number of national education and training institutions and governments. Some 75 Member States contributed to the development of the level-one modules, 50 engaged in level-two development and more than 50 states were involved in the 2004 deliberations and 2005 trials on level three. Most, though not all, of the standards are also directly applicable to the preparation of non-military personnel. The challenge for Member States now is to operationalize the STMs, not only for the military forces for which they were originally developed, but also for police and civilians.

8.   The three STM levels have different objectives. Level one is basic or "universal" training (basic knowledge of peacekeeping, the UN system, codes of conduct, command and control, safety and security—16 modules in all). Level-one modules are also referred to as SGTMs because their topics are "generic," with information about conduct and procedures that all mission members should know and understand. Level-two modules are more specific, designed to provide training for specialists, including military observers, military staff officers, and civilian police who will function as monitors, trainers, or mentors. Whereas the UN circulated the SGTMs as full training modules, level-two STMs instead consist of detailed training specifications which provide detailed goals, objectives, topics, sub-topics and assessment criteria. STMs will be updated annually through Reference Group Seminars with Member States, one seminar will address level-one and level-two, while a second seminar will address the level-three STMs. Member States can assist by sharing with the DPKO their field experiences and views as to the efficacy and relevance of the modules and proposing specific updates. Member States should continue to support the UN as it further develops the STM concept, and offer pro-

posed additions or changes to STMs to DPKO through their missions at the UN, and be ready to conduct courses on a regular basis.

9.   STM level three is intended to create a "standardized management training package for senior military leaders/managers that could form an element of a standardized management training program for senior civilian and civilian police staff" in UN peace operations. [127] Analysis of the evaluation of the pilot STM3 course in Abuja, Nigeria in April 2005, showed the utility and applicability of the 19 modules, proved the concept and construct of the course and the value to the students of having experienced UN Senior Management as mentors and advisors to guide the syndicate discussions. Outputs of the course included specifications for pre-deployment briefings for Senior Mission leaders in UNHQ and identified and started the development of specifications for a in-Mission Senior Management Team exercise, which would be held shortly after mission start-up. The course has now been named the UN Senior Mission Leaders Course (STM3) and there are now 28 modules to draw on, with others under development. The UN's concept for STM level three is to partner with several Member States across all regions to develop and conduct the senior management training.

Institutional Developments

10.   As the importance of preparing individuals and groups for peace operations receives growing acceptance from Member States, the number of training centres, including regional centres, also grows. The UN is working with a number of Member States and regional organizations to create region-wide approaches and cooperation in providing education and training for peace operations, which will contribute to interoperability. The concept should expand to ensure that training centres are multi-disciplinary and deal with non-military education and training as well as military. Examples of developing regional cooperation in this area include ECOWAS efforts in West Africa and the European Union (EU) Group on Training. Centres such as Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana not only train local military, police and civilians, but also undertake a regional role. In addition, a specialized centre of excellence for training police, especially gendarme-type individuals and units, was created in 2004/5 in Vicenza Italy. Within the NATO Partnership for Peace framework a number of countries have developed PfP Centres of Excellence, specializing in a number of areas.

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[127]   Lt Col Vasant Mande, UN/DPKO/TES, 'Standardised Training Modules: Cooperation and Coordination', Beijing Challenges Seminar, November 2004.

Current Priority Areas for Training

> "The common perception was, and this is unfortunately still relevant, that the officers were well trained as police officers and did not need any additional training. This perception led to ineffective, and sometimes incompetent, performance by individual officers in the field"
>
> Commissioner Michael Jorsback, UN DPKO Police Adviser,
> Melbourne Challenges Seminar, November 2002.

11.   Preparing personnel for peace operations requires a much broader training agenda than was earlier the case. Normal military training has progressively been supplemented by information on mandates, the UN system, relevant regional organizations, human rights, gender, and other subjects. Police, civilian and multi-disciplinary training programmes are gradually adopting similar approaches and are recognizing the need for some of the skills that are natural to the military, especially safety-related topics, map reading, communications, and vehicular skills. This section will focus, however, on specialized mission areas identified by the UN and the participating Project Partners as areas of critical importance to the effectiveness and efficiency of complex peace operations. These include: rule of law (ROL); security sector reform (SSR); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); professionalism, discipline, and conduct; and cooperation and coordination.

Rule of Law

12.   Despite recent lessons learned concerning security and the rule of law in Africa, East Timor, the Balkans, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, there are still few training endeavours designed specifically to bring together the two basic providers of these critical elements of post-conflict stability: the military and the police. Moreover, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and prison officials rarely receive preparation for peace missions other than, perhaps, some understanding of the particular challenges to their own profession in the field.[128]

13.   As discussed in Chapter 3, a number of initiatives and courses are being developed, specifically targeting different specialists, for example, prison and probation officers. It is also necessary to develop joint ROL training, and to work within the various international and regional organizations committed to peace operations to promote a similar comprehensive approach at the international level. One proposal for a basic ROL course is to ensure that participants first understand many of the key foundation issues – mandates, environment, contributors, local sensitivities and expectations, and safety – and then, second, examine the ROL environment

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[128]   See the Challenges related, but independent, seminar on the Rule of Law co-sponsored by the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United States Institute of Peace and the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law of Australia, hosted at the US Army War College, Carlisle, July, 2004.

and challenges as a team, before third, concluding by analyzing issues and implications specific to their specialties. While police, judges, prosecutors, prison officials and lawyers have been mentioned as joining such training, it is important also to include military operators, due to their potential roles early-on in establishing ROL. This training can be organized by the international organization conducting the mission. As this report is being published, DPKO is developing STMs for Building Sustainable Peace, which will include ROL issues. In addition to focusing on specific ROL training, Member States should take steps toward building ROL mission teams via non-mission-specific preparatory training. To share the burden of team development and to pool knowledge and resources, regional organizations should include this training objective, perhaps assigning it to regional centres of excellence in the rule of law, as discussed in Chapter 3.

14.   New mandates from the UN Security Council routinely feature the need to "protect civilians".[129] This task requires a strengthened ROL, an understanding of the issue by all international civilian and military elements, and enhanced cooperation in the field to meet this objective. National training must now emphasize the need to protect civilians and the fact that no one tool can accomplish this. The requirement further emphasizes the need for developing a culture of cooperation through national, regional and international education and training. ROL is not just a matter of concern to those directly engaged in the process, such as police, judges, corrections officials, prosecutors and lawyers. There is a pressing need for mission management and key staff to appreciate the need for a team approach as well as the ways of accomplishing such an approach. Essentials of the ROL concept therefore need to be incorporated in foundation training for senior mission management and all staff preparing for deployment to the headquarters of a UN mission or to the offices of appropriate regional organizations. Moreover, an educational effort to explain the ROL requirement and approach needs to be developed for relevant local officials; not only those who will eventually assume ROL responsibilities but also parliamentarians, academia and the local media.

Security Sector Reform

15.   A related issue is the need, normally, to engage in some form of SSR process early in a mission. SSR is a complex and time-sensitive issue and is a key factor in the international community's ability to transfer ownership to local authorities. The SSR team is broad and includes police, corrections officials, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and other legal specialists. The international military force is also likely to play a key role in SSR insofar as reforms are required in the local defence establishment. This requires, from an education and training perspective, an understanding of the complexity of this issue and the vital need for cooperation from all

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[129]   The mandates, for example, of ONUB (Burundi), UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire), AMIS (Darfur), MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo), MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNMIL (Liberia) and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone).

contributing sectors. Security sector reform requires expert and culturally sensitive trainers and training programmes. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the experienced Bosnian police force was unable to take seriously training delivered by many far less experienced international personnel. International staff conducting such programmes should be at least as experienced as the police and other officials whom they are assigned to retrain, and culturally sensitive trainers can make programmes more effective when there is too little time to adapt the training package as a whole to local conditions and cultures, as was the case in Iraq.

16.   Close cooperation and coordination amongst the various contributors to SSR is essential so that the same quality and levels of expertise are developed in parallel within a host nation. Pressures to have significant numbers of local police operating as quickly as possible argue for "on-the-job" and "in-service" training after basic training, such that a day of training is built into new officers' work weeks, linked to gradually but progressively more responsible and complex operational duties. This progression can begin with basic communal and static facility protection tasks, gradually adding, for example, more difficult investigative skills. Trainees might set aside one day a week for attention to incremental training modules that would gradually build the required body of knowledge and skills. The same approach should be adapted to other elements of the criminal justice system as well. Training only the police, at great expense, without parallel developments in the local judicial system, is a waste of scarce resources (as is addressing a judicial system, but leaving the overlying political system unreformed). A phased approach to training, which includes the possibility of a period of mentoring, is one way of ensuring a more harmonized development of local capability.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

17.   DDR is a process, not a professional skill.[130] DDR field operations are becoming increasingly complex; there is little time to plan and implement successful programmes in the field, which require different types of professionals, who must work together. The UN has recognized that DDR field operations can no longer function effectively with the military, NGOs, UN agencies, and local DDR commissions working independently, often at cross-purposes, supporting different agendas. Typically, military contributions focus on the initial phases of the process, disarmament and demobilization, which are supported by some NGOs and UN agencies; while other UN agencies and NGOs focus on the final phase of the process, reintegration into society. Lack of transparency and a resistance to open communication between these groups have compromized the success of DDR programmes.

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[130]   For example, the UN is working on a project called the Integrated DDR System (IDDRS). The purpose of the project is to standardize best practices and terminology, which should promote clearer communication, decrease confusion between mission areas, facilitate the implementation of DDR mandates, and assist DDR training.

18.   This situation should be improved through proper integrated training. Military, NGO, UN and local DDR programme administrators should be in the classrooms together to understand the role and impact that each has on the DDR process. Training institutions cannot and should not focus on tailoring DDR training for every profession that works the issue, but should focus on providing participants with the necessary knowledge and skills to understand the entire DDR process as well as the roles and impacts they have on the process.

Professionalism, Discipline and Conduct

19.   Operational success in peace operations can be severely affected by lack of professionalism, and lack of discipline. Discipline is one of the major challenges facing the UN in peace operations as highlighted by recent international reports.[131] The potential impact of inappropriate or abusive behaviour by military, civilian and police personnel, albeit only a few, seriously affects operational progress and the reputation and effectiveness of the international community.[132] The recommendations put forward in "*A Comprehensive Strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations*", also known as the Zeid Report, was a major step forward in the efforts to tackle this most difficult issue. Now it is a matter for Member States to focus primarily, but not exclusively, on implementation.

