

# Entering 2017: Strengthening Collective Preparedness for Future United Nations Peace Operations

## BACKGROUND PAPER

CHALLENGES FORUM WORKSHOP  
*Entering 2017: Strengthening Collective Preparedness for Future United Nations Peace Operations*

Hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in Bali, 10-11 November 2016

## Background

The work to strengthen peace operations has made significant progress since 2015. The Challenges Forum Workshop in Bali on 10-11 November provides an opportunity to build on the results of the UN Reviews: the 2015 Chief of Defence Meeting and Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, the Challenges 20th Anniversary Forum<sup>1</sup>, the 2016 Chief of Police Summit, UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London and Paris Ministerial Meeting on Peacekeeping in the Francophones Environment. The workshop will discuss and draw conclusions about what concrete steps are required from concerned stakeholders (UN Security Council, UN Secretariat, and T/PCCs) to operationalise these visions and plans in order to improve capabilities and capacities in UN peace operations.

If the many challenges of tomorrow are to be met, it is essential for the international community in 2017 to remain steadfast in its efforts to enhance UN peace operations. The purpose of the Bali Workshop is to contribute to that important work with a focus on collective preparedness for UN peace operations and on enhancing their capabilities. This background paper serves to provide a framework for the workshop discussions, taking stock of recent developments and highlighting what capabilities are still missing and lacking as well as what the related consequences might be. But the paper also advocates for building stronger partnerships in capacity-building and training and concludes by proposing a number of questions for consideration in the workshop and working groups.

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view, opinion or position of the Hosts of the Workshop and the Challenges Forum Partnership.



<sup>1</sup> Challenges Forum, *United Nations Peace Operations 2020: The UN Reviews and Their Implications for Tomorrow's Missions*, Challenges Annual Forum Report (New York, 2016).

## Introcucon

The professionalization of peace operations has been ongoing since the mid-1990s.<sup>2</sup> Since then, various high-level reports have helped develop a stronger practice. Nevertheless, achieving interoperability between more than 120 troops and police contributing countries (T/PCCs) and building adequate capabilities for increasingly challenging operations take time. As UN operations have grown in size and complexity, the delivery of resources, assets and personnel required to effectively implement their mandates has become ever more demanding and not always adapted to the level of ambitions of the Security Council. As pointed out by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), “more complex and sometimes more dangerous operations require strengthened communications, situational awareness, greater interoperability between units, and better force protection”.<sup>3</sup>

In the last two to three years, this reform process of building and strengthening capabilities and capacities has increased in pace, in particular with the holding of the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in New York in 2015, the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London and the Paris Ministerial Meeting on Peacekeeping in the Francophone Environment in 2016. The purpose of these meetings was to expand the base of T/PCCs, to increase and improve the capabilities offered by Member States and most recently to substantiate their commitments. In essence, these unprecedented meetings were aimed at responding to new demands generated by current peace operations, to result in: i) “improved political and military planning throughout the mission life-cycle”; ii) “trained and equipped personnel that give missions the capability to deliver” the mandates authorised by the Security Council; and iii) a “high level of performance from civilian to uniformed peacekeepers, underpinned by effective and accountable leadership”.<sup>4</sup>

Capabilities, capacity-building, and training have been deficient for many decades in multidimensional peace operations. A shared understanding of the required standards for conducting effective operations, in accordance with their given mandates, has also been missing. The New York, London and Paris meetings raised awareness on how such gaps undermine the efficiency and performance of peace operations. In particular, the meetings highlighted that current peace operations suffer from shortcomings in three main areas: i) capabilities, including equipment and training; ii) the ability of missions to operate as a coherent force in a comprehensive manner; iii) and leadership. This paper argues that bridging those gaps requires better partnerships and sustained cooperation among all stakeholders, and including a greater synergy between UN Headquarter and missions as well as a stronger collective preparedness among T/PCCs.

