The First International Workshop on Challenges of Peace Support into the 21 st Century

The Swedish National Defence College Stockholm, September 26-27, 1997

The objective of the Stockholm workshop was to engage an international group of experts to explore and express more effective and legitimate ways of dealing with regional conflicts, bearing in mind the importance of satisfactory civil-military relations, the impact of information technology, the element of limited resources and the complexities related to integrating diverse national approaches to peace support activities.

The workshop series, involving three consecutive meetings, are organised in co-operation with the Russian Public Policy Centre, Moscow, the Institute of Diplomacy, Amman, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, London. The Russian Public Policy Centre hosted a conference on March 15-17, 1998. The third conference will be held in Amman at the Jordan Institutes of Diplomacy on October 17-21, 1998.

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Content

1. Introduction

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By Ms Annika Hilding
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"Peacekeeping" emerged in the early post World War Two period as an improvised solution to the challenge that the de-colonization process presented to the international community. The challenge was not quite foreseen in the United Nations Charter, which defined the use of force by the Organisation and its members in terms of "the most recent war", as interstate warfare with a well defined aggressor and collective security set in motion by the UN members against this state (or these states). As it happened, the UN saw very little activity in accordance with its planned recipe in Chapter V11 of the Charter. The Cold War blocked such action, although the Korean came close to being a Charter case. Between the mid-50's (the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East) and the end of the Cold War peacekeeping developed with a set of more or less generally accepted assumptions about "impartiality", "consent to UN force presence from the parties concerned", and "use of force only in self-defence". While practice in the field occasionally tended to deviate considerably from the model - the UN involvement in the Congo civil war (ONUC 1960-64) being the most obvious case - a peacekeeping culture evolved centred around a UN brigade of states frequently engaged in these operations: Canada, the Scandinavian countries, India, Ireland and a number of others. Peacekeeping was clearly not war waged against states-aggressors by the international community in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter; instead, it was a form of crisis management, providing holding operations while solutions were sought through negotiations and diplomatic means.

With the end of the Cold War, a new situation emerged. The deadlock between the superpowers was broken, both sides being interested in the dismantling of a number of Third World conflicts more or less related to the bipolar confrontation now being terminated. The result was a spectacular rise in the number of "peacekeeping operations" undertaken under

UN mandate and flag. "The system works", as President George Bush said in 1990 when raising the international posse against Saddam Hussein, thus suggesting that after a detour of some 45 years, the UN was back on track as intended in 1945, before the Cold War. The Great Powers were now co-operating, and in 1991 the UN did go to war in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter against an identified aggressor - although the actual operation against Iraq was left to a coalition of the willing managed by the United States.

The Gulf War, however, was a unique case and more traditional peacekeeping operations were conducted in different theatres in growing numbers during the early 1990's: in Cambodia, Angola; former Yugoslavia, and Somalia. The old prescriptions were put to use but under increasingly demanding conditions. It was now seldom a question of the UN acting as a buffer (or intermediary) between well-identified parties to a conflict. The Congo pattern, of "no order in the things" and the UN finding itself faced by chaos and disintegrating state structures inside one country, tended to repeat itself again and again. New formulas had to be found, and mandate references to Chapter VII multiplied as the going got tougher. This development culminated in 1993-95 with Bosnia and Somalia being the defining cases. Both became failures. In Somalia, the UN operation was discontinued and the "cause" given up; in Bosnia, hapless UNPROFOR was replaced by a massive military presence in the shape of a NATO-lead multinational army corps descending on the parties to the accompaniment of air strikes, artillery bombardment and diplomacy of the most arm-twisting and persuasive sort

The following years also demonstrated a rapid decline in both number and volume of UN peacekeeping operations. A new pattern had again emerged with regional conflicts being handled regionally by coalitions of the willing emerging from case to case. The UN remained committed to peacekeeping operations in the traditional mould, but the experiences of the early and mid-1990's had identified limits to how far the old system, invoked so triumphantly by President Bush, could actually work.

Generally, the feeling of there being lessons to be learned, experiences and models to be compared, coloured the debate after the UN Somalia and Bosnia debacles. This coincided with the launching of the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme - as well as more general political and economic tendencies towards "regionalisation" also in other regions than NATO Europe. PfP may be seen as a continuation of the CSCE process of confidence- and security-

building through transparency and co-operation. With PfP, joint training and participation in peace operations is seen as something valuable in itself, also beyond what the actual operations may achieve. The process is the message.

The time seemed ripe for reassessments, critical reviews and international co-operation, regionally but also within the larger UN setting, in order to produce new models for more advanced forms of "peacekeeping". Already the document produced in 1992 for the Security Council by the UN Secretary General under the heading "An Agenda for Peace" had launched a set of terms defined in relationship to one another - peace making, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peace enforcement- and gradually "peace support" emerged as an omnibus term for various activities not conducted under the full legitimisation of Chapter VII, i.e., not war, but involving a wide spectrum from traditional peacekeeping to more "muscular" (or "enhanced") operations. Above a11, peace support indicated "complex" or "composite" operations with a combination of military and non-military components.

Peace support has thus become a matter of both organisation and mandating (global, regional), of "doctrine" for how to use armed forces (to no small extent left unemployed by the end of the Cold War) in order economically and effectively to secure peace and stability in a new, more fluid situation with bipolar "discipline" fading. It has become a matter not only of international co-operation but also of actual integration of these forces as well as of military and non-military elements. And it has become a matter of new technologies.

It is obvious that different national "cultures" exist for how peacekeeping (or, now, peace support) is thought to be pursued. The Scandinavians have their model, which they have regarded as universally applicable, but which they have also been forced to adapt to new conditions in Bosnia. "Traditional peacekeeping" has been challenged just as much as more Rambo-esque approaches tried by the Americans in Somalia. A NATO version of peace support is developing - under strong British influence but also with the Scandinavians and other "traditionals" being in close contact.

At the same time, one has also had to recognise a model practised by Russia within the CIS and on former Soviet territory. With the likelihood of further regional initiatives being taken - such as the ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in West Africa - the need for more operational

co-operation, exchange of information and experiences, aiming also at a greater general "interoperability" - has emerged. Regional conflict management, through prevention as well as actual intervention in open conflicts, may have to be fashioned regionally - but the global mandate, once associated with UN peacekeeping as first organised in the 1950's, still remains not only as a symbolic issue but also as a very practical matter of economy, efficiency and mutual support. "Collective security" is still with us even though the term may apply differently than in 1945.

Against this background, the Swedish National Defence College, in September 1997, organised the first conference for the project "Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century". The project was started as a co-operative venture involving three institutions beside the Swedish Defence College: The Russian Public Policy Centre, the London School of Economics and Political Science and the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy. A second conference was held in Moscow in March 1998 and a third one will be held in Amman in October of the same year. The group of prospective partners has continued to grow and the involvement of a number of new institutions and a second series of conferences are now being planned for 1999 and 2000.

At the Swedish National Defence College, with its Department of Strategic Studies, we hope that this initiative will encourage and provoke new ideas, insights and possible recommendations for international co-operation in peace support operations. The "inclusiveness" and "multi-cultural" character of the "Challenges of Peace Support" initiative is intended to ensure representativity, dynamism and a wide horizon.

During the Stockholm workshop, documented in this volume, we looked at some of the main challenges of peace support. In the first place, by making a comparative analysis of various national doctrines of peace support, the aim was to increase the effectiveness and compatibility of contingents and doctrines. The speakers were asked to examine specific elements of the particular national doctrine, that they believed could enhance the international approach to peace support operations. Three working groups were structured so as to confront the various suggestions presented in the plenary with three problem areas: Domestic constraints on the troop contributing states, peace support flexibility against the background

of different military cultures and operational landscapes, and, finally, the use of force - is there an identifiable middle ground between enforcement and traditional peacekeeping?

On the second day, we turned to civil-military relations involving the political stage at the UN (as well as regional organisations), the national level, and the actual field operation. Again building on different national perspectives, the problems and possibilities of the relationship between civilian and military actors were analysed.

Finally, we addressed the issues of media, information technology and crisis management. This involved the "management" of media in actual operations, profiting from the media's presence and critical assessment of a developing crisis and the peace support role in relationship thereto. The challenges and opportunities of developments in information technology as an element of crisis management were analysed from three different national perspectives.

2. Challenges of Peace Support - Hosting Partners

Russian Public Policy Centre and Peace Support Operations

By Oleg Vishnevsky
(Major General and Executive Director, Russian Public Policy Center)

I am honoured to make a speech at the first session of the International Workshop on "Challenges of Peace Support: Into the 21 St Century" and to welcome its organizers and participants. On behalf of Professor Alexei Salmin - President of the Russian Public Policy Center Foundation, Member Presidential Advisory Council of the Russian Federation, I would like to address our special greetings to the hosts of the Workshop - Rear Admiral Claes Tomberg, Commandant, Swedish National Defence College, Professor Bo Huldt, Director, Institute for National Defence and Security Studies, Major General Dr. Marouf Bakhit Nader, Jordan Armed Forces, and Ms Annika Hilding, Workshops Coordinator.

The Russian Public Policy Center (RPPC) emerged as a result of the democratic revolution of August 1991, to facilitate civil society development in Russia. The creation of the Center and its transformation into an independent foundation were approved by decrees of the President of the Russian Federation - Boris Yeltsin.

Since that time the RPPC has been transformed into an independent nation-wide center for information, analysis, research, consultation and education.

The RPPC closely co-operates with more than 100 non-governmental organisations of all kinds. The Center maintains day-to-day contacts with the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of RF, both Chambers of the Federal Assembly, legislative and executive bodies of the major Russian regions.

The RCCP constantly develops its network of regional branches. At the present time 16 regional branches have been opened in the Russian key regions, and we are planning to open other branches in CIS capitals and abroad.

RPPC has several joint projects with leading domestic and foreign non-governmental organisations of European and Asian countries, such as Adenauer Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Carnegie Endowment, Heritage Foundation, NATO Information and Press Office and China Institute of International Strategic Studies, etc.

The RPPC has considerable experience in organising various international conferences, seminars, round table discussions, and meetings. Only for the last two years five international conferences and three seminars were held by the RPPC and attended by the representatives from 23 foreign countries.

The RPPC regularly publishes the "Politeia" magazine, scientific works and brochures concerning the political and socioeconomic situation in Russia.

Colleagues, we all need the national security concept, based on the primary of mental, moral and spiritual factors. Today we have to mobilize all ways, forms, and methods of work to create a personality of the non-agressive type, a safe society and state.

And as the Leader of the International Committee of Russian Duma, Mr Lou kin said, "The dialogue of deals is coming to its end". The time of practical dialogue and contact diplomacy has begun. But it is still sufficiently difficult, not because it is impossible to reach agreement in principle, but because the "the dialogue of deals" has generated an extremely tense situation. We can see examples of this in Russia, in the post-Soviet area, in other parts of the world.

In the course of our joint project we are expected to focus on working out scientific and practical recommendations, concerning this important sphere of international relations.

One of the objectives of our present session is a detailed discussion of the issues and the agendas of the second series of the conference, which is to be held in Moscow in March 1998. It seems expedient to us to organise a small working group, which will consider organisation and other questions.

We invite the participants of the conference and everyone interested in the development of reforms, democracy and civil society to establish creative contacts and mutual co-operation.

Jordan's Participation in Peace Support Operations

By Marouf Bakhit Nader,
(Major General and Vice President at Mutah' University for Military Affairs, Jordan)

Introduction

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has always been committed to peaceful means for the resolution of conflicts. Its policies have been predicated on an unwavering belief in dialogue and political options as the best mechanism for ensuring lasting security and stability. Jordan views security in its comprehensive definition, which includes social, humanitarian and economic security. It believes that regional and international cooperation is essential for bringing about and consolidating peace and stability. Accordingly, the Kingdom has supported all efforts for achieving peace in its region and beyond, and since 1989, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) have actively participated in the collective security arrangements sponsored by the United Nations in different parts of the world.

Jordan's experience in the field of peace support and peace keeping operations is relatively new. But the vigour and commitment the Kingdom has shown to such operations underline the high priority accorded by the Jordanian leadership to the UN activities in the field of peace keeping and peace building.

Jordan's Position on International Peace and Security

Jordan's participation in, and support for, UN peace keeping operations stem from a host of political, geographic and economic factors. Though a small country with limited resources, Jordan's role has been essential for maintaining peace and stability in the volatile Middle East. The importance of this role derives from the country's strategic location and the moderate policies it has followed since it was established early this century. In order to achieve economic development and coexist with its more powerful neighbours, the Kingdom followed balanced, peaceful and realistic policies that rendered it a force for moderation in the region. Jordan has adopted preventive diplomacy in maintaining peace in the area and resisted the

traditional Middle Eastern trends of resorting to war to deal with conflicts. By all standards, this is an important contribution to international peace and security.

Security and Defence Concept and Policies

Building and sustaining political and military stability in the Middle East has been a major pillar of Jordan's security policy. To achieve this strategic goal, the country has participated in numerous efforts aimed at containing or preventing regional conflicts. These efforts, which were made either bilaterally or in co-operation with other counter, include:

The Kuwaiti campaign of 1961 to defend the country against the Iraqi threat. The Saudi - Yemeni campaign of 1962 to establish peace. The 1975 campaign in defence of the eastern parts of Oman against the communist insurgency.

Jordan believes that maintaining regional security is essential for the national security of all countries of the area. Instability and security threats to any of the regional states will necessarily become a threat to Jordan's national security. The Kingdom believes that arrangements in the region must be based on respect and acknowledgement on the sovereignty, territorial integrity of other states and non-interference in their internal affairs. Jordan condemns violence and terrorism of all kinds and believes that they should be fought at all levels. Subsequently, all Jordanian military activities and participation in regional and intentional security efforts contribute to serving this purpose.

International Security

As viewed by Jordan, international peace and security are not an exclusive task of the UN or the Security Council. These are an international collective responsibility. The achievement of this noble goal requires the co-operation of all members of the international community. Jordan has repeatedly expressed its readiness to take part in any effort aimed at achieving this objective and has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations in various troubled parts of the world.

Humanitarian Causes

Jordan's contributions to regional and international peace have not been restricted to those made through the United Nations. The Kingdom has launched a number of unilateral initiatives through a number of organisations like the Hashemite Jordanian Committee for Relief. The Committee has implemented a number of relief programmes for a number of states that were suffering from either prolonged conflicts or natural disasters. These Jordan's Participation in Peace Support Operations include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Chechnia and Iran.

The humanitarian dimensions enjoy a special attention by the Jordanian Government, not only through its peace support participation, but also in its foreign as well as internal policies exhibited through its political stands in most international issues. Jordan's firm commitment to human rights was proved beyond doubt during delicate circumstances of excessive exposure to successive immigration waves that placed a great deal of political, social and economic pressures on the country. However, Jordan managed to provide successful humanitarian assistance, irrespective of political and ethnic sensitivities and economic implications. Commitment to human rights, particularly one's right to live with dignity in a conducive humanitarian environment is a basic Jordanian priority.

Although their peace support operations started under the UN umbrella in 1989, Jordan's political efforts at the international level actually started long before. It is significant to note that His Royal Highness Crown Prince El Hassan was the co-chairman of the "Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues" set up by the United Nations. This commission came into being in response to the urgency felt need to give humanitarian concerns the same level of experience and expertise usually accorded to economic and security matters. The Commission has an important role to play at the international level in the fields of human rights, protection of war victims, humanitarian relief programmes and implementation of provisions of international law in the conflict territories. The Commission's report, "Winning the Human Race" is an important document that identifies areas on which the international community can cooperate to ensure more effectiveness in dealing with humanitarian issues.

Aims and Benefits of Jordan's Participation

Jordanian participation in UN peace support missions is a practical application of one of the major pillars of the Jordanian security policy, which professes an organic relationship between Jordan's national security and the security of its region and international peace and stability. As such, Jordanian participation is a demonstration of the country's commitment to an international code of political conduct through productive involvement in collective efforts aimed at achieving regional and global peace and security. Jordanian participa tion is also:

An important source of pride for the people of Jordan, who view this effort as a form of positive, fruitful and productive interaction with the international community.

An opportunity to expose Jordan’s military to a new experience by working closely with other friendly armies. This experience will have a favourable impact on the armed forces’ ability to carry out future peace support operations. Of special importance is the opportunity allowed for junior officers to develop their own field leadership qualities. A model which can encourage political and military openness and transparency necessary for trust building in a volatile region.

Humanitarian Roles

Within the framework of UN peace missions, Jordanian Armed Forces, OAF have assumed the following humanitarian tasks:

- Providing protection and security to civilians in designated areas. Offering medical services to local populations.
- Helping immigrants and furnishing them with humanitarian services. Assisting in bringing displaced families together.
- Providing assistance to students in terms of transport and supplying books and stationaries.

- Maintaining road networks for public utility and repairing destroyed bridges and key communication components.
- Restoring basic amenities like power and water supply in conflict areas.

Lessons Learned

Despite the fact that Jordan's participation in peace support operations is fairly recent, the country's experience in this field has come at an interesting time in history of peace support operations that followed the end of the Cold War era. This experience has been rich and useful, and has been viewed with great interest at the local and international levels. It is logical to draw the conclusion that more involvement in such missions will further enhance the promising potential of Jordan's Armed Forces and will reflect positively on the image of the nation as a whole.

Rules of Engagement

There is no doubt that before 1989, most countries did not give peace support serious attention. However, since the end of the Cold War, the need for more competence in conducting peace support operations has become more pressing.

The experience of Jordanian units in former Yugoslavia indicates that a clearer and unambiguous mandate for peace support missions is essential. Consequently, a new set of rules of engagement based on more balanced political, humanitarian and military considerations may be required to ensure protection, credibility and effectiveness of UN forces.

Material Resources

The Jordanian experience has shown that JAFs equipment is compatible to those used by the UN, though the following points come to light. In most cases, participating states equip their units according to national scales rather than to UN standards, which at times hampers the mission accomplishment. Generally, the UN units are sufficiently equipped to provide standard support in an operational environment However, on some occasions, the fulfilment

of extra and urgent humanitarian needs requires more resources. The JAF has to analyse the effects of such situations on the operations of the Jordanian units and re-equip them accordingly.

In relation to the above mentioned points, the requirement of extra -medical services remains one major aspect as it has to be extended to the needy local population. The Jordanian army may consider the supply of extra medical potential to its deployed units for fulfilling any such unforeseen requirement. At times, UN operations require working in extreme weather. JAF may reconsider both scale and type of military clothing system for its UN troops to, render it more suitable for working in severe weather conditions.

In certain circumstances, an availability of engineering vehicles and equipment is vital for the mission accomplishment Jordanian units are equipped according to the national operational scale which may be reviewed for even better performance and task accomplishment.

Better communication is essential to effective UN operation. JAF may put more operational emphasis on improving communication potential of its units in the mission area.

Logistical Support

In a few cases, Jordanian units had to depend on Amman for technical support and spare parts supply, either due to their unavailability in the local market or because of war conditions which left some major equipment out of order for little longer than usual. This underlines the need for further developing the UN spare parts support system.

Human Resources

Language

With English being the UN working language, Jordanian military observers and liaison officers, are able to communicate well with the UN officials. However, language barriers do create a few problems for the troops who are not so well conversant in the language. In the context of general working environment, some difficulties were faced in communicating with

other participating forces. But a major problem was communicating with local people in their own native language. JAF has already taken adequate and effective measures to address this problem.

Troops Training

The Jordanian Armed Forces have recently established a UN specialised institution to handle the following training aspects brought to light by the experiences: Training on technical aspects of peace-keeping operations that are not included in the basic military training. Training on negotiation skills, contact, communications, liaison and other special skills required for a UN military observer. Training to carry out the mission under severe cold weather. Briefings and data base concerning political and geopolitical background of the conflict in the mission area.

Medical Training

JAF is presently seeking to prepare medical units comprising medical practitioners and paramedics specialised in treating peculiar diseases normally associated with particular areas like Malaria in tropical regions and frostbite in cold areas. Preparing these medical teams is an essential necessity to sustain an advanced health status among UN military units and personnel and to be able to provide medical services to the civilians in the mission area.

Environmental Preservation

Jordanian units have demonstrated an advanced level of sense of responsibility in this field. However, there remains a requirement of a general directive by the UN in order to streamline the overall procedures governing environment preservation in the mission areas, taking into account the political and moral responsibilities of the participating governments and troops.

Civil-Military Affairs

Jordanian contact and liaison activities have proved to be effective between and within Jordanian units and their UN command centres and other UN units. Better coordination

between UN peace-keeping missions and other UN agencies working in the mission area may further be improved for higher level of performance. Liaison with local governments, rival parties and NGOs in the mission area completely depended on the English language skills of local liaison officers, a matter that has already been referred to.

Conclusion

Jordan's peace support experience is relatively new, but has been rewarding and educational. The Jordanian army seeks to maximise the benefit from this experience by continuing to participate in UN missions. Jordan's support for the UN peace-keeping activities is a reflection of the country's commitment to efforts aimed at serving the cause of peace. Jordan, under the Hashemite leadership, will remain devoted to this noble goal.

3. Peacekeeping Since the End of the Cold War: Managing "Internal", Regional and Local Conflict

Peacekeeping since the End of the Cold War

By Jan Eliasson
(Ambassador and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden)

The challenges of future peace support operations are tremendous, and success in promoting long-lasting peace and security will require common efforts from all relevant actors. One important way to facilitate such a united approach is to stimulate international debate on issues related to future peace support - and thereby building common values on definitions, division of responsibilities, civil-military co-ordination etc. This series of three workshops will hopefully contribute to our common understanding of how to manage future conflicts - and perhaps even more important - how to prevent them from happening.

Peace Support Activities take place in a security context that has changed dramatically. Internal strife, not nations at war, characterises conflicts of today. Gradually it has become obvious that the notion "security" is no longer limited - was it ever? - to the military security of States. It relates as much to the well being of the individual and to the conditions for the earth's survival. The trend over the last decade points in the direction of an increased number of domestic conflicts and less traditional wars between States.

Though the centre of gravity may be shifting, we will most likely see conflicts between nations also in the years to come. One reason for this may be that competition for resources probably will be a source of disputes and conflict more often than in the past.

Water is already a source of conflict in the Middle East and in several other places. A future increased demand combined with the necessity to share scarce global commons like water, minerals and oil more equally between regions, countries and their growing populations will put considerable strain on international solidarity.

Why was it that while the end of the Cold War made it possible for democracy to gradually make new conquests, it also made former satellite States and new-born democracies erupt into conflict and civil wars? In Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, an increasing number of democratic societies have been emerging. The long awaited freedom and accumulated needs for civil rights as well as for new goods and services, brought about expectations for immediate results and put a tremendous pressure on the political leadership of these nations. How do you run a democratic society without having ever experienced such a system?

Sources of conflict, ethical and religious, that were for long suppressed but not always forgotten, suddenly surfaced and had free scope, sometimes severely exploited by unscrupulous political leaders and factions fighting for power. Terror against civilians and ultimately the complete breakdown of States have too often been the result.

How do intra-state conflicts differ from the traditional ones? Civil wars are often more complex than international conflicts. The mediation in the war between Iran and Iraq was demanding and the shuttle diplomacy between Baghdad and Teheran was a difficult exercise. From the point of view of conflict resolution and professional diplomacy, however, it was uncomplicated in relative terms. The work involved the issue of going back to internationally recognised borders, an exchange of prisoners of war, it pertained to negotiations for a peace agreement All this was addressed in a resolution. It was a matter of classical diplomacy.

Civil wars, however, raise other difficult problems. Apart from the political aspects, there may be military, economic, social, religious, ethnic and other considerations in a complex blend. Civil wars are often very cruel and tend to hit civilians rather than soldiers. Today, women and children are the main victims of violent conflicts. The different nature of intra-state conflict calls for a different response. And the borderline between civil wars and international conflicts is often very thin. Furthermore, internal conflicts may easily escalate and develop into regional conflicts. One example: when the people of Rwanda became victims of genocide, this produced vast refugee flows into neighbouring countries. Refugees and soldiers were mixed up in camps, offensives were carried out across the border and the conflict became regionalised.

In this new security context we need to involve the UN Security Council, not only in traditional conflicts between states, but also in regard to internal conflicts. The formal obligation to respect national sovereignty must not be made an obstacle for international action when parts of the civilian population are being victims of genocide or other acts of terror. Sovereignty first of all stands for responsibility.

For the UN, the avoiding and suppression of war has been the number one priority for more than 5O years. The UN Charter imposes an obligation on Member States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. If the peoples of the United Nations are still determined to fulfil the introductory words of the UN Charter, that is to"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" it is now time to recognise that this objective applies equally to conflicts within states.

How, then, should future Peace Support Operations be designed? Is it at all possible to "manage" ongoing conflicts in different parts of the world? And if so - who should be doing what? Perhaps, a point of departure could be to agree that there is not only one way, of doing it - and that it is certainly not an easy task.

But let us focus on the possibilities and the potential of the international community rather than joining the contemporary gloomy choir predicting multiplying problems. The member states of the United Nations have entrusted the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In looking at new ways of exercising this responsibility in the future, the UN needs to promote international debate on peace and security. It has to engage more member states in developing the concepts of Conflict management for the 21st Century. It should make the mechanisms already available more effective and efficient, and develop the capability for early action. It should observe the need for media strategies as an integrated part of peace support efforts. It should look into more efficient methods of intelligence/information sharing. And it must reach out to partners - be it regional organisations, NGO:s, research institutions or others - in establishing a world wide web of actors with the potential of addressing future conflicts with the appropriate mix of activities. And finally - it should focus increasingly on conflict prevention. After this

demanding list, let us remember that we the member states - share the responsibility for future UN policy in this regard.

We should not try to build one universal model applicable to each and every conflict. It is rather about finding a way to design a tool-box from which to pick pieces to form the right blend on a case-by-case basis. It is about finding the right division of responsibility between global, regional and local actors with respect to their different comparative advantages. We need to stimulate new and creative ways of establishing mechanisms for an international response when peace and security are threatened. Peacekeeping operations in their traditional sense will still be needed but we cannot meet today's diversified conflicts equipped with only yesterday's tools.

The Fiftieth Second General Assembly is about to start and I anticipate that one of the major debates will concern the priorities of the organisation. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of the Organisation there has been a tendency towards polarisation of this discussion. For what: purposes should the UN be used? Some member states argue that economic and social development should be the main task. Others advocate that peace and security and promotion of human rights are the core activities of the Organisation.

It is essential for the future legitimacy of the UN that all member states consider it worthwhile to maintain the global dialogue in their own global organisation. Consequently, it's not an either-or solution we should look for but rather a both-and. Assisting poor countries in their economic and social development, removal of unjustified trade barriers, alleviation of debt burdens - all this is essential in the context of addressing the root causes of conflict And by prevention, containment and settlements of violent conflicts, we increase the possibilities for developing economies to prosper and for ordinary people to lead a normal life. These areas of UN activities are intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

We need a strong UN as a global forum where people of the world's nations can meet on equal terms, in mutual respect, for constructive discussions on our common future. It is not in the long-term interest of peace and prosperity that some nations are excluded from global markets or politically neglected. Nor is it in the interest of any nation, and certainly not small

and medium-sized nations, that the responsibility for peace and security is shouldered exclusively by a few major powers.

In the process of reviewing the concept of peace support activities we need to address the shortcomings of mechanisms already established, but perhaps the more important part pertains to creating a new attitude among different actors towards new ways of co-operation, in order to blend different means and measures to achieve an appropriate mix of components.

A lot of energy is now put into the process of improving the established system of UN peacekeeping. For example, the UN has been criticised for not being able to deploy military forces quickly enough. Several on-going projects are now aiming at enhancing the UN capability in this respect The creation of a Rapidly Deployable Mission HQ in New York is underway. A few weeks ago Secretary General Annan could officially inaugurate SHIRBRIG, the Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade, in which Sweden together with Austria, Canada, Denmark and Norway are the first nations to participate. The UN Standby Arrangement System has seen quite some progress over the last years with some 60 Member States indicating a capacity of 80.000 men and women to be put to the disposal of the UN, some at short notice. The logistical framework has been reviewed, international training standards have been furthered and the information gathering system has been improved.

This is all very important and efforts to complement as well as fine-tune the system should continue. There is however a risk that in concentrating on enhancing only one part of the overall system available for peace support, we may neglect the need for developing components of political, humanitarian and civilian nature, and the need for an integrated approach. We are still dealing to a large extent with adding the finishing touch to the military component of peace support operations.

The shortcomings of some missions in the past is not primarily a problem related to the military component as such, but rather to be explained by mistakes at the strategic/political level: unclear mandates became subject to different interpretations, mandates were not always matched by the means to implement them, resolutions were sometimes unrealistic and the member states of the UNSC advocated solutions for which they themselves were not prepared

to allocate resources, in spite of early warning that a specific situation would deteriorate, the political response has sometimes been to slow.

The military component in peace support operations is normally well trained, well equipped and sufficiently good in delivering its product This is leading to the conclusion that there is now a more pressing need to improve other components of peace support missions, as well as the co-operation and division of work between all these components. And we should not be doing this only from a military perspective.

Civilian police is one component holding a potential for an extended role in future peace support activities. The initiative taken by Sweden during it's Presidency in the UNSC last July, led to a Presidential statement, in -which the Council recognised an increasingly important role for civilian police in contributing to the building of confidence and security in order to prevent conflict, to contain conflict or to build peace in the aftermath of conflict.

The statement furthermore encouraged states to make available appropriately trained civilian police and underlined the importance of the inclusion of legal expertise in civilian police contingents. It stated the need for close co-ordination between civilian police and other components and encouraged states to organise joint training between civilian and military components designated for international missions. Sweden has since established a function as co-ordinator for joint training of civilian and military personnel.

Humanitarian activities, human rights monitoring, demining, infrastructural projects, electoral assistance, institution-building - the list of complementary activities is long. Though not always relevant in each emerging conflict and certainly not often implemented concurrently, they should all be part of a comprehensive approach towards peace support.

Finally a few words on conflict prevention. The absence of armed conflict does not equal lasting peace. Given the complex deliberations preceding the deployment of a multifunctional peace support mission, given tae enormous costs of keeping huge forces for long periods of time, given the occasional lack of political will to commit resources - it is time to give peace a chance also by trying harder and more systematically to prevent violent conflicts. The fire-

brigade will still be needed but it would not hurt to put more emphasis on identifying the arsonists at an early stage.

Prevention is seldom heard of. It does not often make the news. Like in the case of the heart surgeon and the nutritionist, the money and attention is directed to the more spectacular field of work. It may be executed through lengthy discussions far from the political hot spots of the world. But prevention is not only a method or technique, it is a policy choice that has long-term implications. Prevention and early action are priorities for Sweden also in the Security Council.

A policy for conflict prevention should address the root causes of conflict, focus on building common values and strengthen international co-operation. As stated earlier political, economic and social development are key factors for stability in nations and regions provided the wealth is fairly distributed among a majority of the population. Thus these factors are crucial for long-term peace and security. Most multilateral work is about building common values. This is, of course, an on-going process where we do not always think of progress in one particular field as important also in the field of preventing conflicts. Human rights, free trade, social justice - they all affect the disposition towards future conflict. International co-operation, finally, should continue to be strengthened in the interest of peace and security. International interdependence makes future conflicts less likely. We need to cooperate and coordinate at all levels, between all actors, at all times.

International Peace Operations

By Latish Nambiar
(Lieutenant General and Director of the United Services Institution of India; former Commander UNPROFOR)

There can be no two opinions on the fact that, in the foreseeable future, the international community will continue to be called upon increasingly to play a role in the resolution or management, of conflicts in various regions of the world. It is in recognition of this fact that over the last couple of years, there have been so many meetings, seminars, discussions, and workshops on the subject, as also considerable written work to try and analyse, assess, and determine what are the most effective ways of dealing with the challenges of maintaining international peace and security - the primary purpose of the United Nations Charter. The subject of peace operations and the United Nations role in it is vast. I shall therefore in this presentation try to restrict myself to identifying some of the major aspects of peacekeeping in the current global environment, so as to place the subject in a perspective that may enable us to frame our responses more effectively. My credentials for presuming to speak on the subject with some degree of authority are derived from the fact that besides having participated in such deliberations in my own country, and in various parts of the world over the last four years, I had the honour and privilege of setting up the United Nations operation (UNPROFOR as it was then called) in the former Yugoslavia as the first Force Commander and Head of Mission in March 1992, and running it for a year, the full period of my assignment; that I did not accept the United Nations offer of an extension, and preferred to return to the rolls of the Indian Army is another matter altogether. On my return, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, I was responsible for overseeing, among other duties, the Indian commitment to various United Nations missions Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, and so on; in that capacity, I visited Somalia in May 1994, and was able to see at first hand, many aspects of the United Nations operations in that country.

The premise on which international peacekeeping is based is that violence in inter-state and intra-state conflict can be controlled without resort to the use of force or enforcement measures. Needless to say, there are many theorists, and I dare say, a few practitioners, who are of the view that force needs to be met with force. An objective analysis of the history of

conflicts would make it evident that the use of force and enforcement-measures, particularly in internal conflicts, tend to prolong the conflict rather than resolve it speedily. This however, is not to suggest that use of force is to be ruled out altogether; in certain circumstances, use of force may be called for as a catalyst for peaceful resolution. Enforcement actions, by their very nature, however, are subjective and biased towards one side or the other, and as such, if prolonged, which they inevitably will be, particularly in intra-state, or internal conflicts, tend to be counter-productive. Peacekeeping initiatives, on the other hand, will also ensure only a status-quo, and thus be equally counter-productive, unless complemented by associated initiatives like peace-making (working towards a negotiated settlement) and peace-building (working towards the restoration of an equitable economic and social order, among other nation building activities). Peace-keeping operations, being more objective and non-partisan, lay an acceptable base for the pursuit of peace-making and peace-building.

United Nations peacekeeping as it evolved over the years became an extraordinary art because it called for the use of military personnel not to wage war and prevail over an adversary, but to prevent fighting between belligerents, to ensure the maintenance of cease-fires, and to provide a measure of stability in an area of conflict while political negotiations (peace making) were conducted. To that extent, it is vital to distinguish between the concept of "collective security" and peace-keeping in the international environment. Whereas the concept of "collective security" is that of a punitive process, designed to be carried out with some degree of discrimination, but not necessarily impartially, "peace-keeping" is politically impartial and essentially non-coercive. Hence, as we all know, peace-keeping was, and always has been, based on a triad of principles that gave it legitimacy, as well as credibility; namely, consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force only in self defence. Another major aspect of the evolution, besides that of the types of conflicts in which peacekeepers are being increasingly required to operate, is the wide range of activity that most missions are now involved in; assistance to and safeguarding humanitarian relief operations, monitoring human rights violations, assistance in mine clearance, monitoring state boundaries and borders, provision of civilian police support, rebuilding of logistics infra-structure destroyed by fighting, and the organisation and conduct of elections.

Recent deployments have been undertaken in civil war type situations where either there are no agreements at all (as in Somalia), or agreements on deployments are tentative or tenuous (as in the former Yugoslavia). In such situations, co-operation with the peacekeepers is either not forthcoming, or is very lukewarm, whether it be from recognised Governments, belligerent parties or their supporters; it is rarely forthcoming from local warlords. The forces deployed have to deal with uncontrolled, or ostensibly uncontrolled, elements who may indulge in action even against the peacekeepers to secure for themselves weapons and equipment, as also humanitarian aid supplies.

It is inevitable therefore that the traditional time-tested concepts of peacekeeping of the years preceding the end of the Cold War, are being looked at afresh and reviewed in context of the circumstances in which peacekeepers are now deployed, and the experience gained. Operations launched by the international community and the United Nations in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia, Angola and Rwanda in particular, have revealed the need for more comprehensive preparation, training, co-ordination between various agencies, understanding of the nuances of each situation, more credible decision making in the Security Council and other fora, an effective command and control apparatus, both in the mission area and at the United Nations, and greater stress on ensuring the personal security of the peacekeepers by deploying with the muscular wherewithal necessary, together with assured backup in extreme circumstances.

Decision-making by the Security Council will therefore take time, which is as it should be. The crucial question must be whether the United Nations should get involved at all. The most important aspect to emerge from the experiences of the last five years, is that the United Nations organisation was never designed to handle commitments of the magnitude of Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia - not even individually, whereas all three were undertaken, more or less simultaneously in 1992/93. An appropriate division of responsibilities between the United Nations and other international actors in the spheres of preventive action, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement action, and peace-building, needs to be arrived at in order to enable more effective and comprehensive responses to conflict situations around the world. Such division of labour should obviously take advantage of the different capabilities and interests of regional organisations, national governments, and non-governmental organisations. Regional organisations would need to assume greater

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. For quite some years yet, however, it appears that enforcement action will have to be undertaken by coalitions of "the willing and the able"; of course, this will only happen when the key international players are adequately engaged by developments in a particular area.