20.   The UN has, for some years, given its peacekeepers a "Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets" (Ten Rules).[133] It has been suggested that to these ten be added greater cultural awareness training, the need to respect local religion, awareness that the expectations of the local population will be high and that a peacekeeper's action, behaviour and speech will be closely monitored, and the necessity to "not act in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with detainees or people in one's custody".[134] A level-one STM deals with peacekeeper behaviour and the module is applicable to all personnel serving in a peace operations mission.[135]

21.   Further, in problem-based learning methodology (discussed below), gender training has been modified to more effectively and efficiently teach the subject. It is not just the case that there are two groups to be addressed by gender awareness training; those working in a peace operation and those in the recipient populations. In addition, these groups are both heterogeneous populations requiring different levels of gender training that support the work that they do, the cultural context in

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[131]   See *A Comprehensive Strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations*, A/59/710, 24 March 2005, also known as the Zeid Report; and the UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Report 2005.
[132]   HRH Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein of Jordan, Shrivenham Challenges Seminar, 3 March 2005.
[133]   See UN DPKO web site; www.un.org/dpko
[134]   Capt. Rhana Tappa, Nepalese Army, Melbourne Challenges Seminar, November 2002.
[135]   SGTM 5c, available on the UN web site; www.un.org/dpko

which they live, and the organizations or host nation with whom they are affiliated. Gender training must be adapted for the particular requirements of the military, civilian police, humanitarian workers, and government representatives. The gender training offered to these professionals should in turn stress that the recipient populations in peace operations are made up of multiple publics, which are made further complex by the gender issues arising within those publics. As with the challenges of culture, religion, cultural communication, and other frameworks of operations, gender issues as well as professionalism, discipline and code of conduct should be fully integrated with other planning and implementation realities and treated as significant elements in the success of any operation and its transition strategy.[136]

Cooperation and Coordination

22.   To date there are many courses on civil-military cooperation or coordination, but these are mostly military-oriented and tend to focus on military CIMIC capabilities, interests and procedures. Education and training that deals with cooperation and coordination should examine the subject from the perspectives of all of the principal contributors to a peace operation, including host nation actors, but few current courses do so. The necessary elements to be addressed include cooperation and coordination amongst civilian specialties and components within an operation; amongst UN agencies in the mission area; between missions, non-mission agencies (such as bilateral aid donors) and other organizations (such as national and international NGOs); and with the host government and/or the once-mutually-hostile "parties" who comprise it. These are critical gaps because cooperation and coordination are not just objectives. There are issues and obstacles that undermine both, as discussed in Chapter 1, that need to be understood and overcome if a mission is not to become the biggest obstacle to its own progress. There are principles and techniques to be shared, and experiences of how best to promote cooperation and coordination that can now be drawn from many peace operations and their most-experienced personnel. Learning these principles, techniques, and lessons can be enhanced considerably, expecially, if that learning takes place in a multi-disciplinary environment where military, police, and multiple civilian perspectives can be folded into the discussion, as discussed further in the following section. Member States and training organizations should create modules that emphasize the principles and techniques of cooperation and coordination, across organizations and disciplines, as skills to be learned that are critical to the success of any complex peace operation.

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[136]   *'Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations'*, UNDPKO Best Practices Unit, July 2004.

Methodology

23.   Effective education and training require a number of complementary metho-dologies and techniques. This section will focus on the need for multi-disciplinary education and training, on the use of technology to enhance education and train-ing, and the need for better programme assessment and evaluation.

Multi-Disciplinary and Multinational Education and Training

24.   There is a critical need for participants in peace operations to train together: "participants in peace operations shouldn't meet for the first time in the maelstrom of a peace operation".[137] The earlier in one's education and training that one is exposed to the often different views of other disciplines, the more readily one can adapt to the needs of cooperative work in the field. Preparing together in advance of deployment may take three forms: formal training on cooperation and coordina-tion; joint participation in multi-disciplinary seminars and courses; and, training together in exercises specifically focused on cooperation and coordination.

25.   Seminars, courses and exercises aimed at enhancing interoperability between and amongst military, police, and civilian expert participants in peace operations are growing in number, complexity and sophistication, though much remains to be done. Both the value of and the challenges inherent in such multi-disciplinary train-ing cannot be overestimated.[138] Soldiers, police, and civilian personnel serve to-gether in complex peace operations, but rarely train together beforehand, and often have very little direct knowledge of the others' professional culture. There is a need to begin to embed a culture of cooperation in individuals as a principal operational requirement, a lesson identified during operations in the Balkans, East Timor, Bu-rundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan and elsewhere, but not necessarily learned.

26.   Most peace operation exercises, simulated and live, are conceived, organ-ized and implemented by military organizations, national and international. The military has for some time recognized the need for non-military contributions to the scenarios and actual play of exercises, in the interests not only of realism, but with a view to achieving a greater training value for the military itself. In the main, however, the training value for the civilian players has been somewhat limited since they generally role-play without engaging their own organizations – a wasted opportunity. The situation is gradually changing in some Member States. Multi-dis-ciplinary exercises provide a wide range of benefits to the training audience, some

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[137]   Sir Roger Jacklin, Shrivenham Challenges Seminar, 3 March 2005.
[138]   See for example, The Annual Meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) 2005, Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping, United Services Institution of India, October 2005, www.iaptc.org More than 110 representatives participated, incl. civilians, police and military, from some 30 countries and some 25 training institutions from all regions.

obvious and some less obvious. Understanding of, and practice in, staff procedures, operational concepts, civil-military-police cooperation, operational planning and decision-making, and cooperation with local authorities, are amongst the many benefits of such exercises. Principal multi-disciplinary and multinational exercises are currently conceived and implemented by international organizations such as the UN, EU and NATO. Live multi-disciplinary exercises are also a feature of training in several Member States. Moreover, the multinationality of training exercises should be enhanced by extending assistance to and facilitating the involvement in exercises of countries that are principal personnel contributors to UN operations.

27.   Those involved in organizing such training need to understand from the outset that there is a significant need to facilitate civilian participation, beginning at a political level with the provision of the financial resources necessary to enable civilians and police to contribute to an exercise. Beyond that, it is necessary to find ways, on the one hand to bring adequate civilian knowledge into the design of the exercise, and on the other hand, to minimize the need for civilians to participate in all of the many phases, levels and minute technical details of exercise design. A national (multi-disciplinary) peace operations training institution or a special group established within the military exercise design team are two possible ways of developing and providing such facilitation. Future exercise-based training should create conditions that present opportunities for real and focused training of the civilians and police, based on their particular training requirements, rather than merely involving them as role players.

28.   Several training institutions have adopted "problem-based learning methodologies". Problem-based learning is one of the most effective methods of adult learning, and adults are the recipients of almost all peace operations education and training. Such methodologies move away from a reliance on delivering a large amount of information and, instead, combine a necessary but minimum amount of expert advice and information with practical means of accessing additional information using exercise and small group problem-solving procedures, in particular in multi-disciplinary groups. The use of problem-based learning methodologies is effective in that by posing a series of problems and then providing access to relevant information and to other actors to resolve problems, it provides a far more interactive way of learning. A participant is forced to think, to seek out other partners and thus to learn earlier and to work together. It moves away from the static atmosphere created by an expert up front and a group of listeners – the faculty become facilitators and teaching objectives are replaced by learning objectives. Member States are encouraged to use seminars, workshops and briefings in relevant international forums to share experiences on this topic among training and education organizations.

29.   The need for multi-disciplinary training must not stop following deployment to a mission. Rather, additional induction training, specialized safety train-

ing unique to the mission, and further sustainment training related to specialized aspects of a mission or new operational approaches, all need to be considered at appropriate junctures during the mission. *The Report on Integrated Missions* examined training opportunities within eight current missions and concluded that "only two had integrated training cells and those that existed were insufficiently resourced".[139] There are two key elements to this conclusion: the need for more training once in mission due to the new issues that require attention and understanding and that were not covered in national preparations. Second, such training is of particular benefit if it is done in multi-disciplinary groups. The report observes that "common training is a valuable tool for enabling better interoperability between conflicting organizational cultures". Promoting a culture of cooperation therefore continues even after deployment; indeed, "particularly after deployment". Member States are encouraged to work with and support the DPKO development of an Integrated Training Services, in-mission integrated induction and specialised training, and to offer specialised training resources from national peace operations training centres for attachment to specific integrated mission training units.

Use of Technology

30.   Computer assistance, where available, can make training more cost-effective if properly conceived. Proven computer-assisted exercise capability exists within various training institutions in a growing number of Member States. As technology advances and availability increases, it should be possible to do a considerable amount of learning on-line, with people coming together mainly to share experiences, to simulate a peace operations environment by problem-solving together, and for immediate pre-deployment and group development training. In addition, Advanced Distributed Learning can complement existing or planned courses, problem-based learning and exercise pre-training. Many institutions have such a capability and are encouraged to advertize and actively cooperate in sharing the content with others.

31.   The World Wide Web is a technological tool with immense value already now and great potential for the future. The UN web-site and other sites hosted by regional organizations and education and training institutions offer basic information as well as operations-specific studies and best practices. The UN site offers data on all current operations, plus STMs on the DPKO ITS pages, and instructive reports on the BPU site. Member States and individual education and training institutions are encouraged not only to use the websites of the UN in preparing courses and exercises but also to contribute information on courses available, current les-

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[139]   E. B. Eide, A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kent, and K. von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions – Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,* Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (Oslo and London: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and Kings College, May 2005), section 2.5.

sons-learned reports, seminar results, project details, and planned peace operations activities.

Assessment and Evaluation

32.   One of the most challenging areas in the education and training field is that of 'evaluation'. There are three dimensions to the evaluation issue: the first is the simple subjective evaluation of a course or other training activity in relation to 'having learned something'; the second dimension involves a more objective assessment of the utility of what was learned, derived from working in a mission area and applying either knowledge or skills learned, together with an understanding of other skills needed; the third dimension is evaluation by those employing the 'trained' members as to the validity and utility of the education and/or training received. In general, most education and training institutions conduct the first with a view to improving courses and exercises. The second can, if properly conducted, be handled through post-mission (or even 'in-mission') de-briefings as part of a lessons-learned process. The most difficult, and the one dimension that is not regularly accomplished, is that of field assessment (an assessment by the employing organization or agency).

33.   Assessment of the retained knowledge or skills following participation in a training activity is a particular challenge. Although testing and performance measurement is a growing focus of mainstream educational practice, this subject can be politically very sensitive for courses involving international participants. In general, trainees on a military course can, to varying degrees, be assessed. It is part of the military training culture to assess performance and, hence, suitability for work in peace operations. Most current civilian or joint training centres, however, do not have the expertise to validate elements like course participants' attitudes, team skills, other personality aspects, or even a participant's abilities to assimilate new material and concepts. For the many and varied categories of civilians one possibility is to conduct trial evaluations of candidates. Despite the limited availability on most training courses of instructors qualified to assess performance, some measure can be gauged of an individual's ability to work within a team and to comprehend the basic concepts offered during a course. Concerning the utility of training when applied in operational situations, a number of countries conduct lessons-learned exercises, but generally only in the military and police cultures. This information and experience is then fed back into the education and training processes of the military and police. Member States and others interested in enhancing education and training are encouraged to identify existing "workable" systems of evaluation used by committed Member States, to develop more comprehensive systems of evaluation, to sponsor regional seminars on the topic, and perhaps to use the annual meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) for an annual global update seminar on the topic.