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<sup>2</sup> See Alexandra Novosseloff, “La professionnalisation du maintien de la paix ou le travail de Sisyphe”, Global Peace Operations Review, 30 mars 2016, <http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/la-professionnalisation-du-maintien-de-la-paix-des-nations-unies-ou-le-travail-de-sisyphe/> (accessed 1 November 2016).

<sup>3</sup> Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Current and Emerging Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping”, September 2016.

<sup>4</sup> UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial: London Communiqué, 27 September 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/un-peacekeeping-defence-ministerial-london-communique> (accessed 1 November 2016).

## Taking Stock

As the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations stated, “closing the gap between what is asked of missions to protect civilians and what they can provide demands improvements across several dimensions: assessments and planning capabilities, timely information and communication, leadership and training, as well as more focused mandates”.<sup>5</sup> Improving capabilities, capacity-building, and training have been part of DPKO work strands since 2013-14, well before the 2015 reviews.<sup>6</sup>

- In 2014, a series of manuals was developed in cooperation with UN Member States to standardise the operating concepts, organizations, capabilities, training, and evaluation of the different types of units engaged in peace operations, namely: engineering, headquarters staff, logistics, maritime component, military police, reconnaissance units, riverine units, special forces, transport units, and aviation.
- In 2014, a Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) for International Police Peacekeeping was developed and articulated at the capstone level: “DPKO-DFS Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions”. A second tier thematic level guidelines were finalised in 2015-2016 on capacity-building and development; operations; command; and administration.<sup>7</sup> Current work is in progress on the third level of guidelines, which will provide manuals on specific areas of police peacekeeping.
- In May 2015, DPKO created the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell to “ensure proactive coordinated, forward-looking, and sustained DPKO/DFS engagement with UN Member States for the generation of important peacekeeping capabilities with a specific focus on rapidly deployable capacities”. The cell also assists in planning and coordinating mid- to long-term DPKO/DFS engagement with Member States, particularly contributing countries. It is engaged in supporting, guiding and coordinating strategic engagement with current and potential contributors of peacekeeping capabilities. To this end, the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) for managing commitments from Member States was created.<sup>8</sup> The PCRS website includes relevant resources, such as planning and training manuals (<https://cc.unlb.org/default.aspx>).

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, A/70/95-S/2015/466, 17 June 2015, p.11.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, A/70/95-S/2015/466, 17 June 2015; *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2 September 2015; United Nations, *Performance Peacekeeping - Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping*, December 2014; United Nations, *Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, A/69/968-S/2015/490, 30 June 2015; UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace – A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, 2015; United Nations, *External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division*. See Eli Stamnes and Kari M. Osland, *Synthesis Report: Reviewing UN Peace Operations, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Report n°2, 2016; Arthur Boutellis and Delphine Mechoulam, *Etat des lieux des opérations de paix de l'ONU : Un an après la sortie du rapport du HIPPO*, International Peace Institute, July 2016; *Making Reform Reality – Enabling Change for United Nations Peace Operations*, ZIF Background Paper, April 2016; Arthur Boutellis and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, *Working Together for Peace: Synergies and Connectors for Implementing the 2015 UN Reviews*, International Peace Institute, May 2016.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support Guidelines on Police Capacity-building and Development* (Ref. 2015.08); *Police Command in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions* (Ref. 2015.14); *Police Operations in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions* (Ref. 2015.15); and *Administration* (forthcoming).

<sup>8</sup> That system is replacing the old UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) created in 1993.

- Through 2015-2016, DPKO has been developing policy on “Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement” which defines the operational cycle of preparation and use of contributions from Member States. This policy is supplemented by two documents allowing the operational evaluation of units and of deployed staffs: the “Force and Sector Commanders’ Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in Peacekeeping Operations” and the “Evaluation of Force Headquarters in Peacekeeping Operations”. As Paul D. Williams put it, “this awkwardly titled document is arguably one of the most important in the history of peacekeeping because it details how the UN can improve the performance of deployed military units by ensuring a holistic approach by all stakeholders”<sup>9</sup>, through all the four stages of deployment (shaping, preparation, delivery, learning). DPKO has also elaborated a document (a Statement of Unit Requirement) by which T/PCCs can certify their preparedness and another one (Guidelines for Operational Readiness Preparation) to guide Member States in their pre-deployment training and in setting individual standards.