The inordinate delay in the arrival of troops for the missions that were set-up for the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and to some extent Somalia, was a most frustrating feature of the process; even more inexcusable was the inadequate response for Rwanda. One of the measures that has now been instituted to overcome this inadequacy is the earmarking of "stand-by" forces by member states; very commendable and needs to be pursued with vigour. However, it is a moot point whether such "stand-by" forces would in fact be available immediately on demand by the United Nations Headquarters; the Rwandan experience indicates that political expediency and domestic compulsions will always dictate the responses of member states. Having analysed the aspect of ready availability of forces for United Nations peace operations in some detail, I am of the view that the only realistic answer for meeting crisis situations that call for speedy deployment of military forces for the maintenance of international peace and security, is to raise and maintain a standing United Nations force of a defined composition, properly trained and equipped, to be available to the United Nations for immediate deployment when authorised to do so by the Security Council. Reservations about costs and possible biased utilisation at the behest of the more powerful members of the Security Council, are aspects that need to be resolved in context of the restructuring of the Security Council. Utilisation of such a force is premised on its early replacement by another force duly constituted by the United Nations, by a regional organisation, or by a multi-national force, as decided by the international community.

Recent experiences have shown that, on the ground there is a growing "grey zone" between the two well-defined responses of traditional peacekeeping and that of collective enforcement as defined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This "grey zone" is, in effect, the space between traditional peacekeeping (including an appropriate application of force for self-defence), and all-out war fighting. Situations encountered in the "grey zone" often require responses that are neither traditional peacekeeping nor full-blown enforcement action, but something in between. Confusion between peacekeeping and enforcement action, including the tendency to slide from peacekeeping to enforcement action, and then back again, has

proved to be very dangerous. This is essentially what has been witnessed in Somali, Liberia, and the former Yugoslavia, with disastrous consequences in all three cases. This confusion has arisen precisely because no effective mechanisms have been devised for responding to the challenge of the "grey zone".

Some examples of contingencies that may arise in the "grey zone" are as follows:

- When an armed faction in a conflict unilaterally blocks the route of a relief convoy, preventing it from gaining access to a population in distress; they are not resorting to the use of weapons, but have effectively blocked the route. A variation of this situation could be when unarmed women and children block the route.
- When an area deemed to be under the protection of a peace-keeping force is attacked or over-run by a party to the conflict.
- When a group or detachment of peacekeeping troops comes under attack from a faction with superior fire power.
- When peacekeepers are taken hostage.
- When a "no fly zone" is violated.

These developments in the "grey zone", place peacekeepers in an untenable position in various ways. At the operating level, because they are lightly armed, they usually lack the capacity for escalated armed response. The effectiveness of peacekeepers is dependent not on their ability to impose their will by overwhelming force, but rather on the moral authority conveyed by their multi-lateral presence. The predicament of peacekeepers is further compounded by the sentiment of public opinion that does not always appreciate why peacekeeping military contingents seem powerless to respond to force by force, even in the face of aggressive actions or atrocities. The fact that peacekeepers are there to play an essentially diplomatic rather than a military role, is little understood by the public at large.

Many of the countries of the "developing world" that provide contingents for United Nations peace operations, do not have the infrastructure and facilities for the effective conduct of training and preparation of contingents and personnel. It is therefore for consideration by fora such as this, whether there is a need to examine the desirability and feasibility of utilising available expertise on the subject within various regions by setting up regional training

centres. Besides being cost effective, such an arrangement would also ensure International Peace Operations a degree of standardisation, co-ordination and promote better understanding.

The Blue Helmet no longer provides the protection it used to in earlier days. Hence the need for top class equipment and maximum fire-power with flexible Rules of Engagement to deal with armed bandits or miscreants who target peacekeepers or property. The Rules of Engagement for each mission are drawn up by the Force Commander or Head of Mission based on the mandate for the mission, the resources made available to the force, the terms of the agreement arrived at with the parties to the conflict, the prevailing ground situation, and so on. In all operations other than those that fall under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it is to be assumed that the use of force will be restricted to the minimum necessary to deal with a given situation. In the light of recent experiences dealing with intra-state conflict situations, it would appear prudent to ensure that all future peacekeeping contingents be equipped for the "worst case" scenario, so that they can respond with appropriate force in self defence when attacked.

The importance of the media, both electronic and print, in whatever activity undertaken cannot be overstated. There is possibly no other single factor that has a greater influence on the evolution, preparation, and conduct of a peace operation, than this. Some operations in the recent past were rushed into, without adequate preparation and thought, purely because of pressures generated by media reports; in other cases, conduct of operations in the mission areas has been influenced by media coverage, even to the extent of being against the better judgement of commanders on the ground. It is therefore imperative that the international community recognise the omniscience of this vital element of society today, and while using it to good effect to further the cause of international peace and security, have the strength to resist the pressures for deployment of forces without all implications having been taken into account, and full preparations made. Peace missions that are set up must therefore have an effective public information capability from the very outset; to that end, suitable personnel with the necessary background and experience, as also the equipment required must be identified for availability at short notice.

Another major aspect I wish to bring to your attention is that of ‘command-and-control’ of a peace operation. There is only one option - there can be no compromises. All forces and personnel deployed in a mission area, must take orders from the Head of Mission or the Force Commander, and implement them in the correct spirit. It. is for the Head of Mission or the Force Commander to be careful and discreet in decisions that are sensitive; some guidance from the United Nations Headquarters may well be necessary but backing must be total. All this, however, means that the hierarchy and the mission headquarters must be so organised and structured as to breed confidence in the contributor nations and the personnel who form part of the mission. The archaic system that was being followed earlier of getting together an equitable representation at headquarters of personnel from all or most of the countries contributing troops to the mission, is not workable under the conditions that prevail today, increasingly dangerous as they are. Mission headquarters and other headquarters if dealing with more than one or two contingents, must comprise personnel who have preferably worked together before, have a working knowledge of the language of the mission, and have a knowledge of the working of the United Nations or other international organisations. Such a requirement could be met if the United Nations sets up one, two, or three regional headquarters, which in the normal course would monitor and report on developments within delineated regions and undertake liaison and training advisory visits to countries that have earmarked "stand-by" forces, and such headquarters can then provide nucleus staff for a mission headquarters at short notice. Another alternative is that a United Nations Staff College be set up, preferably in a developing country like India, that has unique experience in peace operations, and the nucleus for a mission headquarters at short notice be found from such an institution. The requirement for suitable personnel to man the public information apparatus of a mission could also be built into such organisations.

It is probably no revelation to those who have operated at mission headquarters level, that for reasons that defy logical explanation, the stand-off between the military and civilian staff is universal. Whereas there is no question of the total dedication of both categories of personnel to the success of the mission, it is undeniable that a good deal of the time and energy of the Head of Mission or the Force Commander is taken up on the resolution of this form of internecine warfare. This drawback could also possibly be addressed by having civilian, including police personnel, posted to the regional headquarters or United Nations Staff College, thus enabling better understanding and cohesion when the various components are

deputed to a new mission. Associated with this subject is a similar, but even more unfortunate dimension of operating in the mission area; that of the almost total lack of understanding between the military and personnel working with non governmental humanitarian aid agencies. The primary reason for this is of course the fact that the agenda of the agencies need not always be along the same track as the mission operation. It is possible with training, interaction and more concerted efforts at understanding one another, this serious lacuna may be addressed; though I have a feeling it will take a lot of effort.

It is vital that due attention be paid to the utilisation of modern technology to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Whereas this aspect receives stress among contingents from the "developed" countries due to reasonably ready availability at national level of the type of equipment that assists in the conduct of peace operations, there is an imperative need for a degree of institutionalisation of this process to enable "developing" countries to also be covered by this "umbrella". There is of course, the question of costs; modern technology does not come cheap. The international community would therefore need to be provided the financial resources for the purpose. Such investment is, in any case, preferable to the consequences of conflict.

International peace operations are the best area for effective and increased military to military co-operation, which if properly orchestrated would not only serve the interests of international peace and security, but also lead to better understanding between otherwise hostile armed forces. With the nomination of "stand-by" forces by member countries of the United Nations for deployment in peace operations, the scope for periodic interaction and training increases; thus laying the foundations for more effective joint participation in international operations; compatibility of equipment, particularly communication equipment, will make for better understanding of common operating procedures. As we look into the 21st Century, it is therefore essential that we do not allow the perceived inadequacies of some recent operations to cloud our judgement, and swing from one extreme of attempting to undertake too much, to undertaking too little. There is so much the international community can do to ensure the maintenance of peace and security; it cannot absolve itself of this onerous responsibility.

4. Comparing Peace Support Doctrines: Terminology, Planning and Methods

International Peace Support Operations: Co-operation and Co-ordination

By Claes Tornberg
(Rear Admiral and Commandant, Swedish Armed Forces War and Staff College 1990-1996 and Swedish National Defence College 1997-98)

My belief is that for the foreseeable future, we can neither change the basic way in which the United Nations works nor the nature of the international system itself. We must instead accept them both as they are and put our efforts towards achieving a deeper understanding and broader knowledge of the two systems. If successful, we will hopefully, gradually improve co-operation between participating organisations and perhaps in the long term, create changes.

We have differences in origin and professional cultures. Different organisations have their own agendas and depending on profession, people have different reasons for achieving their goals. One of the overarching challenges for the International Community, and peace support operations to successfully resolve conflicts and achieve mandates, is to enhance co-operation and co-ordination between the intervening elements in a given conflict area.

There are, of course, many reasons for this. First, there is friction in co-operation resulting from differences in culture and language. The language obstacle may have less impact on co-operation than culture, even though the inability to communicate is obviously also important, especially in the field, where it is too often a reality. Differences in culture constitute a barrier, a difference with many things to consider. The obvious difference in geographic origin is noticeable, but as an obstacle to efficient peace support operations, this is both difficult and too sensitive to accept on the other hand, I think that different professional cultures are a far more challenging concept, producing more solid barriers between people, than do barriers based on geographic origin. Professional cultures are very homogeneous. Certain professions attract certain character types, which, in turn, are reinforced by their process of experience

and education, which results in particular patterns of behaviour. Mr Enrique Horst, Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary General in Haiti expressed this process and contradictory behaviour as follows; "Human Rights specialists tend to be opinionated, independent, individualistic, and not too disciplined, even if they do end up working well in a team. Police Officers have a natural tendency to be operational and not necessarily inclined to engage in institutions building. The military, accustomed to acting within a command structure, is the component with the strongest tendency to behave like a structure within a structure. This is unfortunate, given that their analytical skills, discipline and ability to quickly complete tasks would greatly benefit other sections of the mission".

Second, there are mainly two ways in which people regard the objective and purpose of their work and engagement in the area. There are professions that are victim oriented in their objective, such as the Humanitarian Organisations and Non Governmental Organisations. Other professions, like the military deployments, tend to be more mission oriented. The two approaches are not always compatible and cause counterproductive agendas and inefficiencies of operations.

The key remedy for the challenges facing peace support operations as we enter the 21st century is the improvement of training and education in the area of peace support. Working out a peace support environment based on unity of effort has to be seen in a long perspective. There are probably no short cuts. Big issues such as the changing of attitudes, acceptance of differences in cultures, training in foreign languages etc. is a process of persistent and effective training. Establishing an understanding and respect of each other's professional and cultural origin must start early in a training process. Many biases have to be eliminated. We have to understand that the new enemy might be famine, lack of water or food, diseases, gangs, terrorists etc. The struggles of today are different from those we were trained for. This is why the process of co-operation in the broad field of training is a necessity.

At the Swedish National Defence College we have established training programmes to which we bring representatives from a variety of different organisations and institutions together. We try to offer scenarios for discussions and interaction between actors and people who are not used to working together. Discussions of possible solutions should be focused on efforts towards training and information outside missions. It takes time and should be directed

towards long-term objectives. To increase the accumulated knowledge of other professional and geographic cultures, languages and organisational agendas is a cumbersome undertaking. Nevertheless the effort is utterly necessary in order to build a solid base for improved co-operation and co-ordination processes to prevail during the undertaking of joint and international peace support operations as we enter the 21st Century.

Concepts of Peacekeeping Activities in the 21st Century

By Vladimir K. Potemkin
(Lieutenant General and Director, Strategic Military Research Institute of the General Staff, Russian Federation)

In the last few years, participation in international peacekeeping activities has become an important part of domestic and defence policies for the Russian Federation. This is predestined by the huge changes in the world as a whole. In the complex geopolitical situation from 1992 to 1997 Russia has organised and conducted peacekeeping operations on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and is continuing to take part in UN operations.

Today, armed conflicts and wars born of social, political, economic, territorial, religious, and ethnic collisions, especially conflicts and crises arising within the territory of the former Soviet Union, present a very real danger to Russia. In formulating its approach to participation in peacekeeping activities, in particular, in operations to maintain peace or activities in relation to threats to peace, breaking the peace, or acts of aggression according to Article VII of the UN Charter, Russia is guided by the experience and practice of the United Nations Organisation.

This institution is evolving; the development of the principles and conditions for conducting peacekeeping operations is continuing. In our opinion, at the present time, there are no agreed-upon, all-encompassing documents in the framework of the United Nations, which contain the basic definitions and principles for planning and conducting peacekeeping activities. Russia supports the opinion common in UN circles and which has been expressed by the UN Secretary General that it is urgently necessary to develop a "collection" (in some sort of document) of basic principles of UN peacekeeping activities, the basis of which must be the UN Charter, Security Council decisions, and multilateral international agreements in this area. The preparation of such a document would allow UN peacekeeping activities to be conducted on a sound legal basis. It would exclude improvisational elements and avoid "dual standards". It would increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and the authority

of the UN in this important area of its activities. At the same time, some feel that a rigid statement of the principles and conditions for peacekeeping operations might be premature. That is, it might slow the qualitative evolution of this institution.

The leadership of the Russian Defence Ministry is also placing a great deal of attention on developing a theoretical basis for conducting peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the Center for Strategic Military Research is analysing tile experience gained from using armed forces in peacekeeping operations.

We consider the international legal basis for Russia's participation in peacekeeping activities to be the Charter of the UN (Chapters VI, VII, and VIII), including-- corresponding decisions by the UN Security Council and other international treaties and agreements such as CIS and OSCE, to which Russia is a signatory.

The ability to use Russian peacekeeping contingents abroad in accordance with international responsibilities is provided for in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and a number of other federal laws. Russia has already participated and intends to continue to participate in peacekeeping operations established by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with Chapter VI (Peaceful Resolution of Disputes) and Chapter VII (Activities presenting a threat to peace, breaking the peace, and acts of aggression) of the UN Charter.

We divide the principles for establishing and conducting peacekeeping operations developed by the United Nations Organisation and contained in documents of the Security Council and General Assembly and also determined by international practice in this area into the following:

- agreement by the parties;
- impartiality;
- general leadership by UN Security Council;
- Command and Control by UN Security Council;
- use of force only for self protection.

In addition, we think that in recent years new issues, caused by changes in the international situation, have appeared in peacekeeping operations conducted under the aegis of the UN.

On the one hand, the necessity has arisen for the UN to devote more energy and resources towards preventive diplomacy. Russia completely supports such an evolution. On the other hand, since the beginning of the 90's, a tendency has appeared in which there has been a shift towards a "second generation" of peacekeeping operations, which include, in addition to the "traditional" operations, a number of measures aimed at resolving the problems causing a crisis or "healing" societies in upheaval, such as putting a stop- to- massive violations of human rights, preventing humanitarian catastrophes, assisting democratic transitions, organising elections, assisting in the establishment of governmental and social structures, reorganising law enforcement organs and armed forces, managing local administrations, supporting mine-clearing activities, restoring infrastructures, etc.

These wider goals might require more varied and decisive steps to fulfil the mandate given by the Security Council. In a number of cases, while conducting an operation, it might be necessary to take coercive action (sanctions, blockade, prohibit the use or development of certain kinds of weapons, territorial or geographic limitations on the use of certain kinds of troops, etc.).

Analysis of tendencies in the development of the world politico-military situation leads us to the conclusion that it is critically unstable. Under existing conditions, any armed conflict may grow into a localised war or even into a full-scale war. I can say with a large degree of certainty, that more and more emphasis is being placed on forced peace. One of the most discussed problems is whether it is possible to combine "classical" peacekeeping activities with coercive actors using traditional doctrines on the conduct of war and military actions.

Without casting doubt on the basic principles for conducting peacekeeping operations, Russia will determine its relation to a new-style peacekeeping operation in every actual case, based on its own political, strategic military, and economic interests. Russia will be looking at the following criteria:

- timeliness;

- escalation to the next stage or type of operation is necessitated by the fact that all possibilities of the preceding phase have been exhausted;
- economical - it is better to not even start an operation that you can not afford.

The Russian side views as possible participation in peacekeeping operations and operations to force peace such as:

- missions as observers consisting of military members or civilians whose basic mission is to observe and report on a situation or the implementation of a peace accord or cease-fire agreement between warring parties;
- "traditional" peacekeeping operations using national contingents, which have greater capabilities compared with the missions of observers;
- peacekeeping operations to force peace: - activities to ensure or deny free movement; - implementation of sanctions introduced by the UN Security Council on the basis of Article 41 of the UN Charter.

Participation of the Russian contingents in such operations will be governed according to strategic national interests. Russia will determine the expedience of its involvement in every peacekeeping operation. Conditions for Russian support and participation in peacekeeping operations are the following:

- participation of Russian contingent generally in the international and regional interest of Russia;
- situation presents an actual threat to international peace and security; inaction by the international community would result in unacceptable political, economic and humanitarian consequences;
- agreement by the governments (of conflicting parties) to initiate peacekeeping operations, except in the case of a direct threat to Russian security;
- close linkage of peacekeeping operations with assisting the political process and peaceful resolution of the dispute;
- clearly defined mandate, duration and conditions for ending the operation;

- the governing organ has sanctioned all necessary means to accomplish the mandate and the inalienable right to take self defensive measures;
- risk no Russian personnel has been thoroughly weighed and determined to be minimal;
- peacekeeping forces have the inalienable right to self defence;
- the composition of the peacekeeping command adequately reflects the number and role of the national contingents participating in the given operation;
- political control and national military command of Russian military contingent.

Participation by the Russian military contingent and tasking for it must be accomplished by special arrangement between the command and the Russian side. Russia will maintain political control and national military command of Russian military contingents. Russia supports the tendency towards delegation of responsibility for carrying out peacekeeping operations and towards increasing the role of regional structures in this area in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter with the UN Security Council retaining overall responsibility.

Regional structures (such as CIS) should actively be used for peacekeeping and, above all, should take the initiative in preventative diplomacy, mediation, and other forms of peaceful resolution of disputes before they are raised to the UN Security Council as provided for in Article 52 of the UN Charter. Possible forms of stimulating activities by regional structures include regular consultations between them and the UN, mediation efforts by leaders of regional structures, or taking a leading role in resolving a crisis in the given region either by authority of the UN or on their own initiative and with concurrence of the UN.

Regional and sub-regional structures must have the opportunity to operate independently while, of course, abiding by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In particular, this concerns such activities as "peace enforcement", which can be conducted only by special mandate of the UN Security Council. Practical experience of UN interaction with regional organisations in this area shows that this is not simple. It proves the necessity of reaching a clear understanding of the role each organisation might play in establishing peace. This is particularly true for NATO, which must serve as an instrument for the UN and not vice versa. The development of the peacekeeping potential of the Organisation for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE), including preventing and resolving crises, deserves special attention from the Russian side.

Russia believes that OSCE actions in this area may be taken in cases where disputes and conflicts arise between member-states and, in special cases, beyond its boundaries in accordance with the UN Charter and the principles and goals of the OSCE. We support further development and improvement of standards and principles of peacekeeping within the framework of the OSCE based on the decisions taken at the summits of 1992 in Helsinki and of 1993 in Rome, and also contained in the Budapest document of 1994. We are prepared to actively participate in this work, bearing in mind that perhaps the greatest return might be gained by preventing potential crises, including activities of the Supreme Commissar on National Minorities. We support the practice of sending fact-finding missions and reporting missions, considering them one of the most important elements of preventive diplomacy.

Russia agrees that, in certain circumstances, OSCE is capable of developing and implementing international agreements on the presence of "Third Party" forces in member states in upheaval, by request and by agreement of the warring parries, in strict accordance with the UN Charter. These peacekeeping forces might be multinational and all OSCE member states have a right to contribute to them. Russia agrees that OSCE must have the opportunity to send a mission to observe whether the actions of the "Third Party" are in keeping with the principles and aims of the OSCE. This is not to say that the mission is to control or to interfere in the peacekeeping activities of the "Third Party". The mission should also contribute to the process of crisis resolution.

Russia is sure that the OSCE, as a regional agreement, in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter may establish its own peacekeeping missions. Therefore, Russia supported the decision, taken at the European Summit in Budapest 5-6 December 1994, to increase the OSCE involvement in Nagomo Karabakh. The indissoluble connection between the peacekeeping efforts of the UN and the OSCE and the constant political support and provision of technical and expert assistance by the UN Security Council to the OSCE are based on practical expediency. While the UN plays a leading role in the European peacekeeping system and is strengthened by the potential of die OSCE, there may thus still be a place for such organisations as CIS, NATO, EC, etc. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons, European

peacekeeping mechanisms have not spread. Meanwhile, the slide towards armed conflict in a number of sub-regions of the former USSR has persistently raised the issue of raking immediate steps to prevent further destabilisation. Russia feels that, in a number of cases, politically desirable actions to maintain peace conducted within the framework of the regional or sub-regional efforts and representing the third type of peacekeeping operation in the CIS region (the so-called "operation with Third Party participation") are legitimate from an international law point of view.

In particular, we can classify "operations with the participation of a Third Party" those actions by the Commonwealth of Independent States initiating peacekeeping operations based on the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and, naturally, taking into account the provisions of Article 53 which forbids the conduct of coercive actions by regional organs or alliances without authorisation by the Security Council. In all cases, peacekeeping forces of the CIS act with the agreement of the warring parties and contingents and are deployed based on existing international agreements. Additional "legitimisation" by some other international organisation is not required; however, political decisions welcoming or approving the action would be desirable. The responsibility for conducting such peacekeeping operations is borne completely by the parties initiating the operation who are bound by their responsibilities to observe the UN Charter and the principles and aims of the OSCE. In these situations, interaction of OSCE "Third Parties" must take the form of voluntary co-operation and mutual support. The direct basis for Russia's involvement in peacekeeping operations on the territory of a CIS country would be an appeal to her by other countries for assistance in resolving the conflict.

Participation by Russia in peacekeeping operations on the territory of a CIS country would be caused above all by the necessity of ensuring her own security and by the special responsibility, which she and her neighbours have for stability and to observe human rights in this region. The form and scale of this participation is determined strictly on a treaty basis subject to the availability of resources necessary to conduct peacekeeping operations. Experience in peacekeeping operations on the territory of the CIS has shown that purposeful and concerted action by Russia in resolving conflicts has led to a significant stabilisation of the situation in "hot spots". Bloodshed of peaceful inhabitants ceased. The negotiation process continued, albeit with difficulty, to find a political solution to the conflict. As shown by

experience in conducting peacekeeping operations in the CIS, it is preferable to form peacekeeping forces on a coalition basis, not only from military contingent observers of CIS member states military and civilian observers and civilian service personnel, but also including armed formations from the warring parties. Practice has shown that the participation in peacekeeping operations by mutual agreement of equally numbered contingents of the warring parties significantly aids in stabilising the situation since, firstly, it gives the conflict's participants necessary assurance in their own force and, secondly, it forces them to see the mediating peacekeeping contingent as the only natural, stabilising factor. A necessary condition for this is the formation of demilitarised zones and the withdrawal or disarmament of all other military formations of the warring parries. This method of conflict resolution has proven itself in the Pridnestrov region, where one battalion from Moldavia and one battalion from the Pridnestrov Republic were included and in Southern Ossetia where the Russian contingent (500 men) of the peacekeeping forces was approximately equal in number to the Georgian and Osetian battalions (450 men each). I must acknowledge that this method of conflict resolution does not completely match the norms for UN and OSCE. However, in the opinion of Russian military experts, this method was practically unavoidable since the international community refused to grant Russian peacekeeping forces status of UN or OSCE peacekeeping forces. The main thing is that this method has proven its effectiveness in conditions of persistent distrust between the confrontational parties and may become an important addition to international practice in resolving chronic conflicts all over the world.

In all cases, Russia wishes to take part in peacekeeping operations on the territory of CIS countries/Commonwealth members. Russia holds that the basic principles of peacekeeping operations under the aegis of CIS are practically the same as for the UN. It is necessary to regularly inform the UN Security Council and also the OSCE on the course of the operation and the development of the political process.

We are proponents of more active support from international organisations, especially the UN and OSCE, for peacekeeping efforts by Russia and her neighbours. Between these structures, we must gradually develop a clearer assignment of roles and responsibilities for peacekeeping activities. Russia advocates the acknowledgement by international organisations of those peacekeeping methods, the effectiveness of which has been confirmed in the CIS. This

concerns permitting, in certain cases, the participation of contingents of the conflicting parties themselves in the make-up of the forces effecting the resolution.

At the same time, Russia views favourably steps taken by the UN, OSCE, and CIS to improve peacekeeping activities and proposes the following concrete approaches for further improvement of peacekeeping in the next century:

- strengthen the structures of the UN Secretariat which handle peacekeeping and military issues;
- notification by member-states of the actual forces or equipment, which, with the approval of national authorities, could be made available to the United Nations Organisation for peacekeeping activities in each particular case (UN Reserve Forces);
- inclusion of peacekeeping issues in national training programs for military and police personnel; improving the standardisation of procedures to enhance interaction of forces of different countries.

Russia sees one of her tasks to be to optimise the command structure of UN peacekeeping forces by having Russian representatives participate at all levels (in the military command of actual operations as well as at the UN Headquarters in New York). Russia intends to participate in presenting the UN Secretary General with the information (including classified) necessary for preventive diplomacy and for peacekeeping activities in general.

Russia believes that implementing new proposals and ideas in the area of peacekeeping might be accomplished by using the following ways and means:

- issuance of statements and decisions by the Security Council as well as the OSCE and CIS;
- bilateral and multilateral international agreements developing the provisions of the UN Charter and the documents of the OSCE and CIS applicable to actual conflict situations and international problems;
- enact provisions of the UN Charter which have not been invoked at all or have been insufficiently utilised.

These are our general views on the process of developing peacekeeping activities at the turn of the century.

Peacekeeping Doctrine and the United States: Dilemmas of Consent, Direction, and Limitations

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(This paper represents the views of its author, not necessarily those of the Naval Postgraduate School or the US Government.)

Introduction

The United States military has spent an enormous amount of time in this decade in an effort to capture, rationalise, and promulgate doctrine. In the preface to the first edition of *Joint Publication l: Joint Warfare of the United States Allied Forces*, the then Chairman, General Colin Powell wrote:

> When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their best because every other player, the team, and the hometown are counting on them to win. So it is when the Armed Forces of the United States go to war. We must win everytime. . . But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win. This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.[1]

Later, at the conclusion of Chapter 3, the authors, in defining joint doctrine, state:

> Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques and procedures) has been and is being developed by the US Armed Forces through the combined effort of the joint Staff, Service and combat commands. Because we operate and fight jointly, we must all learn

> and practice joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; feed back to the doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises, and operation's; and ensure Service doctrine and procedures are consistent This is critical for our present and future effectiveness. Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war. [2]

The movement under General Powell and the Joint Staff to produce a range of joint doctrine for the US armed forces has continued under the chairmanship of General John Shalikashvili. The Joint Staff has produced two editions of Joint Publication*: Doctrine for Joint Operations* (1993 and 1995), *Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOM (1995), and a *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook' for Peace Operations*. The Army has produced in their field manual series, a finalised *FM 100.23 Peace Operations* (1994). Other documents and supporting pamphlets and guides are also in various stages of production.

In the area of civil military operations and/or peacekeeping, the Army is the dominant service of choice in most instances. In America, the Army has basically taken the responsibility for input into the doctrine as such and is keenly interested in what is decided concerning these areas. In this effort, I will first briefly examine the recent history of the Army and doctrine in general. I will then look at several of die dilemmas facing the Army and our military in general.

Doctrine and History

The ascendancy of the use of doctrine in the United States military in the latter part of this century is probably a result of a natural tendency of planners with a lack of current requirements and in our own case, an earlier need to intellectually and emotionally arrive at a point that was post Viet Nam. The very definition of doctrine is argumentative and may even change in substance over time and experience. Additionally, writers do not necessarily agree on definitions amongst the often-used military terms of doctrine, strategy, operations, and tactics.[3] The current US authorised definition of doctrine is:

> Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.[4]

Success in battle involves more than just the correct doctrine. It includes implementation of correct tactics and success often lies solely on the side of the largest guns. Experience since the allied victory in World War II and in the subsequent conflicts fought by the US in Korea and Vietnam has given Peacekeeping Doctrine and the United States rise to the current US concept of war and doctrine. By tracing some of this development, we can observe what this author regards as unfinished questions concerning doctrine for peace operations.

As is generally accepted, post World War II military doctrine was overwhelmed by the omnipresent nuclear capacity and threat in the 40's and 50's, US Army doctrine could be reduced to a tactical level nuclear exchange with the concept of manoeuvring military formations as an item of the past. With the task of military occupation of Germany and Japan, the US Army was reformatted to best serve military police functions. Training and equipment reflected those goals. The initial debacle in Korea along with a painfully negotiated armistice under UN colours provided to this day a number of serious questions to Army planners. These include the lack of proper preparation, lack of focus, command authority lines, preparation for coalition warfare, unity of goals and an effective plan. The question of success and or the lack of success in this effort is not widely agreed upon to this day. After almost 50 years, the US Army is still in Korea under UN colours.

In South Viet Nam, the US Army using widely innovative doctrine in a number of places was undefeated in the field and watched as the war was lost Combined with the effort in Viet Nam, the US military and the Army, in particular, was faced with a situation in Europe that called for hoping to win in a conventional war with the Warsaw Pact or face a possible nuclear exchange. To this end the US Army began placing more emphasis on the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) whose mission simply stated was to train and prepare the force to fight the nation's wars. In the late 70's, an uplifting product was inaugurated with the publication of the Active Defence Doctrine.[5] This was followed in time with the Air-Land Battle versions.[6] Paralleling the "reformation" in doctrine was a book sponsored by the Army Staff. The title was *On Strategy* and was written by Harry G. Summers, Jr. The author

revisited Clausewitz's *On War* and wrote a treatise suggesting that doctrinal errors were made by the US in the Viet Nam War. Specifically, we initiated participation in the war without the consensus of the people of the US and, additionally, we did not attack the centre of gravity of the enemy. [7]

The 1980 Teheran hostage rescue effort was followed several years later by two other military actions of less than perfection. The first was in the Grenada effort.[8] The second and probably more telling event was the loss of the Marines in Lebanon in 1983. Of note was a speech made by then Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger on 28 November 1984, in which he outlined "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad." [9]

The tests were:

- We should not commit forces to combat overseas unless deemed vital to our national interests or that of our allies.
- If we decide it is necessary to commit troops we should do it with the clear intention of winning.
- If we do commit forces, we "should have clearly defined political and military objectives."
- The relationship between our objectives and forces must be adequate and continually assessed.
- Before committing forces abroad, "there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress."
- The use of force should be the last resort. [10]

Two events in the early part of the Bush administration serve as examples of the impact of the Weinberger Doctrine and the doctrinal elements of the main thesis of Summers. In particular, Desert Shield/Storm integrate the six aspects of the Weinberger Doctrine and the post-Viet Nam cultural support of overwhelming force and a plan to win the conflict. Summers authored a sequel volume of *On Victory 11: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* in an effort to capture the mood of the jubilant armed forces in the war's aftermath. Across the joint staff and the services, we could observe the desire to capture success in doctrine. This manifested itself

in the beginning of the joint Publication series in 1991. As of today, the work on this series still continues.

In our parochial history, subsequent events were not as successful as the military efforts in Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm. Somalia proved to be an operation that caused some difficulties in the manner in which business was conducted. First of all, the operation spanned two US administrations that did not conduct business in the same manner. After the operation was deemed a failure of sorts, those within the former Bush Administration blamed the Clinton Administration for mission creep (along with the UN) and a variety of other shortfalls. The Clinton administration attempted to answer its critics by placing the blame on the imperfect and unfinished plan of the Bush Administration. Both sides blamed the UN and Secretary General Burros Burros Gali, in particular.

Haiti represented another challenge. America might have been able to look the other way save for the continuous numbers of refugees arriving at various ports in our country. A number of years later, we still are unable to announce that the task is finished and a number of comments concerning the application of our doctrine should be made. First of all, the Clinton administration stated that all aspects of our US Doctrine had been met before embarking on a military intervention. The President then enumerated each of the six Weinberger points without alluding to Weinberger. There was not much of a reaction to the speech. The points themselves are probably in dispute as far as a consensus of the American people and Congress and the problem of clearly defined political and military objectives. Gallup and informal polls place 70% of the American population and also the same number of Congressmen to not be in favour of US intervention." A highly placed source within the Washington arena advised me that they knew no one in the Pentagon or the State Department who was in favour of intervention in Haiti except a handful of political appointees." On the military side, despite a lengthy pre-intervention period, it is difficult to put one's hands on "a plan." Unlike Desert Storm, there was no vote in the US Congress.[14]

In official literature, the doctrine for what the military was to call "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW) began to come into print with the draft edition of the Army's *FM 100-5* in 1993. Chapter Thirteen of the FM is devoted to describing the differences in the principles in fighting wars and the principles "associated with Army operations other than war. The

principles include objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security. In comparison the principles of war as currently promulgated include: objective, offensive, simplicity, mass, manoeuvre, security, surprise, unity of command and economy of force.

The Army's list of principles remained constant through the writing *of Joint Publication 3-0, Operations* (1995), and *FM 100-23 Peace Operations* (1994). Application of the principles became problematic with the Kurds, Somalis, Haitians, and most recently in Bosnia.

President Bush addressed the Bosnian question by stating that it was a European problem to solve. After a slow start, the Clinton administration reversed Bush's position by pushing hard on the diplomatic front and by several increments of military force finalised by placing an armoured division in the disjointed area. Prior to the deployment, the armoured division went through a period of training in order to help produce an adjustment in the attitudes of the soldiers - specifically from an offensive and manoeuvre orientation to that of perseverance and restraint It was less than a secret that the Army was not in favour of deployment on a peace operation to the Bosnian area. In the annals of UN or other peace operations, it is only with difficulty that one reads the post Dayton peace agreement speeches and then attempt to understand that the so-called peace was to be initiated with the assistance of armoured columns.

The seeds of the Army's distaste for peace operations reaches back to the stalemated Korean War (under UN auspices), to the search for a scapegoat or a path out of the morass that is represented by experience of Viet Nam, to a vision that the Army's main task is to be victorious in defending the country in battle. Within this culture, the Army was receiving a rash of peace operations when other serious factors had or were not resolved.

Dilemmas

With the collapse of the USSR, the US began to redefine the concept of the threat to our society and what roles the services should play. The official delegation's response, to include the Bottom Up Review, ended mostly in compromise and/or percentage cuts distributed to achieve a peace dividend. No group was ever really happy with the official decisions but the problem really was the inability to focus on and achieve consensus on the threat. During most

of the five decades of the Cold War and specifically under Reagan and Bush, the threat had been in focus and articulated. After the demise or what we perceived to be there to demise of the USSR, what remained for the threat was either a fog or the perception of a requirement limited to a region. In the inter-service rivalry for what became a downsizing of the budget and manpower, the Army did not fare well. This was also compounded by an administration that wanted to be engaged in peace operations. Simply written, the Army was to have a diminished offensive capacity through budget and personnel cuts and then have part of what was left siphoned off for peace operations.[16] The lack of consensus concerning the threat leaves open the questions of "how much is enough" and "how should we prepare for the next mission."[17]

A second dilemma reaches to the points of summers and the Weinberger Doctrine and is the point of who within the government can commit troops to a peace operation. The writers of our constitution believed that the President should be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The power to declare war, however, resided in the legislative branch. In the past century, we have had a number of breaches which could only be explained by lawyers. We are often hard pressed to explain these breaches to civics classes in high school. The commitment of troops to peace operations opens the possibility of a long term involvement and death. In this light, it would seem natural for Congress to be involved in the commitment of troops to peace operations beyond a role of acquiescence. President Clinton had the time to take the Haitian case to the UN but was not obligated nor felt the necessity to involve Congress. Even in the previous case of President Bush going to Congress on the Desert Shield/Storm operation, the procedure itself was not clear cut nor was there a formal declaration of war. Thus, the fifth point of the Weinberger Doctrine has not been observed with any consistency.