34. A field assessment by an employing agency, say the UN or an international or regional organization, of the adequacy of preparatory training for individuals or groups, is difficult for a variety of reasons. Assessing the preparation of individuals or groups in any level of detail has to date been challenging given the sheer numbers of personnel and variables involved. Moreover, there are political sensitivities attached to criticism or negative assessments of performance by individuals and groups, especially senior staff. If mission performance is to be improved, however, these operational hurdles and sensitivities must be faced and overcome, else past patterns of field staff and leadership deficiencies will only reappear in new operations. Sponsors of, and contributors to, complex peace operations owe it to the populations of the war-wrecked countries in which they operate to provide competent, energetic, and effective assistance. Failure to provide well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led personnel will contribute at least to a waste of scarce peacekeeping resources and at worst to failing operations and to disciplinary scandals that tarnish the reputation of those involved, their sponsoring organizations, and peacekeeping itself. Member States should work toward, and implement, evaluation standards for military units, police units and personnel, and civilian personnel, both pre- and post-deployment, ideally based on common performance benchmarks.

35.   Member States should also work with the UN and its agencies, as well as with regional and international organizations, on a mission by mission basis to identify significant problems that can be attributed to training and selection deficiencies, and work to rectify them. The presence of a training specialist on the staff of the SRSG or Head of Mission would help to identify and remedy deficiencies, as would visits to missions by national training experts for periodic on the spot assessments.

Promoting Civilian Training and Public Understanding

36.   Within the military profession, preparation for peace operations is facilitated by an organizational culture of training as part of its normal duty. The mainstreaming of peace operations training can be accommodated within the military training cycle. For police, peace operations training normally cannot be mainstreamed, as it is not a professional requirement, although training for specific operations is not uncommon. For most of the diverse civilian professions involved in peace operations, training in peacekeeping basics rarely occurs, as serving in peace operations is not generally considered a requirement for advancement in most governments, or in the private sector.

Training Civilian Mission Staff

37.   It is common when considering "non-military" contributors to peace operations to use the term "civilian". In reality, however, there are many different types of non-military contributors to peace operations and, as missions grow in complexity, their roles assume significant importance. The variety of civilian contributors has implications for training and deployment systems, not the least because some can be deployed as a part of their official (usually government) functions, while some simply volunteer. For government employees it is a matter of due diligence that governments make available comprehensive training for peace operations. Member States deploy career officials from within Ministries in support of issues such as governance, elections and institution-building, deploy ROL experts such as corrections officials and police, and contract and deploy individuals outside government, such as retired police or judges for specific roles. Member States should encourage the UN to consider the establishment of UN Civilian Observers in order to fill a current gap in the civilian dimension of a comprehensive peace operations mechanism. These, if established, could be required to go through necessary predeployment training similar to that of UN Military Observers. All of these individuals need not only their professional background, but also basic or foundation training for peace operations in order to understand the environment, the other contributors, and the challenges of cooperation, all in the interests of effectiveness. Moreover they often require other skills such as negotiation, report writing, stress management and first aid, and in particular, they need safety skills in the interests of individual and collective safety.

38.   There are few government systems today, however, that link peace operations requirements with personnel, or personnel with necessary training, or trained personnel with national deployment systems. Rarely is there adequate commitment of the necessary financial resources for the development and maintenance of an effective system. There are some examples where governments seek to address this issue at the strategic policy level, by seeking to widen the recruitment base, developing career plans for individuals who devote themselves to peace cooperation activities, and not least making the training and dispatch of civilians part of a governmental plan, but these are the exception.[140] All Member States that seek to contribute to peace operations in an effective and efficient manner should develop a comprehensive human resource generation plan for peace operations.

39.   Among international organizations, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) conducts fundamental peace operations training for its own personnel, and both the UN and OSCE conduct mission induction or special sustainment training for civilians in the field. These international and regional

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[140]   See for example, the Government of Japan Action Plan, Takahisa Kawakami, Beijing Challenges Seminar, November 2004.

preparations include an introduction to the challenges of cooperation and coordination. The EU has designed a multi-disciplinary cooperation and coordination course, and several national foundation/basic courses touch upon the matter.

40.   The quality and scope of training provided for NGO personnel varies considerably. Some organizations insist that individuals arrive with education and training provided by Member States. Smaller NGOs, in particular, may find it difficult to organize and finance adequate preparation and training for their staffs before sending them to the mission area. The large majority of individuals volunteering to work in a peace operation outside any structured, government-sponsored and organized preparations, face difficulty in taking time off from professional work, travelling to a training institution, and paying, personally, for the time, travel, and training course itself. Many civilians therefore continue to arrive in dangerous mission areas with a minimal understanding of the political, environmental, and personal safety issues, and are potential liabilities to mission effectiveness and the safety of themselves and their colleagues.

Training Senior Management

41.   It has been a stated requirement for some time that the senior leadership of a mission requires preparation prior to deployment. Being qualified professionally, having diplomatic experience, and/or having management experience in government or the private sector, are simply not enough to take on the challenges of management of a complex peace operation. Many of the basics – understanding mandates, the environment, the players, the local actors and the safety challenges – are critical for all. The notion of "learning on the job" simply jeopardizes a mission and serves, as a minimum, to delay mission progress. The aforementioned UN STM level three is designed to provide flexible packages for Member States and education and training institutions, in order to facilitate more, and better, preparation of senior mission appointments. In the interests of operational effectiveness, Member States should ensure that politicians, diplomats, force commanders, bureaucrats, police commissioners and senior-level subject experts receive foundation and safety training, as well as other team skills, prior to mission deployment or to joining international organizations that do not have their own senior management training system.

42.   In a related vein, the UN's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended the establishment of a facility for training and briefing new or potential special representatives and other UN mediators.[141] Such a facility could be based in an existing institution, could as appropriate draw upon the UN's level-three STMs, and could be further adapted for the education and training of various other senior management posts in missions, including police commissioners, force

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[141]   Ibid High Level Panel, para. 101.

commanders, heads of agencies and engaged diplomats. Member States could work with the UN and their regional organizations to develop appropriate regional capabilities for the training of the senior management level.

Promoting Public Understanding

43.   Giving parliamentarians and the general public a better understanding of the purposes as well as the complexities of peace operations is a good investment. Both provide essential domestic support to such operations but neither have a good understanding of the complexities that have become a part of daily life for those working in a mission area. Member States may wish to consider focused sessions with parliamentarians, public seminars and meetings, and carefully structured media strategies, where permissible, to raise understanding of and support for peace operations. Diplomatic staff can be far more effective in their analysis and reporting of events and in their national support in theatre, if they understand the rationale behind the events on the ground. Member States should give diplomats posted to national embassies in countries which host or which border a peace operation in progress focused information and training on peace operations in general and the immediate operation, its structure and objectives, in particular.

44.   Often overlooked is the role of the private sector in peace operations. There are productive as well as destructive forces in the corporate world that need to be brought into the discussion. Contracted companies provide critical logistical support to most peace operations. Legitimate foreign direct investment can give an essential boost to a war-torn economy, but needs to be able to evaluate its investment risk. Educating senior operations staff in the corporate world could facilitate investment by promoting better-informed risk assessments and explaining the role of peace operations in promoting both short-term stability and longer-term recovery. The mission itself would benefit in turn from an informed private sector, operating effectively and, potentially, more as a partner. In particular, as discussed in the chapter on Rule of Law, accountability understood and accepted by all actors deployed in an area of operations would greatly enhance the total effectiveness of the international presence. Member States should take up the challenge of facilitating private investment to post-conflict areas by providing accurate information to business, supporting effective peacekeeping and security sector reform.

International Capacity-Building and Enhancement

45.   Enhancing the capacity of all is an essential part of building a broader international capacity for peace operations. It is essential for Member States to share experience, to assist willing but financially and/or technically-unable Member States, and to engage such states and other contributors in a cooperative process of build-

ing or strengthening institutional capacity. The main international current focus is on Africa. However, it should not be forgotten that Member States in other regions also seek assistance.

46.   The broad approach adopted by several principal donor states is a phased one: first, to provide a course and expect that local trainers will participate; second, to provide additional training and material to those designated by host countries as national trainers in the particular subject; third, for donor and host nations to jointly plan and conduct a course; fourth, to move to a host nation course with some donor mentoring and monitoring; and fifth, for donors to continually provide additional, new or updated material and concepts.

47.   This approach is logical and should gradually produce an institutional capability and capacity, but is not universally successful or followed. In some regions there is no overall training concept, just a series of courses offered to meet short-term political or security objectives. Second, there is often no serious attempt to modify course materials and course methodology to ensure that local culture is respected and adopted. Third, in most cases there is no coordinated plan to ensure regional, sub-regional, national or even donor cooperation in the development and delivery of training. Finally, recipient states do not always identify good trainers in advance of courses, nor in a number of cases do they offer local experts. Such experts, because they have peace operations experience, are often on mission.

48.   To overcome these challenges, the respective regional organization could become lead. Donors in Africa, for example, need to begin a serious and coordinated dialogue with, in particular, the AU and African sub-regional organizations to develop needed training concepts, supporting activities, and resources to increase the efficiency of international training programmes. This should, in addition to improving the training product, assist donors and recipient countries in a more effective and efficient allocation of scarce resources.

49.   One particular challenge is that of supporting the civilian capability of Member States who currently focus heavily on military and police contributions. In order to expand international capacity, one possibility is for Member States who have a civilian training capability to build on the UN's experience with its programme of support to national militaries using military training teams. The suggestion is to explore the use of similar civilian training teams, offered by Member States to the UN or to regional organizations, to take the training to groups and individuals who are unable, for whatever reason, to receive adequate education and training by national or other means. The building of civilian institutional capacity, as with military and police situations, should be the ultimate goal. Member States should consider the possibility of UN-certified, civilian-focused, courses to be voluntarily delivered by Member States wishing to contribute mobile training teams through their national multi-disciplinary training institutions.

Peace Operations Data

50.   Capacity could also be improved if Member States and relevant international and regional organizations had better information on trained capabilities – military, police and civilian, by unit and individuals. There is a clear need for better record-keeping in order to identify personnel who have formal peace operations education and training, both generic and specialized. Few Member States keep accurate and accessible records of training accomplished at home or abroad. In most cases the same is true of Member States hosting courses. For example, EU Member States train an average of 100 African military officers in Europe every year and 1,000 in Africa itself, but 'every time an African country or the AU or ECOWAS seeks to deploy a peacekeeping force rapidly, it is difficult to identify these trained personnel'.[142] Countries that host training programmes are encouraged to summarize and to report training accomplishments to trainee contributing states and all should better track their own military, police and civilian peace operations graduates. All Member States should, in turn, create appropriate national data-bases of personnel trained for peace operations. Practical examples of issue specific data bases include the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL) as discussed in Chapter 3 on the Rule of Law. Such cooperation has also begun with respect to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), with the development of a common course, the production of training and reference manuals and the sharing of instructors among several countries.[143]

Training Implications of Third Party Enabling Capabilities

51.   The trend towards some developed nations providing mainly niche or enabling capabilities, while the bulk of the personnel, especially military, are provided by developing nations, has unique training implications. The enabling capability involves the supported nation(s) at some level, some manner and some stage. It is critical therefore that if, for example, heavy airlift is provided, the forces being transported are trained in the proper loading of aircraft in the interests of rapid deployment and safety. Similarly, the provision of special logistics requires standard procedures and, hence, training. Other areas include communications, intelligence and equipment support, all of which have an interface between the providing state and the supported state or organization, and thus specialized training is required. Member States who focus on providing enabling capabilities for peace operations are encouraged to support a broad training programme with Member States of regions with ongoing or potential peace operations, in full cooperation with the supported states or organizations, the UN, and regional organization.