In parallel, three meetings were held under the auspices of Member States in which states made pledges or confirmed them in order to identify “the right types of capabilities and get them into the field in a timely manner”, with the objective to “delivering effective peace operations”<sup>10</sup>:

- During the “Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping” in New York (September 2015) under the leadership of the United States President<sup>11</sup>, more than 40,000 troops and police, as well as helicopters, military engineering companies and field hospitals, were pledged in a bid to boost UN peacekeeping capacities. Over 50 countries pledged to provide more than 40 helicopters, 15 military engineering companies and 10 field hospitals. China made one of the biggest commitments namely, President Xi Jinping pledged to set up a “permanent peacekeeping police squad and build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops”.<sup>12</sup> On the policing side, pledges included: 400 individual police officers, 25 Formed Police Units, including 2 specialized SWAT Units, 4 specialised guards units, and 8 specialized police teams. This summit was also an opportunity to commit Member States to continuous reform of peacekeeping, to modernising UN peace operations to “help meet persistent capacity gaps, improve the performance and capabilities of uniformed personnel, support rapid deployment and reinforce and enhance the foundation for future peacekeeping efforts”.<sup>13</sup> It is worth noting that only two pledges of francophone capabilities—a key and persistent capability gap—were made at this Summit. Barely 6 per cent of the pledges registered in the PCRS are from francophone Member States.

<sup>9</sup> Paul D. Williams, The Peace Operations Challenge for the Next Secretary-General, September 30, 2016.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> The Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping was co-organized by the United States in cooperation with Rwanda, Uruguay, Bangladesh, the Netherlands, Japan, Pakistan and Indonesia. A series of regional consultations 2014-2015 were convened by Rwanda, Netherlands, Indonesia, and Ethiopia, before the Summit in New York.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, Leaders’ Summit 2015, [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/leadersummit.html](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/leadersummit.html)

<sup>13</sup> White House, “Declaration of Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping”, 28 September 2015.

- The follow-up to the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping on the policing side was concentrated to the United Nations hosted Chiefs of Police Summit (UN COPS) in New York (June 2016). Ministers, Chiefs of Police and Gendarmerie and police representatives from 110 countries convened in New York to build on the police pledges made at the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in 2015. The Chiefs of Police Summit 2016 was aimed at seeking to fill critical gaps in UN policing. Priority areas included the need to increase francophone Formed Police Units (FPU): only 27 out of 71 FPUs are francophone, even though five out of the eight missions with FPU presence are francophone operations. Other areas of particular concern were insufficiencies in number of female police officers, quick reaction capabilities and gaps in contingency owned equipment and their self-sustainment.<sup>14</sup>
- In September 2016, the focus of the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London (September 2016)<sup>15</sup> under the leadership of the United Kingdom was on addressing the so-called "3 Ps": planning, pledges, and performance. DPKO confirmed that most pledges made at the Summit had been registered in the new PCRS and some had even been deployed. Many of the pledges had already been verified through Assessment and Advisory Visits (AAVs) by a team of experts from UN Headquarters. AAVs had been conducted to 20 TCC/PCC capitals by the time of the London Ministerial. A handful of countries, such as Canada, Tunisia, and Argentina announced new pledges, and most significantly, six countries pledged to provide units to the Rapid Deployment Level for 2017—Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. These pledges will help realise the concept of the vanguard brigade envisioned in the HIPPO report.<sup>16</sup> However, field support and host government related impediments to rapid deployment remain. As the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support acknowledged, "it is still not possible to stand-up a new mission in under six months from the point of the adoption of the Security Council resolution". Quicker, more flexible funding and procurement rules, for instance, still need to be established. Concerning "Women, Peace and Security", a range of proposals were put forward and Member States agreed, for example, to nominate more women candidates for positions of military observers and staff officers and provide more training that would allow them to serve in peacekeeping missions. Addressing discipline and conduct, in particular sexual exploitation and abuse was another key component during the London Ministerial. Canada will hold next year's UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Meeting.
- France together with the International Organization of La Francophonie hosted a ministerial conference in Paris on 26-27 October on peacekeeping in the French-speaking environment. More than 60 Member States