Dwelling on this second point of decision making, the use of US troops in Macedonia represents an interesting observation point. In this case, US troops were dispatched from the Berlin Command to serve with troops from several Scandinavian countries under the command of a Danish general. There is no precedent for American troops to serve in Macedonia. There was no legislative activity in the US congress. They were dispatched by the administration. Upon arrival the Danish General determined that the best role for the Americans was to use them in reserve in case the Serbs attacked any of the Scandinavian

troops. The whole movement of troops to Macedonia was to send a signal; and the use of the American troops as the ready reaction reserve was to reinforce the signal. Upon the recommendation of the Danish general, the US forces left their Bradley fighting vehicles in Berlin as they were deemed too provocative. These decisions were implemented just a decade after the Marine tragedy at the airport in Lebanon. Despite these problems, the effort in Macedonia is calculated as a success. However, if one were to take a poll of Americans concerning just the question of whether they were aware that we have and continue to have troops in Macedonia, I doubt if one in a thousand would be aware. Or one in a hundred thousand. Far from the popular support deemed advisable by Summers or Weinberger.[18]

A third problematic area for peace operations and the military is the concept of the mix of political and military professions. The US Army in choosing amongst other things to be professional has sought to be internally apolitical. That is their goal. The not so interesting element of the operation in Haiti, for instance, is that the cure is predominantly political. The question that has yet to be answered is whether or not the military can affect a political cure. One could sensibly argue that the military can alter or change a military situation but a cure often entails factors of another dimension. This other dimension requires plans, goals, personnel, and consensus amongst at least the implementers who should practice a political profession. In the last decade, we have not seen much of this type of activity in US peace operations or UN efforts. Instead, we seem to have more of assigning to the military a number of quasi political-military roles and expect or hope that things will work out.

On the heels of this third dilemma is another closely related area for the US military. Periodically we allude to the concept that the military is a total force - that is that the military as an institution includes active and reserve forces. The Army, in particular, relegated a number of military specialities to the reserves. Included are the specialties related to civil military operations and civil affairs. In recent years, in several humanitarian operations in Africa, the Army and the Air Force have brought reserves on active duty for the purpose of manning certain elements of those operations. The Army has also considered assigning the battalion duty in the Multi National Force (MFO), Sinai to the reserves. This last duty is currently filled by a regular unit with a six month rotation. It is yet to be determined as to what role the reserves will play in peace operations. The current mixture in Bosnia may give us more insight into suggestions for the future.

Conclusion

By general consensus, it could be said that the US military and the US Army, in particular, have articulated doctrine or a set of doctrines concerning peace operations. It is my observation that in recent history, the less than official doctrines (Summer and Weinberger) are more in tune with the military thinking than the activity that has been practised by recent administrations. In most cases, it can be concluded that while we may have doctrine, we do not necessarily follow it with regularity.

Notes:

[1] Joint Staff, Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces* (Washington:GPO, November 1991), p. i.

[2] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[3] Barry R Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 245.

[4] Joint Pub 1-Ol, *Joint Publication Systems*.

[5] Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1978).

[6] Ibid. (1982 and 1986).

[7] Harry Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1981). Summers sponsors a bigger war in Vietnam strategy and suggests that the war was one of aggression from North Vietnam. An alternative view is espoused by Andrew F. Krepinevich in *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1986). He views that the war could have been won by a properly conducted counterinsurgency effort by US Special Forces and Army Intelligence. Both authors have their backers on the Army Staff. Most of the historical combat arms quote Summers and the Special Operations groups support Krepinevich.

[8] While viewed by the Reagan administration as a success story, the after action reports allude to difficulties of inter-service operability. General Schwarzkopf discusses a number of these in his autobiography, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam, 1992). Of further note is that the US was the strongest advocate for many years for interoperability within NATO and

continue with this theme in Partnership for Peace. The US, however, as of Grenada had not cleaned up its own act.

[9] Casper W. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner, 1990), pp. 433-445.

[10] Ibid.

[11] For a candid review of US efforts and shortfalls see Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1995).

[12] Author's source is a highly placed member of the legislative branch of the US government.

[13] Author's source was a highly placed government employee in the executive branch of the US government [14] See two articles for opposing views in *Foreign Policy*, 102 (Spring 1996), specifically Robert I. Rotberg, "Clinton Was Right," pp. 135-141; and John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti," pp. 142-151.

[15] Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (1993), pp. 13-0 through 13-4.

[16] One of the most recent articles published to this point was authored by LTG (Ret) William Odom in "Transforming the Military" *Foreign Affairs* 76:4 (July/August 1997), pp. 54-64.

[17] On this interesting note, Alexi G. Arbatov in "The Russian Military in tile 21 st Century" Strategic Studies Institute Series (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1997) articulates somewhat of the same dilemma for the Russian Armed Forces.

[18] John F. Hellion, III, "UN collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half' Parameters, *US Army War College Quarterly*, 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 33-34.

5. Peace Support Flexibility - Different Military Traditions and Operational Landscapes

Peace Support Flexibility and Different Military Cultures

By Christopher Coker
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Even if these logistical and communication problems were to be addressed successfully an RRF would not necessarily resolve what is likely to become the most important of all peace-keeping questions: that of military culture. Strategists are often glib about culture, tending either to ignore it entirely or to claim that while it exists it is not of central importance. Unfortunately, it is. Societies fight wars in particular ways as John Keegan has done much to remind us. They also keep the peace in their own fashion. Over the years, both the British and French have shown much greater willingness to see peace-keeping in terms of enforcement Despite twenty-five or more peacekeeping operations in which the British army was involved during the Cold War peace-keeping was hardly treated seriously in the UK until the publication of the doctrine Peace Keeping Operations in 1988. The subject was not even taught at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst until 1994.

In other words, the ability to act in peacekeeping missions is determined to some extent by the structure of a country's armed forces. Once you have a mandate, of course, and a doctrine to guide the participants, the quality of the personnel is going to be essential. A coalition of the willing is only as strong as the members that comprise it.

Unfortunately, the quality of many forces involved in UN operations in the past has not been very high. As one British general remarked about Bangladeshi soldiers under his command in UNPROFOR "I had enough displaced people to look after without having to add another 100 to the list". In Rwanda Colonel Luc Marchal, the Kigali Sector Commander, voiced many of the same frustrations. "I find it utterly unacceptable" (he said of a composite Bangladeshi

battalion) "that 50% of the personnel under my command were non-operational". Rather more generously General Dallarie, UNAMIR's Force Commander, said that it was unfortunate that Bangladesh had chosen to "mature its army through experience" in the field.

If a NATO force is considered preferable in this respect it is well to remind ourselves that disenchantment within the alliance can be as great as outside it A survey of attitudes by some of the smaller NATO countries (particularly the Danes and Norwegians) by the Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity at the University of Ulster (INCORE) indicates that the perceptions of British, French and US peacekeepers is not always flattering. Some responses suggested that the French were too trigger-happy and the British behaved as if they were in Northern Ireland.

Nor is there any guarantee that the larger NATO countries who find themselves working together will have a positive image of each other. In Somalia the US presidential envoy Robert Oakley was wary of allowing the Italians to take part at all. The C130s, waiting to take off from Pisa were denied clearance to land in Mogadishu because of alleged "overcrowding". In the end the US Defence Secretary had to give the necessary authorisation himself, effectively overruling his own commander on the ground. When they did arrive, of course, the paratroopers did a competent enough job but they did it by questionable methods, engaging in unacceptable behaviour including torture as recent events have revealed. The image of the UN force in Somalia was not improved by the behaviour of other NATO contingents including Belgian paratroopers stationed in Kismaw. Many were so ashamed of what they had seen that they informed Belgian radio that the official kill figures should be multiplied by four or five. It soon became clear that most of the statistics in those "kill figures" were in fact, unarmed civilians.

When we talk of culture and war we usually think in terms of a strategic culture. But the culture of peace-keeping is equally important In war time the key test of the quality of the soldier is fighting performance. Even if troops retreat they can retreat in good order. In peace-keeping, the test has become sustainability. This is a particularly acute question when a force moves from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement. Unfortunately, the military and political requirements in enforcement are wholly different in character from those of peace-keeping and any attempt to combine the two in one operation tends to destabilise the operational

environment in which the force is deployed, and as a result destabilises the coalition that has been keeping the peace.

It happened in Lebanon in 1983 when the United States withdrew unilaterally without consulting its four other NATO allies. It happened again in Somalia ten years later. Sustainability depends to a large extent on what the public thinks of peacekeeping operations. When Belgian troops returned from Rwanda Brussels newspapers begged the question "how could ten soldiers have been killed in a peace-keeping operation?" This is not only a problem that faces a European society. When news of the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers on operation in Somalia reached their homes in Central Punjab their incredulous relatives also asked the same question. It is the nature of war that soldiers should be killed; it is in the nature of peace-keeping that casualties should be kept to a minimum or so the public imagine In reality, of course, peace-keeping has become much more dangerous than war. More British soldiers have been killed any war in which they have been engaged since in Northern Ireland than sine 1945. In Lebanon the United States lost more soldiers in a single day than any day of the Vietnam war. The Israelis lost more soldiers keeping the peace in the Lebanon than they did in all three Arab-Israeli wars.

War zones, by comparison, are often more safe than being stationed back home. *Life* magazine quoted one study that showed it was more dangerous to remain in the United States than to serve in the Gulf War. It estimated that 148 soldiers were saved by their service in Desert Storm and the months of build-up before it.

This is one way in which a rapid deployment force could be bedevilled by culture. Another is the way in which armies keep the peace. The United States must not be judged on one action alone, of course, but its behaviour in Somalia does suggest that in terms of military culture it has a tendency to unilateral action, which tends to blur the distinction between peace-keeping and enforcement, and even more important perhaps, the distinction between peace-enforcement and war.

A confidential UN report completed in February 1994 concluded that the UN had become involved in a war not a peace-keeping mission, a war which, it added, was not even controlled by the Americans, but allowed to "follow its own dynamics". The report, it is worth noting,

did find that the use of force as such was the problem. The Belgians for example when attacked in Kismayu, repulsed the attack and killed or wounded 40 Somalis. On this occasion, however, there were no repercussions, in large part, because the force used was both discriminate and measured.

In Somalia the French were confirmed in their fears that the operation had been shanghaied by the Americans when Admiral Howe decided to put up a $25,000 reward for General Aideed's head with a wanted poster in the best Tombstone-OK Corral tradition. In fact this was looked at through the wrong end of the lens. It is not the regard or lack of it that a coalition's forces show for each other which is always important. It is the seriousness with which they are taken by local factions. The Somalis themselves had no objection to the Hollywood touch the French found vulgar. The most popular film in Mogadishu for years had been Sylvester Stallone's Rambo III - a film, you may recall, in which he had helped another warrior people, this time the Afghans, to liberate themselves from oppressive foreign rule. Rambo III may have failed at the box office in the United States but it never left the screens of downtown Mogadishu. It was the contrast between their conception of the American army before it arrived and what they saw in the field that did much to undermine the moral authority of the US presence.

John Keegan reminds us there have been many cases in the past where the western way of warfare has been ridiculed by non-Westerners. He cites the Japanese military reformer Takashima who tried to demonstrate European drill to high-ranking Samurai in 1841. On that occasion the master of the Ordnance said that the spectacle of "men raising and manipulating their weapons all at the same time and with the same motion looked as if they were playing some children's game". Twenty years earlier the less sophisticated Greek rebels in revolt against Turkish rule had also reacted with ridicule, this time in disbelief rather than contempt, when French, British and German soldiers, many of them ex-officers from the Napoleonic Wars, tried to instruct them in close order drill at the outset of the Greek War of Independence.

From the beginning the Somalis did not take the Americans seriously. They were not overawed by the size of the American presence: the division of infantry and armour and the daytime patrols of Mogadishu by helicopter gunships. Even the way the Americans dressed

communicated the wrong signals. They both inspired fear and were perceived as being fearful: a fatal combination. They always went around in flak jackets and wore helmets, and were protected by helicopters from the air, as opposed to French soldiers who never wore their helmets and only wore their flak jackets when fighting was a strong probability. Among themselves the Somalis often joked about the Americans' physical appearance calling them "human tanks". Without the Americans realising this was a constant irritant and a definite factor in Somali aggressiveness towards them during the summer of 1993.

The French, by comparison, were much more successful. Their commanders sent their troops into the bush on foot in small groups of 30 or 40 men. They would march at night and resurface 48 hours later near to villages and nomadic encampments. Unlike the Americans they were neither over-equipped nor psychologically tense. For the most part, they were relaxed and confident, giving an impression of ease in the environment, ready to fight on the enemy's terms if the need arose but willing to avoid fighting wherever possible. Clearly, membership of a RRF will not necessarily reproduce the same cultural experiences. We should know this from our own experience even if the ethos of Western armies has changed significantly. Back in May 1917, Ernst Junger, while serving on the Western Front with the Hanover Fusiliers, encountered his first Indian soldiers - Rajputs from one of India's military castes or martial races, who were amongst the 20% of the population from which the Indian army is still recruited today. As a member of a military class, Junger concluded he had been privileged to fight them:

> “What does Nietzsche say of fighting men? ‘You must have as enemies only those who you hate but not those who you despise. You must be proud of your enemy and then the enemy's success is your success also’”.

Military castes have often been beaten in the field. The Germans had the better of their encounters with the Indian soldiers in 1917. But military cultures will fight all the harder to avoid being defeated by soldiers they despise, rather than those they respect. The problem is compounded by what we may call, for want of a better term, the American way of peacekeeping - the tendency to simulate everything on the computer first, and re-enact it on the ground, a practise which served it well enough in the Gulf War. Whether war in the future can be ‘simulated’ as successfully as it was the war in the Gulf is a debatable point. It is quite

plain that peace cannot be simulated or casualties necessarily reduced to a minimum. The problem is, do the Americans know it? Training Center at Hohenfels in Germany where American soldiers in Europe find themselves at least once a year for 21 days engaged in what is called situational training with the Multiple Laser Engagement System (MILES), a dial a scenario field exercise using lasers rather than bullets. The technology, of course, is awesome, involving as it does Warlord Simulation and Centre desktop computers and Sun Microsystem computers which run the simulations. It is all immensely impressive but is it real? And how impressive will it appear in the future to non-Western fighters?

The problem is not only whether US forces are engaged on the ground. The problem is that as we enter the era of the revolution in military affairs which Colin Gray rightly reminds us is almost entirely an American revolution, whether we will go down the same route. It would be disastrous were a RRF to adopt a strategic culture, which is inappropriate for the missions of the kind it would be called upon to conduct. Some of you, I recognise, might see my attitude as a Luddite one - but the question needs to be raised at a tune when university departments in Illinois and MIT are offering the American army computer programmes to deal with questions as complex as Bosnia and Somalia.

Peace Support Flexibility and The Case of Russia in Tajikistan

By Lena Jonson
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Introduction

For my presentation in this session today on "Peace Support Flexibility", the role of military tradition and the specifics of the operational landscape, I will use the case of Tajikistan. I will try to explain what is meant by 'peace support flexibility' in this context; and to describe the influence of Russian military tradition on Moscow's policy in Tajikistan.

Many of you may consider this case too far from peace support operations in any UN context for it to be relevant in this session. I agree, that the Russian mission in Tajikistan is different from UN peace support missions.[1] Yet, I believe that the problems the Russians face in Tajikistan are shared by other peace support missions. The experiences of Tajikistan are of general interest because this case highlights several principal questions; for example, what is to be the proper relationship between the international organisation and the regional organisation and especially the regional power. It also illustrates the pitfalls in placing too much confidence in the use of military force to end conflicts. I will here use the term "peace support" with regard to the Russian mission in Tajikistan well aware of the different roots and character of the mission.

From analysing the Russian mission in Tajikistan I have reached three conclusions, which I want to introduce at the very beginning: First, the Russian involvement was initiated and formed within a military and political tradition where counter-insurgency operations were considered the appropriate answer to local armed conflicts. Therefore the Russian mission had the character of counter-insurgency in a low-intensity conflict from the start. However, as time passed, Moscow had to revise it, and try to make it more similar to a UN peace support mission. Second, this revision was forced as a result of the circumstances on the ground in Tajikistan and of domestic political change within Russia. There was growing awareness

among the Russian military and political leadership that Russia lacked the capabilities for carrying out the counter-insurgency mission it had started. In this sense the Tajik civil war can be seen as part of a larger learning process for Russia in the CIS. What started as 'grand visions' of a regional great power intervention had to be modified. Policy had to become more pragmatic and cautious with priority given to political solutions. Third, the case of Tajikistan illustrates the fact that the UN should have a decisive say in military interventions and peace support missions in the future.

The Tradition of Russian Military Culture

The Russian/Soviet traditional approach to conflicts and how to end conflicts include the following elements: [2]

- military means are given priority (Afghanistan 1979, Czechoslovakia 1968, Hungary 1956);
- conflicts are regarded as a zero sum game; a conflict therefore can end only by "winning" not by political compromise/accommodation between the parties;
- military involvement should be based on overwhelming force;
- the military commander is given large authority to make operational decisions on the ground without political interference.

The Russian answer to the challenge from the erupting Tajik civil war was to instigate a counter-insurgency strategy that later had to be revised.[3] The main objectives of such a strategy were the following:

- to install a regime that Moscow could rely on as stable and reliable;
- to seek to make this regime 'legitimate' in the eyes of the international community, and to support it;
- to use military force to wipe out the "enemy", the insurgents, and;
- to cut off reinforcements and support from bases outside Tajikisran in Afghanistan.

Russia and Peace Support Flexibility In Tajikistan

Russian behaviour in the Tajik conflict over the years reflects a revised strategy. From mid-1992 to mid-1993 Russian behaviour reflected elements of a counterinsurgency strategy. From mid-1993 to the end of 1995 a dual strategy followed where Russia on the one hand tried to act as a third-party mediator in negotiations, and on the other hand never abandoned its counter-insurgency strategy. From 1996, Moscow has pursued a strategy where priority has been given to a political solution. With the new peace accord in Tajikistan the Russian troops may become more like a kind of UN peace support mission. From Mid-1992 to Mid-1993: A Counter-Insurgency Strategy Takes Form. It is true that the initial Russian reaction to the conflict erupting in Tajikistan was confusion. The Russian General Staff was reluctant to begin any military involvement on former Soviet territory. Former Soviet troops deployed in Tajikistan were first ordered to stay neutral and not to get involved. However, in the absence of a Moscow policy, Russian officers in Tajikistan did not remain passive but started to act in support of the pro-Communist Popular Front. This behaviour received support from the General Staff. Thus, Russian involvement was initiated from below in what later became official policy.

The roots of the Tajik conflict were regional-political. An anti-Communist opposition movement of Muslim and democratic forces had been growing since late 1980s. There were demonstrations and sit-ins in the spring of 1992. The situation became polarised, and the elected President Nabiyev gave in to the opposition. He accepted a Coalition Government to be created in May 1992 including ministers of the opposition. This resulted in a strong reaction from the pro-Communist 'Popular Front', based in the Kulyab region in the south, with support from the nomenclatura in the northern Leninabad region. In this situation of turbulence, the Russians chose the side of Rakhmonov, the party they believed could bring stability to Tajikistan and secure Russian interests in the region. According to most commentators, Rakhmonov would not have come to power without the help of the Russians. He would not have lasted in power without Russian support.

The Rakhmonov regime was established in Tajikistan in the autumn of 1992 with the help of the Russians. Moscow also supported the new regime when presidential and parliamentary

elections were arranged in 1994-95, the terms of which breached earlier agreements between the parties to the conflict. Moscow gave economic, military and political support Russia assisted in a policy to wipe out the insurgents, the Muslim and democratic opposition, and to cut off reinforcements in a "division of labour" between Russian military units and Tajik troops.

The Russian support for the Rakhmonov regime was defined within the context of the May 1992 Tashkent Treaty of Collective Security under which Tajikistan was eligible for military assistance in case of "external threat". The former Soviet 201st Motorized Rifle Division was ordered to give military assistance to the Tajik government. In 1993 bilateral agreements followed, among them the Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance (May 1993), which envisaged close military co-operation including Russian air defence in case of attacks from Afghanistan. Bilateral agreements regularising the status and responsibilities of Russian border troops reinforced this. Russian strategy in the Tajik conflict during these first years followed traditional Russian military thinking that is reflected in the Russian draft of a military doctrine in May 1992 (later confirmed in a final version in November 1993). It recommended an active Russian involvement to combat "local wars".

This approach to peace support operations was not what the Russian Foreign Ministry had had in mind when a proposal on peacekeeping and military observers was introduced and adopted in March and May 1992 by the CIS Heads of State. The document "Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the CIS" and its protocols were completely in line with UN understanding of peacekeeping or peace support operations. However, the 1992 CIS documents were overtaken by events. Instead, strong military tradition determined Russian understanding of what had to be done in Tajikistan.

From Mid-1993 to the end of 1995: Enforcing Peace in a Dual Strategy. A shift in Russian policy followed an attack in July 1993 on a Russian border station along the Afghan-Tajik border. The Russian reaction to the attack showed that Russia was prepared to take on a large military engagement but was not willing to carry it out itself and not by directly participating in combat. A dual strategy was initiated. On the one hand, Moscow made the mission into a formal CIS collective mission, gave it a peacekeeping/peacemaking label, tried to establish a

UN peacekeeping mandate for the mission and initiated efforts to have negotiations started between the parties to the conflict (April 1994).

On the other hand, a strategy of counterinsurgency was never completely abandoned. This was reflected in the continued Russian support for the Rakhmonov regime; and specifically in efforts (although unsuccessful) to create Tajik national armed forces, to educate officers and train them, and to provide the Tajik troops with weapons and equipment. It was also reflected in the set-up for the military troops where Russian troops in a "division of labour" made their contribution to the Tajik government's fighting the opposition.

The Russian troops in Tajikistan are of two different kinds: Russian Border Troops and the 201st Motorized Rifle Division. They have different mandates and different tasks. Yet, they are both parts of Russian policy in Tajikistan.

- *The Russian Border Troops:* Their formal mission is to guard the border. In addition, they have the function of sealing off the border with Afghanistan from reinforcements and support to military units of the Tajik opposition. They are involved in combat along the border on a more or less daily basis. Their understanding of guarding the border has gone beyond the formal mandate and mission, and they have repeatedly been accused of bombing civilian villages in both Tajikistan and Afghanistan along the border. On some occasions such bombing has been admitted by the Russian military command in Tajikistan. The Border Troops have also assisted Tajik government troops transferring military equipment in preparation for offensives against military units of the opposition.

- *The Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division* constitutes the core of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPF). According to the CIS mandate, the troops are to remain neutral and not to participate in combat. They are heavily armed. One main task is to guard objects vital to Tajik state security. Another task is to constitute a "second defence echelon" by giving support to the Border Troops when necessary. The Commander of the CPF has broad authorities in carrying out the mission.

Russia did intend to have more troops in Tajikistan than were actually deployed. According to a 1994 decision, which has never been implemented, the CPF would be increased up to

16,000 men and the Border Troops to doubled at the most vulnerable parts. Today the CPF consist of 5,500 men of the 201st plus 500 in each a Kazakh and a Kyrgyz battalion, and an Uzbek unit of 300 men. The Russian Border Troops consist of 16.500 men (figures from October 1996). The dual strategy had built-in contradictions ever since it was launched in the autumn of 1993. On the one hand Russia tried to act as mediator in negotiations, on the other hand it fully supported one side to the conflict. The CPF were called peacekeepers but they were part of a Russian policy to support a government which was at war with its opposition. The CPF had no mandate to participate in combat. Still, they were in the position of easily being drawn into direct combat as the peacekeepers were ordered to answer fire if attacked.

At the end of 1995 the situation in Tajikistan was stuck in a stalemate. The negotiations were deadlocked. The Tajik opposition started advancing in the military field. The war in Chechenya provided an unwelcome scenario for Russia in Tajikistan. The failure of Russian ambitions showed the world a decaying and demoralized army. The military on the ground in Tajikistan had been the first to recommend strong and active military involvement in the Tajik conflict, and they became the first to understand that Russia was not capable of contributing to a military victory in the Tajik civil war.

Since 1996: Into political accommodation and a peace support mission. In 1996, Russia changed its policy into a serious search for a political accommodation between the parties. As a result, a peace accord was signed in June 1997 between Tajik President Rakhmonov and the Leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Nuri. As a National Reconciliation Commission began work in July, and a process of co-operation and integration has begun, the mission and its institutional framework will have to change character. The mission of the Russian troops will have to change to become more in line with traditional UN peacekeeping. The CPF now will have to act in consent with both parties.

There are new challenges to peace today. The troops may have the new task of guaranteeing stability under the new circumstances. This may imply the use of force but has to take place if accepted by the parties. Events in August 1997 pointed to the threats coming from within the ranks of the parties to the conflict. Khudoberdyev, commander of the 1st Brigade of the Presidential Guard did not agree with the peace accord and declared his control of the southern and western parts of Tajikistan. Heavy weapons were used in fighting between

Khudoberdyev and troops loyal to Rakhmonov. Also, the leader of the Tajik United Opposition has problems with local commanders. If, and to what extent the CPF would help the parties to maintain control of the situation to continue the peace process becomes a new question. The institutional framework of the CIS mission in Tajikistan will probably change its character as well. The non-Russian CIS member states may be more willing to take on responsibilities and make it a more truly multilateral CIS mission. The role of the observers at the inter-Tajik negotiations over the years (Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan besides Russia) may increase. The UN may also consider a larger role.

Lessons from Russian Experiences in Tajikistan

When analysing the shifts in Russian policy, what seems to be the "lessons" drawn by Russian political and military leaders? If we look at those elements of a Russian military culture that I mentioned earlier as decisive in Russian policy-making with regard to the Tajik conflict, I suggest at least four lessons:

- Military means can not provide a long-lasting political solution (they can at best help to have a cease-fire agreement signed).
- A conflict cannot be understood as a zero-sum game.
- The very idea of overwhelming military force in peace support missions has to be abandoned. Russia no longer has the capabilities for that kind of intervention.
- The military commanders in peace support missions will have to subordinate themselves more to political decision-makers as missions become truly multilateral in character.

To the international community, the Tajik case also highlights the general need to regulate and constrain great power behaviour within regions, which the great power considers to be "its sphere of interest". The power to decide when, why and how an intervention in the name of restoring and keeping peace is to take place can not be left to great powers or regional organisations. International organisations, and first of all the UN, must be given a much larger role to define and pursue a wider policy of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This demands a search for new alternative and flexible forms of co-operation under the aegis of the UN in a division of labour between international organisations and regional organisations.

The responsibility of an international regional organisation like the CIS should be carried out by all its member states and not only by the great power in the region.

Notes:

[1] *The Tajik Civil War: A Challenge to Russian Policy*. The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London. Discussion paper (October 1997). See *also Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia*, (eds. Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1996: and "In Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism" in Conflicts in the CIS, *Low-Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, 1996, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter).

[2] Viktor Kremenyuk, "Post-Soviet conflicts: new security concerns", in *Russia and Europe*: *The Emerging Security Agenda*, (ed.) Vladimir Baranovsky (London: SIPRI/Oxford Press), 1997, p 258.; Pavel Baev, *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles* (London: PRIO/ SAGE Publications), 1996. pp. 127-150.

[3] Roy Allison, *Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States*, Chaillot Papers, 1994, No. 18, (November); Dov Lynch, *Russian "Peacekeeping" Strategies In the CIS, 1992-1996: The Case of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Oxford University, St. Anthony's College (March 1997).

6. Use of Force in Peace Support

Use of Force - Is There A Middle Ground?

By Dick Zandee
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(This presentation reflects the views of the author at the time a member of the International Staff and does not necessarily reflect the views of NATO or its member states.)

The theme of this working group: "Use of Force in Peace Support- Is There a Middle Ground?" could also be read as: is there middle ground between the two concepts of peacekeeping and peace enforcement? For reasons of clarity, I refer here to:

- peacekeeping in its classical form, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, based on three important principles: (i) full consent of the parties, (ii) impartiality, and (iii) use of force only in self defence; and
- peace enforcement in the traditional sense, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: full use of force to expel an aggressor from occupied territory (inter-state conflict).

Two incompatible concepts, defined in more popular terms: in the first case, as lightly armed UN-blue helmet peacekeepers guarding/monitoring agreed cease-fire lines or demilitarised zones, and in the second case, as green helmet, heavily equipped armies conducting full-scale war. Examples: the UN-Force on Cyprus monitoring the cease-fire line as a classical peacekeeping operation and the coalition intervention in 1991 to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait as a peace enforcement operation.

In addition to such classical peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, in recent years new types of operations have been carried out, responding to new, post-Cold War conflicts. The labels used for these new types of operations vary widely: humanitarian operations,

peace-building operations, wider peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping, etc. The debate on terminology is ongoing and perhaps will never reach a state of consensus. Politicians like the term peacekeeping, which is now used for a variety of operations, and it seems unlikely to be replaced for generally accepted new terminology. Let me make a modest contribution to the confusion by throwing in two definitions, which might reflect the new types of missions. The first term has been officially introduced by the UN SecretaryGeneral in his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", namely "multifunctional peacekeeping operations". The Ad Hoc Group on co-operation in Peacekeeping, which consists of all NATO Allies, PfP Partners and Ireland, has defined multifunctional peacekeeping operations in its 1995 Follow-On Report to the 1993 Athens Report as follows: "(...) operations based on a broader understanding of peacekeeping and (...) often carried out in the context of evolving crises, where it has been more difficult to maintain the consent of the parties and hence to implement the mandate". In other words strategic consent is not the same as total consent. At the local level the peacekeeping force might be confronted with opposition, abstruction and violence. As explained in the report, the phrase "multifunctional peacekeeping operations" is not intended to create a new category of peacekeeping operations, but only to describe the increasing complexity of certain operations. It might be useful to keep this Ad Hoc Group definition in mind in discussing "Challenges to peace support: into the 21st Century". Another term, which is being used by the NATO military, is "Peace Support Operations" (PSO). In the approved Military Committee document MC 327 (NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations), PSO are defined as "(...) multifunctional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and (...) designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations". In other words, the term PSO covers the whole panoply of operations under UN Charter Chapters VI and VII. The advantage of using this umbrella-term is, however, at the same time a disadvantage: the type of operation is unclear and further specification is needed.

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), now Stabilisation Force (SFOR), is an example of the new type of operations, whatever one wants to call it. What are its essential characteristics?

- Firstly: a clear mandate provided by the UN Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, SFOR is not in Bosnia to conduct war. But acting under Chapter VII, it will not hesitate to use force against those who threaten the peace or obstruct the Force in the accomplishment of its mission. These are the broad parameters for the use of force in the SFOR operation.
- Secondly: clear objectives, defined in Annex 1-A (Military Aspects) of the Dayton Peace Agreement describing the obligations of the Parties. SFOR's role is to ensure that the Parties carry out these obligations. Annex 1-A provides the yardstick for this: the Parties can be held responsible for their actions (or lack of action), based on their own signatures under the Peace Agreement.
- Thirdly: based on mandate and objectives of the Peace Agreement, there is a clear definition of the mission and Concept of Operations; the Operational Plan (OPIAN) describes in detail how the operation should be conducted (tasks, phases, etc.)
- Fourthly: unity of command; political direction by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) leads to strategic military guidance by SACEUR which in turn is the basis for guidance to the commanders in theatre by the Commander of SFOR; robust Rules of Engagement (ROE), allowing use of force if required, are an essential element of the guidance.

In short, SFOR is tailored to its mission and its tasks, and structured and equipped to be able to perform its duties effectively. This is essential for any peace support mission. There is no standard formula for the composition of a peace support force. Depending on the mandate, the mission and tasks, a peace support force will have to be configured accordingly. The configuration might change if the circumstances change, as has been the case when SFOR replaced IFOR

The UN Secretary-General approached NATO already in 1993 to plan for the implementation of the military aspects of a peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. With its existing military structure, planning and force generation procedures, and the availability of the required assets, NATO was able to lead successful IFOR/SFOR operations. More remarkable is that not only all 16 NATO members participate in the Force, but also 20 non-NATO countries (15 PfP and 5 non-PfP countries). All troop contributors operate under the same rules on use of force as laid down in approved ROEs.

What are SFOR's rules on the use of force? Firstly, use of force is in accordance with the UN mandate for SFOR, which authorises SFOR "to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1 A of the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall continue to be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by SFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex and the, protection of SFOR, and takes note that the parties have consented to SFOR's taking such measures". Secondly, it is clearly defined that use of force, if applied, will be in accordance with the principle of international law, namely proportionality, the minimum use of force and avoiding collateral damage as much as possible. This is reflected in the ROEs, which are mission-specific. Any change of ROEs requires political approval by the NAC.

Use of force is a tool of last resort for SFOR. It is not applied easily and only after other means have been exhausted. However, if it becomes necessary to apply force - e.g. when parties continue to violate provisions of the Peace Agreement and peaceful attempts to reach compliance have failed - then force should be applied effectively to realise the specific objective. In fact, sush use of force (i.e. not in self-defence) is a final step on the escalatory ladder, which cannot be seen in isolation from all previous stages. The ultimate stage of use of force can only be credible if the intent and the capability exist. The old deterrence formula of the Cold War (deterrence = intent x capability) also seems to apply to operations like SFOR's. The parties are well aware of SFOR's capabilities and, so far, have backed off when confronted with the threat of use of force if they continued to violate the peace agreement.

Under these principles concerning the use of force, IFOR and SFOR have been operating credibly and effectively, and as a result, Annex 1 A of the Peace Agreement has been implemented successfully:

- The parties' fortes are separated.
- The heavy weapons are stored in cantonment sites.
- Illegally held weapons are confiscated and destroyed.
- Training and movement is controlled.
- Special police forces are under control.

By ensuring a secure environment, IFOR and SFOR have made possible that the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement could be implemented, the rutines of which is essential for establishing lasting peace. But IFOR and SFOR have also directly contributed to civil implementation: By repairing, restoring and maintaining over 2500 km of roads, over 60 bridges, several railroad tracks and other key infrastructure.

By advising, assisting and supporting the High Representative, OSCE, UNHCR, IPTF and other international organisations in their tasks; the civil-military co-operation (CIMIC` staff element of SFOR is playing a crucial role in implementing the civil aspects of the peace agreement. Reservists with a civil background in law, engineering, communications, agriculture, etc. are helping the parties and the other international organisations in implementing the civil aspects of the peace agreement. But also SFOR troops in the field are providing support (transport, logistical support, engineering, etc.).

By SFOR troops at the local level involved in carrying out "hearts and minds" projects in towns and villages, e.g. rebuilding schools, hospitals, utilities, etc.

To sum up:

- there is a clear distinction between the use of force in new type of operations, mandated under Chapter VII, and peace enforcement in the traditional sense of Chapter VII of the UN Charter:
- use of force in operations like IFOR/SFOR's is in accordance with a UN mandate, the international legal principles of proportionality, minimum use of force and minimising collateral damage, reflected in appropriate Rules of Engagement.
- However, if required, force must be used effectively to ensure compliance by the Parties; a Chapter VII mandate for peace support operations, therefore, sets important requirements for the structure and capabilities of the Force.

Finally, use of force under these restrictions, tailored to the mission to ensure compliance with a Peace Agreement, might be labelled use of force in the "middle ground" between classical peace keeping and traditional peace enforcement, on the understanding that it is not exactly in the middle between those two concepts, but basically a tool of last resort that can be used in different formats, depending on the situation and the goal to be achieved.

7. Civil-Military Relations - Command and Control, Co-operation and Integration in the Field

Civil-Military Relations: Command and Control, Co-operation and Integration in the Field

By Youri E. Fedorov
(Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science Moscow State Institute of International Relations)

"Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it."
Former UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld

Introduction

The developments of the 1990's are providing enough reasons to believe that local disturbances and instabilities, conflicts and wars will be integral parts of political and military environments in the beginning of the next century. The recent experience, and first of all wars in the former Yugoslavia and the internal conflicts in Albania, Moldova, Georgia, as well as the war over the Mountainous Karabagh made evident that armed disturbances are typical not only of the Third World regions but also of the societies in transition of Southern Europe. So, peace operations could and it seems would be among the highest priorities for international institutions and for some nations, including those of Europe.