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[142]   Amb Sam Ibok, African Union, Abuja Challenges Seminar, May 2004.
[143]   Norway, Germany, Canada, and Sweden.

Training and Sustainable Peacebuilding

52.   Working to build international capacity has produced some notable successes. Some progress has, for example, been made in turning former recipients of peace operations into contributors to peace operations elsewhere in the world. In Bosnia, the UN, OSCE and NATO have cooperated in developing a multi-ethnic Bosnian military and police capability, elements of which have already deployed on UN missions, while Bosnia now has a peacekeeping academy.[144] Moreover, in the Asia Pacific region, the education and training of military and police by peacekeeping forces in states such as East Timor and the Solomon Islands have been an important contribution to the long term peacebuilding effort in the region. Member states should design all capacity-building programmes for peace operations with the goal of creating capacity that can be sustained by recipients, either on their own or within the resource constraints of known or projected assistance programmes.

Observations, Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations

53.   Peace operations can only be successful if the international community works together in pursuit of peace and stability, but the current supply of well-trained personnel for peace operations falls well short of today's need. Peace operations are complex, multifaceted, multidisciplinary and difficult. Effective training must replicate real situations on the ground. Education and training need to emphasize professionalism and the creation of a culture of cooperation and coordination, in a multidisciplinary and multinational setting. Member States, and others deploying personnel, should ensure that everyone they commit to operations receive such training and must be prepared to provide the necessary resources and facilitation mechanisms to support it. Civilians, in particular, should be offered more opportunities for such training, which should treat UN SGTMs and STMs as minimum standards within national education and training programmes.

1. Member States should continue to support the UN as it further develops the STM concept, and offer proposed additions or changes to STMs to DPKO TES through their missions at the UN.

Current Priority Areas for Training

2. Member States should take steps toward building ROL mission teams via non-mission-specific preparatory training. To share the burden of team development and to pool knowledge and resources, regional organizations should include this training objective, perhaps assigning it to regional centres of excellence in the rule of law.

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[144]   Bosnian military observers have deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia and Eritrea, while police have been part of missions in Haiti, Liberia and East Timor (UN web-site).

3. Essentials of the ROL concept need to be incorporated in foundation training for senior mission management and all staff preparing for deployment to the headquarters of a UN mission or to the offices of appropriate regional organizations.

4. An educational effort to explain the ROL requirement and approach needs to be developed for relevant local officials; not only those who will eventually assume ROL responsibilities but also parliamentarians, academia and the local media.

5. Security sector reform requires expert and culturally sensitive trainers and training programmes. International staff conducting such programmes should be at least as experienced as the police and other officials whom they are assigned to retrain, and culturally sensitive trainers can make programmes more effective when there is too little time to adapt the training package as a whole to local conditions and cultures.

6. Pressures to have significant numbers of local police operating as quickly as possible argue for rolling programme of training that builds a day of training into new officers' work week, completion of which is linked to gradually but progressively more responsible operational duties.

7. Military, NGO, UN and local DDR programme administrators must be in classrooms together to understand the role and impact that each has on the DDR process.

8. Gender issues as well as professionalism, discipline and code of conduct should be fully integrated with other planning and implementation realities and treated as significant elements in the success of any operation and its transition strategy.

9. Member States and training organizations should create modules that emphasize the principles and techniques of cooperation and coordination, across organizations and disciplines, as skills to be learned that are critical to the success of any complex peace operation.

Methodology

10. The multinationality of training exercises should be enhanced by extending assistance to, and facilitating the involvement in exercises of, countries that are principal personnel contributors to UN operations.

11. Future exercise-based training should create conditions that present opportunities for real and focused training of civilians and police, based on their particular training requirements, rather than merely involving them as role players in military exercises.

12. Member States are encouraged to work with and support the DPKO in advancing the concepts of an integrated training strategy, in-mission integrated induction and specialised training, and to offer specialised training resources from national

peace operations training centres for attachment to specific integrated mission training cells.

13. Member States and individual education and training institutions are encouraged not only to use the websites of the UN in preparing courses and exercises, but also to contribute information on courses available, current lessons-learned reports, seminar results, project details, and planned peace operations activities.

14. Member States should work toward, and implement, evaluation standards for military units, police units and personnel, and civilian personnel, both pre- and post-deployment, ideally based on common performance benchmarks.

15. Member States should work with the UN and its agencies, as well as with regional and international organizations, on a mission by mission basis, to identify significant problems that can be attributed to training and selection deficiencies, and work to rectify them.

Promoting Civilian Training and Public Understanding

16. Member States should consider the establishment of UN Civilian Observers in order to fill a current gap in the civilian dimension of a comprehensive peace operations mechanism. These, if established, could be required to go through necessary pre-deployment training similar to that of UN Military Observers.

17. All Member States that seek to contribute to peace operations in an effective and efficient manner should develop a comprehensive human resource generation plan for peace operations.

18. Member States should ensure that politicians, diplomats, force commanders, bureaucrats, police commissioners and senior-level subject experts receive foundation and safety training, as well as other team skills, prior to mission deployment or to joining international organizations that do not have their own senior management training system.

19. Member States could work with the UN and their regional organizations to develop appropriate regional capabilities for the training of the senior management level.

20. Member States may wish to consider focused sessions with parliamentarians, public seminars and meetings, and carefully structured media strategies, where permissible, to raise understanding of, and support for, peacekeeping and particular operations.

21. Member States should give diplomats posted to national embassies in countries, which host or which border a peace operation in progress, focused information and training on peace operations in general and the immediate operation, its structure and objectives, in particular.

22. Member States should take up the challenge of attracting private investment to post-conflict areas by providing accurate information to business, and by supporting effective peacekeeping and security sector reform.

International Capacity-Building and Enhancement

23. Donors need to begin a serious and coordinated dialogue with, in particular, but not exclusively, the African Union and African regional organisations to develop needed training concepts, supporting activities, and resources to increase the efficiency of international training programmes.

24. Member States should consider the possibility of UN-certified, civilian-focused, courses to be voluntarily delivered by Member States wishing to contribute mobile training teams through their national multi-disciplinary training institutions.

25. Countries that host training programmes are encouraged to summarize and to report training accomplishments to trainee contributing states and all should better track their own military, civilian and police peace operations training graduates. All Member States should, in turn, create appropriate national data-bases of personnel trained for peace operations.

26. Member States who focus on providing enabling capabilities for peace operations are encouraged to support a broad training programme with Member States of regions with ongoing or potential peace operations, in full cooperation with the supported states or organizations, the UN, and regional organization.

27. Member States should design all capacity-building programmes for peace operations with the goal of creating capacity that can be sustained by recipients, either on their own or within the resource constraints of known or projected assistance programs.

Challenges of Implementation Working Paper

Introduction

1.   The Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report contains recommendations as a result of presentations and discussions during the six Phase II seminars and the supporting research and analysis. The principal theme of Phase II seeks to address the proverbial Achilles heel of peace operations; namely, the difficult concepts of cooperation and coordination. The report focuses on cooperation and coordination issues in three main areas: the relationships between and among the UN system and regional organizations; the rule of law; and education and training. The key to success remains in the extent to which the proposed recommendations are in fact implemented. In essence, if the report is to be effective and to have an impact, interested Member States and their relevant government offices, institutions and organizations, need to strive to implement recommendations within their particular sphere of interest and influence. With this in mind, it is hoped that interested Member States, organizations and individuals will consider the following as possible ways of taking the recommendations further and facilitate their effective implementation.

General Implementation Possibilities

2.   The first key to implementation will be for Partners and others interested to work in pursuit of implementation. It is useful to raise official and public awareness of the report by high-lighting issues and recommendations in "digestible bite-size" messages and themes, adapted for national sensitivities and acceptability. In addition, it is urged that interested organizations be pro-active in nationally promoting the value of, and key peace operations parts of, UN documents, such as the *Brahimi Report*, the UN SG's *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* report, the UN SG's report *In Larger Freedom*, the UN SG's report on *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN PKO*, as well as other current and related materials.

3.   A second key to implementation will be to work to ensure that principal recommendations, with any necessary supporting rationale, are raised in appropriate peace operations forums. In addition to national possibilities within either a government or an education and training framework, examples include, national, regional and international peace operations seminars, the peace operations and re-

lated work of standing committees in regional and international organizations (incl. the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations), the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), and ongoing discussions on cooperation between the UN and other organizations (for example UN/EU cooperation, NATO/OSCE crisis management cooperation, etc.).

4.   A third possibility is to arrange or co-arrange national and international peace operations seminars in order to inject observations, conclusions and recommendations from the Phase II report. In addition, some organizations will have the possibility to influence the design and conduct of military and multi-disciplinary training exercises, by building on the report's observations, conclusions and recommendations in several areas.

Specific Implementation Possibilities

Cooperation and Coordination on the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations

5.   Chapter 2 of the Report deals with matters at the strategic and operational levels, where policies are made, decisions are taken, and operations are implemented by collective mechanisms such as the UN system and regional organizations. The Challenges report is aimed at securing the support of Member States for enhancing such organizations' capacities to conduct more effective and efficient peace operations. Each of the recommendations in Chapter 2, while presented as a challenge to collective bodies, should also be seen in the light of a challenge to Member States to promote these recommendations within the UN system and within the respective regional organizations. A key to implementing the recommendations in Chapter 2 therefore will be for interested Member States, to work at political levels with the leadership of the various organizations, at a working level with their respective secretariats, and in a national representational context within the working committees of these organizations, to pursue improvements in the areas discussed in this chapter. Possible detailed implementation steps with respect to the observations, conclusions and recommendations of Chapter 2 include the following:

   Cooperation and Coordination between the UN and Regional
   Organizations

– Engage in a dialogue with the interested Member State's delegations in the UN and in appropriate Regional or International Organization(s).

– Seek and promote official government support within relevant government departments for pursuing the challenge of enhancing relations between the various organizations engaged in peace operations, principally the UN, EU, AU, NATO, and OSCE.

– Offer briefings to national delegations of these organizations on Challenges Phase II, and develop national strategies for pursuing particular recommendations. One way of initiating this within an organization could be to link report and specific recommendations directly to current operations of the particular regional organization, with a view to assisting the operation itself.

– Develop a national seminar to discuss the Challenges Phase II report, in particular Chapter 2, involve relevant government departments, education and training institutions, and appropriate representatives from the interested Member State's delegations to the UN, EU, NATO, AU, OSCE, etc, as appropriate.