<sup>14</sup> UNCOPS, *United Nations Police gaps and capacity requirements*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/gaplisten.pdf>, (accessed 29 October 2016).

<sup>15</sup> UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial: London Communiqué, Ministry of Defence and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 8 September 2016: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/un-peacekeeping-defence-ministerial-london-communicue>

<sup>16</sup> The HIPPO report recommended that "the Secretariat should propose for Member State consideration proposals for a UN 'vanguard' capability and rapidly deployable integrated headquarters for new missions. The Secretariat should consult with Member States and regional organizations on the options for a regional and global capacity for rapid deployment capabilities, including to serve as bridging forces and prepare a proposal for Member States" (paragraph 195).

participated. While 60 per cent of all uniformed personnel are deployed to a UN francophone mission representing 55 per cent of the total UN peacekeeping budget, only about 20 per cent of peacekeepers are francophone. Against this background, the objective of the Paris meeting was threefold: i) to highlight the specific needs of peacekeeping operations deployed in such environment as a way to ensure that efforts undertaken by the international community to increase the resources of United Nations peace operations also benefit the francophone areas; ii) to discuss reinforcement of African peacekeeping capabilities in the francophone area; and iii) to look for precise commitments in order to develop the French-speaking capabilities of UN and African peacekeeping contingents, as well as their civilian counterparts. With regards to training, better use of regionally-focused national military institutions was mentioned, as well as the need for the UN to certify training institutions.<sup>17</sup>

With regard to more focused mandates, there have been various dialogues on the importance of providing UN peacekeeping operations with clearly defined and focused mandates, as well as key reviews on adequate resources based on a realistic assessment of the situations. However, more efforts need to be done, particularly on the enhanced consultation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and T/PCCs.

### **What has been achieved? What capabilities are still missing or inadequate? And what are the consequences?**

All these initiatives taken and programs established are laying the ground for better collective preparedness, but they are also a work in progress. Of the various pledges made at the 2015 New York Leaders' Summit, the UN was able to deploy 19 various units on the ground. All pledges are being processed through the PCRS' different stages to allow improved readiness and reaction, once the political decision to deploy troops is made. The PCRS is a system that is still being built by which the UN Secretariat will assess Member States contributions and align them better with the missions' gaps that remain to be filled. Overall many countries have committed to contribute new capabilities. Those capabilities are now registered and many have been assessed to meet UN standards and readiness criteria whilst the others are working with the UN to meet its standards. This will lead to better predictability of the capabilities of the units that the UN aims to deploy and more rapid deployment of them.

In peace operations in general, capabilities are often not up to the required standards and "training is significantly under resourced".<sup>18</sup> This has clear consequences for the performance of UN peacekeepers having to face sudden deteriorations in the security situation within their mission areas. For example, lack of sufficient mobility leads to an inability to protect civilians properly and therefore to implement the mandate; lack of information analysis capabilities prevents peacekeepers at every level from having a clear understanding of

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<sup>17</sup> See the conclusions of the co-chairpersons (Germany, Bangladesh, Canada, France, Senegal): [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/conclusions\\_conference\\_maintien\\_de\\_la\\_paix\\_cle0a2b97.pdf](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/conclusions_conference_maintien_de_la_paix_cle0a2b97.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> United Nations, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, A/70/95-S/2015/466, 17 June 2015, *op.cit.*, (paragraph 230).