The prospects for Russia and a number of the newly independent states are not optimistic. The clan struggle in Tajikistan and the Armenian-Azery dispute over the Mountainous Karabagh seem to be of a long term nature and could last into the first decade of the 21st Century. There is no political settlement in Moldova and in Georgia up to now. These conflicts are considered by a large part of Moscow's elite as affecting Russia's vital interests and Russian actual or potential involvement into the developments in these zones seem inevitable. It seems that

political and military sides of Russia's peace operations are not balanced and military activities prevail over political.

The Content of Civil-Military Relations in Peace Operations

The proper co-ordination of political and military aspects of peace operations is, of course, an important factor of their effectiveness and success. Basically, civil-military relations in a course of realisation of peace operations have three main dimensions. The accumulated experience is presented in a number of documents and basic concepts like, for instance, "NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations".

The first one is the political control and guidance over an operation. "The overall political control of a peace support operation will be the responsibility of a single, impartial, internationally recognised, multinational, political organisation, i.e. the UN or CSCE. The senior executive body of the responsible organisation, either the UN Security Council or CSCE Committee of Senior Officials, will appoint a Head of Mission for a particular conflict situation and provide a clear written mandate, specifying the mission, objectives, authority, expected duration, and terms of reference. The Head of Mission, whether the military Force Commander or a civilian Special Representative, will then act on behalf of the responsible organisation in all matters of related to the assigned mission."[1] The main aims of political control over a peace operation could be an assurance of such basic principles as impartiality, limited use of force, unity of command, transparency, and first of all, orientation of an operation as a whole to solution of the conflict, as well as, of course, fulfilment of a mandate of operation. So, the principal issues are: who makes a decision on operation, appoints a heads of missions or commander of peacekeeping forces and to whom field commanders and political officers are reporting - and how is all of this done.

The next dimension of civil-military relations is co-ordination and integration of civil and military components and missions in the framework of the operation: "Current peace support operations involve important, but distinct contributions by the civilian and military components of the mission. It is critical to mission success that the activities of the UN civil police, elections supervisors, human rights monitors, humanitarian aid agencies, and similar organisations be integrated with the military operations. Co-ordination among the components

should be frequent, routine, structured, and in-place down to the lowest practical level, such as battalion or company".[2]

It seems important both for practical purposes and for academic generalisations to summarise the primary components and objectives of a civilian or political-diplomatic side of a peace operation. Their principal aim is to regulate the conflict by political instruments, to create a political environment favourable for termination of armed hostilities and also to restore any civil institutions that may have been destroyed in the result of fighting. A group of military officers and academics has summarised during the international seminar in Moscow in June 1995, the essence of political and civil side of peace operations in the following way:

- mediation and negotiating efforts aimed at reaching cease-fire agreements;
- creating or helping create structures and tools that can be used to assure and monitor the cease-fire agreements (demilitarised zones, security zones, an observer system, the withdrawal of various categories of hardware and weapons from the conflict zone, etc.) and also having representatives of the armed forces carry out, in full or in part, certain administrative functions in the security zones;
- facilitating the negotiation process in order to resolve the most acute problems, i. e., those capable of provoking a renewal of military actions;
- helping restore or create a system of civilian administration capable of effectively resolving local political and practical problems; providing for the functioning of the systems necessary for the daily lives of the citizens; and ensuring that human rights are protected;
- helping bring about a political resolution of the conflict as a whole, to include organising or overseeing the organising and conducting of referendums, free elections and other actions which make possible the resolution of the question of power, which is the issue that causes the majority of the domestic conflicts; these actions should be taken with the participation or supervision of the international community;
- aiding in the return of the refugees or displaced persons, since experience shows that any political settlement of the conflict is practically impossible without the resolution of such problems as these, should they arise.[3]

The effectiveness of the operation as a whole, and its civilian side, in particular, depends in many respects on whether political (or civilian) bodies and institutions are created and whether they are able to make decisions which the military peacekeeping forces are bound to carry out. The subordination of the military force to the civilian institutions should be the basic principle of the peace operations.

The main tasks of the military force in the course of peacekeeping operation could be summarised in a following way:

- forcing the combatant's armed formations out of the contact zones, pursuing them, and if absolutely necessary, destroying them;
- presenting a show of military force as a deterrent to the combatants;
- separating the combatants by creating demilitarised zones, security zones and corridors etc.,
- completely or partially disarming the combatants, collecting and storing weapons and military hardware, conducting searches seizing weapons;
- exercising control over lines of communications, patrolling, preventing weapons and armed groups penetrating certain areas;
- providing for the safe delivery of humanitarian workers and cargoes into the conflict area;
- ensuring law and order and basic human rights;
- protecting agencies and institutions which exercise political and humanitarian functions in the conflict zone; protecting refugees as well as ethnic and other minority groups which are discriminated against;
- providing physical protection of the strategically important or speciality dangerous facilities in the conflict zone.[4]

In case peace enforcement or, perhaps, peace restoration is necessary, for instance, if some armed formations prevent peacekeeping forces from entering the conflict zone, then these forces are to fulfil some battle missions in order to halt armed hostilities, and provide security, and other conditions for political, humanitarian and other civil measures aimed at resolution of the conflict.

The third dimension of civil-military relations in a course of peace operations are associated with the relations between the institutions and forces responsible for the operation and local authorities and population: "The success of a peace support operation will often rely on the quality of relations between the peace support force and the population in the mission area. Historically, the effectiveness of such operations has been diminished when the local community misunderstood the mission, objectives, and activities of the peace support force, either unintentionally or through false rumours or deliberately through desinformation spread by one or more of the warring factions. Planners must ensure that they incorporate into their plans the means and techniques to develop and maintain strong, positive communications with the local populace, starting before the first deployment of their elements into the mission area".[5]

Thus, historical and practical experience makes it evident that civil-military relations in the course of the peace operations should be organised in a way to ensure the priority of political tasks and functions as well as political control over military, and to direct the operation as a whole on political, peaceful settlement of the conflict, and to assure integration and co-ordination of the civil and military institutions at the field, and to arrange proper relations between the local population and authorities, and the international peace forces and bodies.

The Legal Aspects of Civil-Military Relations in the Course of Russia's and CIS Peace Operations

The legal foundations of Russia's peace operations are formulated, firstly, by the Constitution of the Russian Federation; and, secondly, by the Federal Law "On the Order of Providing by the Russian Federation the Military and Civil Personal for the Activities on Keeping or Restoration of International Peace and Security", approved by the State Duma on 26 May 1995 and confirmed by the President on 23 June 1996; and, thirdly, by a number of CIS documents and decisions supported and approved by the Russian Federation.

According to Article 102 of the Russian Constitution, Russia's armed forces can be used beyond her borders only if that is approved and sanctioned by the Council of Federation (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament). [6] That is an important provision, but it does not

describe, even in a very general way, either the decision-making process, or the civil-military relations in the course of peace operations.

The detailed pattern and procedures of decision-making on Russia's participation in peace operations are defined by The Federal Law of 26 May 1995.[7] Of principal importance are the provisions of the Law according to which Russia may participate in peace enforcement measures or realise them unilaterally if such measures are approved by the UN Security Council. However, as for peacekeeping and peace restoration operations Russia according to the Article 2 of this Law may underwrite them in accordance with the decisions of UN Security Council, or of regional organisations, on the basis of Russia's bilateral or multilateral agreements.

This provision is rather ambiguous from, at least, two angles. Firstly, a restoration of peace in many cases may include fighting actions and other forms of enforcement in order to compel the combatants to cease-fire and to obey the peacekeeping institutions. Secondly, such operations can be undertaken not only in accordance with corresponding decisions of international organisations, but also on the basis of Russia's international agreements. That means that the Russian leadership is rather free to use military force beyond Russia's borders. Russia may in fact conclude any agreement with any party of the conflict, including sovereign "quasi-state formation" like, for instance, Abkhazia, or Southern Ossetia, or the Transdniestrian Republic. All of them could be considered as international agreements or accords.

The decision-making procedures defined by the Federal Law of 26 May 1995 includes the following series of stages. The President addresses the Council of Federation with the proposal to send Russia's armed forces on a peace mission abroad. This proposal should consist of a definition of the area of the mission; tasks of the force; nature, type and composition of the weapons and military hardware the force will have subordination of the forte; the duration of the mission and the procedure of its prolongation; conditions and rules for rotation of the military personal; social guaranties and financial compensations for them. Besides, the President should present to the Council of Federation with the mandate of the operation. The Council of Federation should approve or disapprove the proposed mission. After that the President makes the decision on Russian military participation in a particular

peace operation in a form of the Presidential Decree. If Russian personnel is participating in a peace operation on the basis of international agreement, then such an agreement is to be ratified by the Federal Assembly (i.e., both by the upper and the lower chambers) in two cases: firstly, if some additional budget funding is necessary for such operation; secondly, if Russian troops are intended to be used in peace enforcement actions.

That means that there are no special provisions and rules in the Russian legislation, which regulate and manage the co-ordination and integration of civil-military aspects of peace operations, and that there is no special political control and guidance over the peace operation presumed by the law. Russian troops participating in such operation: act within the usual framework of subordination. Their commanders report to the Ministry of Defence, while the latter reports to the President as the Supreme Commander. The only body which is able to perform some limited co-ordination functions at the central level (but not in the field) is the Interdepartmental Commission on the Co-ordination of Russian Federation's Participation in Peace Activities, established by the Decision of the Government on 9 November 1993. Two deputy ministers - of Defence and Foreign Affairs - were appointed as co-chairmen of the Commission.[8]

The only political document which defines some rules and procedures of political control and guidance over the peace operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union is the Concept of Prevention and Settlement of the Conflicts at the Territory of the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States approved by the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS on 19 January 1996.

It was stated in this Concept that the most preferable way of settling disputes and preventing conflicts is preventive political and diplomatic measures, basically different forms of mediating. They could be undertaken on the basis of appeal of the CIS member-state, which is supposed to be threatened and are to be realised by the Special Representative of the CIS. In some cases, deployment of military or police force is necessary to prevent the escalation of tensions and transformation of the disputes into armed conflict. Such deployment could be undertaken only after corresponding appeal of the parties of conflict and their mutual consent and on decisions made by the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS [9]

The Concept regulates also basic procedures and rules of the civil-military relations in the course of peace operations in the former Soviet Union. The Council of the Heads of States of the CIS is defined as the highest political body which makes the decisions on the beginning of the operation; approves the Mandate; defines the tasks and the composition of the Collective Peacekeeping Force as well as the duration of the operation; appoints the Head of the Peace Mission of the CIS or the Special Representative of the CIS for the settlement of the conflict; the Commander of Peace Force and, in some cases, the Head of the Group of Military Observers. The Head of the Mission and the Joint Command are responsible for the preparation of the practical proposals on prolongation of the operation to be presented to the Council-of the Heads of States.

The Head of the Mission (or Special Representative) is acting in the zone of conflict on behalf of the Council of the Heads of States and is fully responsible for the political aspects of the peace operation, and supervises the realisation of its Mandate. The Council of the Foreign Ministers of the CIS is responsible for the directing of the negotiating process on prevention and settlement of the conflict and reporting directly to the Council of the Heads of States.

The Commander of the Collective Peacekeeping Force (or the Head of the Group of Military Observers) is responsible for the immediate guidance of this force (or group) and for fulfilment of tasks defined by the Mandate. As a rule, this position should be given to the representative of the state providing the largest number of personnel for the Collective Peace Force. The management of the Collective Peace Force is carried out by the Joint Command composed from the officers of all states participating in the peace operations.[10]

The provisions of the Concept are ambiguous in several respects. It is not quite clear whether the Head of the Mission (or Special Representative) is able to guide and direct the activities of the Commander of the Collective Peace Force, or not. His task of supervising the fulfilment of the Mandate is not supplemented by the necessary authorities. It is not defined who governs the Commander of Collective Force and how this is to be done at the operational level between the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States. All this makes the Concept non-operational.

The Practical Realisation of Civil-Military Relations in the Course of Peace Missions in the Former Soviet Union

The structure of civil-military relations in the peace operations in Southern Ossetia and Transdniestria have a great deal in common. It is defined by two agreements: The Russian-Moldovan Accord of 21 July 1992 and Russian, Georgian Accord of 24 June 1992. Both of them were approved by the Transdniestrian and Southern Ossetian sides. The basic provisions of these accords were similar and obligated the parties:

- to take all measures for the establishment of a cease-fire;
- to create a security zone from which all heavy hardware would be pulled back, with this zone under a special control of joint peacekeeping forces;
- to create a peacekeeping force to be made up of Russian contingents as well as units of the hostile sides;
- to create a joint command to lead these forces as well as a political institution, i.e., Combined Control Commission in Transdniestria and a Joint Control Commission in Southern Ossetia; these institutions are authorised to make decisions concerning the state of affairs in the security zones.[11]

Thus, these joint or combined commissions composed of the military and political representatives of hostile sides and Russia are the principal structures intended to co-ordinate and integrate civil-military relations in the zones of conflicts and exercise political control over peacekeeping military force there. Such an institution is working sufficiently well in Transdniestria, but is not effective at all in the Southern Ossetian case. The reason for that are political controversies which prevent the combined commission to gather in the regular way. Accordingly the daily political issues are discussed and decided by the commanders of Russian battalion and heads of Georgian and Ossetian formations.

A number of basic documents are providing the legal and political basis for the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia, Georgia: The Accord for cease-fire and Separation of Forces of 14 May 1994, The Decision of the Heads of States of the CIS on the Use of Collective Peacekeeping Force in the Zone of Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict on 21 October 1994, and The

Mandate of the Collective Peacekeeping Force in the Zone of Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia approved by the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS on 21 October 1994. The scheme of political control and guidance is defined by the last document. According to this:

- The Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF) is created.
- The joint Command of the CPF should be created from the representatives of the states participating in the peace operation.
- The commander of the CPF is appointed by the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS.
- The commander of the CPF reports to the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS, while on the operational issues he may obtain advises of the Chairmen of the Councils of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the CIS.
- The Commander of the CPF is responsible for the relations with the parties of the conflict, with the Defence Ministries of the countries participating in the peace operation, with the Staff of Military Co-operation of the CIS, and with the local authorities, with the representatives of the UN and the OSCE.

This means that the Commander of the CPF is responsible both for the military and political sides of the operation. However, in reality the peacekeeping force is made up from Russian troops only, and they are subordinated directly to the Russian Ministry of Defence. The Joint Command was created in a very formal way from the Commander of the CPF and his deputies.

The peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan has its specific pattern of integration of the political and military activities. It was outlined by the Statute of the Joint Command of the Collective Peacekeeping Force approved by the CIS Heads of States on 24 September 1993. This document defined the structure of the Joint Command, its tasks and functions, as well as the status of its personnel. There are several principal points which are important for civil-military relations in the course of the peace operation in Tajikistan:

- The Joint Command is responsible for the realisation of the decisions and instructions of the Council of the Heads of States and consists in particularly of representatives of the states participating in the peace operation.

- The Joint Command controls and directs the CPF including their participation in the fighting operations.
- The Joint Command participates in the negotiations on stabilisation of the situation in the receiving state.
- The Commander of the CPF is appointed by the Council of the Heads of States and reports to the heads of states and the ministers of defence of the participating states.
- The Commander of the CPF is responsible for the contacts with the representatives of the parties in the conflict, with the ministries of defence of the participating states and with the local authorities.[12]

Conclusion

All this means that there is no common pattern of political-military relations in the peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and furthermore there is neither concept nor developed practice of civil functions of such operations. Political and civil activities are basically fulfilled by the Commanders of CPF and daily contacts with the local authorities are limited. Despite the corresponding provisions of The Concept of Prevention and Settlement of the Conflicts at the Territory of the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States approved by the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS on 19 January 1996 there are neither Special Representatives or Heads of Mission responsible for the political aspects of the operations nor groups of observers and other institutions involved in political solution of the conflicts. Particually, Russian troops are the only or dominating part of the CPF and it is only natural that Russian Ministry of Defence plays the decisive role in managing the CPF. Such a situation provides Russia with the substantial influence over the operation and accordingly in the area of conflict, but does not help its settlement.

Notes:

[1] *NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations,* 28 February 1994 Draft. p. 6.

[2] Ibid. p. 10.

[3] "Non-Traditional Operations Involving the Use of Armed Forces" An International Seminar sponsored by the Center for Political and International Studies, Moscow and the Foreign

Military Studies Office, Fort Levenworth, Kansas, 31 May - 3 June 1995. Foreign Military Studies Office - pp. 14-15.

[4] Ibid. pp. 16-17.

[5] NATO Doctrine.." p. 25.

[6] The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Moscow - 1995 - p. 36. (In Russian).

[7] Here and after the text of the Federal Law on 26 May 1995 quoted as it is published in the Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (Diplomatic Herald), N. 8., August 1995. pp. 3-6. (In Russian).

[8] Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (Diplomatic Herald), N. 1-2, January 1994. p. 8. (In Russian).

[9] The Concept of Prevention and Settlement of the Conflicts on the Territory of the Member-States of the Commonwealth of the Independent States. Approved by the Council of the Heads of States on 19 January 1996. pp. 2-3.,

[10] Ibid. pp. 6-7.

[11] Text of *The Accord on the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova* and *The Text of The Accord on the Principles of Settlement of Georgian Ossetian Conflict.*

[12] The Text of *The Statute of the Joint Command of the Collective Peacekeeping Force*, Approved on 24 September 1993.

Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping

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Civil-Military relations are normally dissected in the context of the nation state, the classic study being Samuel Huntington's *Soldier and the State*, published in 1957.[1] In that volume he underlines the central tension that exists given in the United States between the highly conservative military on the one hand and a liberal society on the other. In the 1960s there followed a rash of studies beginning with S.E. Finer's *The Man on Horseback* in 1962[2], which reflected the prominent role played the military in the emerging states of the Third World. In that decade in Africa, Asia and the Middle East the major vehicle of political change appeared to be the coup d'etat. More recently, however, the military's role in politics has appeared to decline, in many cases quite spectacularly as, for example, throughout Latin America and in some Asian countries like South Korea and Thailand. Coincidental with this, there has been a lack of attention paid to the interface between the military and politics.

In the 1990s a new context emerged in which the military entered the political realm, namely peacekeeping. Peacekeeping as such, of course, was not new. The United Nations had mounted peacekeeping operations from the late 1940s on. But the operations that flourished in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1989 were radically different. Unlike traditional operations which tended to be mounted along borders or cease-fire lines as in the Sinai, Cyprus, the Golan Heights and Kashmir, "second generation peacekeeping" as it was soon called was concerned above all with domestic conflicts and civil wars as in Cambodia, El Salvador, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mandates for these operations were highly intrusive and involved soldiers working alongside civilians at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

These armies were neither waging war against the local population, nor were they armies of occupation. Instead, they found themselves working in the field first with civilians within the mission (colleagues within the UN and its agencies); second with civilians on the fringes of

the mission (the NGO community); and third with civilians outside the mission (though the tasks troops were given with regard to the local population that no army had previously undertaken). As part of their service the military were expected to broker diplomatic deals; help provide shelter for the displaced; protect human rights; supervise the return of refugees; organise and monitor general elections; and support civil reconstruction. Few armies were equipped for such new roles, not even those of Canada, India, Pakistan and Scandinavia - all of which had traditionally provided the backbone of international peacekeeping operations - nor the British Army, which had acted in support of 'the civil power' in Northern Ireland since the 1960s. Three key features of second-generation peacekeeping missions distinguish them from peacekeeping operations prior to 1989:

- They were highly intrusive, with ambitious political mandates that paid less attention to national sovereignty than had traditional peacekeeping operations.[3] There was rarely any front line, and if there was, it certainly did not follow an international border, or even a cease-fire line. Peacekeepers were spread out with a presence in most towns and villages, sometimes protecting humanitarian aid deliveries, as in Bosnia or Somalia, or providing security for critical electoral processes, as in Namibia and Cambodia. In general, the military were undertaking dramatically new tasks and increasingly assuming semidiplomatic roles.
- They involved considerable numbers of civilians working alongside the military, either directly for the UN or for other humanitarian agencies, such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the unique International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or the numerous NGOs in the field.
- The staffing of these missions increasingly included, and tended to be dominated by, troops from NATO countries and some of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, which before 1990 had largely been excluded from peacekeeping missions.[4]

Peacekeeping post-1989 thus thrust civilians and the military into closer proximity than had previous military activity, in which military and civilian tasks were clearly demarcated and separated. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld was once reputed to have remarked that peacekeeping was not a job for soldiers, but that only soldiers could do it. Once, that may have been true. But as the twentieth century draws to an end, militaries must

now adapt to working closely, and sharing strategic control of the theatre, with other non-military actors. An extraordinary expansion of peacekeeping took place after the end of the 80's, the Cold War reaching its peak in 1993/4 when there were almost no Peacekeepers deployed around the world and the UN budget for peacekeeping was $3 million. By late 1997 those numbers had declined to 18,000 and $1.3 billion respectively and were almost certainly set to decline further in course of 1998. Why was there this apparent reversal of fortunes for peacekeeping will it be permanent ? There are, I believe, three fundamental reasons.

- In the first place, the appetite for intervention has been reduced after apparent setbacks in Bosnia and Somalia. Even the record of UNTAC in Cambodia appears to have been flawed by the consolidation of power in July 1997 by the former communist party led by Hun Sen. As the decade has progressed the international community has realised that civil wars and domestic conflicts are less amenable to resolution than had previously been thought. We now have a greater understanding of these conflicts - their sheer savagery, brutality and intractability. This we should have known as the US Civil War of 1861-65 was in many ways the first modern war and the Spanish Civil War of 1936-9 and the Greek Civil War of 1946-48 were amongst the most brutal conflicts of modern times.
- Secondly, while we read constantly of economic globalisation, in the realms of politics and diplomacy there has been a re-nationalisation of foreign policy. Increasingly, the UN has been marginalised and the Security Council reduced to a licensing authority for operations by others. A striking example in this regard is the Italian led intervention in Albania in 1997, Operation Alba. Which strategic analyst would have been brave enough five years ago to predict an Italian military operation? Similarly, we have seen Russian peacekeeping operations in the former republics of the Soviet Union and Nigerian military intervention in Liberia under the cover of ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States). In addition to this, regional organisations like NATO are mounting their own peacekeeping operations such as IFOR and then SFOR in Bosnia.
- There have been shortcomings in peacekeeping operations themselves, not least in the area of civil-military relations, which have had a disillusioning effect on governments and public opinion.

This said, there can still be little doubt that in the course of the first decade of the next century we are likely to see a return to peacekeeping and probably under UN auspices. Armies are

probably more likely to find themselves involved in such operations as in fighting traditional wars such as that against Iraq in the Gulf in 1991. Peacekeeping today is a complex and multi-faceted task and is likely to remain so. If peacekeeping is to be successful, closer co-ordination of its civilian and military elements is vital. The military-humanitarian interface or CIMIC in military parlance - is an increasingly key area for policy development, particularly in terms of military support for civilian groups within peacekeeping, crisis-management and peace-support operations. The IFOR/SFOR experience and other peacekeeping operations in the 1990s have helped to generate new concepts of civil-military relations in the peacekeeping context.

In peacekeeping missions there is no clear distinction between peacetime and wartime, entailing a much greater need for continuous civil-military interaction. These operations are truly political-military enterprises, in which civilian leaders and military commanders contribute together to the decisionmaking process. In these contexts more than ever, political leaders must understand the military tools at their disposal, and military commanders must understand the political aims and constraints underlying the missions they carry out. Political authorities, whether in national capitals or at the headquarters of international organisations such as the UN or NATO, develop the goals and decide the mandate of an operation. The military, for its part, gives essential guidance on what it considers to be militarily feasible and what resources are necessary. Clearly, for these operations to be successful, the civil and military components must have a secure and trusting relationship. While this has always been an important factor, it is indispensable in addressing the complex conflicts and crises that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Two key requirements are:

- clarity in setting mandates which respond both to the needs of the situation and to the resources available; and,
- regular dialogue between all the principal players, including representatives of the increasingly important NGO community, not just the military participants in a mission .

Unclear mandates from the UN Security Council have been one of the primary causes of poor civilian-military relations in the field. The military and humanitarian agencies cannot be blamed for failing to cooperate adequately in confusing or inappropriate missions. Instead, mandates should include from the outset the necessary political, military and humanitarian

input. Ensuring input from all sides would help to avoid a military peacekeeping operation being authorised when a humanitarian operation supported by the military would be more appropriate. It would also help to avoid situations in which humanitarian operations are used as a substitute for political or military action.

Once a mission has been deployed, improvements in command-and-control arrangements should be possible in three areas:

- More effective military staff capacity is required at the local mission headquarters, responsible directly to the UN Security Council in New York. The current arrangement of Military Advisers to the Secretary General leaves their functioning entirely to his discretion: he may or may not accept their advice, or share it with the Security Council. Hitherto, this has not worked satisfactorily.
- The major troop-contributing countries should be systematically involved in determining mandates, and any changes therein, as well as in reviewing operational plans. Greater involvement in a mission's formative stages would reduce the extent to which national authorities interfere at the field levels.[5]
- Senior military officers from all the larger troop-contributing countries should be based at the field headquarters. This would further reduce the incidence of unwelcome national intervention.

Militaries need to gain a greater understanding of the relevant international standards without which human rights - a major function of contemporary peacekeeping - cannot be addressed. Operations such as UNTAC, UNPROFOR, IFOR and Operation Alba are not traditional military activities: they are far removed from the wars that militaries have been customarily trained to carry out. There is, therefore, a need for greater transparency in the field at the tactical and operational levels, and for closer political supervision and advice. This greater openess between the civil and military authorities could also help fine-tune the calibration of diplomatic and military moves which have proved problematic in both the UN and NATO deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without open and accountable procedures, concerns about human-rights abuses are likely to remain unaddressed and could jeopardise the ultimate credibility of the whole mission. In several operations, the UN and NATO have been unwilling to take up violations of the settlement with one or another party in a vigorous or

consistent way. This has been a particular problem where the UN mission sees itself not as a guardian of the settlement, but rather as an impartial facilitator, and becomes over-cautious about protesting too loudly lest it be perceived as taking sides.[6]

Disputes over human-rights violations have tended to be ignored by the military or have been dealt with through informal political channels, rather than through public condemnations or remedial action. Thus, for example, UNPROFOR military commanders, almost without exception, were afraid or unwilling to condemn or even acknowledge directly the practice of 'ethnic cleansing', although this was frequently denounced by the UNHCR and civilian officials of the peacekeeping mission. This had several unfortunate consequences - it led to tensions between the civilian and military components of the mission and gave the local population the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the military was not prepared to denounce even the most egregious human-rights violations. In Cambodia, the military component of UNTAC behaved in a similar manner with regard to serious human-rights violations carried out by the Khmer Rouge against members of the ethnic Vietnamese minority in 1992-93. While condemning and investigating these abuses rightly fell under the mandate of the Human Rights Component assisted by CIVPOL officers, the military were reluctant to provide general security in an attempt to prevent further killings for fear that doing so would lead to confrontation with the Khmer Rouge.

To avoid such situations, the UN itself - and, for that matter, NATO should declare its formal adherence to international humanitarian law and internationally agreed standards of human rights and criminal justice, especially where these relate to the detention of prisoners and the use of force. Sponsoring organisations should ensure that all troops participating in international peacekeeping operations are fully trained in those standards and understand their obligation to adhere to them. Specific mechanisms now need to be established at the international level to monitor, investigate and report violations of international norms by peacekeeping personnel, and to ensure that those responsible for serious misconduct are brought to justice in accordance with international law.[7] Given the disrepute brought upon three NATO armies - Canada, Belgium and Italy[8] - by their actions in Somalia, the UN and its member-states should develop strict rules of conduct and effective oversight mechanisms to help detect and report troops or units lacking proper discipline, so that they can be withdrawn from the operation and punitive action taken as appropriate.[9]

If, as seems inevitable, peace-support operations become a major part of Western military activity in the early 21st Century, serious attention must be given to reviewing military training. Before they are deployed, enforcement or peacekeeping units should receive - in addition to military training - training in human rights, humanitarian reporting and assessment, local culture and norms of behaviour. Greater emphasis should also be placed on the importance of collaboration both within missions and on their fringes with civilian components. Where missions are deployed for prolonged periods of time, military forces may become increasingly involved in law-enforcement tasks in order to ensure the success of their missions. Many – if not most armies – are not properly trained for this specialised work, which in practice bridges the divide between military and civilian tasks.[10] In this respect, Western militaries should strengthen their military-police capabilities so that in situations where law and order have completely collapsed, they can adequately and effectively fill the void. More ambitiously, the concept of a separate and distinctive United Nations Humanitarian Security Police should be carefully considered.[11] Reflecting on the experience of IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia at the end of 1997, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana argued for the establishment of a permanent international police force, possibly under UN supervision.[12] Furthermore, the skins required for peacekeeping differ, for example, from those necessary in combat. Appropriate military education and training is essential to ensure that these new missions are effective. Greater emphasis should be placed on the 'softer' aspects of military science - managing resources, civilian control, human rights - while also ensuring that adequate technical war-fighting skills are maintained.[13]

This readjustment of training poses particular problems for countries with long military traditions, such as the UK, France and, above all, the United States, which have traditionally looked askance at ‘soft’ military options. The US military priority has been to conduct full-scale war-fighting operations effectively; until recently, the US armed forces had been less concerned with peacekeeping. Nor does the experience of the French Army in enforcing a neocolonial order in much of Africa, or of the British in supporting the civil powers in Northern Ireland, necessarily equip them for peacekeeping duties. Indeed the experience of British forces in Northern Ireland has given them a particularly jaundiced view of ethnic and communal conflict; Belfast may always have been a divided city, but Sarajevo before 1992 was not.

Preparing troops for UN missions must therefore seek to integrate the more diverse aspects of peacekeeping, rather than focusing strictly on professional military training. UN missions are multinational, and training should cover co-operation in all aspects, both in dealing with other actors and cultures, and in co-ordinating efforts with civilian peacekeepers. In other words, training, even at a national level, should be adjusted to the changing demands of multinational peacekeeping.

The close co-ordination between the civil and military sides of operations, essential for effectiveness and legitimacy in the new forms of intervention, has implications for the nature, demands and requirements of soldiering; for how forces are prepared for participation in multinational peacekeeping; and for leadership, management and oversight of the military. It is critically important that armies are as well prepared for these operations as they are for war. It is precisely because they are not going to war that peace operations place a premium on semitivity to, and knowledge of, the local context. Many of the problems that arose in Bosnia and, above all, in Somalia might have been avoided had the forces been better prepared for the challenges they faced. Absorbing the lessons of multinational interventions in the 1994s will greatly facilitate this endeavour.

Notes:

[1] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA; Tre Bellknap Press, 1957.

[2] S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, Manchester University Press, 1962.

[3] For example, UNTAC (The UN Transitional Audlority in Cambodia, 1992-93) and ONUSAL (The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, 1991-95). NATOs first peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, the 1995-96 Implementation Force (IFOR), and its successor, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR, 1996-98), are further examples.

[4] Even China was involved in one major peacekeeping operation, UNTAC.

[5] Instituting regular troop contributing-nation (TCN) committees in New York would be helpful in this respect. As long ago as die 1960s, the Congo Advisory Committee included all the contributory countries, plus others with the ability to enhance political support for the

operation. It developed a consensus singularly absent in the case of Bosnia and Somalia in the 1990s.

[6] Examples abound in Cambodia and Bosnia.

[7] In this context, states must cooperate with the UN, if necessary, foregoing national privileges.

[8] Soldiers from all three countries were alleged, or found guilty, of serious human rights abuses including torture and murder. In the Canadian case this actually led to the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, an unprecedented action in modern military history.

[9] See John A. Cope, *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*, Mc Nair Paper 44 (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 1995)

[10] See Oakley and Dziedzic "Policing the new World Disorder".

[11] Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, Renewing the United Nations System (Uppsala: 1994) pp. 118, iv4-5.

[12] "Pan-European Peacekeeping", speech by the NATO Secretary -General, European Forum, Berlin, 8 November 1997; see also Financial Times, 10 November 1997.

[13] See Cope, op.cit, pp.1-72.

Co-operation in Peace-Keeping/Peace-Enforcing Civilian/Military Operations

By Johan Hederstedt
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The most difficult conflicts today are mainly long civil wars followed by civilian disasters like disintegrated infrastructures, food shortages, collapsed medical facilities and water supplies, as well as human frailty in the form of violations of human rights, corruption, crime, widespread pessimism and despair. One can say that every aspect of an individual's life is affected in the uneven struggle for survival. One must be aware that the aid workers face extremely complex problems that do not have any direct counterparts in a peaceful civilian society. I mention this, because you often encounter the view that it is possible to put people straight from civilian society into a catastrophe situation.

Lessons of Somalia, Angola and Bosnia

There are many shortcomings in international aid and peace-keeping work. In my opinion it is frightening to see how badly many missions are carried out. It seems as if modem thinking in planning and command has not yet reached the aid sector, and in practice it is run with a mixture of adventurousness and idealism.

The three missions in Somalia, Angola and Bosnia offer much food for thought, for example:

- There are no simple solutions to complicated problems. Clear and definite goals must be formulated, as well as the strategies that are to lead to these goals. A detailed operational plan is needed.
- It must be possible to co-ordinate civilian humanitarian aid and military operations. This has not been done successfully in any operation, even if the conditions have gradually improved in Bosnia.

- We have to provide all of a person's needs - safety, food, clothes, water, sanitation, basic medical care and housing. A social economy has to be established and made secure.
- We must concentrate our resources in time and place.

We have to make our plans in such a way that we have a reasonable freedom of action in unexpected situations, i.e. in some form of reserves or units that can temporarily be withdrawn from their regular task in order to solve another. This option is not provided for in Bosnia.

- The organisation must have endurance. It is a sign of bad planning if you can say that your staff works 20 hours a day, seven days a week.
- You have to show respect for the country and people you are trying to help. They have to participate in the peace process and take responsibility for its various aspects. The task of the aid workers should always be to support their efforts, not control them. This demands great patience, respect and humility of the aid workers.
- The mental process must be allowed to take time. Reconciliation between groups of people takes a long time. Since emergency aid and peace-keeping work are costly in time, there is an inevitable desire to finish as soon as possible. This is often in direct contrast to the wishes of the people we are helping. They are in no hurry for several reasons. This makes for frustrated aid workers, which means that they increase their efforts, which in turn creates tense situations vis-à-vis the people needing help, not least their leaders, who realise the political possibilities that open up from the situation.
- Somalia, Angola and Bosnia are all good examples of this problem. The implementation times are not in reasonable proportion to time needed for a thorough reconciliation process. Aid workers have to concentrate on results and see what would benefit the situation as a whole, and suppress their own egos, and refrain from giving prominence to nationally and other organisational questions. Aid and peace-keeping activity chiefly suffer from command problems. The actual, practical work should be done by locals. Today qualified people as well as workers are available in most countries. One should strive to form co-ordinated command units that can be set in at an early stage.
- One must be aware that apart from all the human and technical difficulties there are also considerable risks for the aid worker's own life, both in the form of direct attacks, but also

from indirect systems like mines and other ammunition. Aid workers today have to be trained to encounter dangers more than ever before, since aid workers used to be regarded as protected by the warring parties.

Massive military operations are becoming more and more frequent either as peace-enforcing or peacekeeping. Normally the primary task of the forces is to monitor a cease-fire or a peace agreement between fighting parties. As a rule the task demands comprehensive employment of many military units deployed over the whole area. Through its massive employment the military organisation dominates the aid work and for this reason has to take on a series of humanitarian problems. Firstly, security and protection can be provided by the military units, and secondly, food, medical care etc. So far the military units have had considerable problems in meeting all the demands put forward by individuals and civilian authorities. They are simply not trained and equipped for these tasks.

However, this does not mean that they should not, or are unable to, contribute to humanitarian work. They have the resources for swift aid measures in a trained organisation with a high state of alert, clear and rapid chains of command, good radio communications, good transport facilities, and a flexible medical organisation. These resources can have a good effect if they are used together with civilian measures. In the future we will probably have units that can handle protection and security as well as humanitarian aid, but there is still a long way to go, since a great deal of prejudice must first be overcome.

Necessary Changes

People who work with humanitarian and peace-keeping operations often voice the same criticism during and after each tour of duty, regarding both the chain of command and the actual performance of the work at different levels. In general we can say that they have become expert at describing the shortcomings, but that we lack the ability to deal with them.

The gap tends to widen between decision makers at a high international level and those who implement their decisions, which is unfortunate, since every operation must have realistic goals and resources to solve the task at hand. The overall aims now also include demands for measures to strengthen democracy and human rights in the conflict area, requirements that

cannot be questioned as long as the discussions are in general terms, but they are difficult to put into practice. We do not have any tried-and-true methods for managing local conflicts. The actual peace-keeping work becomes weak and today one should rather talk about denying war actions than building peace. One can rapidly achieve considerable improvements through co-ordinated efforts in these areas, which would not only make better use of the available resources, but also improve the participation by the authorities and organisations involved and their resources, which is a condition for achieving long term results.