– Building on a national seminar or workshop, conduct a regional seminar on aspects of Chapter 2 that would involve regional states as well as representatives from the UN and the relevant regional organization.

– Together with national delegations in principal international and regional organizations, develop proposals for consideration within the appropriate political or political/military or crisis management or training and exercise committees of the respective regional organizations, and with relevant UN staffs, on matters such as enhanced staff exchanges between organizations, common doctrine for peace operations, mission handover procedures, sharing best practices, and strengthening the envisaged Peacebuilding Commission.

– Offer to fund one or more liaison officer positions for either the UN or a regional organization, based on a comprehensive exchange plan that would involve several regional countries in a burden-sharing approach.

– Make available national peace operations doctrine to the UN and to appropriate regional organizations.

– Work with relevant government departments in researching and formulating positions.

– In pursuing specific Challenges recommendations, consider seconding an expert and accompanying financial resources to a particular organization to assist in advancing the objective of such recommendations.

– Engage national delegations in joint consideration of operational/functional peace operations issues such as DDR, ROL and SSR, with a view to having more consistent national and regional policies and procedures within the principal international and regional organizations.

– Ensure that the national delegations representatives on key committees of the UN (C34, fifth committee, ACABQ etc) and regional organizations are fully briefed on, and conversant with, the relevant recommendations and conclusions of the Phase II report.

Capacity-Building in Regional Organizations

– Develop and maintain national standby lists of civilian and military experts for use in both the strategic level headquarters and the various mission headquarters of specific international or regional organizations. Make available such lists, and a clear national point of contact, to these organizations.

– Offer education and training opportunities to staffs of international and regional organizations, whilst seeking the active contribution of the organization to the course/exercise itself.

– Offer advice as required, ideally through seconded and funded experts, to organizations in the process of building up its peace operations capabilities.

– Consider a concept of seconding recently retired nationals from one organization to a different international or regional organization, with a view to enhancing understanding between such organizations.

Cooperation and Coordination on the Rule of Law

6.   Chapter 3 deals with cooperation and coordination in a specific functional area of modern peace operations, namely 'Rule of Law'. Initial implementation therefore will fall to the organizations, institutions and government departments with an interest and an expertise in the rule of law. Others, who are affected by the success or otherwise of rule of law issues, will need to be a part of the implementation process at appropriate junctures. Possible detailed implementation steps with respect to the principal observations, conclusions and recommendations of Chapter 3 include the following:

Managing Rule of Law Issues in Peace Operations

– Identify the key national actors – the institutions, organizations, offices and individuals – in the peace operations ROL issue.

– Identify recently retired experts and develop and manage a national database. Seek early opportunities to draw upon their expertise.

– Conduct an inventory of available national lessons-learned and national courses, civilian and military, in ROL.

– Bring key national actors together in a workshop format to both brief on the Challenges ROL observations, conclusions and recommendations and to look at national issues related to preparing national ROL experts/teams for peace operations. Continue to seek views on how to implement challenging and difficult recommendations.

– Consider forming an informal working group that would meet periodically to keep abreast of (international and national) ROL developments.

- Research and identify the regional dimensions of this issue – points of ROL contact in the appropriate regional organization(s), lessons-learned, regional initiatives, and strengths and weaknesses of ROL operations underway in the region.

- Brief all national ROL bodies on Challenges Phase II and in particular Chapter 3.

- Hold seminars to discuss key issues arsing from Chapter 3, such as ROL teams, an interim national response capability, lists of national experts and the management of same, cooperation in national and regional training, and cooperation with national military elements on ROL matters.

- Engage the academic community in the debate on the transitional justice issue.

- Bring regional countries together to consider the Chapter's proposal concerning a ROL Centre of Excellence in the region, and the modalities of same.

- Work with national authorities designing exercises, normally the military, to ensure that rapid response ROL teams, transitional justice, accountability (in several forms) and other key issues discussed in Chapter 3 are practised in exercises.

Accountability

- Brief all relevant national parties on the Chapter's considerations of the accountability issue, and seek to engage various national communities in a continuing dialogue on the issue (military, academic, legal, human rights, political and the private sector, etc).

- Develop a strategy, in conjunction with relevant training institutions and government, to fully engage key elements of the private sector, in the accountability debate.

- Work with relevant national education and training institutions (military, civilian, police, civil service and multi-disciplinary) to ensure accountability aspects are appropriately addressed in education and training.

Cooperation and Coordination in Education and Training

7.   Chapter 4 provides an opportunity for interested Member States to implement or influence the specific recommendations, since most States either have a national peace operations education and training institution (s) or are involved with a regional centre that educates and trains both nationals and internationals. With respect to the observations, conclusions and principal recommendations of Chapter 4, possible implementation steps for Chapter 4 include the following:

Current Priority Areas in Education and Training

– Conduct an inventory of available national courses, military, police and civilian, in ROL, SSR, DDR, Professionalism, Discipline, and Code of Conduct; and Multi-Disciplinary Cooperation and Coordination (not including military CIMIC courses).

– Identify areas requiring either national attention, or identify other regional or international sources of such education and training.

– Identify national experts with current field experience to develop and facilitate such courses.

– Confirm that national basic or foundation courses, including military education and training, introduce peacebuilding as a topic, as well as the functional areas of DDR, SSR, ROL and Multi-Disciplinary Cooperation and Coordination.

– Confirm that national courses mainstream gender and code of conduct.

– Consider the development of national courses in ROL, SSR, DDR, Professionalism, Discipline, and Code of Conduct, and Multi-Disciplinary Cooperation and Coordination in partnership with other Member States, the UN, and regional organizations.

– During (military-led) exercises, work to ensure that ROL, SSR and DDR situations are incorporated, Professionalism, Discipline and Code of Conduct is exercised and also that opportunities are created to practice multi-disciplinary cooperation and coordination in a variety of forms.

– Work with other interested Member States, the UN and regional organizations to ensure that course material is regularly updated.

Methodology and Techniques

– Identify existing national, regional and international training exercises with peace operations scenario and objectives.

– Work, initially, with national military exercise-design authorities to incorporate civilian players, not just as role-players but as a true part of the exercise play, in order to generate a training value also for civilian organizations and individuals.

– Identify an organization able to facilitate civilian play by protecting civilians from the need to participate in the many time-consuming layers and details of practical exercise design. Such an organization might be a national multidisciplinary training centre, a multidisciplinary team within the exercise design group, or a consulting company in exercise design. The organization would be responsible for ensuring civilian input to the exercise design on behalf of

potential civilian players, as well as keeping the potential participants periodically and appropriately up to date on the exercise.

– Work with civilian organizations, especially those with a training culture, UN regional offices, principal national NGOs and representatives of international organizations to design a civilian-based exercise. A multidisciplinary institution or a government ministry (foreign affairs or development) might take the lead.

– Examine possibilities to gradually shift to a concept that uses a combination of Advanced Distance Learning and courses using problem-based learning techniques. Sharing experiences within regional forums, the IAPTC, and online with the UN's Best Practices Unit and the Integrated Training Services can contribute to further development and application of this concept.

Promoting Civilian Training and Public Understanding

– Identify national institutions with the capability to conduct peace operations foundation training for civilians. In the absence of national institutions identify regional or other institutions that can contribute to building national capacity.

– Analyse how national civilians are currently prepared for peace operations.

– Study the national requirement for civilian training by numbers, and by type, level and timing of training.

– Develop a national point-of-contact for the UN, international and regional organizations and NGOs to state requirements for peace operations personnel.

– Develop a national points-of-contact for providing the requisite organizations with data on national capabilities, including qualified personnel.

– Examine the funding requirements to support the proper training of government employees and include same in appropriate budget requests.

– Examine the training programmes of international and regional organizations, which seek national personnel for peace operations posts, and work within such organizations to improve, to acceptable levels, such training.

– Examine ways of facilitating the deployments of national personnel to peace operations areas, perhaps through embassies in theatre or through contracting a national NGO to facilitate the deployment and arrival in theatre of national personnel, and their teaming up with the employing organization.

– Develop a plan to enhance national training for civilians by updating material, using nationals returning from missions, and participating in relevant national and regional seminars and associations.

– Develop a national human resource generation plan for deploying individuals.

– Develop an overall concept that links peace operations requirements, with national capabilities to identify individual experts and volunteers, with training capabilities and capacities, with deployment mechanisms, with the necessary funding.

International Capacity-Building and Enhancement

– Identify all contributors and potential contributors to current and planned national capacity building assistance.

– Work in seminar or working group format to consider education and training priorities with the host nation, relevant regional authorities, the UN as appropriate, and all current and emerging donors (governments and the private sector).

– Emphasize as a key objective the need to build, or enhance, and sustain local institutional capacity rather than a short term expedient focus on simply building local capacity.

– Regularly meet with all interested and involved groups to review progress measured against original objectives.

– Over time, and as appropriate, adapt assistance from an approach of control, to partnership, to background support.

– Encourage emerging and existing local institutions to base their training on UN STMs, to cooperate on education and training within regions including burden-sharing as appropriate, and to urge such institutions to share their experience on both a regional basis and more internationally (such as with UN DPKO and the IAPTC).

– Work with UN DPKO to identify major contributors to UN operations currently seeking international assistance.

The Role and Possible Functions of the Challenges Partners

8.   At all times any interested organization or individual wishing to clarify aspects of the report proper, or this suggested implementation possibilities, can contact the Challenges Project Coordinators or a regional Partner Organization (as listed in this report and available at www.challengesproject.net). It is envisaged that, at an appropriate future date, an implementation conference might be called to share experiences, at a place to be determined.