their environment and constrains decision-making<sup>19</sup>; lack of adequate force protection makes all peacekeepers vulnerable to extremist attacks<sup>20</sup>; lack of fast reacting and well-equipped medical facilities exposes peacekeepers to unnecessary, life-threatening risks and is a significant disincentive to TCCs.<sup>21</sup> These are basic capabilities required for any military operation. Overall, “persistent capacity gaps mean that peacekeeping mandates cannot meet the high expectations placed upon them.”<sup>22</sup>

In order to have a more rationalized approach in addressing these difficulties, DPKO has identified, through its PCRS, a number of capability and training gaps, more specifically: quick reaction force (QRF) companies, medium utility helicopters, attack helicopters, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance units with drones. It also anticipates the gaps to remain with regards to francophone capabilities, female participation, and highly qualified staff officers and military observers. The gaps are listed in a paper that is updated by the UN DPKO on a quarterly basis as a first step to foster a common understanding and knowledge of the current situation. The next step is for Member States to develop various partnerships and to strengthen existing ones to collectively try to fill those gaps.

### **Building stronger partnerships in capacity-building and training**

T/PCCs are responsible for training and equipping their uniformed personnel and formed units prior to deployment. This includes both professional training to meet operational requirements and UN-specified training to ensure that personnel are able to operate in a UN mission context. To do this, T/PCCs must have institutions capable of delivering training in a competent and sustained manner. To enhance and facilitate interoperability among the T/PCCs, both in the field and in training, the UN Secretariat can offer guidelines, elaborate policies and standards, while bearing in mind the importance to closely consult with the C-34 as the only intergovernmental body mandated by the General Assembly to review comprehensively the whole question of UN peacekeeping operations. To this end, in addition to all the work undertaken since 2014, two new sets of guidelines are currently being elaborated: one on the “use of force”, and one on “collective training of the Force Headquarters”. A Handbook on Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) is also being developed.

But to bridge the gap between the capacities of T/PCCs, some Member States have undertaken for some time already “train and equip programs”.<sup>23</sup> Training and capacity- building have also to a certain extent been achieved through co-deployments, when two or more countries combine personnel to deploy to a peacekeeping operation. Operational partnerships have proven useful for new TCCs navigating the UN peacekeeping system for the first time, as well as small TCCs, which lack the resources to deploy and sustain entire units on their own. The benefits of partnering for these countries are numerous: to

<sup>19</sup> Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff, “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine,” New York: International Peace Institute, July 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Arthur Boutellis and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2016.

<sup>21</sup> Sara E. Davies and Simon Rushton, “Healing or Harming? United Nations Peacekeeping and Health,” New York: International Peace Institute, March 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Charles T. Hunt, “Peacekeeping Needs Reform, Not Just Reinforcement,” *Global Observatory*, 14 September 2016.

<sup>23</sup> See for example programs led by the United States in “FACT SHEET: U.S. Support to Peace Operations 2015 Leaders’ Summit on UN Peacekeeping”, 28 September 2015.

make up for shortfalls that prevent or hinder deployment; to receive assistance in navigating the UN's Memoranda of Understanding and other, sometimes arcane procedures and requirements; and to share mission burdens to the mutual benefit of the partners. Some smaller TCCs that partner with larger TCCs also receive free training and equipment from their larger partners. A number of countries have "graduated" to deploying formed units in UN peace operations by beginning their experience through embedding small numbers of their troops in another country's contingent.<sup>24</sup>

In its 2016 report, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), "encourages the Secretariat to continue to play a significant role in improving coordination among the capacity-building efforts of various regional, multilateral and bilateral actors directed towards establishing long-term and stronger relationships with current or potential troop-contributing countries, including through developing outreach strategies". It also urged "the Secretariat to facilitate capacity-building efforts using enhanced training material and through the application of "train-the-trainers" packages, including through pre-deployment visits in order to allow those conducting peacekeeping operations to focus on mission-specific requirements and to tailor the training and validation packages accordingly prior to deployment".<sup>25</sup> The HIPPO also underlined in its report the fact that "a more comprehensive medium-term framework for defining capabilities and performance improvement should be built from ongoing initiatives, along with a stronger global training partnership to address priority training requirements".<sup>26</sup>