How to organise the activity in practice naturally depends on the nature of the task and different solutions will apply to different situations. Co-operation and co-ordination are difficult to achieve. It is much simpler to act on one's own without having to consider others. At the same time everyone seems to be aware that better results are gained by co-ordinating resources. Swedish experiences from several civilian/military operations (most recently in Somalia, Mozambique, Angola and Bosnia) all indicate that the main issue is that the commanding personnel, both in the civilian and the military organisations, have insufficient competence or knowledge to solve problems beyond the direct task of commanding their own units. This inability leads to passiveness and sometimes negative attitudes. For example, military leaders who do not want to cooperate with civilians, or civilians who regard the military as the major threat. These attitudes block a rational use of the joint resources in an operations area. In order to overcome these difficulties it is necessary to have:

- Better recruiting of personnel to be in charge. The commanders must be able to think in operational and strategic terms and have the ability to see the whole picture as well as their own part in it.
- The personnel must be given proper training, which should include knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of different civilian and military organisations, and an understanding of their particular work situation. This training should be provided before employment and continue throughout the employment and continue throughout the employment
- Special liaison groups should be formed to bridge problems between different organisations and co-operate with local authorities/organisations, as well as co-ordinate aid measures. The CIMIC organisations should be revised

In Sweden we must continue to analyse and assess the problems and suggest practical solutions for how to develop methods for how multi-functional and multi-combination missions are to be carried out in the future.

Mixing Guns and Butter: Military-Civilian Relations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

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Introduction

Military forces under United Nations or other multilateral command have since the end of the Cold War been increasingly obliged to deploy alongside civilian organizations involved in humanitarian and other ameliorate field activities. Even in the best of circumstances the juxtaposition of such markedly different entities would produce misunderstanding and tension - a veritable "clash of cultures". Often, however, the encounter takes place during so called complex humanitarian emergencies which require large-scale intervention, usually to deal with mass starvation and or genocide.[2] In the midst of human misery and anarchy, when time is of the essence, long-term relationship-building is impossible and coordination and consultation are unavoidably improvised. This aggravates tensions, compounds stereotypes and leads to mission dysfunctionality. The aim of this paper is to examine military-civilian relations in such situations, identify problems and suggest remedies.

The Context

Complex humanitarian emergencies are defined, according to Andrew Natsios, by five characteristics: deterioration or complete collapse of central government authority; ethnic or religious conflict and widespread human rights abuses; episodic food insecurity, frequently deteriorating into mass starvation; macroeconomic collapse involving hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and net decreases in GNP; and mass population movements of displaced people and refugees escaping conflict or searching for food.

Civilian elements present in complex humanitarian emergencies are many and varied. They include:

- non-governmental organizations (NGOs), devoted to relief, development, peacebuilding or, increasingly, a combination of these;
- UN multilateral agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Development Program (UNDP);
- the singular International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the civilian leadership of UN operations both in the field and at UN headquarters;
- and civilian components created specifically for a particular mission, such as UN civilian police (CIVPOL) and components dealing with areas like elections and human rights.

Of these, the emphasis in this paper will be on the military's relationship with the humanitarian organizations, whether non-governmental or inter-governmental, UN or non-UN.

Military involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies can be categorized into three broad types. Each has different implications for military-civilian relations. In the first scenario the military is directly involved in addressing the humanitarian crisis. In this case its aims are, at least in theory, congruent with those of humanitarian organizations. Military involvement can range form air drops of supplies, when the military may never set foot in the country concerned, to the massive deployment of infantry, engineering and other battalions on the ground. The military's most valuable contributions in these cases are security and logistics, which might include a mix of the following activities:

- transport and logistics for bringing humanitarian relief to the country concerned
- protection of humanitarian relief in-country
- delivery of humanitarian relief in-country
- provision of other immediate amenities such as fresh water supplies and medical care
- reconstruction of infrastructure such as water and power supplies, roads and bridges
- protection of populations at risk

- provision of security generally, including to human rights monitors, relief workers, UN civilian personnel and war crimes investigators.[3]

A second type of military involvement occurs when an international humanitarian operation precedes, coincides with or is grafted onto an existing UN peacekeeping operation established to deal with a political or military conflict situation. Here the military has its own mandate and agenda separate to that of the civilian agencies. Peace-building efforts aimed at the longer term recuperation of the society concerned will often also be envisaged. Humanitarian needs are just one part of the problem, although military activities may be viewed as contributing to the long-term resolution of conflict, which in turn will help relieve the humanitarian emergency. Military activity in such cases can include:

- monitoring a ceasefire
- separating combatants
- disarmament and demobilization of combatants
- demining and mine awareness programs
- "assistance to the civil power" such as with elections and law and order
- reconstruction and development

A third possibility is when a complex humanitarian emergency takes place while a peace enforcement operation is being carried out, military operations are being conducted by international forces, mandated by the UN Security Council, against one or more of the warring parties. Here the military's agenda is often viewed by humanitarian agencies as being incompatible with theirs. Some, like the ICRC, will see it completely contrary to their mission of alleviating human suffering.

The variety of these missions, which collectively may be termed "peace missions", produces an infinite variety of relationships between military and civilian elements. At one extreme the situation can be dominated by the military, as with the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, while at the other there is no appreciable military involvement, as in Operation Lifeline in Sudan in 1988 where the military confined itself to offering operational advice to NGOs.[4] In between lie complex joint civilian-military operations such as the UN Protection

Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In some cases the military will be in charge of the operation, in other cases it will be civilians. In the case of complex, multi-component peacekeeping operations a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) will have overall command. However he or she may be either civilian, as in the case of the UN operations in Angola and Mozambique, or military, as in the case of Somalia and Haiti. Although often including a large military presence, such operations may be overwhelmingly civilian, as in the Cambodia case. Assumptions about the military dominance of UN peace operations, true in the past, no longer hold. As a result it may be difficult to disentangle what are military policy attitudes from those of the mission as a whole. Commentator's judgements about UNPROFOR's relations with humanitarian agencies may be shorthand for describing either the military component's relations with them or the entire missions relations with them. Moreover, NGOs, humanitarian organizations and military contingents are of varying professionalism and competence. For all these reasons, one should therefore be extremely careful about generalizing about military-civilian relations in any particular situation.

The Record to Date

As might be expected from the above description, the record of military-civilian relations in complex humanitarian emergencies is mixed. At one extreme Operation Provide Comfort, which extended humanitarian relief to the Kurds in 1991 after the Gulf war, is viewed as "an exemplary success story" in terms of military-civilian relations, convincing some observers that "the gap between humanitarian and military personnel involved in combined operations may be smaller than it initially appears".[5] But Andrew Natsios, who also describes the Kurdish operation as the utmost successful humanitarian response in the post-Gold War era, cautions that this may have been due to the fact that initially it involved no UN organizations or UN peacekeepers but rather three military commands that had just fought in the Gulf War together, one donor country response office and no more than half a dozen NGOs. "Limited organisational participation in this context", he says, "translated into operational success" [6] Two of the largest missions which followed the Kurdish operation, Somalia and Rwanda, are not viewed in such a favorable light and provide numerous insights into problems encountered in civilian-military relations in situations involving almost unimaginable human tragedy.

Somalia

Three different phases of the humanitarian operation in Somalia are identifiable: two UN missions, UNOSOM I and II, and a US-led mission, UNITAF.

- UNOSOM I (April - December I 992)

The first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was a small-scale military operation designed to provide a modicum of security for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. It was deployed to Somalia without consideration of the possibility that involvement of the military might be counterproductive in the long-term humanitarian strategy. Although NGOs were represented in the first UN technical team to visit Somalia to consider the needs of the country they were not fully consulted in the final preparation of the plan to deploy UNOSOM. It is doubtful that they would have recommended deployment.[7] Yet according to Mohammed Sahnoun, the arrival of the first UN troops in Somalia was eagerly awaited by Somali leaders, NGOs and the people of Mogadishu.[8] The UN had already deployed 50 unarmed military observers in Mogadishu and they were doing reportedly excellent work far beyond their mandate, getting involved in peacemaking between different militias and escorting relief convoys.

It was anticipated that an increased UN military presence would provide security for urgently needed humanitarian relief efforts. However, relations between UNOSOM and the local population deteriorated over doubts about the UN's impartiality in the Somali conflict. These were compounded by a particular incident in which a Russian-owned aircraft with UN markings delivered cash and arms to supporters of one of the warring factions led by interim president Ali Mahdi in northern Mogadishu.[9] The Pakistani peacekeeping troops were confined to their base in Mogadishu and essentially adopted a fortress mentality.

According to a report by the Lessons-Learned Unit of the UN Secretariat, civilian/military cooperation and coordination varied considerably over the UNOSOM I period.[10] The humanitarian providers and the military had very little experience working with each other. They began the undertaking with considerable mutual ignorance, suspicion and stereotyping,

especially regarding each other's organizational mandates, objectives, operating procedures and constraints. This led to friction and misunderstanding.[11] From the NGO perspective the range and limitations of military support available to humanitarian operations were unclear and at times inconsistent. These problems became less acute as they developed professional relationships in the course of working together. Much effort was expended during the various phases of UNOSOM to try and improve coordination bot none ultimately succeeded.

Relations between UN agencies and UNOSOM I were also strained. With their own budgets, sources of funding and governing bodies to which they were answerable, UN agencies resisted full integration with the mission on the grounds that political objectives might conflict with humanitarian ones. Relations between the UN agencies and NGOs were themselves strained. The UN agencies were regarded as having come late to Somalia, having retreated to Nairobi when the Government collapsed and anarchy broke out.

- The United Task Force (UNITAF), December 1992 - May 1993

In light of the failure of UNOSOM I to cope with the humanitarian disaster facing Somalia in 1992 the US volunteered to lead a coalition force, UNITAF or Operation Restore Hope, to establish a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The decision was controversial among humanitarian organizations from the outset. While UN agencies and NGOs such as CARE were enthusiastic, others such as Save the Children, were opposed. The ICRC, which had been able to work successfully in many of the worst affected areas, reluctantly acquiesced.[12] Many believed the worst of the famine was over, were resentful that the US had taken so long to act and were fearful of the consequences for their operations and independence once the military was deployed. The high profile, CNN-telecast arrival of UNITAF on the beaches of Mogadishu alienated some humanitarian agencies and NGOs further. Complaints were soon heard that the arrival of troops had lead to a perceptible deterioration in security conditions for aid agencies.[13] However, security did ultimately improve dramatically and thousands of lives were saved through UNITAF's escort of aid and protection of aid workers. Security was clearly needed: even the ICRC, for the first time in its history, employed armed security guards to protect its operations.

The success of the humanitarian mission depended on UNITAF commanders working closely with civilian organizations and personnel. Robert Oakley, former US Ambassador to Somalia, acted as "de facto pro-consul", becoming a key interlocutor among faction leaders, NGOs, military contingents and the UN.[14] To coordinate the military operations with humanitarian relief, UNITAF established a Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC) in Mogadishu. Harmonization of activities was facilitated by daily briefings and meetings attended by the UN, relief agencies and military components.[15]

However civil affairs were not so well handled. The initial plan included activation of 8-10 reserve military civil affairs units (about 250-300 personnel) to work with the remnants of Somali local government, particularly on rebuilding the police and judiciary.[16] However the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the idea because the operation was supposed to last only 6 weeks. As a result only 7 civil affairs personnel were deployed during the crucial first six months of the Somalia operation and only 30 thereafter. In contrast, the US deployed 200 personnel in Panama in a successful operation to rebuild infrastructure and institutions after its invasion, while 1000 were deployed in Kuwait City after the Iraqis had been expelled.[17] In Somalia the US did not see nation-building as its role.

Military-civilian cooperation in the field depended very much on which contingent was in charge. In Baidoa, the Australians established their own Civil-Military Operations Team (CMOT) to handle relations with local elders, NGOs and UN political officers, as well as coordinate military support for humanitarian operations, such as convoy escort, food distribution and NGO compound security.[18] In the absence of any form of organized, formal, civil authority, the responsibilities assumed by CNOT were enormous. For example it became intimately involved in the re-establishment of local police and justice administration.

In summary, UNITAF was a largely successful example of military-civilian cooperation, probably because it was headed by a single, well-equipped nation, it was well organized throughout and because its mandate was limited mostly to humanitarian assistance and protection.

- The UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), May 1993-March 1995

Like UNITAF, UNOSOM II's mandate was one of nation-building, envisaging the rehabilitation of political and civil institutions, restoration of the police and judiciary, a transition from emergency relief to a functioning economy, disarmament of militias and mine-clearing. This multifaceted mandate required even closer cooperation between the military and civilian elements than had occurred in UNITAF.

Yet UNOSOM II, with its wider mandate, fewer resources and chaotic organization was not an effective platform for such cooperation. First, there was strategy for nation-building into which military-civilian cooperation could be slotted. No one had devised a serious plan for conducting the civilian side of the UN operation, nor wanted to admit that in the Somali context this meant governance rather than assistance, since the former would have required many more resources.[19] A $166.5 million Relief and Rehabilitation Program for Somalia was devised in consultation with Somalis, UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs at the March 1993 UN Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia in Addis Abeba.[20] However no implementation strategy was established and the plan essentially languished.

Second, since UNOSOM II was dominated by the military, military thinking dominated mission planning. One result was that military deployments disregarded political-administrative boundaries of the Somali regions, making it was difficult to orchestrate military, political and humanitarian assets at the local level to rebuild political and judicial institutions. [21] Regional boundaries should have been maintained and military contingents made answerable to a UN civilian official with authority for each area. Interaction with civilian agencies and NGOs was rendered more difficult because military deployment both in Mogadishu and in the countryside tended to be in small pockets and defensive bases. Moreover, coordination structures, procedures and policies were not uniform among military contingents and were often dependent on personalities. Compounding the problem, contingents had differing Rules of Engagement (ROE) which affected their involvement with civilian elements. Some, like the Italians, could use force to protect NGOs and Somali civilians, while the Germans were prohibited by their ROFs from doing so.[22]

A third Problem was the inattention to civil affairs paid by the military. UNOSOM II's military lacked a civil affairs strategy, adequate staff and a high-level staff officer to coordinate civil affairs operations. The US Army had expanded its own civil support staff to

30 from 7 in UNITAF, but this remained grossly insufficient. Lieutenant-Colonel S. J. Whidden, who supervised US civil affairs support claims that "Inadequate civil affairs staff augmentation contributed to many of the problems experienced in Somalia ... This shortfall was particularly evident in the transition from the initial 'limited and specific' mission focus toward a more long-term nation-building operation". [23] Andrew Natsios describes the result as "nearly catastrophic". [24] NGOs and UN managers have repeatedly commented how well they can work with civil affairs officers, who are often civilian professionals recruited for specific missions, compared with combat commanders. [25]

A fourth problem was a sheer lack of resources for the civilian elements of UNOSOM II, especially logistical, intelligence and legal support staff. The head of the mission, Admiral Jonathan Howe, himself records that the mission was given neither the resources nor the personnel to help carry out its ambitious tasks. [26] Although UNOSOM was divided into civilian and military affairs, the civilian staff was minuscule by comparison with the size and capability of the military component According to Chopra et al, the civilian component was "virtually non-existent" and "stuck in Mogadishu". [27]

There was a humanitarian section within the civilian part of UNOSOM, headed by a senior Humanitarian Coordinator who reported to the SRSG, participated in daily meetings of UNOSOM's senior staff and coordinated efforts with UN agencies and NGOs. Humanitarian Operations Centres (HOCs) throughout southern Somalia were a useful mechanism for decentralizing the Coordinator's work. [28] However, problems included the high turnover in the positions of Coordinator and Acting Coordinator and the poor security situation which inclined senior UN agency staff to base themselves in Nairobi rather than Mogadishu.

None of the foregoing would have mattered so much had the military's relationship with the Somali factions and local populace, especially in Mogadishu, not begun to deteriorate. This soured the whole operation, sweeping up the humanitarian agencies and NGOs in its wake. Many humanitarians felt early on that their work was made difficult if not impossible by UNOSOM's "percieved lack of impartiality". [29] It was made even more difficult by the development of an atmosphere of "opposition and exclusion" between most of the military contingents and the Somalis, especially in Mogadishu, which further increased when peacekeepers began to be killed in mid-1993. [30] The drift of UNOSOM II into peace

enforcement, especially its decision to attempt to capture General Aideed, not only physically interrupted humanitarian activities for weeks and led to deteriorating security, but philosophically alienated the military from the humanitarian community.

Since local civilians found it difficult to distinguish between different parts of a UN mission or even between UN and non-UN efforts, the community found itself drawn into the growing cycle of violence despite its efforts to distance itself from the enforcement operation. World Vision headquarters in Baidoa was bombed in February 1994 by a Somali militia annoyed with peacekeepers over an issue unrelated to World Vision operations.[31]

Rwanda

The involvement of the military in humanitarian operations in Rwanda was, as in Somalia, complex and multi-phased. Four different phases are identifiable: two UN missions, UNAMIR I and II, the French-led Operation Turquoise and the US-led Operation Support Hope.[32] All had different relationships with the humanitarian and NGO communities.

- UNAMIR I (October 1993 - August 1994) and II (August 1994 March 1996)

Initially the military were represented in Rwanda by a small UN peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR I, established as a confidence-building measure even before large-scale massacres broke out in April 1994. It comprised only 2500 troops. Relations were damaged with some civilian elements because of its inability to carry out what many regarded as crucial elements of its mandate flowing from the Arusha Accords, namely helping make Kigali a "weapons secure area" and affording protection to threatened civilians once large-scale massacres began. This was not UNAMIR's fault, It was given neither the mandate not the resources to carry out these tasks, despite repeated requests from the commander, General Romeo Dallaire. The presence of troops from the former colonial power, Belgium, in UNAMIR was also criticized by some NGOs. The military role during the massacres was extremely limited. It did what it could to save limited numbers of people and liaised with civilian agencies where possible, but it was essentially overwhelmed. At the end of April it was ignominiously reduced to just 270 men with an unchanged mandate.

Military-civilian cooperation again became a pressing issue with the advent of UNAMIR II, the reinforced UN operation, established in august 1994 after the massacres had subsided and the country largely over-run by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Relations between the military and civilian elements, principally the NGO relief organizations, became even more complex than in Somalia. There was an unprecedented number of actors involved within Rwanda and in the four neighbouring countries. They included at least 7 UN agencies, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 250 NGOs, at least 8 military contingents (including those comprising the UN peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR, and those deployed unilaterally), the ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and various National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies. In addition, the system was resourced by over 20 donor organizations, several of which placed their own teams in the field. [33]

The military's role was significant in providing essential services. These included security, logistics (transport of humanitarian commodities, free access to fuel, communications, medical support and air services), information-sharing, and even direct delivery of assistance. Although the assistance was mostly appreciated and was an important element in the success of various activities, there were mixed feelings in the humanitarian community, especially among NGOs, about becoming too closely linked with the military. [34] However, unlike UNOSOM, UNAMIR established a mechanism, die UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) in Kigali, for liaising between the UN, humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the military. It was however limited by its ad hot character, a shortage of experienced staff and resources and the lack of clarity in its relationship to DHA, UNDP, other UN agencies and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda.[35]

In the field, military-civilian relations varied. Canadian, British and Australian contingents were prominent in giving support to relief agencies by virtue of their substantial logistical, medical and engineering units.[36] Others, such as the Ghanaians and Ethiopians, while concentrating on providing security, also supported relief activities. For instance, trucks belonging to various UNAMIR contingents were widely used to transport internally displaced persons and vital relief equipment. A unique experiment in civilian-military interaction occurred when uniformed British engineering troops were assigned to UNHCR to work at

water and sanitation projects in refugee camps. [37] Irish military engineers clad in NGO T-shirts performed similar functions under the command and control of the Irish NGO, Goal.

Suspicions between the military and civilian agencies were reportedly greater outside Rwanda's borders. (Some agencies in Goma, for example, apparently refused to admit foreign military personnel into their compounds or their vehicles. [38] A Danish-initiated study, the *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, concluded that this may have been because of the lack of a single military command and the role of Zairean soldiers in exacerbating the security situation, as compared with UNAMIR's leading role within Rwanda.

- Operation Turquoise June-August 1994)

In the case of the French-initiated and led *Operation Turquoise,* which was intended to create a safe zone in the south-west of Rwanda in mid June 1994, several of the main NGOs were uncomfortable with French military involvement because of its part links to the Rwandan government and armed fortes and because they had been given a Chapter VII mandate to use military force to secure the safe zone. Some NGOs refused to cooperate with the force. As to military-civilian cooperation generally, the *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, notes that despite the attachment of a civilian diplomatic and humanitarian cell to *Operation Turquoise*, it does not appear to have functioned as effectively as the civil-military operations centres later established by US forces in Rwanda. Remarkably, NGOs looked to the UN coordination office, UNREO, to coordinate humanitarian efforts in the French safe zone.

The policy of *Operation Turquoise* towards supporting the work of the humanitarian agencies also appears to have varied by location and over time. Prior to the influx into Goma in mid July no support and very little information was provided to the few agencies there; whereas afterwards substantial French logistical capacity was provided, including earth-moving equipment, fork lift trucks, lorries and the use of helicopters. In the south, however, the assistance was much more limited. In August the World Food Program's request to use Turquoise trucks was denied, even tough they were to be used to transport a French food aid consignment from Bujumbura. [39] While media representatives were regularly carried on French helicopters, this facility was not offered to NGO personnel.

On the other hand the French presence substantially improved security in the safe zone, creating a so-called "humanitarian space" in which NGOs and others could operate. Whereas only the ICRC, Catholic Relief/Caritas and WFP had been able to provide any form of relief prior to the intervention, by August the number of UN agencies and NGOs running or in the process of establishing programs had risen to 15.[40]

- Operation Support Hope (JulyAugust 1994)

The US military operation in Rwanda, Operation Restore Hope, in contrast to the French operation, was presented as a strictly humanitarian one with no peacekeeping (much less peace enforcement) role and a clear separation of its command structure from other parties. Although 3000 US personnel were deployed in Entebbe, Goma and Kigali, the bulk of the force remained at rear base at Stuttgart/Mannheim, Germany. The scale of the logistical support provided by the operation was highly impressive and went beyond simply transporting equipment and personnel. For instance, an epidemiological reporting form for daily reporting by agencies operating clinics, cholera treatment and unaccompanied children's centres, designed jointly by the Adanta-based Centre for Disease Control and UNHCR in Goma, was flown to rear base, printed and 48 hours later several thousand copies had been delivered back to Rwanda. [41]

The US effort, unlike in Somalia, included a "robust" civil affairs component, initially provided by the US Peacekeeping Institute but later augmented by active and reserve civil affairs personnel.[42] Civil/Military Operations Centres (CMOC) were also created. Yet, the Danish-initiated study of the Rwanda crisis reports that, "the ability of US forces to dovetail their activities with those of UN agencies and NGOs working in the same sector or geographical area was limited". [43] It was especially hampered by tight restriction on use of US equipment by the UN and a strict concern for the safety of US personnel, the latter dictated by the US Administration's concern over potential US casualties in the wake of Somalia. US forces were heavily armed and protected and carefully convoyed, cutting them off from contact with humanitarian workers and others. As Antonio Donini puts it, "Razor wire is enough to intimidate NGOs, not to mention the local population, even if the blue flag provides a reassuring presence". [44] This contrasted with *Operation Turquoise*, which emphazised foot

patrols and no armoured vehicles. In addition, all US personnel were required to return to the secure US compound by nightfall, resulting in US soldiers who were attending late afternoon coordination meetings with NGOs and UN agencies having to leave by dusk. [45] Although the US had made clear at the outset that it was not sending a security force to Rwanda, the presence of well-armed troops invariably raises false expectations among the humanitarian community in situations of poor security.

The Problematique of Military-Civilian Cooperation

The foregoing quick excursion through two of the most prominent examples of complex humanitarian emergencies indicates that military-civilian cooperation in such situations is problematic. What are the factors involved in producing this outcome and what might be the solutions?

The "Clash of Cultures"

It is hardly surprising that military and humanitarian organizations find cooperation so problematic when their cultures are so strikingly different. The military emphasizes structure, order, hierarchy, discipline and command and control. Humanitarian organizations are frequently characterized by informal, improvisational, egalitarian and consensual styles. [46] In Somalia US military officers were shocked at the youth and inexperience of many NGO workers in positions of great responsibility. [47] Military units are materially and financially self-sufficient and logistically independent, while their humanitarian colleagues are acutely aware of their dependence on donations and substantial material support On the other hand, the military requires massive sustenance to operate in the field, while some NGOs can operate on a shoestring in conditions the military would never contemplate. Some NGOs have long experience of the local milieu and close lies with the local populace, whereas UN contingents often arrive without even proper briefing and are required to forge relationships with a cowed and suspicious population and create information (or intelligence) sources from scratch. While the military emphasises the establishment of a secure environment using their military capabilities, humanitarian agencies see relations with the local populace as their best guarantee of security.

Humanitarian organizations, despite increasingly realizing that their activities invariably have political implications, believe in varying degrees that their neutrality, independence and non-political orientation are indispensable to their success. They view with suspicion the claim by peacekeeping troops that they to are striving for neutrality. The military's possession of arms and certainly their use, even in self-defence, appear to humanitarian workers to be antithetical to the achievement of humanitarian goals, despite the fact that humanitarian agencies sometimes pressure governments and the UN to deploy the military. US military commanders in Somalia were understandably frustrated when the same NGOs that had called for their presence then began criticizing them for using force. [48] Hugo Slim believes this is the "rub" in the civilian-military relationship: "At a profound moral level, the humanitarian has more problems with the military than the military has with the humanitarian. The result is a reticence and ambivalence in the relationship on the part of the humanitarian which extends beyond questions of operational procedure to matters of ethics and identity". [49] The military, for their part, while increasingly acknowledging the bravery and dedication of humanitarian workers, remain smug in their knowledge that as a last resort humanitarian agencies are likely to be forced to rely on military protection.

Different time horizons are also apparent. Humanitarian organizations tend to take a long-term view of the needs of a given population. They are acutely conscious that they were there before the military arrived and will be there after it leaves. The need to sustain long-lasting relationships with the local populace and any authority that exists is a priority. For the military, a quick fix, often driven by a time-limited mandate, is the focus. While they can use the sheer weight of their presence and the implicit or explicit threat of force to achieve some of their objectives, humanitarian agencies are necessarily limited to painstaking cooperative endeavours. In the view of InterAction's Julia Taft, these differences have traditionally relegated NGOs to the status of eccentric relatives whose invitation to the policymaking party never arrived.[50]

Gender differences also play a part in defining differences between the military and humanitarian organizations. While most military forces are still predominantly male, a high proportion of humanitarian workers are female and are found increasingly in senior positions. Hugo Slim notes that "while it would be simplistic to suggest that women do not buy into the macho culture of humanitarianism", the high profile of women in humanitarian organizations

"does introduce a challenging gender dynamic into civil-military relations which may not exist to such a degree in military-military relations". [51]

Differences between the military and humanitarian cultures should not however be exaggerated. It is not true, for example, as more than one observer has claimed, that "in common with all military establishments, the UN military tends to cut itself off from society by setting up heavily fortified military compounds wherever it goes". [52] Some militaries involved in peacekeeping, including many from developing countries, are closely integrated with their local communities back home and have few difficulties doing so on peace missions. In Somalia the Australians, Botswanans, Indians and Italians were well integrated into the local community and adopted the antithesis of the fortress mentality. The UN Force Commander in Cambodia, Lieutenant General John Sanderson, espoused a view that would resonate with humanitarian workers when he claimed that the aim of his mission, UNTAC, was to form an alliance with the Cambodian people.[53]

One problem in forging a more cooperative relationship between the military and humanitarian agencies is that there has also been a cultural divide between UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs. As Andrew Natsios notes: [54]

> "The two sets of institutions compete for scarce donor government resources, speak to quite different constituencies that are frequently hostile to each other, recruit different kinds of people to work for them and move at distinctly different speeds. One institution measures success by whether host governments are pleased, the other by whether public and private donors are happy. One is more centralized, the other highly decentralized. NGO field directors generally have much more authority over the programme and management than their UN field counterparts, a situation about which many of the latter complain a great deal. One encourages risk taking (some would argue coyboyism) and informality; the other advocates regular procedures and bureaucratic propriety."

Some observers argue that competition between these different types of assistance-providers is gradually making them more alike. [55]

In any event there appears increasingly to be a convergence of views between the military and humanitarian organizations regarding the nature of humanitarian intervention. Both recognize its limitations, seeing it as essentially a stop-gap measure rather than a long-term solution to problems of governance and development. Both feel in some sense "imposed upon" by the international community to conduct ameliorate activity in the absence of any long-range strategy for political or military action or nation-building. These sentiments help draw the military and' humanitarian organizations closer in shared endeavour.

A Clash of Activities

Apart from cultural clashes there can be a real disjuncture on the ground between the activities of the military and civilian sectors. This is exacerbated by the fact that until recently the practice of humanitarian intervention lacked doctrine or guiding policy. In large-scale relief efforts where both the military and humanitarian agencies are involved in delivering aid, such operations may compete, resulting in duplication and confusion. The capacity of airlifts, airports and ports may be substantially absorbed with deploying the military rather than bringing in humanitarian relief supplies. Military preoccupation with logistics and delivery systems may replace and in turn undermine local capacity to carry out developmental activities assisted by humanitarian agencies. [56] A predominant military presence can undermine civilian control which in turn may slow peacebuilding efforts by NGOs and others. In the most extreme case military operations may completely disrupt humanitarian ones, as occurred in Somalia. Even the possibility of military action may slow down or halt humanitarian operations, as in Bosnia when air-strikes were imminent.

On the other hand, some humanitarian activities may have unintended consequences that make the military's principal tasks more difficult. Dr Mary Anderson has identified at least 1 J ways in which international assistance can worsen conflicts. [57] For example, well-intentioned aid may empower a particular militia at the expense of another, thereby frustrating peacekeepers attempts to dampen down conflict. In Cambodia the provision by a Japanese NGO of portable radios to Cambodian villagers to receive UN broadcasts created a security problem for the UNTAC military when the devices became a kind of currency, leading to robberies at storage sites. In the Sudan it has been alleged that humanitarian assistance has freed up government resources for use in prosecuting the war. [58] NGOs may sometimes also

express solidarity with warring groups struggling against repressive regimes, thereby indirectly reinforcing the conflict. [59] The activities of the CARE-Canada, which has genocidal killers in its refugee camp in Zaire, affect both the fate of the killers and their hostages and the political situation in Rwanda. [60] NGOs are now beginning to acknowledge that their assistance inevitably becomes a factor in conflicts and may exacerbate them: this may ultimately make NGOs more sympathetic to the complexities of the peacekeepers' tasks in preventing, managing and resolving conflict

The Absence of Strategic and Operational Coordination

Cooperation depends either on control or coordination. But in truth no one is in control of the international response to complex humanitarian emergencies - they are by definition out of control. Nor is there an ultimate authority that can be invoked in such situations. The UN finds it difficult to coordinate its own agencies much less its member states, NGOs and all the other players involved. Nor is the military able to do so.

While the military will at least strive for logic, order and an integrated, coordinated campaign strategy, most NGOs are reluctant to cede managerial or program autonomy to the goal of greater strategic coherence or managerial efficiency. According to Natsios this is their greatest weakness: [61]

> "Most lack either the will or the self-discipline to surrender autonomy and integrate their work with other actors. Their focus on the village and neighbourhood has been at the expense of dealing with national problems of governance, economic reform, planning and policy-which, when done badly, can cancel out overnight any grassroots successes their programmes may have enjoyed."

Many humanitarian agencies believe that coordination and especially integration, will harm their neutral status and damage their ability to conduct their operations. The ICRC, with its detailed protocols and procedures for maintaining its neutrality, honed over decades of field experience, is the most insistent on this. According to the Red Cross, in all peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations a "humanitarian space should always be maintained and the independence of humanitarian action should be guaranteed. Coordination between

humanitarian action and military mandate is essential and an exchange of information should take place on a regular basis. However, a subordination of one to the other has to be clearly excluded". [62]

Deficiencies in the UN System

Cooperation between the military and civilian agencies has also been stymied by structural deficiencies in the UN system which in the past have almost guaranteed non-cooperation between various participants involved in field operations. In the UN Secretariat in New York, military matters relating to field operations are handled in a separate department from humanitarian issues. Traditionally this mattered little since peacekeeping was dominated by the military and had relatively small civilian components, if any. Rarely did humanitarian crisis accompany traditional peacekeeping operations (UNIFIL in Lebanon being one exception). Little coordination or cooperation was required. Force Commanders were appointed to run peacekeeping operations and were generally given relatively free reign. Experienced civilians in the Secretariat provided assistance and advice.

With the end of the Cold War however and the vast expansion of peace operations, a reorganization and expansion of the management of such operations at UN headquarters has taken place through the establishment of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO). This has produced greater professionalism and improved organization but, ironically, sustained the military's domination of the peacekeeping planning process. Most of the outside personnel seconded by governments to DPKO are military and their presence is overwhelming compared with the units established to plan and manage civilian police operations, electoral matters and human rights. The military dominates the 24-hour Situation Room. Military officers from the militarily most powerful states, with their more assertive approach, have for the first time become involved in planning and managing UN peace operations. Hence, while the tasks of peacekeeping have become more varied than ever before and peacekeepers are now deployed in complex humanitarian emergencies that are not purely political or military, it is the military that has exponentially increased its presence in the planning process.

Humanitarian affairs are handled by a separate Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), reporting to a separate Under Secretary-General. The Department, a relatively new part of the UN Secretariat, was set up with the express purpose of improving coordination within the UN system of humanitarian issues. Due to its limited statutory authority over UN agencies, constrained resources and the "Byzantine bureaucratic politics of the UN system", [63] the Department has not achieved control and is incapable of achieving i Indeed, control over the UN's voraciously independent humanitarian agencies - once described as the "last of the world's absolute monarchies" - is impossible in the absence of a reform and restructuring of the entire UN "system". [64] Compounding this, the DHA cannot of course control NGOs or non-UN international humanitarian organizations.

Unclear mandates issued by the UN Security Council for UN operations have also been a stumbling block to better military-civilian cooperation. The less clear the goals of the operation, the less likely the military and humanitarian sides will be able to cooperate and coordinate sensibly. Compounding the problem is the lack of a UN doctrine for peace operations which spells out the *modus operandi* for each type of UN operation, whether peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention or peace enforcement and in particular what role each element of the operation should play. One tragic result has been confusion among the military and humanitarian agencies alike as to whether UN troops are expected to protect civilians in danger or whether the self-defence rules prohibit such activity. Clarification is required not just to avoid dangerous false expectations but to strengthen the deterrent effect of whatever measures can be considered realistic.

Possible Solutions and Current Reforms

The most drastic solution to the problem of cooperation between the military and civilian sectors would be to remove the military from the equation altogether. This may be possible in some humanitarian crises where it is judged that a military role is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive, degrading security rather than increasing it. With various countries, particularly the Scandinavians, establishing non-military rapid reaction teams, the overall need for military involvement in crisis situations may diminish somewhat. Sometimes, the deployment of UN civilian police or UN guards will be sufficient to provide the security that is often the main contribution expected of the military.

But dismissing the possibility of military involvement in all humanitarian crises is both unnecessary and potentially disastrous. There are some tasks only the military can do. Other tasks can be done by others but the military do them better. Massive emergency airlifts for instance can be organized speedily and efficiently by the military (although more expensively[65]) compared with the civilian aircraft. The military has an emergency standby capacity which is often unavailable to humanitarian agencies still coping with previous emergencies. In some situations only the military will be able to provide the security necessary for the delivery of aid. Protection of civilian populations is another obvious military role, although certainly in some situations merely the presence of NGOs, the ICRC, military observers or UNCIVPOLs will be sufficient. Many humanitarian agencies and NGOs now concede that the military can be extremely important in the early days of a crisis when rapid response is required. Moreover, the military will always be present where a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation with political or military goals coincides with a humanitarian emergency. In these cases the military and humanitarian sides will perforce have to coexist and cooperate.

Hence the search for improved military-civilian cooperation will continue to be a requirement. Some of the problems involved are clearly addressable and are already being tackled. Others, particularly those related to culture or structural impediments may not be susceptible to solution over the short term. They may simply have to be lived with in the meantime. The learning curves that both military and civilian sides of the equation have entered are steep.