Annex 2 List of Challenges Phase II Chairmen, Speakers/Presenters, Rapporteurs, Moderators and Messages

Title	Family Name	First Name	Position	Organization	Country/Intl Org
Colonel (Retd)	Aboagye	Festus Boahen	Head of Programme	Institute for Security Studies	South Africa
General	Abubakar	Abdulsalami A	Former Head of State	Government of Nigeria	Nigeria
Rear Admiral	Adedeji	Amos Gbadejo	Commandant	National War College	Nigeria
Ambassador	Adeniji	Oluyemi	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Nigeria
Colonel	Agoglia	John	Director	United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute	United States
Lieutenant General	Agwai	Martin L.	Chief of Army Staff/Former Deputy Force Commander UNAMSIL/Former Deputy MILAD UNDPKO	Nigerian Armed Forces	Nigeria
Brigadier General	Al-Allaf	Mohammed	Commandant, Royal Jordanian National Defense College	Jordan Armed Forces	Jordan
Mr	Alberoth	Jonas	Deputy Director General	Folke Bernadotte Academy	Sweden
Mr	Alozieuwa	Simeon	Researcher	University of Abuja	Nigeria
Ambassador	Altan	Can	Former Ambassador of Turkey to the Democratic Republic of Congo	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Turkey
Ambassador	Bailes	Alyson	Director	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	SIPRI
Doctor	Bakut	B.	Researcher	Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution of the National War College	Nigeria
Brigadier (Retd)	Baly	Dick	Advisor to the African Union	Consultant	United Kingdom
Doctor	Bartoli	Andrea	Director of the Centre for International Conflict Resolution	Colombia University, United States	Italy
Doctor	Berry	Glyn	Minister Counsellor/Chair of the Working Group of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations	Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations	Canada
Mr	Bessler	Manuel	Senior Adviser	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	United Nations
Ambassador	Bilhan	Murat	Chairman	Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Turkey

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Title	Family Name	First Name	Position	Organization	Country/Intl Org
General	Bir	Cevik	Former Commander of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)	Turkish Armed Forces	Turkey
Ms	Blair	Stephanie	PhD Candidate	Department of War Studies, Kings College	Canada
Mr	Boothby	Derek	Former Director of European Affairs, UN Department of Political Affairs	United Nations	United Nations
Professor	Bothe	Michael	Professor of Public Law and International Law	Johann Wolfgang Goethe University	Germany
Mr	Bozay	Mehmet Kemal	Counsellor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Turkey
Professor	Bring	Ove	Senior Lecturer	National Defence College	Sweden
Ms	Campos Dugone	Alaciel	Education and Doctrine Adviser	CAECOPAZ	Argentina
Mr	Cangöz	Alaettin	Deputy Head of Department for International Relations	General Directorate of Security, Turkish Police	Turkey
Mr	Carmody	Shane	Deputy Secretary of Strategic Policy	Department of Defence	Australia
Doctor	Cilliers	Jakkie	Executive Director	Institute for Security Studies	South Africa
Mr	Cina	Jon	PhD (Law) Candidate	University of Melbourne/Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law	Australia
Doctor	Ibn Chambas	Mohammed	Executive Secretary	ECOWAS	ECOWAS
Professor	Coker	Christopher	Reader	London School of Economics & Political Science	United Kingdom
Mr	Coleman	Andrew	PhD (Law) Candidate	University of Melbourne/Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law	Australia
Ms	Conidi	Britt	LLM Candidate	University of Melbourne/Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law	Australia
Ms	O'Connor	Vivienne	PhD Candidate	Irish Centre for Human Rights	Ireland
General	Cosgrove	Peter	Chief of the Defence Force	Australian Armed Forces	Australia
Mr	Darvill	Steve	Humanitarian/Peace - Conflict Adviser	Australian Agency for International Development	Australia
Doctor	Dessau	Erling	Special Adviser to the Rector	University for Peace, Costa Rica	United Nations
Mr	Dewey	Arthur Gene	Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration	State Department	United States
Ambassador	Dolgov	Konstantin	Deputy Permanent Representative	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations	Russian Federation

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Mr	Donnelly	Chris	Head, ARAG	Defence Academy	United Kingdom
Col	Dooley	Michael	Director	United States Army Peacekeeing and Stability Operations Institute	USA
Professor	Du	Nongyi	Senior Research Fellow	China Institute for International Strategic Studies	China
Group Captain	Dunbar	Garry	Head of International Organizations Department	Australian Defence Organization	Australia
Ms	Dunsmore	Sandra	President	Pearson Peacekeeping Centre	Canada
Doctor	Durch	William	Senior Fellow	Henry L. Stimson Center	United States
Doctor	Dziedzic	Michael	Program Officer Balkans	United States Institute for Peace	United States
Brigadier General	Edholm	Sten	Former Force Commander	United Nations SHIRBRIG	SHIRBRIG
Mr	Erdogan	Recep Tayyip	Prime Minister	Government of Turkey	Turkey
Mr	Feith	Pieter	Deputy Director General	DG-E (European Security and Defence Policy)	EU Council Secretariat
Flight Lieutenant	Field	James	Australian Air Force Legal Officer	Headquarters Air Command	Australia
Doctor	Fitzgerald	Ann	Project Director	Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform	United Kingdom
Major General	Ford	Timothy	Military Adviser	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations
Mr	Forste	Lars	Assistant Commissioner	National Criminal Investigations Department	Sweden
Ms	Griffin	Michele	Political Officer at the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs	United Nations Department for Political Affairs	United Nations
Mr	Guéhenno	Jean-Marie	Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations	Department of Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations
Mr	Gül	Abdullah	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Turkey
General	Guangkai	Xiong	Deputy Chief/Chairman	General Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army/China International Institute for International Studies	China
Ms	Guicherd	Catherine	UN-G8 Team	Ministry of Defence of United Kingdom	France
Mr	Guofang	Shen	Assistant Minister	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	China

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Mr	Haekkerup	Hans	Former SRSG UNMIK and former Minister of Defence	United Nations/Government of Denmark	Denmark
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Mr	Harland	David	Chief/Head	DPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit	United Nations
Brigadier General	Harm de Jonge	Jan	Former Commander of NATO Task Force Fox - Macedonia	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
Ms	Harris Rimmer	Susan	Durable Solutions Officer	UNHCR Regional Office for Australia	United Nations
Lieutenant General	Hederstedt	Johan	Supreme Commander	Swedish Armed Forces	Sweden
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Ms	Hilding Norberg	Annika	Project Leader, Challenges Project	Folke Bernadotte Academy	Sweden
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Professor	Huldt	Bo	Director, Department for Strategic Studies	National Defence College	Sweden
Professor	Ibeanu	Okey	Professor	MacArthur Foundation	Nigeria
Ambassador	Ibok	Sam	Director, Peace and Security Department	African Union	African Union
Major	Ibrahim	S	Major	National War College	Nigeria
Doctor	Igwe	Israel	Researcher	Federal Civil Service Commission	Nigeria
Professor	Inan	Yüksel	Professor	Department of International Relations, Bilkent University	Turkey
Hon	Ingram	Adam	Minister of the Armed Forces	Ministry of Defence	United Kingdom
Sir	Jacklin	Roger	Director	Defence Academy	United Kingdom
Major General	Jaggabatara	Songkitti	Deputy Commanding General/Former Deputy Commander INTERFET	Thai Armed Forces	Thailand
Major General	Jiangfeng	Yan	Secretary General	China Institute for International Strategic Studies	China
Colonel	Jianxin	Lu	Peacekeeping Affairs Office	Ministry of National Defense	China

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Ms	Jones	Lisa	-	Policy Development and Studies Branch of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	United Nations
Mr	Jorsback	Michael	Chief, Civilian Police Division	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations
Ms	Jusu-Sheriff	Yasmine	Member of the Executive Board	Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS)	Sierra Leone
Mr	Karadeniz	Bulent	Senior Diplomat	Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Turkey
Professor	Karaosmanoglu	Ali L.	Chairman of the International Relations Department	University of Bilkent	Turkey
Ms	Karrenbroch	Gesche	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Representative in Turkey	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	United Nations
Ambassador	Kasrawi	Farouk	President	Jordan Institute of Diplomacy	Jordan
Mr	Kawakami	Takahisa	Director	International Peace Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Japan
Ms	Keita	Marie-Thérése A.	Senior Political Affairs Officer	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for West Africa	United Nations
Colonel	Kelly	Michael	Director	International Organizations Department, Australian Defence Organization	Australia
Ambassador	Ki-Doulaye	Corentin	Director of Conflict Prevention Center	Office of the Commissioner for Peace and Security	African Union
Lieutenant Colonel	Klappe	Ben	Special Assistant to the Military Adviser	Office of the Military Adviser, Department for Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations
Mr	Klein	Jacques Paul	UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Liberia	United Nations Mission to Liberia	United Nations
Mr	Kobieracki	Adam	Assistant Secretary General for Operations	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
Major General (Retd)	Konrote	Jioji	High Commissioner of the Republic of the Fiji Islands to Australia and Singapore/ Former Force Commander UNIFIL	Royal Fiji Military Forces	Fiji Islands

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Title	Family Name	First Name	Position	Organization	Country/Intl Org
Mr	Kwankaso	Alhaji Rabiu Musa	Minister of Defence	Ministry of Defence	Nigeria
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Doctor	Langholtz	Harvey	Director	United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction	United Nations
Mr	Lightburn	David	Representative of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres	Pearson Peacekeeping Centre	Canada
Ms	Lindh	Anna	Minister for Foreign Affairs	Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Sweden
Ms	Link	Joan	Head of Conflict Issues Group	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	United Kingdom
Mr	Malan	Mark	Head of Peace Missions Programme	Institute for Security Studies	South Africa
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Lieutenant Colonel	Mande	Vasant	Deputy Director	DPKO Training and Evaluation Service	United Nations
Ambassador Chief	Mbanefo	Arthur	Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations	Permanent Delegation of Nigeria to the United Nations	Nigeria
Professor	McCormack	Timothy	Director/Professor	Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law/University of Melbourne	Australia
Mr	McNamara	Dennis	Inspector-General	United Nations High Commission for Refugees	United Nations
Mr	Mohammed	Abdul	Chairman of the Board	Inter-Africa Group	Ethiopia
Federal Agent	Moses	Richard	Police Adviser	Australian Mission to the United Nations	Australia
Mr	Mosselmans	Michael	Head of Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department	Department for International Development	United Kingdom
Lieutenant General (Retd)	Nambiar	Satish	President	United Services Institution of India	India
Wing Commander	Naiya	M	Researcher	National War College	Nigeria
Commissioner	Nylén	Lars	Head of National Criminal Investigations Department/Director General	National Police Board/National Prison and Probation System	Sweden
Mr	Obafemi	Lanre	Researcher	National War College	Nigeria

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General	Ogumudia	Alexander O.	Chief of Defence Staff	Nigerian Armed Forces	Nigeria
Colonel	Oliver III	George F.	Researcher	US Army Center for Military History in Washington D.C.	United States
Professor	Onuldran	Ersin	Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences	Ankara University	Turkey
Mr	Oswald	Bruce	Acting Director	Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law	Australia
Admiral	Parry	CJ	Director General	Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre	United Kingdom
Ms	Petrovic	Jadranka	PhD (Law) Candidate	University of Melbourne/Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sir	Prendergast	Kieran	Under-Secretary-General	Department for Political Affairs	United Nations
Major	Ribier	Francoise	Officer	EMA	France
Ambassador	Sahlin	Michael	Director General/EU Special Representative to Skopje	Folke Bernadotte Academy	Sweden
Professor	Salmin	Alexeij	President	Russian Public Policy Centre	Russian Federation
Ms	Schlesinger	Nicole	PhD (Law) Candidate	University of Melbourne/Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law	Australia
Mr	Serayderian	Souren Georges	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General	United Nations Mission in Liberia	United Nations
Mr	Sezer	Ahmet Necdet	President	Government of Turkey	Turkey
Senior Colonel	Shaoan	Dai	Deputy Director	Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense	China
Ms	Sharma	Mandira	Executive Director	Advocacy Forum	Nepal
Ambassador	Southwick	E. Michael	Program Officer (Africa)	United States Institute for Peace	United States
Commander	Stephens	Dale	Fleet Legal Officer/Former Chief Legal Officer to the UNTAET Force Commander	Maritime Headquarters in Sydney	Australia
Major General	Stigsson	Tony	Commander of the Joint Forces Command	Swedish Armed Forces	Sweden
Ambassador	Sundh	Lena	Head of Conflict Resolution and Prevention/Former Deputy SRSG MONUC	Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Sweden