At the London meeting, the UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Field Support welcomed "triangular partnerships" in providing and standardizing training between the UN, the needs (those receiving) and the resources (those providing). In Paris, the UN USG for Peacekeeping Operations argued that generating additional contributions from francophone Member States with limited resources had to be approached as a long-term endeavour, for example by building on existing defence cooperation partnerships that could be oriented more towards UN peacekeeping. He also encouraged the participants to explore new partnerships to build specific capacities of francophone Member States over the long term, for example helicopters, which remained in short supply.

On October 3rd, 2016, the first "training of the trainers center" opened in Entebbe. The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) also plays a role in this context. It provides a platform where representatives from civilian, police and military peace operations training centers from some 50 countries meet annually together with regional organizations to be briefed on and discuss the material developed by the UN in particular. A key challenge in the effective operationalisation of new guidelines is the lack of knowledge about their existence in the T/PCCs training providers. The annual IAPTC provides a mechanism that ensures that new material reach

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
<sup>24</sup> Donald C. F. Daniel, Paul D. Williams, and Adam C. Smith, "Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons- Learned from Operational Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping," *Providing for Peacekeeping* No. 12 International Peace Institute, August 2015. According to these authors, 41 cases of co-deployments have been registered so far.

<sup>25</sup> *United Nations Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/70/19, 15 March 2016, paragraphs 100 and 325.

<sup>26</sup> *United Nations, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, A/70/95-S/2015/466, 17 June 2015, *op.cit.*, p.13.



these trainers, and it is also an opportunity to encourage Member States to use the developed material properly. This should be a continuous partnership that also allows DPKO to receive feedback from the training community, adapt current materials to the changing peace operations environment, and entertain a permanent dialogue between all stakeholders, as underlined by the chart below.



## Conclusion


Improving interoperability between all T/PCCs is key to the effectiveness of current peace operations. Capacity-building and training are important elements of that global effort. It will not replace a deeper discussion among all peacekeeping stakeholders (Security Council, Secretariat, T/PCCs) and a stronger triangular cooperation<sup>27</sup> on how to conduct those operations and how to adapt the peacekeeping instrument with its principles of consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate, to current conflicts. It will not replace either a more effective compact to be established with the host nations in order to support rather than undermine the Security Council's resolutions and missions' mandate implementation. It is most probably high time for the UN to undertake a new doctrinal work on where to put the limits to peacekeeping operations.

<sup>27</sup> Alexandra Novosseloff, "Triangular Cooperation: Key to All", *Global Peace Operations Review*, 10 November 2015, <http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/triangular-cooperation-key-to-all/> (accessed 1 November 2016).

## Questions for Discussion

- How can we ensure that the recent pledges are delivered and contribute to strengthening capabilities and training, and ensure that the support is sustained in the long-term? How can we ensure that they enhance capabilities and training?
- What are the most urgent gaps and needs, and what role do T/PCCs and the UN Secretariat respectively play in meeting them? What role (if any) do regional organizations play in this regard?
- What benefits are there from partnering in training and capacity-building efforts? Are some partnerships more suitable for certain areas and are some more effective than others?
- How can communication between T/PCCs and the UN Secretariat on the gaps and needs be improved? The work done by PCRS is crucial in this regard, but is there a need to improve communication on policy and political aspects as well, and if so, how?
- How can partnerships best be developed in operations, in capabilities and in training? What forms of partnership would be best adapted to these three areas?
- How can capacity-building partnerships most effectively be facilitated?
- What factors related to senior mission leadership will be most critical in furthering the capabilities and capacity-building agenda?

## Current Peacekeeping Operations



Uniformed Personnel Contributed to UN Operations by Region of Origin, as of April 2016