Tackling the Cultural Problem

Tackling the cultural problem is partly a matter of increased communication and familiarization, partly attempting to find a middle ground and partly simply adapting to differences and accepting them rather than attempting to change them. On the military side, although it has traditionally lacked experience with and preparedness for dealing with humanitarian agencies, especially NGOs, this is changing rapidly. Many western militaries recognize the need for working closely with such agencies and participating in humanitarian work and "nation-building" themselves. Doctrinal changes in a number of Western armies now include a recognition that good relations with NGOs can be useful to the military's own

mission: this includes drawing on the experience of NGOs with local conditions and the local populace in preparing for deployment and in devising strategies and tactics once in the field. The US Army Field Manual on Peace Operations now states that: [66]

> "Commanders must understand that NGOs and PVOs [Private Voluntary Organizations] have valid missions and concerns, which at times may complicate the mission of US forces. Relationships with non-military agencies are based on mutual respect, communication, and srandardization of support."

The Pentagon has recently merged its Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs office with its Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy section, partly for financial reasons, but also in recognition of the close relationship between all these issues. [67] The importance of civil affairs officers and staff is also increasingly being recognized in many of the key peacekeeping contributing countries. Another factor bringing military and humanitarian cultures closer is the number of former military personnel being hired by humanitarian agencies, such as UNHCR, to work in dangerous environments, precisely because of their military skills and experience.

For their part, civilian elements need to become more aware of the requirements, capabilities and limitations of the military. They must especially recognize that the military is constrained by the mandate given to it by the UN Security Council. It cannot for instance involve itself in protection of a civilian population at risk unless mandated and equipped by the UN to do so. NGOs also need to learn that while militaries are powerful instruments they are also blunt. Tradition-bound and often inflexible, they can be frustratingly slow to respond to unexpected emergency needs. The military needs to realize that excessive concern with its own safety, as evinced by the US military in Somalia and Rwanda, can damage relations with the humanitarian community as well as with the local populace.

Many observers suggest that proper training will resolve at least some of the problems encountered in military-civilian relations. Improved training was recommended by both a UN-sponsored "lessons-learned" report on Somalia and the Danish-initiated study on Rwanda.[68] Training should not only be done separately but jointly, with humanitarian agencies and NGOs participating in peacekeeping field exercises and training programs. In

this way effective relationships will be forged before deployment. The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Centre for Peacekeeping Training in Nova Scotia is clearly on the right track in emphasizing the "New Peacekeeping Partnership" in its training philosophy. This term encompasses "the military, government, and non-government agencies dealing with humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons; election monitors and media; and civilian police personnel as they work together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations". [69] While the Pearson Centre claims to be unique in this approach, some programs are also realizing the benefits of this approach. Training should include a basic understanding of the political, historical, social, economic and cultural context in which operations take place.

In addition to training, the UN now realizes that recruitment of suitable staff in the first place is necessary. Its lessons-learned seminar on Somalia concluded that, "It is...necessary to recognize that at any given time, the interests of NGOs may be at variance with those of the (peacekeeping] operation. An important criterion in selecting a senior staff of a peacekeeping operation ... is their ability in managing such differences in as constructive a manner as possible".[70] The US military has also acknowledged that it currently has no system of selecting the best military personnel to lead humanitarian missions, particularly commanders with key characteristics of flexibility, personability and negotiating skills.[71] Codes of conduct for both military and humanitarian organizations are also essential and are gradually being introduced.

Improving "Coordination"

If it is recognized that control of all the players in a crisis situation is impossible, the next best thing is coordination, strategically and operationally. Improved military civilian coordination is ultimately dependent on better coordination of the entire international response, including within the UN system, Among NGOs, between NGOs and UN agencies and components and even within the military itself. The advise of Lieutenant-General Anthony Zinni, former director of operations for UNITAF, is: "Coordinate everything with everybody". [72] Turf battles and competition are, however, an inevitable fact of organisational life even within tightly controlled structures. One must therefore expect a certain amount of dysfunctional activity in a complex human undertaking such as international humanitarian interventions.

One should also be cognizant of the wide variety of means of the term "coordination": its meaning is in the eye of the beholder. It can range from simply exchanging information, though joint planning, to complete integration of all activities.

Improving coordination is often the leitmotif of proposals to improve the performance of the United Nations system. The problem of coordination in the UN system is a generic one and its fundamental resolution involves drastic reform in the entire system. Such reform has been proposed by Kofi Annan and is being considered by a range of subsidiary bodies of the UN General Assembly for reporting to the Assembly in September 1996. [73] It remains to be seen whether any wider UN reform will be actually implemented. In the meantime however steps can be and have been taken to improve coordination at least in regard to the humanitarian wings of UN field operations.

- Coordination Within the Humanitarian Community

It is difficult to see how the military can be expected to coordinate with the humanitarian community when the community cannot itself achieve internal coordination. Without this the military is obliged to deal with scores of different entities. It would improve cooperation enormously if NGOs could speak with fewer voices and could themselves coordinate with UN civilian elements.

An attempt at strategic coordination was made with the establishment in 1992 of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), comprising the WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, WHO, FAO, the ICRC, the International Organization for Migrations and representatives of European and US NGOs. Chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, the committee has improved the flow of information but has not been able to design comprehensive strategies, much less enforce discipline on its range of participants.[74] Supplementing this the DHA has also attempted to improve its relationships with NGOs by initiating monthly coordination meetings with NGOs in New York and Geneva.[75] UNHCR, for its part, has established a Partnership in Action (PARinAC) initiative to develop an operational and policy framework for working with NGOs. Voluntary agencies have an International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), which has sought close cooperation with DHA, in particular in relation to Rwanda.[76]

Coordination arrangements for the specific theatres of operation have also been established such as the successful Somali Aid Coordinating Body. [77] Some observers, including NGOs themselves, have suggested that humanitarian agencies develop an independent accreditation system to screen NGOs for their suitability and ability to respond to certain crises before they deploy to the field. [78] This is anathema to some of the smaller, maverick NGOs.

A conference at Oxford University in October 1995 suggested several ways of improving coordination within the humanitarian community, including: designating a humanitarian coordinator for each mission supported by a small group of professionals, detaching the humanitarian component from the overall mission's military arid political activities to the extent possible, sharing information among all actors promptly, defining the roles and responsibilities of different actors early, encouraging NGOs to present a consolidated picture and to work together on information and security issues, issue consolidated appeals on behalf of all humanitarian organizations, work out security policies collectively and plan emergency relief and rehabilitation programs within a long-term development context, including capacity-budding for local institutions and groups. [79]

The proposal by Argentina to establish civilian "White Helmets" teams to carry out humanitarian work alongside blue-helmeted peacekeepers would in theory make military/civilian coordination easier. There would be fewer agencies to deal with and to some extent such an entity will be organized along military lines, making mutual understanding more likely. It should, in theory, also make provision of aid better organized and targeted, which would increase the military's respect for such operations and coordination easier. However, since the White Helmets would not be given a monopoly on humanitarian work in a particular theatre, but rather would supplement that already provided by NGOs and others, there will still exist the problem of military coordination with all such bodies, not to mention between the White and Blue Helmets themselves.

It will have to be accepted that no matter what institutional reforms are made, some NGOs and international agencies will never want to be closely integrated with the plans of others. This may not necessarily be a bad thing. Integrating them too closely may in fact be the death of them: they may lose their spontaneity and creativity and thereby their ability to fill needs that may fall through the cracks of coordinated schemes or which arise unexpectedly. For

others, like the ICRC, the very effectiveness of the organization may be put at risk by identification with the rest of the humanitarian community, not to mention the military. One should not be too doctrinaire: so long as coordination and information-sharing generally is achieved, one should not pursue a potentially damaging universality.

- Coordination Within the Military

Just as the humanitarian wing needs internal coordination so does the military. Too often the various military contingents in UN operations have had different philosophies, standard operating procedures, rules of engagement and capability. Too often, especially in dangerous operations, the UN military component has not achieved unity of command. Contingents have sought guidance from their national capitals and disobeyed directives from the UN Force Commander. This makes humanitarian agencies distrustful of the military, seeing them as unreliable and unpredictable and association with them as potentially dangerous. It is also important that no national contingents operate alongside UN forces and outside the UN command structure as occurred in Somalia with disastrous results.

The UN is working on a number of fronts to improve the performance of its peacekeepers which will result in more integrated, better trained, better led forces in the future. Command and control issues are also being attended to. Plans for rapid reaction forces are also likely to lead to the deployment of military contingents which are better integrated and commanded than previously, especially as the new Canadian-proposed deployable headquarters proposal becomes operational. [80] Hence in the critical early stages of a crisis the UN military is likely to be better prepared and better represented on the ground. This should improve its relationship with the humanitarian community. The training program devised by the UN for all elements of the UN mission in Haiti (UNMIH) is a model that proved highly successful and is likely to be emulated in future missions.[81]

- Military-Civilian Coordination

Direct improvements in the coordination between the military and the humanitarian community will come through initiatives both at the strategic level and in the field. DHA has established a Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of

Humanitarian Operations, which has elaborated guiding and operating principles for the use of such assets by humanitarian agencies and studied the impact of such use. [82] The Task Force has set in turn up the Military and Civil Defence Support Unit (MCDU) within DHA-Geneva to support collective preparedness measures and provide a point of access for governments and organizations interested in planning and supporting humanitarian operations.

Until 1994 there was still no formal mechanism for integrating peacekeeping and humanitarian functions at the strategic level, a lacuna which discouraged cooperation in the field. The Secretary-General's Task Force on UN Operations, established in 1994, was intended to fill this gap by improving interdepartmental coordination at the highest levels, increasing information sharing, and encouraging joint policy and strategy development and mission management between DPKO, DHA and the Department of Political Affairs. Mission-specific interdepartmental working groups were intended to improve coordination at lower levels. These reforms have been only partly successful and coordination problems reportedly persist.

The UN Secretariat and its military advisors appear to have concluded, however, that it is simply impossible to impose the same command and control arrangements on its civilian partners in field operations that it attempts to impose on the military contingents under its command. The UN has therefore begun to refer to "unity of effort" rather than "unity of command" when it comes to overall coordination within a peacekeeping mission. According to the UN's new "Guidelines for peace-keeping Operations": "It is important to stress unity of effort in cases in which a peace-keeping operation is deployed in tandem with, or in protection of, a major humanitarian relief effort ..." [83] Lieutenant-General Zinni observes that in complex humanitarian emergencies command and control is as much about coordination and cooperation as it is about command and control. [84]

This is a welcome recognition, although the concept seems notoriously vague and will need tight definition if it is to lead to real improvements on the ground. Much will depend on the individual qualities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and his or her ability and willingness to provide leadership. To assist him and those under his command, Standard Operating Procedures should be developed by the UN for handling civilian-military relations, including with NGOs. These should include information on the role, function and

organization of coordination mechanisms such as civilian/military operation centres. In addition, they should describe the range of military support services (such as transportation, engineering, logistics, security) available to humanitarian organizations as well as the assets that the latter may be able to bring to assist the military (including the provision of timely information about conditions in the field). [85] While sensitivity in the UN about intelligence-gathering will need to be taken into account, this is quietly changing.

Military commanders should establish a control structure such as a Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC) as soon as possible and have ample civil affairs staff available. The military should establish direct and effective communication channels with all humanitarian organizations. Briefing sessions and exchanges of information should be systematized. While there may be valid requirements for keeping some military information secret, in general the greater transparency and openness the better. Plans should be drawn up in cooperation with all mission partners covering: political/military aspects of the mission, security, transition (such as from or to a non-UN force), emergency capabilities and withdrawal. There needs to be ongoing coordination as the mission proceeds, particularly if the mandate or the mission change. An effective public affairs campaign is also necessary.

Pre-negotiated standby arrangements, whereby the military agrees to provide some particular capability long before a particular crisis arises, are another way of ensuring clarity of roles and activities. UNHCR for example has agreements with the Swedish military for housing, with the Russian military for airlift capabilities and with the Belgian air force for pilots, some of whom are on 72 hours standby for emergency flights. Former Force Commander of UNOSOM II, Lieutenant-General Bir, has suggested that NGOs in a mission area in which Chapter VII operations are being conducted sign a binding "Memorandum of Agreement" with the UN outlining their relationship with the mission and any special requirements appropriate to the theatre of operations.[86] It is not clear how this idea would be received by NGOs: some may do so, others would definitely refuse, while others would be reluctant.

Another way of enhancing civilian-military interaction is through the military's involvement in so-called civic action work. This is seen by the military themselves as being invaluable to their role as peacekeepers and beneficial to the goals of the mission as a whole. [87] Some NGOs have resisted this perceived intrusion by the military into their patch. There has also

been resistance in the UN Secretariat to allocating the military funds to undertake such activities on the grounds that they are within the remit of the UN's humanitarian agencies. This seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the role and values of the peacekeepers in peace-building. In circumstances where there is a large and intrusive UN military presence and possibly elements of resistance, the UN needs actively to seek to win the "hearts and minds" of the populace. Civic action programs can improve relations between the military and the local population immeasurably, promote the image of the UN as a whole (which in turn will benefit other UN agencies) and complement the work of NGOs whose capabilities may not extend to those that the military can provide. With proper coordination mechanisms to ensure that duplication is avoided, the military's role in civic action should be to act as a humanitarian "force multiplier".

A special area requiring military-civilian cooperation is de-mining. The clearing of thousands of anti-personnel mines and other unexplored ordnance is now such a vital pre-requisite of successful peace-building that cooperation is essential. In 1992 DPKO established a Demining Unit to handle demining in current peacekeeping operations. However in order to affect a smooth transition to continued and hopefully increased demining activity in post peacekeeping situations DHA has also established a Mine Clearance Policy Unit. [88] The two units, each with different perspectives, one military, the other humanitarian, are intended to work in close collaboration in providing technical support and operational planning for demining activities. A growing trend is for military advisors to establish demining programs and then turn them over to indigenous agencies. Both phases will often be assisted by non-governmental and commercial contractors, making military-civilian cooperation even more essential.

Mandates and Missions

As is constantly called for, the Security Council should aim to issue clearer mandates that are based on advice from not just the military but also the humanitarian element. This should aim to avoid situations where a military peacekeeping operation is authorized when a humanitarian operation supported by the military would be more appropriate. On the other hand humanitarian operations should not be used as a substitute for political or military action. It is difficult to blame the military and or the humanitarian agencies for failing to

cooperate in confusing or inappropriate missions. In any event military Masks, whatever they may be, need to be related better to and integrated with overall nation-building goals.

When peace enforcement operations are conducted in a theatre where humanitarian relief is also provided, as in Bosnia, there may be an inherent incompatibility between the military presence and the civilian operations. In such cases the military's activities will be seen as "spoiling" humanitarian operations, while humanitarian efforts may be seen as obstructing the military campaign. The enforcement and humanitarian operations should, in these cases, be kept as separate as possible. Moreover, in conducting peace enforcement operations careful consideration needs to be given to the situation after force has been used: national reconciliation and reconstruction should always be an important part of the calculus. One of the clear lessons of Somalia is that the civilian mission should guide the military, rather than the other way around.

Where the military is used to help protect humanitarian relief the relationship between the military and humanitarian organizations will always be delicate: "fighting aid through" is pregnant with consequences for the next delivery of aid attempted and sits uneasily with the humanitarian ethos of non-governmental organizations and UN humanitarian agencies. If force is required to secure delivery of humanitarian supplies, either the two functions - military and humanitarian - should be completely separated, which may not be possible, or the military should both protect and deliver the aid. Ambassador Charles Thomas, former US Special Envoy to Yugoslavia once asserted that "Either you're operating in a permissive environment that allows the UNHCR to do its job the way it is supposed to be done" or you respond to a dangerous situation by "turning the task over to UNPROFOR and having them do it ... with the force necessary to carry out their mission". [89] Former Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson has also noted that: "In enforcement cases, voices may be raised that the humanitarian efforts should be separated from the military action. Since it is difficult to envisage the UN abandoning its humanitarian role in a conflict, a credible de-linking of the different UN roles would then have to be sought. Otherwise, humanitarian relief may have to be left to other organizations without formal linkages to the UN action". [90] William DeMars argues that: "Successful humanitarian operations require that somebody else, not the agencies providing relief assistance, is doing the heavy lifting politically". [91]

Argentinas White Helmets may be valuable in making the UN's military and civilian activities more distinct. Nonetheless there is still a problem of local populations often being unable to distinguish between various UN agencies, NGOs and UN military forces. Rwandans, for instance, commonly used the generic term "Red Cross" to describe all foreign agencies, whether military or non-military. This underlines the importance of the UN having a well developed, carefully targeted public relations plan to explain its various roles to the local populace and at least attempt to separate them out This is difficult to achieve and may ultimately be unconvincing. Even the attempt to disaggregate NATO enforcement action in Bosnia from the UN operation was unsuccessful. Peacekeepers were taken hostage precisely because the Bosnian Serbs did not concede any difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement undertaken at the behest of the Security Council.

UN operations in which military forte is used should above all comply with international humanitarian law. UN troops must be trained to uphold such laws with the assistance of the ICRC where necessary. Orders to strictly adhere to the laws of war should be issued and the appropriate rules of engagement enacted. Agreements between troop contributing countries and the UN and any Status of Fortes agreement between the UN and the host country, should clearly iterate the international legal responsibilities of UN troops.

Conclusions

The relationship between the military and civilian elements in humanitarian crises will always have elements of competition and discordance. One cannot expect vastly different organizational types to become homogenized, through a process of increasingly intimate contact. Nonetheless, increased cooperation is possible through better planning, enhanced joint training, clearer mandates, better UN management of its field operations, more determined attempts to achieve "unity of effort" and proactive efforts by each side to understand if not concur in the other's culture and outlook. Many of these improvements will come with the slew of reforms currently being undertaken at the UN to improve its performance in crisis situations and peace operations generally. Others will have to come from the military and humanitarian communities themselves as they absorb and process the lessons painfully learned from the operations of the past few years.

Notes:

[1]Dr Trevor Findlay is Project Leader on Peacekeeping and Regional Security at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden. The original version of this paper, with the tide "Military-Civilian Cooperation in Crisis Situations", was presented o an international colloquium on "Le Concept des 'Casque blancs': A-t-on besoin d'une nouvel(e fornve d'intervention intemationale?" ("The White Helmers Concept: Is There a Need for a New Form of International Intervention?") organized by the Raoul-Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, University of Quebec at Montreal, 19-20 June 1996.

[2] Natsios, A., "NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?" in Weiss, T.G., and Gordenker, L (eds.), NGOs, *The UN, and Global Governance* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 67.

[3] For a specific instance in Rwanda, see James, Maj. LS., "Engineers in Support of Humanitarian Operations: Operation GABRIEL, August November 1994", *The British Army Review*, no. 110, Aug. 1995.

[4] Dixon, A.M. and Wigge, M.A. (eds*), Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy*, Proceedings of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 1995 Annual Conference, CNA, Alexandria, VA, 1995, p. 59.

[5] Conference Report on "Improving Loordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations", US Deparanent of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington DC, 23 June 1994.

[6] Natsios, p. 79.

[7] *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995*, Friedrich Ebert Stiltung, Germany; Life and Peace Institute, Sweden, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with the Lessons-Learned Unit, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, United Nations, 1996, p. 6.

[8] Sahnoun, M., *Somalia: The Missed Opportunites* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1994), p. 38.

[9] Sahnoun, p. 39.

[10] *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Z.earned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995*, p. 10.

[11] *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995*, pp. 8 and 11.

[12] Ingram, J., "The Intemational Response to Humanitarian Emergencies" in Clements, K. And Ward, R *Building International Community: Cooperating for Peace Case Studies* (St Leonard's: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 174.

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[15] Baker, p. 125.

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[17] See Kelly, M.J., "Military Civil Affairs: The Need for Dedicated Military Units", in Homer, D. (ed.), *Armies and Nation Building: Past Experience -Future Prospects* (Canberra: Australian Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1995), p. 81 and Clarke and Herbst, p. 77.

[18] Kelly, p. 78 and Clarke and Herbst, p. 84

[19] Chopra, J, Eknes, A and Nordbo, T., "Fighting for Hope in Somalia", Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations, UN programme, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, no. 6, 1995, p. 73.

[20] Chopra et al., p. 61.

[21] Chopra et al., p. 69.

[22] Chopra et al., p. 88.

[23] Quoted in Kelly, p. 85.

[24] Natsios, A., "The International Humanitarian Response System", *Parameters*, Spring 1995, p. 80.

[25] Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System", p. 79.

[26] Howe, J.T., "The United States and United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement", *The Washington Quarterly*, summer 1995, p. 58.

[27] Chopra et al., pp. 72-73.

[28] Report of the Seminar on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia at the strategic and Operational levels, New York, 19-20 June 1995, p. 8.

[29] Hansen, P., "Coordination of Humanitarian Efforts in Somalia", presentation at the Comprehensive Seminar on Somalia, Plainsboro, New Jersey, 13-15 Sep. 1995, p. 6.

[30] Chopra et al., p. 55.

[31] Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System", p. 72.

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[33] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Part 3, "Humanitarian Aid Effects" (Copenhagen: steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), p. 159.

[34] Donini, A., "The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in the Relationship between the UN and NGOs", in Weiss, T.G., and Gordenker, L (eds), NGOs, *The UN, and Global Governance* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 96.

[35] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Part 3, pp. 16 and 62. UNREO for a time included UNAMIR's own Humanitarian Assistance Cell and the US Civil/Military Operations Centre.

[36] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Part 3, p. 57.

[37] Donini, p. 97.

[38] *The International Response to Conflict and. Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Part 3, p. 62.

[39] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Part 3, p. 56.

[40] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Ex perience*, Part 3, p. 55.

[41] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Part 3, p. 58.

[42] Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System", p. 80.

[43] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience,* Part 3, p. 59.

[44] Donini, p. 97

[45] *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Part 3, p. 59.

[46] The following adapted from Conference Report on Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations, p. 1.

[47] "Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies", Discussion paper no. 5, African Rights, London, Nov. 1994, p. 8.

[48] Humanitarianism Unbound?", p. 7.

[49] Slim, H. "The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations", Centre for Development and Emergency Planning (CENDEP), paper presented at the conference Beyond the Emergency: Development within United Nations Peace Missions, Pretoria, South Africa, 13-14 Mar. 1996, p. 4

[50] Quoted in Aall, P, "NGOs and Conflict Management", Peaceworks, no.5, US Institute of Peace, Washington DC., Feb., 1996, p. 12.

[51] Slim, p. 4.

[52] Donini, p. 97.

[53] Findlay, T., *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, SIPRI Research Report No. 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.

[54] Natsios, p. 75.

[55] "Humanitarianism Unbound?", p. 14.

[56] Smock, D.R, "Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa", *Peaceworks*, - no. 6, US Institute of Peace, Feb. 1996, p. 3.

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[58] Prendergast, J., "Tie Humanitarian Assistance to Substantive Reform", *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, July/August 1995, p. 42. See also "Humanitarianism Unbound?", p. 13.

[59] Smock, p. 2.

[60] Smock, p. 13.

[61] Natsios, pp. 75-76.

[62] Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), 13-15 Sep. 1995, Plainsboro, New Jersey, p. 2.

[63] Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System", p. 77.

[64] Righter, R, *Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order*, (New York: Twentieth Century Book Fund, 1995), p. 55.

[65] Research has reportedly indicated that in Rwanda military cargo flights were 4-8 times more expensive than available commercial carriers. See "The Role of the Military in Humanitarian Emergencies", Conference Report, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, Oxford, 29-31 Oct 1995,, p. 7.

[66] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23, Dec, 1994, p. 27.

[67] US Information Service, Wireless File, USIS Stockholm, 6 June 1996.

[68] *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia*, April 1992-March 1995, Friedrich Ebett Stiftung, Germany; Life and Peace Institute, Sweden, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with the Lessons-Learned Unit, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, United Nations, 1996, p. 8. See also "The Role of the Military in Humanitarian Emergencies", Conference Report, p. 7.

[69] Information pamphlet, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada.

[70] Report of the Seminar on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia at the strategic and Operational levels, p. 8.

[71] Dixon and Wigge, p. 56.

[72] Dixon and Wigge, p. 19.

[73] For details see Findlay, T., "Reform of the United Nations", Appendix 2D in *SIPRI Yearbook 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 117-132.

[74] Natsios, p. 77.

[75] Natsios, p. 74.

[76] Dixon and Wigge, p. 65.

[77] Smock, p. 12.

[78] "The Role of the Military in Humanitarian Emergencies", p. 11.

[79] "The Role of the Military in Humanitarian Emergencies", p. 9.

[80] Government of Canada, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* (Government of Canada: Ottawa, Sep. 1995).

[81] See United Nations Forces in Haiti Force Training Program, UN document (unnumbered), 3 March 1995.

[82] *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992-Match 1995*, p. 39.

[83] UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, "General Guidelines for Peace-Keeping Operations", document 95-38147, Oct. 1995.

[84] Dixon and Wigge, p. 24

[85] *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992-Match 1995*, p. 10

[86] Briefing by Lieutenant-General Bir to the United Nations, unpublished, 25 Jan. 1994.

[87] An Australian defence lawyer even goes so far as to argue that it is not just a moral but a legal obligation for UN peacekeepers when they are in effect occupiers, as in Somalia, to provide care and assistance to local populations. This interpretation would be contested by others, who would argue that UN forces were not occupiers in Somalia, although the sentiment in favour of assisting the local population would nonetheless be endorsed.

[88] See Kelly, p. 8.

[89] *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995*, p. 40.

[90] Dixon and Wigge, p. 27.

[91] Eliasson, J., "Humanitarian Action and Peace-keeping", paper presented to a conference organized by the International Peace Academy, 3 March 1995, p. 14.

8. Media, Information Technology and Crisis Management

Dealing With the Media During Crises and Peacekeeping Missions

By Jamie P. Shea
(Spokesman and Deputy Director of Information and Press, NATO HQ Brussels)

Expanding Means but a Contracting Attention Span

In 1981, 11.7% of the world population had television sets. Today it is 23.4%. There is more and more worldwide access to the same media products, such as soap operas or mini-series, and to certain extraordinary events which transcend purely national interests. The funeral of Princess Diana was seen by one-fifth of the global population. The global electronic network of shared images in real time has produced "The Global Village", a place where everyone knows everything at the same time and claims the right to do so. The paradox, however, is that as the technical means of reaching people expands exponentially, the educational content of what is broadcast is declining. In other words, as the potential audience for foreign news and international affairs continues to expand, the supply offered by the major networks is falling. In the 1970s, reports by overseas correspondents on US television averaged three to five minutes; today they rarely exceed one and a half minutes. According to the Tyndall Report, total foreign coverage on US network nightly news programmes has declined precipitously, from 3, 733 minutes in 1989 to 1,838 minutes in 1996 at ABC, the leader, and from 3,351 minutes to 1,175 minutes at third-place NBC. Now that the defining parameters of the Cold War have disappeared, the perception of foreign affairs as crucial to the national interest and personal well-being has waned, particularly among the younger generation. More than half of the audience for the evening network news programmes in the United States is 50 or older.

Other factors have contributed to the lower salience of foreign affairs on the major TV networks:

- The intense competition that the traditional networks are now facing from satellite and cable channels which are forcing reductions in costs and an emphasis less on news and more on popular programming. Witness how domestic CNN and CNN International have diverged markedly in content in the last two years. As foreign news coverage is very expensive for the networks - at least US$3,000 a day for technical support on the location, plus transport and satellite fees - this budget is vulnerable when costs are under scrutiny. Costs also induce networks to spend less time producing their own reports and to use more the standard products offered by others leading to a loss of diversity and a narrower spectrum of news coverage.

- The merger of news channels with multinational business - such as CNN with Time Warner, Star TV with Rupert Murdoch's News International, Capital Cities / ABC with Walt Disney, and NBC with General Electric. Business strategy can have a direct impact on the news content of programming, as when Rupert Murdoch dropped BBC World Service news bulletins from Star TV in Hong Kong in order to be able to beam Star TV into China. The Chinese have also tried to stop Disney / ABC from broadcasting a programme about Dalai Lama. Will this lead to more self-censorship by Western TV keen to penetrate lucrative markets in South East Asia where restrictive guidelines are often imposed on the media (Indonesia, South Korea)? Unlike the traditional publisher or owner with whom reporters and editors could discuss a sensitive issue after climbing a flight of stars, the new owners, because of the vastness of their organizations, are distant physically and in their priorities.

- The emergence of international news channels, such as CNN, BBC World Service TV and TV5 which beam their programmes into Ministerial offices, stock exchanges and four-star hotel rooms world-wide, has profoundly influenced the conduct of diplomacy, particularly in conflict situations. These 24-bour channels cater for an elite of "news junkies" and can supply blanket coverage of specific events, like the Gulf War or the storming of the Russian Parliament in Moscow. As a result, they are watched predominantly by decision-makers who need `real time' news. The e1ite nature of these media means that they are often used by decision-makers and political activists to communicate with each other rather than with mass public opinion. Remember the way in which the Bush administration used CNN to communicate with Iraq during the Gulf War and vice-versa.

Former White House Press Secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, recalls in his memoires how President Bush rejected an Iraqi peace plan and communicated to 26 coalition nations via CNN - no Ambassadors were involved in this transmission. Compare this to Woodrow Wilson in 1919, ordering the US Postmaster General to control cable traffic between Europe and the US so that Wilson could censure news reports from the Versailles Conference. Bush realized only too well that "if you can't beat them, join them". Real time news offers us unprecedented opportunities to put one's message across but also puts decision makers under greater pressure to react immediately. This can be dangerous as public diplomacy via the airwaves makes private accommodation and face-saving compromise more difficult. Imagine the Cuban Missile Crisis played out live on CNN.

- The rapid development of the Internet and other on-line services which provide specialist news services for specialists with a particular interest in foreign affairs and the resources to hunt for the right information including now full motion video. These media are also becoming increasingly inter-active, giving the consumer for the first time some degree of editorial control. It is very difficult for governments to control these new technologies - witness the discussion on the availability of pornography or extremist political messages on the Internet. Ingenuity and even smaller satellite dishes will enable subscribers to get round many restrictions. As a result of this development, network newscasts will feel even less compelled to offer coverage of foreign events to a mass audience.

Media coverage of international affairs is becoming an elite preoccupation in the same way that policy-making is the preserve of elites. As Spokesman of NATO I find it relatively easy to appear on CNN or the BBC World Service but, except in dramatic crisis situations, very difficult to appear on domestic TV and radio. The 24-bour international news channels after all have plenty of space to fill. The only problem is that my message may be heard more by my own colleagues than by the "man on the Chapman omnibus" that I would ideally wish to reach.

A Cluttered Environment for Being Heard Above the Fray

In trying to get his message across, the modern Spokesman has to contend a number of practical problems:

- The large number of "experts" and "armchair strategists" who contribute their views on background or on the record or who leak information, crowding out the official message of a government or international organization.
- There is also an increasing number of spokesmen from pressure groups and non-governmental organizations. The inclination of the media to present issues in terms of debates and confrontations of opposing views. As a result, a Spokesman spends as much time rebutting the views of others as in putting forward his own.
- For a Spokesman of an international organization, often political sensitivities or disagreements between the member states can fuzz the message or make press lines unduly defensive and bureaucratic. Diplomatic language is naturally not as attractive to the press as fiery rhetoric or colourful criticism.

In Moments of Crisis, the Media Cannot be Avoided

Although TV is not good for explaining complex foreign policy issues, like European Currency Union or Scottish Devolution, it is excellent for relaying crises and extreme forms of human experience. So Crisis situations attract journalists - at least in the early dramatic stages before compassion fatigue sets in.

For policy-makers crises are worrying and stressful times but for media they are moments of opportunity. CNN has never regained the ratings it achieved during the Gulf War. Journalists have their Pulitzer Prices to win and crises give them particular influence/visibility (e.g. Christiane Amanpour in Sarajevo, David Halberstam in Vietnam).

The media can focus on what they often do best - the micro-image and the human story whereas policy makers have to focus instead on the more abstract high politics, thereby risking to be perceived as uncaring or indifferent. By arriving on the scene first, the media can set the agenda and define the terms in which the crisis will be discussed. It is at this moment that foreign affairs reconnects with a mass TV audience and can even engender national debates (for instance, to intervene or not intervene, to use classical peacekeeping or to enforce peace).

Media have greater penetration, even to the most remote spots computer generated news, satellite phones, digital photo transmissions, video, 4-wheel drive vehicles. Images and commentary can be transmitted raw, in real time, increasing the emotional value of instant news and mobilizing public calls for action / reaction - "the CNN factor". Extraordinary mobilizing power of TV not to create but to amplify a mood - for example: demonstrations in Prague in 1988 when the crowds teased the riot police with the slogan "The world sees you". The irony is that the pictures were replayed by CNN's Russian satellite. When viewers in other Central and Eastern European states saw the Prague protestors on CNN, they were inspired to fill the streets as well in a spontaneous demonstration of emotional solidarity. "You can't beat CNN" - media do not require the full story to report but policy-makers need the full story before they can react - the critical time lag - decision-makers have less time for reflection; they have to react even while they are not in possession of all the facts. Compared to the 19" century when J.B. Stead's famous reports on the Bulgarian atrocities took nine days to reach "The Times". The media go to a spot when a crisis breaks out. The institutions of the international community tend to become involved only later when mass violence occurs. Unlike the international community, journalists have no hesitation in taking sides; by focusing on a story they acquire particular expertise, making them frequently sceptical and distrustful of official views. The parties to a conflict will also try to use sympathetic foreign journalists to relay their views and to influence international opinion - this can even extend to outright manipulation, e.g., Saddam Hussein's baby powder factories - indicate the responsibility of the media to exercise restraint and judgement/caution.

In situations short of war, it is difficult to impose blackouts or restrictions on the media. The Gulf or the Falklands are unlikely to work again. Indeed the reverse is more often true. Instead of chasing after the story, the media seem to choreograph it in advance as during the Somalia beach landing.

The Media is an Instrument of Crisis Management

The media is a reflecting mirror. It is the way political elites communicate with the public opinion but also informs elites about the evolving nature of that same public opinion. If the media is not convinced by the messages it receives, it will substitute its own views and messages. As 100% of public opinion and even 70% of elites form their view of truth in

foreign affairs exclusively from the major media, it is very important for leaders to follow carefully what the media is saying. The media punishes those it believes are ignoring it. So leaders must be responsive to the media while never slavishly following it: And those responses must be timely to avoid the accusation of "too little, too late". Nobody's reputation is ever enhanced from being seen to be forced into doing something by the media. The best political leaders disguise their responses to media pressure as their own voluntary initiatives - you must always be perceived as leading public opinion, not following it.

Casualties in particular are explosive because they link a foreign story to a domestic story - suffering families at home and the failings of individual commanders. The more the policy vacuum, the bigger the impact on media images. The US experience in Somalia shows that TV images can rapidly undermine popular support for a peacekeeping mission where the rationale for that mission and for the acceptance of risks to life and limb is not clearly established. The media rapidly smokes out ambivalence or ambiguity. Recognizing this vulnerability certain parties will try to use the media to intimidate the international community and compel it to change course or even withdraw. Equally, policy makers must use media to convince their antagonists of their determination to compel compliance with the rules of the international behaviour (remember Colin Powell's strategy briefing on the eve of Desert Storm) while reassuring their own public opinion that they are not running unnecessary risks.

It is as important to influence the local media as the international media, particularly in breaking the stranglehold of TV /radio /newspapers that preach ethnic hatred / incite to violence - Radio Deux Collines in Rwanda / SRTV in Bosnia. UK fortes depicted as Nazis / NATO aircraft accused of dispersing toxic chemicals over Bosnian Serb villages. So make sure a code of conduct for the local media is included in the peace agreement or UN mandate to give you the legal basis and authority to exercise tight supervision and act if necessary. This was overlooked at Dayton, and had to be added later at Sintra with the result that much time was lost

Can we use the tools of the dictators to bring peace to Bosnia? If SFOR destroys TV transmitters, the propaganda will just go on to the radio instead. Dilemma: Shut down the offending media, impose censorship or set up rival independent pluralist media? The cost in

Bosnia is US$ 6 million, yet only US$ 2 million has been pledged - a fraction of the annual cost for SFOR The 1997 annual programming budget for the Open Broadcast Network in Bosnia is DM 300.000 whereas it costs the BBC £300.000 to make just one thirty-minute episode of the soap opera "East Enders". Setting up rival media networks is expensive and it takes many years to gain viewer acceptance (Sky TV, Channel 4). A better strategy is to insist on more diversity of opinion on the official stare TV such as SRTV in Republika Srpska. Use the carrot and stick approach - the carrot of financial aid and training of journalists to encourage more objective pluralist programming and the stick of closing down media as a last restore if abuses persist.