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Title	Family Name	First Name	Position	Organization	Country/Intl Org
Doctor	Tekin	Ali	Research Fellow	Department of International Relations, Bilkent University	Turkey
Captain	Thapa Rhana	Yvetta	Former Deputy Chief Legal Adviser UNMISET	Royal Nepalese Army	Nepal
Ms	Udum	Sebnem	PhD Candidate (Security Studies)	University of Bilkent	Turkey
Lieutenant General	Uvarov	Nikolay	Military Adviser	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations	Russian Federation
Mr	Weisserth	Hans-Bernardt	Policy Unit, European Security and Defence Policy Task Force	Council of the European Union	European Union
Ms	Wells	Jennifer	Program Coordinator (Emergencies)	Australian Council For Overseas Aid	Australia
Mr	Wiryono	Sastrohandoyo	Senior Fellow	Centre for Strategic and International Studies	Indonesia
Major General (Retd)	Yudong	Luo	Vice Chairman	China Institute for International Strategic Studies	China
Prof	Zabadi	Istifanus S	Director, Centre for Peace Research & Conflict Resolution	National War College	Nigeria
Mr	Zacklin	Ralph	Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs	United Nations Office for Legal Affairs	United Nations
Ambassador	Zannier	Lamberto	Chairman of the Conflict Prevention Center	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe Secretariat	OSCE
HRH Prince	Zeid	Ra'ad Al-Hussein	Permanent Representative/ Advisor to the UN Secretary General on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel	Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations	Jordan
Professor	Zhao	Liu	Research Fellow	China Institute for International Strategic Studies	China
Major General	Zhengbai	Shi	Senior Official in charge of Peacekeeping Affairs	Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense	China
Major General	Zorlu	Hilmi Akin	Former Commander of International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan	Turkish Armed Forces	Turkey

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

Challenges Project Phase II presentations (2002-2005) can be found in the following publications:

The 11ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002): Howard, Jessica & Oswald, Bruce (eds.), *The Rule of Law on Peace Operations: A 'Challenges of Peace Operations' Project Conference*, Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law, Melbourne 2002.
The 12ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003): Hilding-Norberg, Annika & Sahlin, Michael (eds.), *Report on the XII International Challenges Seminar: Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism*, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 2003.
The 13ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003): Yücel, Ihsan & Boothby, Derek (eds.), *The Challenges of Change: The Nature of Peace Operations In the 21ˢᵗ Century and Continuing Need for Reform*, Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Okay Reklamcilik ve Tanitim Hizmetleri Ltd., Ankara 2004.
The 14ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004): Adedeji, Amos G., & Zabadi, Istifanus S. (eds.), *The Regional Dimension of Peace Operations in the 21ˢᵗ Century: Arrangements, Relationships, and the United Nations Responsibility for International Peace and Security*, National War College, Abuja, Planet Press Limited, Lagos 2004.
The 15ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004): Zhengbai, Shi et al (eds.), *Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations*, Peacekeeping Affairs Office, MND, and China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Peoples Liberation Army Military Publishing House of Friendship and Literature, Beijing 2005.
The 16ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005): *Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations in the 21ˢᵗ Century*, forthcoming.

Chapter 1. The Dynamic Nature of Peace Operations and the Challenges of Change		
"The Challenges Project & Peace Operations"	MajGen Tim Ford	The 11ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Safety of Personnel Serving on Peace Operations"	Mr Takahisa Kawakami	The 11ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism: an Academic Perspective"	Amb Alyson J.K. Bailes	The 12ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism: a Policy Perspective"	Dr William Durch	The 12ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Terrorism, Political Violence, and Peace Enforcement"	Dr Michael J. Dziedzic	The 12ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism Perspectives on United Nations Peace Operations"	MajGen (Retd) Timothy Ford	The 12ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21ˢᵗ Century"	Gen Johan Hederstedt	The 12ᵗʰ International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

"Winning the War on Terror? The Contradictions of Counter-Terrorism and Implications for the Pursuit of Peace Operations"	Dr Claire Heristchi	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
Opening Statement	Foreign Minister Anna Lindh	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism: Perspectives on United Nations Peace Operations"	Amb Chief Arthur C.I. Mbanefo	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism: a Military Perspective"	LtGen (Retd) Satish Nambiar	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism: a Police Perspective"	Comr Lars Nylén	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism: Perspectives on United Nations Peace Operations"	Mr Ralph Zacklin	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Humanitarian Dimension in Civil Affairs - Jordan's Experience in an International Context"	MajGen Mohammed Al-Allaf	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"An International Policy Approach"	Dr Andrea Bartoli	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
Opening Statement	Amb Murat Bilhan	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Characteristics and Principles of Peace Intervention. The Somalia Experience"	Gen (Retd) Cevik Bir	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Challenge of Enhancing Local Participation in Peace Operations"	Ms Stephanie Blair	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Ingredients of Success in Afghanistan"	Mr Arthur E. Dewey	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Public Security Challenge and International Stability Police Units"	Dr Michael J. Dziedzic	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Conclusion. The Ankara Seminar and Beyond"	Prof Ali L. Karaosmanoglu	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
Message to the seminar	Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
Opening Speech	Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Challenges of Change. The Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and Continuing Need for Reform"	Mr Jacques Paul Klein	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Challenges of Change: How Can the Military Contribute to a 'Culture of Protection' in Peace Operations?"	Mr Mark Malan	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Winning the Peace in Iraq. Planning and the Initial Accomplishments of ORHA and CPA"	Col George F. Oliver	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
Concluding Remarks	Prof. Dr Ersin Onulduran	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Military Advice to the UN Security Council"	LtGen Nikolay Uvarov	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
Message to the seminar	President Ahmet Necdet Sezer	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

Title	Presenter	Source
"Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies"	Mr Manuel Bessler	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
Opening Remarks	Mr Jonas Alberoth	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Humanitarian/Reconstruction Coordination in Peace Support Operations"	Mr Arthur E. Dewey	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations: Military Perspective"	Ms Alaciel Campos Dugone	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Enhance Cooperation and Stand up to Challenges Together"	Gen Xiong Guangkai	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
Remarks on Challenges Seminar "Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations"	Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (delivered by Mr David Harland)	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"The Future of Peacekeeping: the Challenges of Co-ordination and Co-operation"	Dr Catherine Guicherd	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"We are Coming for Peace"	Mr Shen Guofang	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"No More Failed States?"	Mr Hans Haekkerup	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"The DPKO Guidance Project. An Overview"	Mr David Harland	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Challenges to Troop-contributing Countries in a New International Environment"	Col Lu Jianxin	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations" Presentation by UNOCHA	Ms Lisa Jones	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
Statement on Challenges Seminar "Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations"	Mr. Kieran Prendergast (delivered by Mr. Derek Boothby)	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
Closing Speech	Mr. Luo Yudong	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
Opening Speech	MajGen Shi Zhengbai	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Improving the UN Capacity for Peacebuilding"	Ms Stephanie Blair	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Improving the UN Capacity for Peacebuilding"	Mr Francis	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
Statement on Challenges Seminar: "Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations in the 21st Century"	Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"UN High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change – From Recommendations to Implementation	Lord David Hannay	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
Key Note	Rt Hon Adam Ingram	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
Welcome & Introductory Speech	Sir Roger Jackling	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Building on the Recommendations to Improve Peace Operations by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change"	Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"The UK Doctrine on Peace Support Operations"	Adm C J Parry	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Beijing Challenges Seminar Synopsis"	Sen. Col (Retd) Maocheng Zhuang	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

"Challenges Project Updates"	Annika Hilding Norberg	Challenges Seminar Reports 1-16 on the web
Chapter 2. Cooperation and Coordination: Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations		
"Comments and Summation on Regional Views on Peace Operations"	MajGen Tim Ford	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Past Experiences & Future Challenges: A Military Perspective"	MajGen Songkitti Jaggabatara	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Regional Approaches to Peace Operations"	Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Past Experiences & Future Challenges: A Civilian Perspective"	Ms Mandira Sharma	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Operational Legal Views from the Field: A Military Perspective"	Capt Yvetta Rhana Thapa	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution on Peace Operations"	Mr Sastrohandoyo Wiryono	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Challenges of the Middle East: Possibilities for a Way Ahead"	Amb Farouk Kasrawi	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
Opening Statement	Foreign Minister Anna Lindh	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Management of Africa Crises in a Changing World. The Nigeria Perspective"	LtGen Martin L. Agwai	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"UN Peace Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo"	Amb Can Altan	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Characteristics and Principles of Peace Intervention. The Somalia Experience"	Gen (Retd) Cevik Bir	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Balkan Experience in the Development and Implementation of Comprehensive Strategies for Multidimensional Peace Operations. A Brief Analysis of the Bosnia and Kosovo Cases"	Mr Mehmet Kemal Bozay	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Turkish National Police Department Resources. A Police Perspective"	Mr Alaettin Cangöz	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa"	Amb Ki Doulaye Corentin	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Ingredients of Success in Afghanistan"	Mr Arthur E. Dewey	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The NATO Operation in Macedonia"	Brig Jan Harm de Jonge	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Conclusion. The Ankara Seminar and Beyond"	Prof Ali L. Karaosmanoglu	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Review of the Situation in Liberia"	Mr Jacques Paul Klein	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"NATO and Peace Operations"	Amb Adam Koberiacki	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

"Challenges of Change: How Can the Military Contribute to a 'Culture of Protection' in Peace Operations?"	Mr Mark Malan	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Challenge of Reconciliation and Peace-building"	Mr Abdul Mohammed	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"A Perspective of Coordination between the UN and Regional Organizations in Peace Operations"	Prof Du Nongyi	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Winning the Peace in Iraq, Planning and the Initial Accomplishments of ORHA and CPA"	Col George F. Oliver	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Concluding Remarks"	Amb Michael Sahlin	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The European Union Perspective"	Amb Hans-Bernhard Weisserth	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"OSCE's Contribution to Peace Operations"	Amb Lamberto Zannier	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"A First in NATO Peace Operations in Afghanistan"	MajGen Hilmi Akin Zorlu	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Lessons Learned from Afghanistan"	MajGen Hilmi Akin Zorlu	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Challenges of Collective Regional Security: The SADC Experience in Initiating and Sustaining Regional Peace Operations"	Col (Retd) Festus B. Aboagye	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Concluding Remarks"	RearAdm Amos G. Adedeji	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations: Perspective from Nigeria"	LtGen Martin L. Agwai	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Key Note Address"	Foreign Minister Amb Oluyemi Adeniji	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Summary of Issues"	Amb Glyn Berry	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations: Perspectives from ECOWAS"	Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations: Perspective on South America"	Dr Erling Dessau	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Peace Keeping and Peace Building in the Pacific"	GrCpt Garry Dunbar	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"International and Regional Cooperation within the UN Framework: Lessons Learned from UNMIL Interim Headquarters in 2003"	Brig Sten Edholm	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations: A European Police Perspective"	Assistant Cmr Lars Forste	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

"Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations: Perspective from the African Union"	Amb Sam Ibok	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"International Support for Capacity Building for regional Peace Operations: Perspective from the African Union"	Amb Sam Ibok	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Women and Regional Peace Operations"	Ms Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"UN and OSCE: Cooperation and Coordination"	Prof Ali L. Karaosmanoglu and Ms Sebnem Udum	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Welcome Address"	Defence Minister Alhaji Rabiu Kwankaso	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Opening Remarks"	Amb Michael Sahlin	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Concluding Remarks"	Amb Michael Sahlin	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Consolidating Peace in Liberia: UNMIL, ECOWAS, State and Non-State Actors"	Dr Souren Serayderian	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
Opening Remarks	Mr Jonas Alberoth	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Humanitarian/Reconstruction Coordination in Peace Support Operations"	Mr Arthur E. Dewey	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations: Military Perspective"	Ms Alaciel Campos Dugone	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Enhance Cooperation and Stand up to Challenges Together"	Gen Xiong Guangkai	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"We are Coming for Peace"	Mr Shen Guofang	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations" Presentation by UNOCHA	Ms Lisa Jones	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
Statement on Challenges Seminar "Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations"?	Mr. Kieran Prendergast (delivered by Mr. Derek Boothby)	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Building African Capacity for Peace Operations"	Col Festus Aboyage	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Building African Capacity for Peace Operations"	LtGen Martin Agwai	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"The African Peace and Security Architecture and African Stand-by Force Concept"	LtGen Martin Agwai	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"The African Peace and Security Architecture and African Stand-by Force Concept"	Dr Jakkie Cilliers	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"The EU's Contribution to Peace Operation"	Mr Peter Feith	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations in the 21st Century"	Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

Chapter 3. Cooperation and Coordination: Rule of Law		
"Opening Address"	Mr Shane Carmody	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"The Rule of Law on Peace Operations from the Perspective of an Institutional Donor"	Mr Steve Darvill	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Challenges of Peace Operations"	Mr William Durch	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"The Challenges Project & Peace Operations"	MajGen Tim Ford	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Rule of Law on Peace Operations: An NGO Perspective"	Ms Susan Harris Rimmer & Ms Jennifer Wells	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Police in Peace Operations"	Mr Michael Jorsback	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Closing Remarks"	LtCol Michael Kelly	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Use of Force on Peace Operations"	MajGen (Retd) Jioji Konrote	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Engaging and Committing to Peace Operations"	Mr Andrew Ladley	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations"	Ms Nina Lahoud	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"A Civilian Operational View from the Field"	Mr Dennis McNamara	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Operational Legal Views from the Field: A Military Perspective"	Capt Yvetta Rhana Thapa	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"United Nations Management of Legal Issues"	Mr Ralph Zacklin	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Terrorism, Political Violence, and Peace Enforcement"	Dr Michael J. Dziedzic	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
Opening Statement	Foreign Minister Anna Lindh	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism Police Perspective"	Comr Lars Nylén	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
"The Balkan Experience in the Development and Implementation of Comprehensive Strategies for Multidimensional Peace Operations. A Brief Analysis of the Bosnia and Kosovo Cases"	Mr Mehmet Kemal Bozay	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Legal and Disciplinary Perspectives"	Prof Ove Bring	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Ingredients of Success in Afghanistan"	Mr Arthur E. Dewey	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Public Security Challenge and 'International Stability Police Units'"	Dr Michael J. Dziedzic	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Conclusion. The Ankara Seminar and Beyond"	Prof Ali L. Karaosmanoglu	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"The Creation of Rule of Law Tools for Use by Member States: The Model Transitional Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice Project"	Ms Vivienne O'Connor	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations" Presentation by UNOCHA	Ms Lisa Jones	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

"Accountability on Peace Operations: Challenges for Cooperation and Coordination for Member States in the New Era"	Mr Bruce Oswald	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Transfer of Authority between a Quick Reaction Force and a UN Force"	Maj Francoise Ribier	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Building SSR into Peace Operations"	Dr Ann Fitzgerald	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Building SSR into Peace Operations"	Mr Bulent Karadeniz	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Ethics in Peace Operations"	Ms Joan Link	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Building SSR into Peace Operations"	Mr Richard Moses	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Building SSR into Peace Operations"	Mr Lars Nylén	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Ethics in Peace Operations"	Amb Lena Sundh	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
"Ethics in Peace Operations"	HRH Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)
Chapter 4. Cooperation and Coordination: Education and Training		
"Regional Approaches to Peace Operations"	Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar	The 11th International Challenges Seminar Report (Melbourne 2002)
"Peace Operations and Counter-Terrorism Perspectives on United Nations Peace Operations"	MajGen (Retd) Tim Ford	The 12th International Challenges Seminar Report (Krusenberg 2003)
Opening Speech	Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"NATO and Peace Operations"	Amb Adam Koberiacki	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Education and Training in Peacekeeping Operations. International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC)"	Mr David Lightburn	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Lessons Learned from Afghanistan"	MajGen Hilmi Akin Zorlu	The 13th International Challenges Seminar Report (Ankara 2003)
"Major Issues and Opportunities in the Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations: Perspectives from ECOWAS"	Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"International Support for Capacity Building for Regional Peace Operations: Perspective on South America"	Dr Erling Dessau	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Interface between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peace Operations: Perspective from the African Union"	Amb Sam Ibok	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"Women and Regional Peace Operations"	Ms Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff	The 14th International Challenges Seminar Report (Abuja 2004)
"A Personal Perspective on the Emerging Trends in Training and Education"	Col John Agoglia	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations: Military Perspective"	Ms Alaciel Campos Dugone	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)

Annex 3 Challenges Project Phase II Seminar Presentations

"Enhance Cooperation and Stand up to Challenges Together"	Gen Xiong Guangkai	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"The Future of Peacekeeping: the Challenges of Co-ordination and Co-operation"	Dr Catherine Guicherd	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"The DPKO Guidance Project. An Overview"	Mr David Harland	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Challenges to Troop-contributing Countries in a New International Environment"	Col Lu Jianxin	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Cooperation and Coordination in and on Peace Operations" Presentation by UNOCHA	Ms Lisa Jones	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Education and Training of Civilians for Peace Operations"	Mr Takahisa Kawakami	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Development of Concepts for Computer Assisted Exercises"	MajGen Tony Stigsson	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"Challenges of Training for the UN Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century"	Prof Liu Zhao	The 15th International Challenges Seminar Report (Beijing 2004)
"The UK Doctrine on Peace Support Operations"	Adm C J Parry	The 16th International Challenges Seminar Report (Shrivenham 2005)

List of Acronyms

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance
ADL	Advanced Distributed Learning
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory & Training Team
BPST	British Peace Support Team
C(3)I	Command, Control, Communication and Information System
C34	United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CAA	Conference of American Armies
CANADEM	Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
CARE	Cooperative for Aid and Relief Everywhere
CARICOM	Caribbean Community Common Market
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Materials
CEEAC	Economic Community of Central African States
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFSP	European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMR	Civil Military Relations
CMIC	Civil-Military Information Centre
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPU	Close Protection Unit
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTC	United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EASBRIG	Eastern African Standby Brigade
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUJUST THEMIS	European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia
EUJUST-LEX	EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUROPOL	European Police Office

List of Acronyms

FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G8	Group of Eight
GA	General Assembly
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GRULAC	Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries
HAC	Humanitarian Assistance Centre
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HOC	Humanitarian Operation Centre
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration System
IDG	International Deployment Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
IJP	International Judges and Prosecutors
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
INPROL	International Network to Promote the Rule of Law
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IO	International Organization
IPTF	International Police Task Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IST	Iraqi Special Tribunal
ITS DPKO	Integrated Training Services DPKO
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAPP/OEA	Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia
MERCOSUR	South Common Market
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Military Staff Committee
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MSU	Multinational Specialised Unit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO PfP	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Partnership for Peace Framework
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical warfare
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
OAS	Organisation of American States

List of Acronyms

OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLMEE	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ORHA	Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P5	The Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PIF	Pacific Island Forum
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PLANELM	Planning Element
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMG	Peace Monitoring Group
PO	Peace Operation
PROXIMA	European Union Police Mission Proxima (Macedonia)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	The Peace and Security Council of the African Union
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PSO	Peace Support Office
PST	Provincial Stability Team
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistant and Cooperation Team
REC	Regional Economic Commission
RECAMP	Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROL	Rule of Law
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
SDS	Strategic Deployment Stocks
SGTM	Standardised Generic Training Modules
SHIRBRIG	United Nations Standby High Readiness Brigade
SOP	Standard Operational Procedure
SPC	United Nations Standing Police Capacity
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STM	Standard Training Modules
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UN	United Nations
UN BPU	United Nations Best Practices Unit
UN SC	United Nations Security Council
UN SG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCC	United Nations Compensation Commission

List of Acronyms

UNCHR	**United Nations Centre for Human Rights**
UNDP	**United Nations Development Programme**
UNDPKO	**United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations**
UNFICYP	**United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus**
UNHCHR	**United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights**
UNHCR	**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**
UNIDO	**United Nations Industrial Development Organization**
UNIKOM	**United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission**
UNITAR	**United Nations Institute for Training and Research**
UNITAR POCI	**UNITAR Program of Correspondence Instruction for PKO**
UNMEE	**United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea**
UNMIBH	**United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**
UNMIK	**United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo**
UNMIL	**United Nations Mission in Liberia**
UNMIS	**United Nations Mission in the Sudan**
UNMISET	**United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor**
UNMO	**United Nations Military Observer**
UNMOVIC	**United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission**
UNOCHA	**United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**
UNPOC	**United Nations Police Officers Course**
UNOCI	**United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**
UNPriPOC	**United Nations Prison and Probation Officers Course**
UNPROFOR	**United Nations Protection Force**
UNSAS	**United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System**
UNSCR	**United Nations Security Council Resolution**
UNSECOORD	**Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator**
UNTAC	**United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia**
UNTAES	**United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium**
UNTAET	**United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor**
UNTES	**United Nations Training and Evaluation Service**
UNTSO	**United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**
USAF	**United States Air Force**
USG DPKO	**Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations**
WB	**World Bank**
WMD	**Weapons of Mass-Destruction**

Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Project Partner Organizations
(in order of hosting)

Folke Bernadotte Academy in coop w Armed Forces, National Defence College and National Police Board, Sweden (Project Coordinators)

Russian Public Policy Centre in coop w Diplomatic Academy, Russian Federation

Institute of Diplomacy, Jordan

Institute for Security Studies, South Africa

United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in coop w United States Institute of Peace, United States

United Services Institution of India, India

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada

Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff in coop w Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Argentina

Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law in coop w Australian Defence Organization, Australia

Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coop w National Police Force, Armed Forces and the University of Bilkent, Turkey

National War College in coop w Armed Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Nigeria

China Institute for International Strategic Studies in coop w Ministry of National Defence, China

Ministry of Defence in coop w Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development, United Kingdom

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