How to Handle the Media: the Eight Golden Rules or the Spin Doctor's Manual

- Objective = news dominance. Get your message across. Avoid being surprised or embarrassed by the messages of others.
- Take the media seriously/ Integrate press policy fully into all actions / discussions in Crisis management. Have media strategy for every important decision. Anticipation is better than reaction. For TV it is particularly important to link your announcement to some activity or event that can be filmed, for instance a ceremony. Choreography is important. "How will this play in Peoria?". Ifll's diction: "in wartime truth must be protected with a dense thicket of lies" may be true of wartime but only of wartime - regular information keeps press occupied/ builds up trust and credibility in your competence in handling crises. If media don't get information from you, they will get it from someone else - without your spin.
- Unlike war crisis management involves many organizations / or many participating nations. Joint press briefings / prior co-ordination where differences are unavoidable. Identify ways to play them down.
- Take productive approach: sell your success stories / focus on big picture. Timing is almost as important as substance. Press tours are very useful to draw press attention to aspects they may not otherwise cover.
- Don't allow your policy to become media driven - explain why you are there / what your objectives are frequently - don't allow media to push you in or push you out. Strong leadership compels public support / impresses media. Do not allow the media to judge you

by standards that you yourself have not established. Always recall your mandate or the media will blame you for everything that goes wrong.

- Do not lie. Admit your mistakes and make it clear you are taking action to redress them. Example: Pentagons handling of "Gulf War syndrome" of chemical poisoning. If you have someone to hide, say more rather than less. Mistakes are forgiven but never a cover-up.
- "Gather ye rosebuds while ye may" - the media spotlight will not be on you for long - so communicate as much as possible while you have a captive audience.
- From the outset of any media campaign, develop a set of Master Messages in good soundbite form which explain your general objectives. Repeat some of those Master Messages during every interview - repetition is fundamental to communication. Never give factual information without giving the overall philosophy as well.

The Organization of the Spokesman's Role

- Spokesman must have access to principals and must themselves be always accessible.
- Daily briefings during crisis situations; at least weekly in normal periods. Credible, high-level spokesmen - limited number.
- Press lines after every meeting. "No comment" is never an acceptable answer. Balance defensive lines with positive messages.
- Separate operational from political briefing. The military public information officer in the field should never comment on political topics. Flat management for quick reactions / responses.
- Top down / bottom up information - make sure everyone knows the line
- Use potential of electronic communications. This will reduce the number of routine phone calls and allow a more pro-active approach. NATO has a Home Page on the Internet. This produces 89,000 hits every 24 hours which we calculate at present about 20,000 people actually logging in.
- Use backgrounders to build a special relationship with journalists whom you can trust - the more journalists trust you as a reliable source of accurate information, the more they will take your line.
- Place as much as possible in the media: interviews with Secretary General are the main medium - have group interviews to achieve simultaneous impact in several countries.

Place Op-Ed pieces; adapt speeches for newspapers. Use other senior officials to do the secondary work or supply the more technical media. Always have one good idea or one newsworthy comment in every speech to ensure that it is covered by the media - if they cover the newsworthy item, they may well cover the other less newsworthy parts as well. Be imaginative to keep your organization visible in the media even in quieter moments.

The Crisis Management System Outlook

By Andrei Marshankin
(Major General and at the time Chief of the Public and External Relations, Department at the Staff for Co-ordination of Military Co-operation of the CIS Member States in Moscow)

Issues of Crisis situation management are not abstract for the CIS. They directly link to the maintenance of security either at the national level or throughout the Commonwealth. At the present stage the CIS is an international regional organization filled with conflicts inside its member states and between them. There are the conflicts in Pridestrovje (Moldova), Abkhaziya (Georgia), Checheniya and Osetino-Ingushetiya (Russia). They are all at different stages of development and tension.

In some of the conflict zones peaceful arrangements have been signed, mediated by UN and OSCE. Other conflicts are not over yet, and have been a source of aggravation (i.e. Osetino-Ingushetiya). Some of the others are still searching for mutually acceptable decisions during the conduct of peacekeeping operations in the areas of conflicts. Issues of prevention and normalisation of crises and conflicts in the CIS member-states have been a priority for the CIS since 1992. That actually forced the setting up of the CIS system of collective security. In May 1992 in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) the agreement of collective security was signed. Known as the Tashkent Treaty it incorporates nine states of the Commonwealth: Azerbadjan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Russia, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan. The Council of the Collective Security was set up under the provisions of this agreement. The Concept of collective security and the Concept of prevention and management of conflicts in the territory of the Commonwealth member-states have been elaborated.

In the framework of the Council of Collective Security (CCS) political consultations are held. The General Secretary of the CCS regularly meets the representatives of the agreements' member-states to discuss the current situation in the CIS, including the areas of conflict They consider the efficiency of the steps taken to settle the situation, and put forward proposals for sessions of the Council of the Heads of States. The efficiency of the political consultations was demonstrated during the meeting of the Heads of States (Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Russia

and Tadjikistan) in Alma-Ata in October 4-5, 1996. This meeting was due to the radical changes of the situation in Afghanistan and the rising threat of a breach in the southern frontiers of the Central Asian states - members of the Tashkent Treaty.

In the fall of this year we are planning to consider, at the level of the Heads of States, the idea to set up the CIS Committee for Conflict Situations. Actually it could deal with prevention and peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts within the CIS, organizing consultations on political issues of peacekeeping activities, participation in preventive diplomacy, establishing relations of the CIS with the UN, OSCE, NATO, EC, WEU etc. The cooperation among the Security Councils of the Commonwealth Member-States has been improved to speed up the exchange of information to update the situation in the CIS regions.

Basic Approaches to the Assessment of Crises

A crisis situation can develop either smoothly or radically aggravate. According to the CIS experience the evolution of the internal conflict includes different stages:

- Rising contradictions between the different sides and relevant tension of situation on the background of strategic stability.
- The tension increases. Contradictions go deeper. Political and diplomatic actions take place. International trade and economical relations are cut off.
- The parties escalate actions against each other in political, diplomatic, economical, informational and propaganda spheres. Demonstration of readiness to use force if needed.
- Critical. This stage is characterised by a critical situation that leads to strategic instability and to an imminent military threat
- Switch to full-scale combat actions.
- Call for the world community to launch peacekeeping operations under UN or OSCE supervision to stop military conflict and to create conditions. for peace talks.
- After conflict setting.

Conflict mediating actions are welcome and appropriate at any stage of the conflict. But the efficiency of such steps is not always adequate for the situation. It is important to back up

political, informational and psychological steps at the initial stages with economic pressure and if required to demonstrate power. International institutions should be involved in time. From the point of view of crisis management it is important to determine the moment, when the situation is not convertible. As experience tells us it is clear that the political decisions for conflict management must be found before the situation becomes critical.

The main principles for crisis management within the CIS include:

- implementation of international law and coordination of efforts with
- international security organizations;
- analyses and prediction of the upcoming situation in the CIS area;
- elaboration of the scenarios of joint actions in case of crises and working out political, diplomatic, economical and military measures to prevent and to limit the crisis.
- obligatory implementation of the joint decisions.

Informational Support for Crisis Management

The collapse of the USSR and the distinction of national property and armed forces among the newly independent states of the ex-Soviet Union, led to a great problem for information support of crisis situations management

Due to that fact a Unified Information Space of the CIS member states was badly needed. By now the Concept of the CIS Unified Information Space (UIS) has been approved by the Heads of the Governments. This Concept specifies the CIS information space as the combination of the national member-states informational scopes that cooperate on the basis of the respective interstate agreements in the agreed spheres. The setting up and development of the CIS information scope is a wide-scale sophisticated task that requires coordination of efforts from the member states to solve legislative, technical and financial issues. We plan to accomplish the mentioned task in two steps.

First step 1996-1997. To establish legislative, technical and organizational bases for information exchange between the CIS member-states and its organs. To prepare a long-term plan to implement the Concept of the CIS information source.

Second step 1998-1999. To provide the citizens of the Commonwealth, state bodies and administrative organs with wide access to national and international data-bases. The common interests of the Commonwealth member-states in the establishing of the CIS information space and management of crisis situations include the following:

- to secure information;
- to coordinate actions against organized crime, drug dealing and terrorist activities;
- cooperation in crises, disasters and the management of emergencies.

National information sources are used by the CIS with respect to interstate agreements. Issues of legal access to the information sources are considered at the States level. They also determine rights and duties of the owners and customers of the information sources, as well as the security of the information sources. We provide opportunities for the rapid exchange of documents within the CIS, as well as electronic transmission of messages and data telecom services. From this point of view we plan to set up a computerised information exchange network for the member-states. That will be a part of the CIS information scope and is intended to provide exchange services among state administrative bodies and the CIS bodies. One of the most important issues for setting up the information scope for the member states is to secure their own information and information sovereignty.

Mass Media

Mass media will occupy the most voluminous sphere in the future CIS information scope. Applied to conflict situations mass media could be used as:

- an information tool for belligerent sides and political parties;
- a source of information (desinformation) for opposing sides;
- a transmitter of "signals" between sides of conflict, as well as between these sides and the UN (OSCE);
- an instrument to ameliorate conflicts through transmission of facts;

- a source of information on current events, forces, groups and parties involved, especially in the beginning of the conflict.

Journalists and correspondents normally possess updated information of the conflicts, which is sometimes not accessible for the belligerents and which is of great interest for the representatives of the peacekeeping missions and operations. Business contacts with the mass media and cooperation for mutual profits in the future are important in a view of close control over crisis situations and pressure on the belligerents to convince them to stop combat actions and start peace talks.

Sample of Information Support

In 1996 the Computerised Information Crisis System (CICS) of Russia's Ministry for Crisis Management was put into operation. The System includes:

- Crisis Management Centre (Moscow)
- regional centres
- administrative points
- large number of on-site posts in the M4C organizational structure (detachments, rescue teams etc.)

CICS data base accumulates the information about dangerous and possibly dangerous sites (chemical agents depots, industrial areas, nuclear power plants etc.) means and forces, which could be involved in emergency situations, probable directions (scenarios) of their activities and other information. Thus, as the information and technical source for the Crisis Management Centre, the CICS is a kind of pattern of informational know-how in the activities of the future CIS informational scope. Currently the CIS HQ for coordination of military cooperation (Moscow) works out the provisions, structure, tasks and duties for the CIS Centre of peacekeeping operations management. Russia M4C CICS might be used as a model for this Centre. In the future the international and control system of the Peacekeeping Centre could join all military participants of the process for monitoring, preparation and decision-making related to launching a peacekeeping operation. Along with that, this system could provide the

CIS military command with reliable monitoring of possible crisis regions (zones), data and scenarios of actions, capabilities to train and teach the peacekeepers.

Conclusion

To finish, I would like to emphasise that during the last decade the world has witnessed 90 armed crises. Fifty of them were international ones. The rest were the after-effects of international contradictions. For the last decade the UNO launched more peacekeeping operations than during the whole of its previous history. But those operations managed to establish only a measure of control over conflicts, not to stop or prevent them. Changes in the nature of conflicts require new approaches for their management and solutions. One such approach is the creation of regional security organizations, in Europe as well, with equal participation of all interested states.

Information Technology and Crisis Management

By Göran Tode, Brigadier General (Swedish Air Force)
(At the time Head of the Department of joint Operations Training Division at the Swedish National Defence College)

Information technology is developing rapidly. There is no doubt that the technology brings us tools that are also very useful in Peace Support Operations. When we talk about Peace Support Operations it is important to note that the circumstances and the roles are changing: From earlier having been limited to setting conflicts between states, today they also incorporate internal conflicts between more or less well defined parties.

Peace Keeping Operations have changed in their character. From previously having been very restricted, today they involve actions of more traditional military nature though they are performed according to chapter VII of the UN charter. Numerous examples of this can be found for instance in Bosnia. It means, that whatever is written in UN rules, military units use "information" to ameliorate the security, and to be able to plan their operations. Information technology, therefore, plays a greater role today than previously.

I intend to divide my paper into two parts. The first addresses information technology and the special problems connected with it in Peace Support Operations. The second part deals with information and media. Modern operations are under constant observation from the media. And media are used by the belligerent parties for their own purposes. Since media plays such a big role in forming public opinion today, no Peace Support Operations can be performed without a proper handling of contacts with the media and an active use of media.

Information Technology

The Need for Information

It is obvious that in order to become successful the forces in a Peace Support Operation must have knowledge of a number of conditions that only partially are of a military nature. This

information varies from strategic information, which could be gathered before the operation, over operational information that must be gathered on the spot, to tactical information, where there is a need for rapid communication.

The information must also cover both internal information and information about the conflicting parties and the special circumstances in the area.

Some examples: [1]

- The UN system (mandate, command and control, ROE, SOP, supply service etc.)
- National limitations
- Other international organisations, their plans and operations
- Geography, topography
- Weather and ground conditions
- Infrastructure (roads, bridges, railroads, telecommunications)
- Belligerent parties, their aim, force composition and actual deployment
- UN force composition, actual deployment, plans and operations
- Social and ethnic conditions
- Economic and religious conditions
- Politics
- Media
- Belligerent parties, their actual military/paramilitary activities
- UN troops, their actual military/paramilitary activities

Depending on their position various players have interests in different pieces of information; the UN Security Council, the troop-contributing nations, the SRSG, the Force Commander, the battalion commanders and the civil agencies.

The need for information also varies over time from the pre-deployment phase with preventive diplomacy, over the operational phase, and the withdrawal phase to the post-operational phase.

There is no doubt that modern information technology can help to collect, distribute and analyse all these pieces of information. But in reality there are some problems connected to the special circumstances for Peace Support Operations.

Technical Problems

In Peace Support Operations the technical level differs very much between the participating contingents, for example, between troops from United States and troops from the third World. In the latter case their sensor systems are limited to eyes and ears, their communication systems very often limited to telephone, fax and various types of radio systems, and their information systems are non existent.

In the case of US troops they have access to all kinds of sensor systems, communication systems and information systems. Within US units information like data, pictures and secure voice can be brought over in real time or in near real time, and the information can be analysed and displayed very quickly. Teleconferences with secure voice and pictures allow commanders to confer on their common problems, to inform on plans and to co-ordinate their actions.

The technical level and standards of the European states vary with every country. But even with high standards of equipment they have different systems which cause problems with the interface between systems. NATO states, however, have a fairly good communications interoperability. But problems arise when NATO units communicate with non-NATO units. Military units must also be able to communicate with civilian organisations, like CIVPOL. These organisations normally do not have military equipment and their means for communication are very basic. Technically it means that you have to choose the lowest common denominator, or provide the organisations with equipment and operators. Technical problems are hard enough, but they can be solved, given will and money. Perhaps more difficult are other constraints inherent in Peace Support Operations.

Political Restraints

One UN principle is that all information, its collection and storage have to be public, open and transparent It should not be possible for any party to gain any advantage from a peacekeeping mission's misuse of information.

First of all we must recognise that there is a big difference concerning handling of information between traditional UN Peace Keeping Operations and those PKO's where UN has sanctioned a regional organisation - like NATO - to take the whole responsibility for the whole operation.

In operations where the UN has authorised a regional organisation, like NATO, to run the operation, the handling of information is somewhat different. When the mandate for the mission is discussed with the parties, matters concerning information are brought up. In the case of IFOR or SFOR negotiations were made with the outcome that NATO would use its normal information structure and information 1 handling in these missions. This means that NATO at present uses various sensor systems for reconnaissance, like satellites, recce aircraft, and UAV, and its own communications system with secure communication between NATO units. But this is not a rule. Negotiations will be made case by case.

In traditional Peace Support Operations it is forbidden to undertake active intelligence gathering by military means. UN military forces have to rely on the information that is given to them by the belligerent parties and by NGO's. This type of information is not controversial, but not without friction. The belligerent parties give only as much information as they want to, and they are very suspicious about this information being brought over to the other side. Also the NGO's are reluctant to give all their information, as it could jeopardise their own mission. The peacekeeping force must not be perceived as merely another combatant in the area. But in practice the military commander uses information of all kinds to ensure the security of his units and to serve his task. In practice part of this information is not kept open to the belligerent parties.

In Somalia the United States used national intelligence means to monitor the belligerent parties, and was also willing to share the information with other UN contingents. This willingness seems to have diminished after an incident in Somalia, where secret US information was handled openly by another UN contingent.

There are many reasons for using information sources and information systems in peacekeeping operations. First of all it should be very legitimate to use information to protect UN forces. Secondly, in order to be able to operate, these forces must have access to up to-date information and appropriate information systems. This also gives a better understanding of the real situation and a better possibility to mediate. Finally the information must be able to kept secret. This calls for the development of common standards for information systems. Nations without their own systems should be provided with appropriate systems and systems operators. And it must be possible to keep information secret within the UN contingents.

Many obstacles must be passed before obtaining all this: (1) How to create understanding in the UN for the need for appropriate and timely information, and the need for adequate information and information systems? (2) How to ensure secure information systems without risk for leakage? (3) Can UN contingents trust one another on secrecy? (4) Who should provide the equipment (5) How to safeguard being considered as a neutral party by belligerent parties? Let s hope that the evidence shown under previous and current operations help to bring these questions to a good solution.

Information and Media

There is no doubt that media play a big role in modem conflicts. The conflicting sides use all media to propagate their opinions. Especially in internal conflicts this propaganda is used to underpin hatred towards the enemy group. In extreme cases it involves urging people to kill civil inhabitants belonging to the enemy group. We have seen it under the build-up of the Bosnian conflict, where local politicians used the media to provoke animosity between the ethnic groups. We have seen it in Rwanda where a local mayor urged his people to kill civilians from the "enemy" group.

The speed and efficiency of media communications is immense, and puts very high demands on UN communications. Mr. Simon MacDowall gives an example:

> “In the autumn of 1994, by way of example, the SHAPE media office received a telephone call from a Brussels-based reporter from ARD German Television. The reporter said he had information of a NATO air-strike due to take place in 15 minutes.

> What had happened was that the UN had given the Bosnian Serbs a 20-minute warning of the impending air-strike, and they in turn immediately told an ARD reporter in Pale, who passed it back to Brussels. The air-strike was covered live on television while NATO spokesmen were saying they could not confirm what was happening and senior military and political leaders had not yet been fully briefed."

This is - as the BBC reporter Nik Gowing has put it - "the tyranny of real time". Media move into the theatre early in the conflict. Very often the media pushes the political decision to commit troops. Media are not dependent on the UN either for communication or for transports. And they are not in the pocket of the international mission.

The necessity of speedy communications and information systems is therefore obvious. The UN must not come in as a runner up. When the first media transmission is on it will form the picture for the public opinion. Coordination within the UN military organisation and other organisations is also very important, as is the need to rapidly establish the correct source.

Media has - for better or worse - a huge impact on the home front. Vietnam was the first media-war, where media was a major factor contributing to bringing the US out of the war. In the case of Somalia, media presented pictures in the US making the home front very reluctant to further US engagement.

The UN has been rather passive concerning trying to bring timely and correct information to the inhabitants in the conflict area. Only in on case Rwanda - has the UN jammed a radio transmitter which provoked genocide.

The UN must be more active in this respect Big nations like the US have the tools to jam radio and TV-transmitters, and also to take over senders and broadcast on radio and TV. These assets should preferably be used more frequently, and as early as possible in the conflict. Another way is to destroy or jam the network itself by use of electronic intrusion.

Many legal problems arise. Before you break into local media systems you need a mandate, negotiated with the parties. There is also a difficulty in that acting like this the UN might be considered to lie a belligerent party. Still, there is no question that non partial and correct

information early in a conflict can help to cool down hot feelings and make people really understand what is going on. How this should be done, under what circumstances and what form, should be subject for a deeper investigation.

Notes:

[1] Partly from Eriksson, Rekkedal,, Strömmen: FOA Report December 1996.

Sources:

Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peace-keeping Operations; Swedish War College ACTA C1, Department of Operations, 1996.

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Virtual Peacemaking: A Military View of Conflict Prevention Through the Use of Information Technology

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) assesses regional military and security issues through open-source media and direct engagement with foreign military and security specialists to advise army leadership on issues of policy and planning critical to the U.S. Army and the wider military community.

Introduction: What is Virtual Peacemaking?

While on patrol in Bosnia, an American lieutenant colonel was confronted by an irate Croat who, with an old map in his hand, told the officer that he was on his territory. Referring to his own map, the officer replied that he wasn't, and offered to go one step farther to prove his point. Taking out his Global Positioning System (GPS), he entered data and showed the Croat the results. "Sir, " the LTC said, "I have consulted the cosmic tribunal (three satellites) and they have proven me correct. Excuse us, we have to continue with our mission."

Today there are many such occurrences when information technology (IT) is consulted to provide accurate and timely information. IT has the potential to become a huge conflict prevention tool or mechanism, an area largely under-utilized. Traditionally, crisis managers and conflict resolution academicians attempted to prevent conflict through diplomatic, economic, cultural, and finally non-lethal means. If these steps failed, then the international community deployed military forces to exert pressure on potential combatants. The use of information developments now must be added to this process or progression. IT's data-processing systems connect people, places, concepts, and organizations with speed and accuracy, significantly upgrading the conflict prevention methods and integrating other

conflict prevention means. Through developments such as the Internet, IT offers the potential to reach both ruling elite and individuals in societies contemplating conflict whether they have access to the technology or not

The application of IT to processes that influence or regulate our lives has spawned a host of new concepts. Perhaps the most important is the concept of "things virtual." These "things virtual," as but one example, allow people to experience concepts or illusions temporarily simulated or extended by computer software." Things virtual" explain processes we can see and use but which we can't directly touch or feel. Some of these processes are familiar to us - virtual reality games, for example, are available to children. It is possible to order virtual flowers for loved ones via the Internet; and virtual environments show scientists to explore molecular structures, architects to walk clients through their designs, and Ford Motor Company to teach forge hammer operators how to stamp out connecting rods.[1] Branches of government now study concepts such as virtual diplomacy, virtual justice, and virtual communications.

It seems only natural then to develop or apply virtual processes that help prevent conflict. Computer simulations, IT used by diplomats in negotiating processes, and IT used by militaries to monitor locations or find minefields are a few of many potential applications. This concept, hereafter termed virtual peacemaking, is defined as:

The use of virtual processes of information gathering, analysis, and communication (through the use of information technologies) for simulated or training exercises as well as real-world scenarios by diplomats, mediators, negotiators, military leaders, and other individuals or groups to end a dispute and resolve the issues that led to it before conflict occurs. [2]

The definition of peacemaking utilized in the collation was taken from the 1997 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics. Here, peacemaking is defined as "the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it." Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, 1997, p. I-119. Peacemaking, in the opinion of the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, refers to the term

as used in 101-5-1 but, in addition, encompasses military support to preventive diplomacy as incorporated in the umbrella concept of peace operations.

The most important part of this definition is the last few words that the use of these processes will happen "before conflict occurs." Also of importance is the term information technology, which forms the core element of virtual peacemaking processes, and is often used as a specific reference point by discussants of conflict prevention who do not use the broader term virtual peacemaking.

This paper focuses on the military aspect of virtual peacemaking, those virtual information technologies the military can use to prevent conflict. First, it discusses the goals, interests, and value of virtual peacemaking. Second, it discusses the environment in which militaries conduct operations today, and the applicability of virtual peacekeeping to this environment. Third, it discusses the information technologies available. Finally, the limitations, problems, and dangers involving the military use of virtual peacemaking are explored. [3]

It will be useful to review a related use of IT that served as the catalyst for the idea of virtual peacemaking before beginning the detailed examination. This use was the crafting and implementing of the Dayton Accords negotiation process, which allowed the international community not only to manage the Bosnian crisis but also to find some resolution. So far, the process has successfully endured the challenges to peace for nearly two years. Future historians will look on the accords as the first major successful application of IT to assist in the conflict prevention process, in this case via "virtual crisis management."

The Dayton Accords

"In peace operations... perception is reality." [4]

After nearly three years of fierce fighting among the factions in the former Yugoslavia, the international community finally persuaded the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia to sit down together and discuss how they could end the bloodshed. This meeting took place at Dayton, Ohio in the fall of 1995. IT played a prominent, even decisive role in convincing the three leaders that the accords would be administered fairly and without prejudice. Mapping

and satellite data were the two pieces of information technology used most often. Similar procedures could prove useful for virtual peace-making, it appears.

A huge TV screen was located in the room where these leaders met. A replica of the conference working map on the table in front of them was shown on the screen. This allowed the leaders to keep their fingers on the changing Inter-Entity Boundary Line that marked where the boundaries for their countries would lie. This was the chief area of contention. Mappers would digitize the line and import the information into a terrain visualization system called Power Scene (an advanced software architecture for terrain visualization), showing a 3-dimensional terrain perspective to depict where the fine apportioned the land. Negotiators could also use the system to further refine the proposed line. For example, if the line cut through a building, the line could be moved to either side of the building and viewed on the screen. [5]

Current mapping for the software was accomplished by using real time satellite images from "flyovers." This three-dimensional, moving model of Bosnia's terrain was combined with PowerScene software (which purports to have no limitations on image source, scale, or breadth). Imagery of varying resolution from satellites, aerial photographs, and other sources were integrated into a seamless image on the screen. Maps and cultural features were worked into the display as well, since the imagery was correlated with real-world coordinates. [6]

Working with legal experts, the mappers exported information to an 8mm tape and hand carried it to the joint Topo Tactical Operations Center UTT), located three-quarters of a mile from the delegates quarters, for hard copy production. Sometimes d1e information was piped through fiber optic cables linking the JTT to the Remote Replication System support function to expedite production. The numerous changes kept the mappers very busy, with as many as 600 maps produced a day. Line drawings were digitized and put on a 1:600,000 UNPROFOR road map, where a transparent overlay was created and matched to a Defense Mapping Agency 1:50,000 Topographic Line Map, and replicated on a bubble jet printer.[7] The software almost eliminated misunderstanding over boundaries, thereby building confidence, mustering support, and saving time.

Aviation Week and Space Technology indicated that PowerScene had uses other than mapping, however. The journal indicated that PowerScene had also helped coerce the participants by demonstrating to the Serbian, Croat and Muslim leaders that NATO warplanes were very capable of precisely hitting targets if the fighting did not stop. That is, the possessor of these technological capabilities linked to simulation and mapping alone was able to demonstrate in a benign form' its potential military power. Today PowerScene is being used in Bosnia to support command, control, communications and intelligence. If the commanding general wants to know what the road looks like from point A to B, or the line of sight from a mountain, the system is ideal. [8]

After the peace agreement was initiated, representatives from the three sides continued to exploit this virtual reality view of the zone of separation. [9] Another source defines virtual reality as "a realistic simulation of an environment, including three-dimensional graphics, by a computer system using interactive software and hardware." (Random House Websters Pocket Dictionary, Random House Inc., 1993, p. 735.) They went on a simulated flight along the 650-mile long border to determine, in some cases, on which side of a road the boundary should run. [10] The flight lasted nearly nine hours. Thus, the application of virtual crisis management at Dayton helped eliminate mistrust and desinformation, and served as a confidence building measure.

During the implementation phase, the reinforcing mechanisms of the treaty were essential to the successful implementation of the peace accords while IT continued to play a major role. Helicopters, equipped with a new method to digitize the attack helicopter's gun-camera footage, exposed Dayton Accord violators by photographing their infractions. Occasionally peacekeepers presented evidence of a violation to leaders of the nation or group breaching the Accord to compel compliance. At times, cross hairs were trained on the equipment in the photographs to demonstrate the precision of the technology. The implied message was taken to heart by the transgressors.[11]

Information technology also connected NATO-Headquarters with IFOR, the Internet kept troops informed of events at home, and a joint information bureau provided timely information and helped insure compliance with the Dayton Accords. The bureau provided daily advice to the division commander and operated together with the operations,

intelligence, and civil affairs elements. It has helped manage a multitude of tasks and missions, and offered to journalists a unified, coherent view of the situation from an IFOR/SFOR standpoint. Clearly a key lesson learned, whether in the negotiation room or in the zone of separation, is that in peace operations in Bosnia, "perception is reality." [12] Managing this effort was possible because the agreement was in place before troops were deployed to the field.

What are the Military Goals, Interests, and Value of Using Virtual Peacemaking?

The military's goal regarding virtual peacemaking is to apply technologies to conditions generated by a new world environment, turning this integration into military plans and operations to resolve disputes before they transform into conflicts. Just as diplomats use virtual processes (communications, negotiations, etc.) to keep a disagreement "within bounds," the military must use virtual processes to guide or force (when necessary) the militaries of disputing nations away from conflict. Military planners and operators do this by providing channels for anger, providing alternative to frustration, relieving stress and tension, and avoiding overreactions on the one hand; and by deterring, monitoring, and even compelling disputing militaries on the other.

Virtual peacemaking allows intermediaries to "use forces" instead of the use of forte. The military is a power in being with coercive capabilities that create pre-conditions for peacemaking. That is, the use of fortes can serve a pre-emptive role and prevent the use of forte. Virtual peacemaking can also support the rules of engagement for the forces called upon to prevent conflict. The difficulty with virtual peacemaking is convincing governments without IT capabilities that IT is serving international and not national interests. Yet virtual peacemaking offers the opportunity for those with extra concerns and anxieties (whether they are or are not part of the conflict or conflict prevention process) to "monitor the monitors." However, at times the national approaches to conflict prevention are so diverse, due to national attitudes or the participation of peoples and movements instead of states and nations in national decision-making processes, that it is impossible to keep everyone satisfied.

Virtual peacemaking is not a tall for virtual presence. Troops are still required. Virtual peacemaking merely strives to control disputes and prevent them from moving to open

conflict by taking advantage of contemporary technology. Virtual peacemaking is a transparent process that offers five areas to assist conflict prevention: it explains the nature or causes of a conflict, or measures taken by the international community; it demonstrates simultaneity of effort, or the impotence of those involved in the conflict; it compels compliance by simulating consequences of actions taken by the participants; and it can monitor and review actions for the satisfaction of the participants and the international community. If the end goal is served, the value of virtual peacemaking cannot be overestimated. Such a process can even help promote the creation of a global civil society through the development and use of common values, something long sought after but deemed unattainable.

What is the Relation of Military Methods (Combat and Peacetime) to Virtual Peacemaking?

An important report by the Carnegie Commission, completed in 1996, recommended several ways to nurture conditions to prevent conflict from occurring. Although these recommendations were not necessarily military in orientation, they suggested other uses for virtual peacemaking. For example, the list included conflict prevention recommendations such as promoting inter-communal confidence, and developing programs to open up and maintain cross-cultural lines of communication.[13] Since militaries are called upon to assist in implementing these recommendations, their application to virtual peacemaking should be considered.

The military has at its disposal a list of mechanisms to prevent conflict that are applicable to virtual peacemaking scenarios. Michael Lund, author of *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, listed several of these mechanisms:

Restraints on the use of force:

- arms control regimes, to include their monitoring
- confidence-building measures
- non-aggression agreements
- arms embargoes, blockades

- non-offensive defense force postures
- military-to-military programs
- preemptive peacekeeping forces for deterrence and containment
- demilitarised zones, safe havens, peace zones

Threat or use of armed force:

- deterrence policies
- security guarantees
- maintaining or restoring local or regional "balances of power'
- use or threat of limited shows of force. [14]

Each of the technologies discussed below should be evaluated against these mechanisms and applied where necessary. Virtual means can also help explore the relationship between military power and police power, or the use of forces under extreme conditions, to prevent conflict. The use of force under extreme conditions could also be simulated if necessary. Yet another vital simulation worthy of exploration is the impact of "information friction" on the situation the impact of media bias, language difficulties, and cultural barriers and prisms on the force.

There is a huge civilian aspect of virtual peacemaking that works hand in glove with the military component and helps prevent conflict by defusing and alleviating risk factors. [15] These civilian mechanisms include the ability to:

- alert international bodies (use of the Internet, satellite communications)
- secure reliable information (through access to reliable data bases)
- identify and strengthen moderate leaders (use of TV/news/radio)
- establish channels of communications, both formal and informal (cell phones, Internet)
- develop coordinated political, economic, and social contingency plans, encourage and reward non-violence, limit the spread of violence, penalize aggressors (integrate many IT uses noted above)
- follow up political support, economic engagement (virtual diplomacy and economic IT)

- establish regular consultations (hot lines, satellite communications, Internet)
- increase readiness of forces (measure units preparedness via simulations, use remotely piloted vehicle flights over formations and territories)
- prepare non-military measures and actions (use of virtual diplomatic, judicial, and communication assets, economic and information blockade, use of non lethal weapons)
- strengthen deterrence by signaling red lines not to cross (use computer teleconferencing, transparency of preparations of the international community to act, etc.)
- communicate commitment to rake stronger action (demonstrate ability to conduct system override, interference in all communications activities)
- prepare citizens to accept courses of action (use of public affairs assets and organizations, along with TV/radio/Internet, and other IT capabilities)
- initiate formal negotiations (Tele conferences, virtual diplomacy, etc.)[16]

Preventive actions help control early reactions to signs of trouble, identify and resolve the underlying causes of the potential violence, and offer a balanced approach to alleviating pressure and risk that may result in violence. [17] NGOs, for example, have become one of the urost important indicators of the potential rise of conflict. They are often the first to penetrate crisis areas and have a wealth of information regarding the conditions and grievances that give rise to potential violence. Governments often do not have direct contact with the population bur NGOs do.[18] In this limited sense, non-stare actors are replacing governmental agencies as a means for integrating and coordinating cross-border issues. It is important to be cognizant of their IT means and coordinate them with those of stare actors and militaries, ensuring some compatiblity and a means through which to communicate. Whatever course taken, governments, NGOs, and militaries must keep in mind that prevention will require actions, actions will involve costs, and costs will involve tradeoffs. [19]

Is Virtual Peacemaking Applicable to the Current International Environment?

An air of optimism regarding IT's assistance to the conflict control process existed after the Dayton Accords. IT fostered both confidence and a positive attitude among the sides at Dayton (the Bosnian Serbs were not part of that process). Can virtual peacemaking responses be tailored to handle the different (race, religion, culture, etc.) causes of conflict, no two of

which may be alike? [20] Second Annual -Progress Report, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, 1996, p. V.

The information "center of gravity" will vary from conflict to conflict, from level to level, and from dimension to dimension. The greatest challenge for the policymaker will be to manage a national intelligence architecture, which can rapidly identify the information center of gravity, prepare the information "battlefield", and deliver the appropriate (non-lethal) information "munitions" to carry the day. [21]

In spite of such difficulties, U.S. Armed Forces leaders support ideas related to virtual peacemaking, offering potential momentum to the concept and encouraging its integration. For example, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, believes "our analysis for the future points out that we need a capability called `strategic pre-emption'. Strategic preemption is the ability to halt or prevent a conflict or crisis before it becomes debilitating or protracted-before it spreads out of control." [22] Shaping the international environment is a pillar of our national security strategy. Concepts such as virtual peacemaking should compliment these visions. Obviously, virtual peacemaking will also require international legal sanction and support, and a great deal of foresight and intelligence about the military situation.

During the Cold War, it was more difficult to influence a potential conflict situation, and to clear up misunderstanding, n e many societies operated as closed systems. Government agencies, local business, the mass media, elite, and especially the special organs of intelligence directed a specific flow of information at both principal actors within the system (Presidents, Prime Ministers, General Secretaries, etc.) and at society at large. Control of this flow of information from the top down formed the outlook and attitudes of the populace.

This situation was directly influenced by limited access to signals, human, photo, and electronic intelligence, and the manipulation of such information for policy formation and policy execution. Now, this position has changed dramatically as a result of IT and the end of the Cold War. While the intelligence systems still impact on policy formation and execution, public opinion also matters since many countries, previously bound by parts of solidarity with closed soc ieties, opened up to the global information market. An entire system known as the

Global Information Environment (GIE) developed, mainly through the auspices of businesses and systems designed to monitor various situations (arms control, weather, the environment, etc.) offering an explosion of communications and other information technologies that have saturated societies world-wide. There is also a greater ability to manage open source information from sources around the globe, causing electorates at home and abroad to question given official sources due to access to alternate and comparative forms of information.

On a positive note, IT has penetrated and evaporated some of the opaqueness that surrounded many countries, and made them more transparent to both the outside world and their own citizens. The GIE includes individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences. GIE is composed of national, global, and defensive information infrastructures, [23] and impacts on all countries, whether they realize it or not, through their use of satellites or other IT source. Satellites and cables offer outsiders or observers the opportunity to see inside and talk with members of a closed society (such as North Korea). Satellites monitor troop mobilization and deployments, measure the local harvest and ascertain if people will starve or not, allow ordinary citizens to communicate via the Internet with people on the other side of he world, and afford businessmen the opportunity for instantaneous communication with financial and industrial centers all over the globe without government interference. The sovereign, on the other hand, has lost control of much of what people can see and hear, making it more difficult to "form" the consciousness of the populace than in the past. If the essence of sovereignty is the power to exclude others from interfering in one's affairs (personal or governmental), then IT is eroding that concept.

Virtual peacemaking offers the international community and individual states the capability to mobilize world opinion and put pressure on governments intent on initiating conflict The 'advanced countries are being transformed fastest and in the process are transforming others due to the impact on economic activity. Now, even the most backward societies are touched by the revolution in computing technology and global connectivity. Virtual peacemaking also offers the opportunity for the international community to "signal" what is and is not acceptable norms of behaviour, and to isolate a government if the need arises. This is especially effective due to ITs instantaneous impact. Now, the opportunity exists to utilize

virtual diplomatic and economic means, or to use virtual information blockades or information overloads outside or within a country, respectively. Access to outside information also allows the local populace to influence the decision making processes of a nation through the exertion of public opinion more than ever before.

Walter Wriston, former chairman and CEO of Citicorp, speaking at a conference on Virtual Diplomacy in Washington, D.C. this past April, highlighted several intriguing aspects of the new IT environment that military planners must keep in mind. These included the impact of virtual peacemaking methods on sovereignty, on the destiny of people, and on the development of what he termed an "information standard." His message must be considered and measured by the military as it attempts to fit its methods and hardware to the virtual peacemaking concept

Wriston noted that the entire political process is magnified and sometimes distorted by the images on our TV screens produced instantaneously by IT, especially by the 24 hour international reporting offered by stations such as CNN. This has also impacted on the way nations communicate with one another, as special interests (both national and transnational) more often bypass official foreign ministry channels. But IT enhances the effectiveness of conflict prevention measures, if Wriston's comments are on the mark, via the same TV images and access to the Internet In Bosnia, for example, a legal web page was developed that had a virtual library and electronic publishing format, helping to build the rule of law. Bosnian judges used the system to access ways others handled similar problems. The system tied together not only judges but also attorneys, clerks, and defendants. It may offer a symbiosis of the rule of law, the press and the people for the not too distant future. [24] However, problems of language, different legal systems, methods of legal input, and script must be overcome first. More important, Wriston added, IT offers people a say in their own destiny. The formation of an information global village implies that denying people human rights or democratic freedoms no longer means denying them an abstraction they have never experienced. Instead they are being denied the established customs of the village which they may have seen on TV or read about over the Internet. Wriston also noted that if the economic market is viewed as a giant voting machine recording in real time the judgement of traders all over the world about our diplomatic, fiscal and monetary policies, then we must be aware of the creation of an "information standard" which is more draconian than the old Gold standard and operates more

swiftly. [25] The information standard changes the way we solve problems, impacts on how we do our jobs, and most important of all changes the way we view and interpret events. Through the phenomenon of instantaneous IT, the information standard loosens the hold of the sovereign and projects the individual as the object of events and information as much as the state.

That is, those possessing IT must learn how to use its consequences. Transparency issues and institutional methods offered by international participants such as the OSCE, UN, local academies, and institutes must also be studied. According to one Russian information warfare expert, S. A. Komov, IT can be used to distract, pacify, appease, intimidate, provoke, immobilize or pin down, wear out, confuse or weaken, suggest, or mislead.z6 This is an important list of uses, since many can help slow or prevent the use of force. These uses may also affect force projection, mobilization, and movement, thus affecting the capability to conduct actual conflict. [27]

A final virtual peacemaking use by governments is to help achieve economic leverage over potential combatants through inducements and incentives to be brought into the information age or, failing complicity, by using IT to establish economic blockades and affect indicators of stability and vitality, among other measures. Virtual peacemaking relies heavily on images and communications, with words and visuals becoming a currency of sort.

The military must learn to integrate virtual peacemaking mechanisms into its preventive deployments and defensive postures. The military can fool potential combatants about the actual situation before them, gain information on potential combatants, and exert pressure, among other uses; and it can take preventive steps by planning ahead to control the consequences that might develop. In the final analysis, virtual peacemaking nicely compliments General Reimer's "strategic pre-emption" concept.

Thus, the balance of power in the world is no longer simply about bi- or multipolar issues. Nor is it simply about balancing issues of diffuse, profound, and ancient collective-memory problems (race, religion, history, national interests) or balancing diffuse force-on-force problems. The balance of power also hinges on images and the use of IT that can tilt the balance one way or the other. This makes virtual peacemaking an inviting idea to explore

further since it offers enhanced understanding of all these issues through transparency in the diplomatic, economic, and military areas, and enables the concept of strategic pre-emption.

What Information Technology Will Assist Us?

"Technology empowers people." [28]

The next era of peace operations and conflict resolution will be strongly influenced by the relationship between humans and things virtual, if the Bosnian experience is any indicator. Designers will have to make software that can relate to soldiers, diplomats, and people with influence that fits their cultures and expectations. This requires that software manufacturers interact with academicians, religious and cultural leaders, and others who understand international sensitivities. It is a significant challenge seldom recognized, and one worthy of future study.

This realization comes at a time when consumer electronics, Hollywood, military planning and peacetime actions, and society all have access to similar items (in some countries of the world), that is, integrated IT systems. The military is buying off the shelf technology from the consumer sector, and Hollywood is amazing society with its ability to put the results of this convergence on the big screen. For those third world societies where access to IT is limited, it is still likely that decision-makers have access, which might alter the use of virtual peacemaking if conflict were imminent but would not eliminate its use. The next era of peace operations may also witness the capability to customize or tailor IT to fit the contractor (a multinational force, the UN etc.). This will make IT potentially useful for peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace building operations. "Customizing" means selecting new developments according to their applicability to one of the types of peace operations, although they could just as easily be adopted for wartime use. For example, Bill Gates, Chief Executive Officer of Microsoft, described three ideas die consumer can expect to see in the not too distant future. They are the wallet personal computer (PC); electronic books that offer readers the opportunity to participate in writing the conclusion to the story; and advanced software that records each person's "documented life." [29]

Superimposing these three ideas on a military scenario allows one to envision, in the first case, an electronic wallet in the pocket of each peacemaker that offers instant information on the treaty being implemented or the international law about to be broken, supply and refugee routes available, location of NGO support groups, tele medicine information, local phone numbers of influential people, rules of engagement, cultural sensitivities, and other types of civil-military information. The electronic wallet also could be equipped with read-outs from built in radar detectors, and have the ability to place calls for help that designate both location and real-time images.

An electronic book could be used by commanders to access the electronic operations order of a higher level of command in one's own armed forces in order to help write the operations order based on the situation in his locate. Or it might be used to offer conflicting parties a chance to dialogue alone or with a mediator if all three parties were electronically connected. Access to one's documented life, in this case the documented steps leading up to a crisis, would allow the participants to review the steps that logically brought them to their conclusions in the first place. If potential combatants wanted to talk over the phone or via a computer in complete anonymity, this is also possible with the help of IT. Camo-voice, a communications technology offering such anonymity to the caller, is available. Another communication's method is a software package called Lotus Domino, which allows a mediator control over who sees what on a monitor. Through such devices of anonymity, presidents or secretaries of state could utilize the IT tools and conduct the negotiations while appearing to simply be a "representative" of the state in question.

There are many other hi-tech tools and software that can be customized for military use as virtual peacemaking instruments. These include such common everyday items as electronic mail, statistical analysis, graphical illustrations, use of indicators and warnings (or flagging specific words or concept variations), and the use of computer generated overlays or maps. It also includes such simple devices as a video camera.

Americans are very familiar with the power of images that video cameras have offered over the past few years, whether it be the beating of Rodney King; the photos of Timothy McVeigh in a junction City McDonalds, tying him to the scene of the Ryder truck rental; or the footage shot during the beating of Missouri prisoners in a Texas prison. Prison guards report that one

of the greatest fears of a prisoner, who has no civil rights, is to be videotaped during a disturbance because it will hurt the persons chance at parole. Some prison officials have even stopped a prisoner from further acts of harm by simply pulling out a camera and pointing it at the individual. They know that the video record will speak for itself at any hearing. Monitoring the outside of military garrisons or sensitive border regions with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could have a similar impact in recording the actions of countries that violate agreements and presenting them to international tribunals. Again, however, there are legal issues to overcome, in that countries are not prisoners and have no cause to expect violations of their sovereignty or privacy. They have rights not to be spied upon. But if the international legal community agrees that such monitoring is in the cause of preserving peace and eliminating bloodshed, then such "big brother" activity may have a chance, especially since nations observe one another from afar in peacetime through satellites. UAVs may not be as large as problem as they appear.

Simulations are another form of information technology that have real value for virtual peacemaking. Its adaptation for use in conflict prevention scenarios is quite simple. For example, societies about to become involved in a conflict could be shown a simulation (on local TV if the desire was to mobilize the entire populace) of the good and bad consequences of their deeds. Such a simulation may not necessarily show their destruction, but only the path leading to war and its consequences for the economy, for example, versus the path leading to peace. This would offer everyone the opportunity to sit back and consider the consequences of their actions, and to develop ways to interact and find solutions. Again, the problem will be cultural, finding a method to affect different parties in the same way.

Simulations can also be used to prepare the peacemaker. If human behaviour can be properly modeled, to include its irrational aspects, then computer exercises would be more realistic instead of the pre-programmed responses we have come to expect over the years. These simulations could even be designed for specific locations and environments. As a result, peace operations personnel would enter into an area with a much more realistic appraisal of the situation. Thus, simulations are vital because they: (1) provide greater visual realism (sensations of motion, temperature, sound are important but visual imagery is best, especially if put in helmet mounted displays) (2) offer better and less expensive databases (3D data bases are available as well) (3) provide a broad spectrum of capabilities (allows planners and

individual soldiers and pilots to participate; offers chance to train en route or on site) (4) are mora deployable, and offer mission-specific training and (5) offer improved upgradability for lower lifetime costs (can rehearse various geo-strategic settings and rapidly changing scenarios). [30] Obviously, simulations work for both wartime and peacetime operations. [31] - *micro sensor networks*: networks composed of thousands of micro sensors that are deployed from a wide range of delivery platforms, which form themselves into monitoring networks to transmit data to remote sites.

Speakers at the Virtual Diplomacy conference mentioned earlier offered other examples of how IT can be applied to military peacemaking efforts to enhance the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Wriston, for example, noted that IT enables airborne mine detector systems to locate mines and explode them via IT imbedded in drone Panther tanks, which demonstrates how information has replaced some human assets. Locating and clearing minefields makes them useless, and demonstrates the impotence of those who planted them to influence the situation. Other panelist observations impacting on virtual peacemaking processes were:

- IT affects the way we conduct military affairs, in that we move faster to react-act than in the past due to instantaneous communications and data transfers. [32]
- IT helps us conduct "navigation warfare" (determining where things are). It also is a "negotiation weapon" in that precise information in real time offers an advantage in decision-making. Unpiloted remote vehicles are an example of technology that can provide this information. [33]
- IT enhances a diplomat's understanding of the history, training, biological processes, and learning techniques of a nation, not just their thoughts and the things they want today. We need to learn to connect data perceptual systems. [34] This lesson should be studied by psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel.
- IT can also allow one to look at roots of conflict associated with geography, such as natural resources, land, fond, water, high ground, space, the environment, movement corridors, strategic locations, or cultural objects. A Geographic Information System (GIS) exists that can help resolve conflict by offering a number, quality, and diversity of global databases (routing, crime analysis, line of sight, monitoring) which have peace keeping/peacemaking implications for combatants (where is the bread, the mines, the

ammo, and so on). It also shortens the time lag between collecting and using, interrelates available information, and can put any factor of reality in a reference base. [35]

- IT has assisted the mapping industry to enable us to communicate intuitively, since maps offer a framework for compromise and tradeoffs (can show flood plains overlaid on property, buffer zones around rivers, line of life for communication sites, and so on). [36]
- IT can model biological processes, hydrological processes, and the movement of animals or humans, among other things, and offers a framework for cooperation between academia, business, non-governmental agencies, government/military, and citizens.[37]
- IT enhances TV coverage, influencing measures of military success. [38]
- IT is heightening our view of the unusual (the Rollman-Madonna effect), which is making us more tolerant of "different" thinking about an issue. [39]
- IT should discourage us from thinking in terms of platform versus platform. Adversaries won't build pieces like that. We cannot predict events due to change, chaos, and complexity, but we must be ready for all contingencies. [40]
- IT has created greatly flattened bureaucratic structures to implement conflict prevention processes. How to work with this apparatus must also be learned by diplomats and the military.

Limitations/Problems

"The Internet may develop a conscience. It appears to be evolving on its own without a mandate." [41]

How nations learn to manage or leverage the consequences of the information age may greatly determine their power or influence on world affairs, much like the influence of great state diplomacy and nuclear weapons in the past. Yet while virtual peacemaking shows great promise as a new means to prevent or control conflict, there are also limitations and problems with its use. For example, there is an imbalance in the capacity to store, process and use information among nations, another reality of the new-world order. This means that virtual peacemaking might work in some vicinities with developed information infrastructures but be limited in others. Another aberration is that the attainment of IT allows some smaller countries to possess a greater ability to conduct these operations than former superpowers

(i.e., Japan versus Russia). And the mere thought of using IT as an intervention tool to prevent conflict raises serious questions about the need to fix responsibility for its use and misuse under law. Legal decisions will play a major role in many IT issues, and must be studied closely. They will help decide whether IT use represents interference in state or human rights affairs, or the violation of a nation's sovereignty.

Another problem for virtual peacemaking methods is one that has been with us for years. It is the historical, cultural, logic, and religious frames of reference used by different nations to measure IT developments. What may be a perfectly acceptable use of IT for one nation may be extremely limited in another due. For example, in societies dominated by religion, the Internet may be forbidden due to its ability to access information, especially about other religions movements or negative information about their own. In America, the restrictions the Amish place on their people represent an example close to home.

Yet another limitation or problem may be the use of virtual peacemaking as a psychological operations (PSYOP) weapon. PSYOP offers many uses for one's benefit, whether in the diplomatic, economic, or military arena, but also several dangers since it can act on the limited understanding of the gap between reality and a humans ability to comprehend things virtual. For example, TV's transformation from pixel to digital systems may offer an enormous opportunity for the moving, editing, and transforming of visual information and subsequent manipulation of a populace. Another example concerns the ability of software to recognize vehicles or other objects. The software could be manipulated, misinformed, or penetrated, perhaps even by other virtual images, to fool a monitor or an adversary about intentions or movements. Even the mass media can, wittingly or not, play a huge role here. Information technology can be used to create a common perception or agents of influence among populates considering conflict through developments suck as voice or music synthesis or the use of holographs. The limitations and problems with their use are obvious, in that the opinions and responses these mechanisms generate may be interpreted as violations of international law. Regardless, a union of virtual peacemaking and psychological processes is bard to ignore. It may be one of the most dangerous weapons employed by the special organs of security or intelligence as well.

Another problem is the attention paid to processing technology at the expense of developing doctrine, training, and an infrastructure to support virtual peacemaking. This was also one of the conclusions from the study by Kenneth Allard on the use of information operations in Bosnia: namely that advances in information technology are valuable "only to the extent that they are accompanied by coherent doctrine, organizations, equipment, and people to say nothing of the time needed to make them function as a team." That is, we can't forget the fundamentals.

There is also the problem of excess attention focused on the get rich quick schemes of information technology at the expense of virtual peacemaking and other, more humanitarian uses of 1T. For example, Ismail Serageldin of the World Bank is adamant about ridding the world of some of its most obvious disparities, frustrations, and tensions. He noted that while we are more interdependent and environmentally conscious, connectivity is better, and democratic principles are winning the globalization battle as are human rights, we have an abject demographic mess all over the globe. Globalization appears to be only for the minority, since 20% of the world's population gets 83% of the world's income, while some 40,000 people die of hunger each day, a moral outrage. What a contradiction we have in the era of the information revolution as a result, Serageldin believes. [42]

In addition to problems, there are also dangers beyond PSYOP associated with the use of IT. For example, the use of IT not only allows small groups to mobilize quickly, but it also allows them to influence or even shut down political processes. The U.S. Congress has recently felt the pressure of this "participatory democracy." In the past, the U.S. electorate stayed at home and was content to vote every few years for a President and for members of local and state congresses. In extreme cases, letters would be written to Congressmen to bring attention to an issue. Today the situation is entirely different. With Internet access and e-mail links to Senators and Representatives, the electorate not only votes but offers opinions merely by sending e-mail. The danger is that the electorate can also send multiple messages that overload and shut down systems. In this fashion the Internet is developing a conscience of its own.

In an associated danger relative to small groups, small countries possessing the right kinds of IT can become as powerful as large countries overnight. This situation can become dangerous

if the country having access to the right types of IT is a nation such as Iraq. The danger level would rise from mild to extreme since the world has come to understand that its leader, Saddam Hussein, is irrational and so might be his use of the technology. Terrorist groups of any kind, for that matter, can threaten the entire world with the correct IT in their hands.

There are various methods that terrorists use information that become dangers, such as computer viruses, a terrorist home page to unite causes, or simple IT destruction or vandalism of vital equipment Terrorists can access IT cheaply as well. Their goal will be conflict escalation, not prevention. For example, if a satellite up-link truck was stolen and transponders were knocked out, then terrorists could aim the beam at satellites themselves. Nothing could provide terrorists with more opportunity to demonstrate or exploit their causes than their ability to knock out the communications of governments.

Conclusion

"Computers exchanging video calls as commonly as e-mail. Three dimensional windows that open into virtual worlds instead of virtual scrolls...and everything, from our medical records to our office files to the contents of our refrigerators, hyper-textually linked via the great global network." [43]

The future promises excitement and opportunity to those who capture the ability to work with IT. Will concepts such as virtual peacemaking be part of that future? Hopefully, the documentation in this report has demonstrated that the capability to do so exists and that it isa worthwhile cause. First, there is a wealth of ideas, technologies and software applications with direct applicability to conflict prevention practices and theory. Some are as common as e-mail and the Internet, others as specific as MapLinx and Lotus Domino. Just as Bill Gates adapts these concepts to the life of the consumer, soldiers and diplomats should begin exploring their application to conflict prevention mechanisms.

Second, these technologies enable, using General Reimer's expression, "strategic pre-emption." This means that the concept of virtual peacemaking is applicable to conflict prevention theory not just on the tactical but the strategic scale, and offers a new tool to political scientists, soldiers, and diplomats to develop their models and uses of technology (of

course, preemption has a purely military use as well [escalation domination to protect U.S. interests]; this is not its virtual peacemaking intent). Far too little time has been devoted to this topic to date. While we have examined and used IT as a crisis management mechanism, rarely have we looked at it as a conflict prevention mechanism. Virtual peacemaking is in need of further elaboration, especially since the military and consumer sectors are converging, implying one can assist the other in helping to prevent conflict.

Third, it is important that software manufacturers be made aware of the crucial role they can play in this effort. Academicians, religious and cultural leaders, and others who understand international sensitivities need to work closely with software producers to develop the products that take into consideration the terminology, cultural specifics and concepts associated with international negotiation processes. For example, just between Russia and the U.S., peace operations terminology can have varying differentiation that must be taken into account as well as cultural and political peculiarities. Only talented people with the proper guidance can develop the software required of such specificity.

Fourth, virtual peacemaking can take advantage of a phenomenon of the new world order, namely that many formerly closed societies are now, like it or not, more transparent due to IT. Whether it be e-mail, the Internet, or cellular phone linkups (it is hard to forget the striking image of the African warrior in the field with a spear in one hand, a cellular phone in the other), the world is more integrated than at any other time in history, offering opportunities to use virtual peacemaking tools to assist in deterring, blocking, pacifying and controlling conflict

Fifth, while there are as many dangers as there are advantages to the use of IT, the dangers are controllable. Some believe that we, the IT tool makers, have made the tools so simple that now anyone can use them, even to destroy the tool-makers! These include terrorists access to IT, and the ability to employ IT in a PSYOP operation against any country or group. One recent PSYOP example in America involved an email of a speech delivered by author Kurt Vonnegut at a commencement address. Filled with pearls of dry wisdom, it was passed around the country. However, the message was a fraud, written by a journalist and not Vonnegut. It demonstrated how vulnerable everyone is in the age of information technologies.

And this analysis has not mentioned the dangers of hackers nor the friction and fog of information war.

Sixth, in Dayton it was demonstrated that the possessor of IT (linked to simulation and mapping alone) was able to demonstrate in a benign form its potential military power. This was the finest hour to date in preventing conflict through virtual means. The Dayton process added credibility to virtual peacemaking's potential to become an important conflict prevention tool in the future. It also must be kept in mind, however, that the management of this effort was possible because the agreement was in place before troops were deployed to the field.

There remains an entire series of questions that indicate other problem areas to address in future papers on this subject These include the following concerns about controlling conflict: Whose interests are served through the use of virtual peacemaking (a country's national interests, black market interests, the UN, etc.)? Who will be in charge of the global information infrastructure? Can virtual peacemaking be used to predict as well as stop conflict? How can virtual peacemaking help political stability and eliminate elements of closure? Can cultural sensitivities be included in virtual peacemaking methods and technology? How can virtual peacemaking support humanitarian assistance? How does bureaucratic stupor, cultural psyche, clans, tribes, or Mafia affect virtual peacemaking? How does the composition of society affect the use of virtual peacemaking? What is the impact of virtual peacemaking on diplomacy? What is the role of the mass media in this effort? When does virtual peacemaking become a violation of a nation's sovereignty? What determines elite consensus for virtual peacemaking (information or personal interests, power, or clan input)? Can virtual peacemaking be used by a potential enemy or apparent "friend" against you? How do we distinguish between PSYOP, persuasion, the truth, and vested interests such as the black market during the conduct of virtual peacemaking? Do we need "preventive sloganeering" and "dead end" recognition to enhance virtual peacekeeping? Can a "participatory democracy" be mobilized to support virtual peacemaking or will it be an obstacle?

In spite of the problems, limitations, and dangers associated with virtual peacemaking listed above, it still appears to be a subject worthy of further exploration. Better now to start

studying the positive uses of the information revolution to prevent conflict and find ways to monitor potentially dangerous groups or gangs before it is to late. This includes groups and gangs on the Internet who invade personal privacy, invite you to participate in illegal behaviour, or ask you to complicate police investigations and criminal cases. A recent report indicated that some citizens are taking it upon themselves to impose their own version of law and order on the largely unregulated Internet. There is even a group called Cyber-angels, an offshoot of the New York City Guardian Angels, seeking out potential offenders and those who would take advantage of other "netizens." In the past year, web pages such as Women Halting Online Abuse were developed, as well as hundreds of others." And these problems arise at a time when we are already slipping away from silicon technology to DNA, molecular, or quantum computing. Time is of the essence.

Notes:

[1] W. Wayt Gibbs, "Taking Computers to Task," *Scientific American*, July 1997, p. 84.

[2] This definition was generated by collating the main ideas from two definitions, that of virtual diplomacy and that of peacemaking. This past April, at the opening session of a conference on Virtual Diplomacy, the President of the United States Institute of Peace, Richard Solomon, defined virtual diplomacy as "an exploration of how our world is being transformed. by the global information revolution, one that assesses new technologies of data processing and communication to prevent, more effectively manage, or resolve international conflict." He added that virtual diplomacy is designed to help us explore the possibility to decrease conflict through virtual processes of information gathering, analysis and communication. Richard Solomon, Conference on Virtual Diplomacy, April 2-3, 1997 Washington, D.C.

[3] An extended version of this paper discusses the uses and modeling of conflict prevention, and where the concept of virtual peacemaking could make its biggest impact.

[4] Kenneth Allard, "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment," *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Number 91, November 1996, p. 14.

[5] "DMA Support to the Peace Talks," Online. Internet 15 March 1997, p. 1 http//www.dma.gov/inf.acts/site/mappers.html

[6] PowerScene, advertising overview handout, November 1995.

[7] "DMA Support to the Peace Talks," p. 2.

[8] Joseph Anselmo, "Satellite Data Play Key Role in Bosnia Peace Treaty", *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, December 11 1995.

[9] Virtual reality is "an interactive technology, that creates an illusion, still crude rather than convincing, of being immersed in an artificial world." Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Cyberpunk," Time, 8 February 1993, p. 60.

[10] Eric Schmitt, "High Tech Maps Guided Bosnia Talks," *The New York Times*, November 24, 1995, p. 1.

[11] Allard, p. 4.

[12] Ibid., pp. 1, 3

[13] Second Annual Progress Report, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, 1996, p. 8.

[14] Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., second printing 1997, p. 203.

[15] Carnegie Commission, p.7. The commission also recommended developing an "information index," developed by comparing a logic of warning [sooner one acts the better] versus a logic of policy [put off hard choices as long as possible]).

[16] Carnegie Commission, p. 10. The uses of information technology suggested next to each item were not listed in the original, but added by the author,

[17] Carnegie Commission, p. 6.

[18] Carnegie Commission, p. 7.

[19] Carnegie Commission, p. 5.

[20] What is new about the international environment to which these considerations must be applied? Some of the most prevalent though not always obvious characteristics are: 1.) Modern methods for controlling crises utilize very slow decision-making processes, although progress in streamlining their effectiveness has been noted. 2.). Crises areas may require military action with humanitarian support, or military support of a humanitarian action. That is, nothing is predictable or traditional. 3.) Crises today, in contrast to the Westphalian system of the past, often require states to consider intervening and violating a country's sovereignty in order to stop military action. 4). Some crises today require intervention in an area where no legitimate government is operating. 5). Many crises today are far from America's shores, do not threaten our national interests, and consequently engender little public support. 6.) Crises often encourage manipulation of the force through "mission creep". 7.) Many modern crises require close coordination between many different organizations, which has required new

organizational techniques to handle military interaction with both governmental and non governmental (NGO) agencies. 8.) Contemporary crises require governments to decide if they will support the international peace process, a national interest, or a humanitarian cause. 9.) Crises can demonstrate the power of national will of a country, such as has occurred when a hi-tech force is faced by an opponent with a "warrior" mentality. 10.) Major powers are often impotent to act in crisis situations, even with a high-tech force at the ready. 11.) Regional organizations are sometimes impotent to act in crisis situations, even if they have multinational rapid reaction forces at the ready. 12.) Crises can develop due to the breakdown of the laws of society and methods for obtaining pay and goods, or for religious or ethnic reasons, making use of military force a last option. 13.) The multidimensional nature of crises makes it difficult to identify the center of gravity of forces involved in a conflict, especially among paramilitary forces. 14.) Some crises involving irregular or paramilitary forces have demonstrated little regard for standard warfare procedures or international law. 15.) Crises can spread within or between countries not initially involved in a conflict, simply over which side to take in the struggle. Any border issue usually involve military forces, however.

Not long ago the Carnegie Commission completed a study that outlined factors in today's world that eventually can lead to warfare. The report cited the 1) political and economic legacies of colonialism and the Cold War 2) illegitimate governmental institutions 3) problematic regional relationships 4) social cleavages derived from poorly managed religious, cultural, or ethnic differences 5) widespread illiteracy 6) disease and disability 7) lack of resources such as water and arable land 8) patterns of political repression, cultural discrimination, and systematic economic deprivation 9.) location of minority populations in economically depressed areas along borders with kindred states 10.) despotic leaders 11.) weak, corrupt, or collapsed regimes and 12) the exacerbation of these problems by new global political and economic forces.

The commission offered recommendations to get at the root causes of conflict produced by these circumstances. Finding ways to control conflict is crucial to world stability since local hostilities can become international ones, not in the nuclear sense as in the past, but in the sense that conducting quarrels no matter how deadly is an outdated idea.

[21] Robert Steele, "Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution through Information Peacekeeping," downloaded from the Internet on 14 July 1997. Quote is on p. 26 of 28 pages at site http//www.oss.net/Paper...Virtualintelligence.html

[22] General Dennis J. Reimer, "The Army and the Cyberspace Crossroads," *Defense Issues*, Volume 12, Number 33, as taken from the Internet on 4 August 1997 at sits http://wwww.dtic.mil/ defe...nk/pubs/di97/dil 233.html

[23] FM 100-6, *Information Operations*, August 1996, pp. 1-2.

[24] Henry Perritt, Villanova University School of Law, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[25] From a speech by Walter Wriston, "Bits, Bytes, Power and Diplomacy," presented at the conference on Virtual Diplomacy in Washington, D.C., 1, 2 April 1997. All of Wriston's comments noted in the paper come from his presentation at the conference.

[26] S. A. Komov, "On the Methods and Forms of Conducting Information War," *Military Thought*, July-August 1997, p. 19.

[27] Virtual peacemaking has many uses by governments if properly applied to our information dominated environment. It can use IT as a deterrent or a confidence-building measure to contain or block access to other information or technology. As a deterrent, IT can help explain an action, put pressure on people or organizations, help instill fear over potential actions, and even find expression as an information saturation or blockade operation. IT can also deter by threatening to expose a leader's state secrets, by demonstrating the impotence of a nation to offer a credible threat, or by exposing troop deployments or other forms of military build-ups, thereby uncovering blatant lies designed to manipulate public opinion.

Another Virtual peacemaking use is to energize the diplomatic language of treaties. For example, any treaty utilizing the words "develop, plan, train, or engage in" has a use for virtual peacemaking. "Develop" can refer to the ability to expand on existing capabilities through, for example, new satellite links; "plan" can refer to the construction of an Internet capability or the laying of fibre optical cable; "train" can refer to the use of simulations to learn how to use preventive techniques, or to follow logic trees that would demonstrate the negative impact of some decisions; and "engage" can refer to IT methods to conduct negotiations through the use of information technology means (communication systems, etc.). It is also possible to prevent conflict by manipulating, interrupting, or interfering with information systems and infrastructures, although there is always an element of chance in such ventures as well as a question of legality (see section on limitations and dangers below).

[28] Chester Crocker, Georgetown University, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[29] Bill Gates, "The Road Ahead," *Newsweek*, 27 November 1995, p. 61.

[30] Oyler, J., "The Battlefield in your Brain", *Military Training Technology*, June/July 1997, summary of pp. 8-11.

[31] There are other devices that must be considered as agents of virtual peacemaking as well. Some are pieces of hardware and some are software. They include the following:

CD games with emotions, religion, culture. On computer games today we can see the bodies-the clothing, the faces-so the personality of the characters is naturally becoming a bigger part of the game design. CD games are beginning to make characters dominant or appealing, and to include other personal sensitivities such as emotions. There is little reason why these technologies cannot be used as a virtual peacekeeping means. For example, during negotiations or initial discussions, it might mean allowing the sides to confront one another through this process and witness first hand some of the distress or pain their actions might cause.

Public forums. Usually taking place on a web page, public forums offer participants a place to explain the logic of their distress and thought processes. It is also a great place for the display of images, video, sound, and so on. This discussion may be conducted by academicians, diplomats, or any other credible group. The key problem will be finding acceptable artificial intelligence that can accurately portray the opposing sides and run ehe game. Any garner magazine shows that there are big problems in these areas.

Dual language software. Already under development, this software could be used to integrate culture specific terminology and sensitivities with peace operations concepts of the sides. This is important because not all sides use the same words and concepts in the same way. Most potential conflict situations will certainly be multilingual.

Digital artists. These people are creating culturally oriented scenes to accompany landscapes, which will make the message and image more appealing to the reader. Naturally, it is almost pointless to have someone other than a local inhabitant create ehese scenes.

Digital cameras. Similar in use to the video camera, they can use wireless infrared technology or snap into your PC. This allows a person to send back photos instantaneously as if he had a movie camera that only made still photos. This allows for quickly informing people of developing situations, allows for the instantaneous indexing of potential trouble-makers (if legal authorities permit you to do so), and so on.

Hand held fax readers. These devices allow you to send, receive and view faxes on the road. You even can receive long operation or fragmentary orders under such conditions, or offer situation reports supported by drawings or documents. Time to get material back to headquarters can easily be cut by over 100%. For example, the Philips Velo I is an example of some advanced technology with peacemaking potential. It is a palmtop with a built in modem and fax-send capability as well as an integrated digital voice recorder and browser capable of reading images of most Web pages at reduced scale. Peace operations personnel could theoretically even get onto the Home Pages of the sides in confrontation to try and calm them, or offer options.

Computer-aided design (CAD). This type of software lets designers and engineers make three-dimensional models of almost anything. Terrain, buildings, and other objects can be modeled to offer a virtual reality climate in which to make proposals and decisions.

MapLinx. This software develops automatic displays of customers, prospects, sales, marketing or other data on detailed maps. It is possible to view the entire country or zoom down to a local neighbourhood. With a single keystroke, it may be possible to map religious and ethnic groups, cultural and historical sites, and highlight electrical and water sources. This item would be especially useful to virtual peacemakers doing civil-military operations.

Lotus Domino. This is software that allows you to control who sees what, and who can make changes to what they see. It offers a degree of confidentiality and security during intense or sensitive consultations over open lines.

Personal video products. In addition to video cameras, these products now include video tele-conferencing that provide a virtual environment in which all participants sit around the same table. As was discovered during the Paris peace talks to end the war in Vietnam, cultural sensitivities also need to be taken into account here, in this case the size and shape of the tables, which could be modified if video teleconferencing was used to fit what the participants see. Edited video or still images, and personal video conferencing are other options.

Intelligent agents. These agents are actually programs that adapt to preferences of the user, even making decisions on their behalf (for example, a refrigerator alerts you that you need cheese. Such a system could find use as a warning system for surveillance UAVs or other monitoring or sensing devices).

Other technology includes:

- some software allows you to work over your PC like a phone. That is, the electronic wallet discussed earlier could also serve as a telephone.
- the ability to create home pages accessible to spiders-software programs that prowl the Web as part of a search engine. To attract spiders, one needs to take advantage of meta tag-lines of code in which programmers put private comments or key words, which spiders read vociferously.
- cyber shot cameras that store images on chips which can be transferred to a VCR or a personal computer.
- a portable head-mounted video player, the Glasstron, which may do for video what the Walkman did for audio. It could be used as a simulator as a soldier walks in a mock up village or to receive news updates and images on the battlefield.

Finally, consideration must be given to the multitude of high technology "spy stuff" that can be used in conflict prevention. These devices include, but are far from limited to, the following:

- *camo-voice*, which is a digital voice masker for telephone calls. If a party to a conflict does not want to be identified, he can use this device to talk to parties on the other side in anonymity.
- *phone safe*, a device that can be engineered to identify and defeat eavesdropping devices. - theft *detection powder*, which shows up under ultraviolet light and could be used as a verification device to prevent forgeries from being exchanged between two sides.
- and *heat stalker*, which can sense heat up to 100 feet It can be used along with sensors in zones of separation.

For Operations Other than War (OOTW) scenarios, there are also more specific tools that employ information technology. Some of the non-lethal means recommended for application to conflict prevention scenarios in the sense of compellance (and likely adaptable to virtual peacemaking) are:

- *soldier tracking and warning systems*: system transmits a soldier's position back to Hqs, and provides warning to a soldier who gets out of his area or too far from HQ via a beeping signal. Can also be used to track friendly and/or hostile vehicles and individuals.
- *"lifeguard" anti-sniper Infra Red system*: uses sensors to track the heat of a sniper's bullet back to the point of origin. Has some applicability to rules of engagement as well.

- *people/vehicle/metal sensors along borders*: system can distinguish between people, metal, people carrying metal, etc. up to a range of several hundred meters.
- *hover UAVs*: air breathing vehicles that can remain stationary or nearly stationary and provide long endurance (several to many hours) sensor platforms. Serve as "local area satellites."
- *MHD or Magneto Hydro-Dynamics*: use electromagnetic power impulses for a variety of actions, such as disabling equipment and stopping vehicles.
- *high power, low frequency sound systems*: systems that disable humans by causing intestinal distress and disorientation. Testing involves ethical and political ramifications. - high intensity lights/laser weapons: systems that can flash blind people or disable optical and infrared systems.
- *stink bombs*: non-toxic substances which are illegal under the chemical Weapons Convention.
- *sticky foam/deployable nets*: systems that stop or impede human passage or activity by creating barriers.

[32] Anita Jones, Defense Research and Engineering; the Pentagon, comment made during the presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Mark Weiser, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[35] Jack Dangermond, Environmental Systems Research Institute, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid.

[38] Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[39] Arno Penzias, Bell Labs/Lucent Technologies, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[40] Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, U.S. Manne Corps, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[41] Jack Dangermond, Environmental Systems Research Institute, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[42] Ismail Serageldin, World Bank, comment made during his presentation at the Virtual Diplomacy conference.

[43] Gibbs, p. 82.

[44] Bill Golden, wgolden@psrw.com